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ABSTRACT 
This study is an attempt to examine the concept of creativity 
within a framework of Piagetian operational structuralism. Previous 
notions of creativity are examined and a re-definition is proposed. 
Because it is believed that creativity and intelligence cannot be 
separated, creativity is examined in relation to the development of 
knowledge as a whole. 
In the first part of the research, a battery of creativity tasks 
was developed. The tasks, based on stated principles, were administered 
to a sample of 100 subjects ranging from 6-13 years of age. In the 
subsequent analysis, relationships between the test items were con-
sidered, also changes in performance as a function of age. A tentative. 
analysis of the sub-categories of assessment was made and their 
implications for a stage-explanation of creativity considered. 
The second part of the research examined the question of training 
for creativity and argued that all such training must be related to 
the cognitive abilities of the subjects concerned. Based on the find-
ings in Part 1, a set of training tasks was constructed and an attempt 
was made to train 80 subjects between the ages of 7-10 years. An 
analysis of their performance in relation to their age and operational 
ability is made. 
The research concludes with a proposal for a developmental scale 
of creative ability. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A DEFINITION 
OF CREATIVITY. 
7. 
8. 
Before any meaningful re-construction of phenomena can take place, 
an individual must be capable of understanding the identity and struc-
ture of phenomena - or at least the phenomenon under consideration. An 
understanding of identity and of structure leads not only to a grasp of 
an object's wholeness, a realisation of its boundaries and defining 
properties, but makes possible reversibility, re-organisation and re-
construction. An identity can be known from more than one standpoint. 
Shifts in perception (e.g. figure-ground) can lead to an increased under-
standing of identity. An ability accurately to define an identity or 
identities could be regarded as one index of comprehension. Such 
definitions need not be verbal. 
The concept of identity is central to this study. It is seen as a 
first and essential step in the process of creative transformations and 
could be regarded as an extension of Piaget's notion of 'object concept'. 
A very adequate explanation of what object concept involves is offered by 
Flavell (1963): 
"For Piaget, a mature conception of objects most of all demands 
that an object be seen as an entity in its own right which 
exists and moves in a space both common to it and to the subject 
who observes it. Moreover, and very important, the continued 
existence of the object must be construed as separate from and 
independent of the activity which the subject intermittently 
applies to it." 
The definition implies the individual's realisation that the self is also 
one object among others and that, as a consequence, 'objective' construc-
tions of reality become possible. 
Whilst one can say that at a certain stage of cognitive development 
a child attains object concept, and that this attainment represents a 
Flavell, J. (1963) The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget. P.129. 
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certain level of cognitive organisation, the knowing of objects is still 
affected by the ego-centricity of the child, and it is only at the formal 
operational stage that one could theoretically state that an individual 
had fully attained object concept. In other words, a period of refinement 
is required. 
The link with creative re -structurings of reality is strong, for 
without an adequate grasp of an identity, its structure and defining 
properties, re-constructions will be limited and subject to distortion. 
All creative knowing - which is an active and constructive process - 
is about identity transformation. An identity could be any single object 
or event, or any cluster of objects and events forming a recognisable whole. 
Single identities can be transformed in themselves. Identities can be 
related and changes brought about by means of the relationships. 
Transformations can take place in one or some of the following ways: 
Al Apprehension and re-definition of reality (an essential principle 
upon which all transformations are dependent). 
B1 Re-structuring of an identity (in the sense of re-organising existing 
component parts of an identity ). 
B2 Addition(s) to an identity. 
B3 Subtraction(s) from an identity. 
B4 Multiplication or increase of an identity. 
B5 Relating of identities (including combination, synthesis and 
causality). 
B6 Adjusting identities. 
B7 Division(s) of identities. 
All creative transformations of reality are governed by one or more of these 
principles. Essentially, such principles are assumptions, arrived at by 
consideration of ways of organising and of re-organising reality. 
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The quality of these transformations will be dependent primarily 
upon an adequate grasp of the identity of the phenomenon concerned. All 
such transformations can be carried out at a concrete or formal operational 
level. Non-operational transformations would be chance-like performances 
lacking the permanence and repeatability of operational activity. Trans-
formations of reality can lead to convergent (logical) conclusions or to 
what might be termed divergent conclusions. Transformations are expressed 
in different modes - symbolic, verbal, figural, etc. 
The recognition and understanding of an object's identity permits of 
conscious variation or reconstruction at the level of that recognition and 
understanding. Identity transformation is possible at the level of a system 
of objects, events or symbols as well as at the level of individual items 
or events. Language is an instance of such a system. 
To be potentially creative, an individual at some stage during the 
process has to comprehend the boundaries defining identities. Beyond 
given points, identities will change. Such given points will be deter-
mined by: 
a) the physical properties making up the phenomena; 
b) the flexibility of the rules governing the definition of an 
item or of a system. 
SYMBOLIC TRANSFORMATIONS OF IDENTITIES 
Before an individual can carry out symbolic transformations, he must 
have some comprehension of standard modes of classifying and of ordering 
phenomena, and of symbolic groupings and symbolic associations. This is 
essential if he is to recognise his own efforts as some kind of departure 
from a normative system. Symbolic transformations involve the establish-
ment of relationships and identities on a symbolic basis. Within the 
11. 
classification systems of a culture, groupings might be based on physical 
properties, usage or association. Often such classification systems 
appear to be arbitrary in terms of criteria, at times being based on an 
aspect of an item rather than upon the tem as a whole. In a "red-shiny" 
classification, for instance, other features of the item would be ignored 
and very diverse objects could be included on the basis of the criteria. 
However, in an "all snowflakes" classification the wholeness of the object 
would be more readily included. The logic governing a culture's way of 
interpreting reality cannot always be discovered by deduction. Its abstract 
and sometimes arbitrary nature can require that individuals be taught about 
it in some way. 
There is, however, a more profound requirement rooted in Piaget's 
concept of operational knowledge which is this. An individual may learn 
a number of classification systems but if he is to be reflective and poten-
tially creative, he must grasp the concept of classification itself. 
Given such knowledge, an individual might seek or discover new clas-
sifications based on symbolic, subjective criteria. He will be aware of 
his relating on the basis of criteria not commonly employed. Such aware-
ness of deviation is essential to any creative departure. 
A symbolic response can also be subjective and ego-centric in nature. 
Such responses are not conscious or deliberate deviations. They stem 
rather from a lack of knowledge and from cognitive limitations. This study 
is concerned with the deliberate and conscious uses of such classifications 
and transformations of identities and not with involuntary ego-centric 
responses. 
Creative behaviour then is a way of acting upon phenomena. A 
creative action transforms objects and events in the sense that they are 
perceived, constructed and related in novel and unexpected ways. An 
individual might well set out deliberately to scan objects and events from 
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various standpoints. Such initial deliberation is not essential; what is 
essential is that at some point during the process the individual becomes 
aware of his own activity and the effects of that activity upon the 
organisation and re—organisation of reality. Without such awareness, he 
will be unable to recognise and evaluate his own behaviour and such con—
ditions are essential to creative transformations. 
Creative behaviour is not a behaviour per se. It manifests itself 
in various modes. It is the cognitive abilities and dispositions of the 
individual at a given time which define an act as creative in terms of 
process. A creative process does not guarantee a creative product 
(Guilford, 1965). An individual may discover, he may set up between 
phenomena, relationships which are new to his experience, but which to the 
experience of others could be common—place. This does not render his own 
experience any less novel or any less creative in terms of process, only 
perhaps in terms of product. 
There is raised here the whole question of cultural recognition or 
approval of creative activities, and a distinction must be made between 
this kind of recognition and the essential process of transformation of 
identity. Many activities which are creative in their searching, trans—
formations and evaluations may well pass unnoticed by others. Similarly, 
a social label: "creative" is no description or assurance of the quality 
of process behind the product. Cultural labels in no way define a 
creative process. A critical point here is that of the distinction 
which exists between identities as culturally defined and identities 
which can be recognised by virtue of their structural forms. On this 
point there are certain affinities with Gestalt explanations. 'Early 
Guilford, J.P. (1965) "A Psychometric Approach to Creativity" in: 
Creativity in Childhood & Adolescence, Amer. Orthopsychiatric Ass. Sympos. 
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this century, Wolfgang Kohler wrote as follows: 
Gestalt psychology holds that sensory units have acquired 
names, have become richly symbolic, and are now known to have 
certain practical uses, nevertheless they existed as unite 
before any of these further facts were added." 
There is a passive dimension to early Gestalt explanations which is 
rejected by Piaget, but this distinction between what might be termed 
"structure", and cultural labelling of structures, has implications for 
creative transformations. It might be useful to develop this point 
through examples. An individual in a creative exercise might combine 
two identities — 
identity X combined with identity Y = identity Z. 
In such combinations, perceptual shifts are vital. If we continue to 
"perceive" this combination of X and Y as XY we shall be unable to per—
ceive what could be a new structural form — namely Z. In other words, by 
continuing to perceive already identified structures, and especially 
culturally labelled structures, we may delay or prevent the discovery of 
a new structural form which once identified will no doubt receive a new 
cultural label. In this sense, therefore, a creative structure is 
independent of the known form(s) through which it is expressed. In 
practical terms, hybrids can be explained in this way. A hybrid can only 
come into existence when we cease to focus entirely on its component parts, 
and move instead to know the identity through the relating of such parts. 
Cultural labels provide us with a certain kind of assurance. Research 
in the area of language — and especially that concerned with deafness — 
has indicated that when materials, forms, shapes are labelled, they are 
Kohler, W. (1929) Gestalt Psychology. P.51. 
14. 
more readily recognised and remembered (e.g. Robertson and Youniss, 1969). 
It is suggested that a problem of creative training might be that of over—
coming such labels which encourage individuals to perceive reality in 
culturally labelled forms. It is the structures underlying such forms 
that will give rise to new creations once they are identified and developed. 
Just as cultural labels do not make a creative process, a creative 
process in itself need not necessarily lead to a creative product or 
transformation either in terms of the individual's recognition of the 
process or that of the culturds. Correct logical behaviour leads to a 
correct logical outcome. As Bartlett (1965) has pointed out, this stems 
from the fact that such thinking is "closed—system" thinking. The con—
clusions are known in advance and concern is with the steps leading to 
that conclusion, i.e. with an interim process. However, what Bartlett 
has termed "adventurous thinking" falls into a different category. Here 
conclusions cannot be known in advance. It is the nature of the process 
that such cannot be so. There is no known or specific conclusion so 
concern is with the process and with the recognition of a conclusion 
when such is discovered. Recognition can occur at any stage of exploration 
and not necessarily at the initial stages, though its occurrence will mark 
a new stage in the exploration. 
In the convergent—type problem where a response is already known, 
the task of the subject is to discover the logic of the problem. Gestalt 
psychologists would speak here of "vectors" which give, or can give, 
direction to the problem—solving process. In divergent—type problems 
there is no vector in the above sense. Here the subject has to discover 
Robertson, A. and Youniss, J. (1969) "Anticipating visual imagery in deaf 
and hearing children". Ch. Devt. El, pp 123-35. 
Bartlett, F.C. (1965) Thinking: An Experimental Study. 
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and recognise conclusions and in a certain sense invent new vectors 
governing and leading to these new logics. The creative thinker has, in 
effect, to discover both the solution and the process. 
A non-creative outcome could result from several factors: 
a) a poor manipulation of identities; 
b) non-recognition and so non-definition of a new structural form; 
c) poor grasp of its implications and follow up. 
This idea of a non-creative result is of interest with regard to the 
young child's behaviour. Some knowledge is essential for creative re-
constructions of reality. The child's early encounters with reality and 
its organisation have strongly convergent pressures attached to them. He 
learns through experience, sometimes ordered experience, to "know" a 
limited number of identities. Such identities are almost always 
culturally recognised and labelled. A child may come to know a square 
form as an identity and his own manipulations might lead him to the con-
clusion, at a simple, non-operational level, that the components of the 
square could be used to other purposes - i.e. to construct other identities. 
Insofar as he is aware of the identity of the square and of his own trans-
formations, such behaviour could be said to be potentially creative to a 
point. But, as will be suggested, there are certain factors missing. 
However, the point at issue for the moment is that a certain quality of 
creative behaviour can exist within the limited knowledge of the child. 
The wider one's knowledge, the wider the field for creative explorations. 
This is not unlike the notion of "decalage" as explained by Piaget 
(horizontal). *(note) 
*(note): _"... (while) it may be useful to think of an individual as being 
generally characterised by a given cognitive structure, he will not neces-
sarily be able to perform within that structure for all tasks. Task 
contents do differ in the extent to which they resist and inhibit the 
application of cognitive structures," Flavell, J. (1963) Ibid. 	 P.23. 
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This leads again to the idea that creativity might be most usefully 
considered as process rather than product, and that the process is made 
up of several phases - not all of which the child is able to complete, 
and his way of handling each step of the process will vary qualitatively 
from adult ways. After consideration of Wallas (1926), Ghiselin (1955), 
Rogers, (1959) and others, it is proposed that the process of creativity 
might best be considered as falling into the following three phases. 
1. Apprehension of the problems  
This is the first step in any creative process, though it may well 
be preceded by less conscious searchings and exploratory transformations. 
The amount and kind of knowledge required will vary according to the task. 
Similarly, there can be no agreed amount of time. It is possible, given 
certain tasks or problems, that the problem and solution could appear 
together - for instance, a perceptual shift leading to a re-definition 
could both define the problem in a different light and offer the way to 
its solution. 
2. Experimental transformations  
Such may be deliberate, stemming from conscious effort. The time-
span cannot be specified. There may be a deliberate incubation period - 
or apparently no incubation at all in that the individual is not conscious 
of such a period. An increase in specialised knowledge may be a require-
ment depending upon the nature of the problem or issue. The solution may 
be rapid or attained slowly with each step apparent. On the other hand, 
there may be no solution or no end product to draw the process to a close. 
Wallas, G. (1926) The Art of Thought. 
Ghiselin, B. (1955) The Creative Process. 
Rogers, C.R. (1959) "Toward a theory of creativity" in: H.H. Anderson (ed) 
Creativity and its Cultivation. pp 69-82. 
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3. Evaluation  
In practice, this is difficult to separate from the previous stage 
in the process. However, evaluation may be deliberately suspended for a 
time (as in "Brainstorming" for instance) though more normally it could 
accompany each step of the whole process. 
Theoretically, this process could be carried out by the cognitively 
mature 'ideal type' (Weber) adult. The child, especially the pre-operational 
and concrete-operational child, is more likely to display qualitative dif-
ferences in his apprehension of the problem and in his experimental trans-
formations. He may never attain the stage of conscious evaluation. A 
child at either of these stages of development might combine as follows: 
identity A and B to produce identity C. 
At the level of the objects the child may realise that he has produced 
a different identity and could, to this degree, be regarded as creative 
in attitude and action. However, his grasp of the transformation (in this 
case combining of identities) will be confined to the immediate concrete 
act itself. He is less capable of comprehending the process itself and 
of realising the effects of his actions upon phenomena. 
The process of creativity might normally be carried through by one 
individual or a group of individuals - in both cases, those concerned 
would participate in the process from its start. However, it is possible 
that a child, lacking some or many of the cognitive qualities required 
for the whole process of creative transformations, could initiate a 
process for an observer who is 'cognitively mature'. The child's 
initiatory processes would of course stem from cognitive immaturity as 
opposed to cognitive divergence, but they could present - were they 
recognised - the possibility of a novel identity and the possibility 
could be continued through by an adult knower. 
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THE GENESIS OF CREATIVE STRUCTURES  
Piaget (1971) has considered this question with regard to the genesis 
and formation of logical structures. Here must be posed the question: 
what is the relationship between logical and creative type structures, or 
- are there separate cognitive structures for creative behaviour? Further, 
if such separate structures exist, how is their existence to be explained? 
As Piaget has pointed out (1971), genetic explanations have often 
taken off from two extreme standpoints: those with atomistic tendencies 
and those concerned with emergent totalities. Piaget proposes a third 
explanation - that of operational structuralism - a position adopted in 
this present explanation of creative behaviour. Operational structuralism: 
"... adopts from the start a relational perspective, according 
to which it is neither the elements nor a whole that comes about 
in a manner one knows not how, 
elements that count. In other 
natural processes by which the 
the whole, which is consequent 
or the elements." 
but the relations among the 
words, the logical procedures or 
whole is formed are primary, not 
on the system's laws of composition, 
Implicit in this theory of operational structuralism is the idea that 
structures are constructed and that it takes time before they are fully 
developed and defined. Further, generation is always a passing from 
simple to more complex structures. Piaget (1971) speaks of a structure as: 
"... a system of transformations... In short the notion of 
structure is comprised of three key ideas: the idea of wholeness, 
the idea of transformation, and the idea of self-regulation." 
It is through functioning that such structural behaviour becomes differen-
tiated, and early functioning is concerned with "general co-ordinations 
of actions" (sensori-motor organisation) behind which one cannot go 
(Piaget ibid). The dynamic factors are of course assimilation and accom-
modation, whilst the movement towards equilibration is a kind of monitor. 
Piaget, J. (1971) Structuralism. P.8 and P.5. 
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Creative and logical structures are one and the same thing. 
Theoretically, it would be inconsistent, somewhat atomistic, to explain 
creative behaviour by means of two sets of structures. In describing 
logical structures, Piaget points out that structures are inseparable 
from performance, from functions in the biological sense of the word (ibid). 
It is this inseparable relationship of structure and function which 
explains creative structures. 
Essentially, a cognitive structure is a way of speaking about an 
'ability'. A particular ability may involve perceiving, and actively 
understanding phenomena from varied standpoints. The standpoints may 
be well known, rule-governed standpoints and this would be about logical 
behaviour, in the general sense of the term. That same structure, that 
same ability, may be applied by the individual to more divergent processes. 
A phenomenon may be constructed, understood from standpoints which are not 
governed by rules, because as yet such rules are not part of a culture's 
logic. This activity, rooted in the same cognitive structure, could be 
about divergent, creative-type behaviour. In other words, cognitive 
structures are applied to problems of different natures and different 
processes. It is in the functioning that a structure not only develops, 
but further, develops a facility (fluency) to apprehend phenomena of a 
particular kind and in a particular style. Functioning governs the growth 
of cognitive style. As is consistent with Piaget's explanation of know-
ing, prime importance is given to the knower who is conceived of in active, 
constructing terms: 
"If cognitive structures were static, the subject would indeed 
be a superfluous entity." 
Piaget, J. (1971) Ibid. P.70. 
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Not only does the subject play the central role in terms of bringing 
structures into being, his cognitive experiences determine the 
flexibility of his cognitive structures in terms of apprehension and 
interpretation of different kinds of problems and outcomes. Creative 
behaviour is most likely to come about when the individual is familiar 
with the contexts and objects upon which and with which he is operating. 
There is, therefore, a need to explore unfamiliar contexts if creative 
conclusions are to emerge from other than familiar contexts. Such 
explorations might be seen in terms of preparation or facilitation and 
in themselves might appear to be somewhat aimless. However, such could 
be the breeding ground for creative endeavours. 
Creative behaviour is seen, in this study, as falling into three 
main developmental stages, distinct on qualitative grounds and exactly 
paralleling those stages outlined by Piaget. The stages are as follows: 
1. Autistic Transformations  
During this stage, subjects are capable only, or largely, of 
responses of an autistic or symbolic nature. In fact, such responses 
tend to come 'naturally' and they are to be distinguished from self 
chosen, conscious adult responses of a symbolic kind. From the subject's 
standpoint, there is nothing imaginative or organised about them, rather 
they are rooted in confusion and phantasy. 
2. Concrete Transformations  
A level of organisation appears here. In a concrete way the child 
becomes capable of transformations but he is tied to immediate conclusions. 
Because he knows now what is, with regard to identities presented in a 
concrete way, he is able to explore what could be — but only with concrete 
materials. This limitation — the inability to enter the zone of the 
imaginary and hypothetical, means that his explorations and transformations 
are limited to step—by—step discoveries. 
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3. Formal Transformations  
The formal-operational child enters the world of the abstract, the 
formally organised in Piaget's sense with the full possibility of "what 
might be". His explorations are "mental" explorations, and even when 
there is resort to the concrete, the manner of the exploration here is 
more organised and reflects the quality of the thinking behind the 
organisation. At this stage, the child is capable of increasing objec-
tivity, of understanding the reasons for rules and the implications of 
deviation from such rules. He is capable of evaluation. 
Implicit in this discussion is the belief that distinctions such as 
"intelligence" and "creative behaviour" are false. Essential processes 
concerned with "knowing" can be directed to divergent or to convergent 
ends: an individual can combine, adjust, etc., to produce convergent or 
divergent products or end results. Whatever the direction his efforts 
will rest on the same cognitive structures. The use of the structures 
will be determined to some extent by the nature and direction of the prob-
lem. A helpful distinction might be made here between the existence of an 
ability and fluency in that same ability. Existence of ability is seen as 
being dependent upon operational structures; fluency is expected to be 
affected by factors such as experience. Often cognitive abilities are 
most frequently engaged in convergent-like tasks and considerations, and 
they may (if one can speak so concretely) be less well-oiled in the direc-
tion of divergent tasks. This is a matter of balancing formative 
experiences - it is not a question of two distinct modes of cognitive 
ability. 
The distinction between 'ability' and 'fluency' in a discussion of 
operational creativity leads to some mention of symbolic behaviour and 
imagination in the child. Piaget argues that the young child has no 
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imagination (1951). Essentially Piaget is talking about the child's 
ability to make certain kinds of mental representations. Flavell (1963) 
notes that as the child develops, his imaginal activity becomes more 
mobile and flexible, able to anticipate the successive movements of yet 
to be transformations. Whilst such an ability is closely related to 
operational thought, it does not account for the genesis of that thought. 
In his analysis of the fourth stage of play, Piaget explains that there 
comes about in the child, with the co-ordination of secondary schemas, 
ritualisation. This is seen by Piaget as a preparation for the next stage 
in which ritualisation is accentuated and during which preparation for 
symbolic activity occurs. The ability to indulge in ritual, in this 
sense, implies some ability to make some distinction between the real and 
.the phantastic. In Piaget's fifth stage of play, there comes about, owing 
to definite progress in the direction of representation, the dissociation 
of the ludic symbol from ritual. This ludic symbol takes on the form of 
symbolic schemas: 
"All that is needed for the ludic to become a symbol is that the 
child is aware of the make-believe of the situation." 
Within Piaget's system, the explanation can be given in terms of the 
ratio between assimilation and accommodation. 
Symbol for Piaget implies a resemblance between signifier and sig-
nified. It is a personal thing and unlike a sign does not involve a social 
relationship. The child's symbolic games for instance, imply represen-
tation of an absent object. Symbolism is then seen as a preparation for 
the construction of representation, and free assimilation becomes creative 
imagination. In primary symbolism, when a child consciously assimilates 
one object with another (e.g. Piaget gives the example of the child 
Piaget, J. (1951) Play. Dreams and Imitation in Childhood. P.130. 
Flavell, J. (1963) Ibid. 
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treating a shell on a box as a cat on the wall), because of the conscious—
ness of the activity, the child is moving from the realm of chaos and 
phantasy towards the area of creative imagination (ibid). 
Such symbolic behaviour is important to an understanding of creative 
behaviour for it says much about the child's developing attitudes towards 
reality. In this representational activity the child treats reality in a 
new way. Objects and events become what he wishes them to become, and 
yet he possesses the ability to know their social reality. 
Whilst imagination has no essential role in providing structures for 
intellectual (including creative) development, but rather is itself 
dependent upon intellectual structures, imagination as understood here 
is essential to mature creative thought. It allows the thinker to enter 
the domain of "what might be" which is a step beyond mental exploration of 
"what is". Imagination is a way of representing thought. 
Creativity is short—lived. Much must be unrecognised. When a 
creative process leads to a creative outcome or product, there has to be 
recognition and public approval of that product. This raises the question 
— is creativity essentially subjective in that a particular construction 
of reality is limited to an individual? At its inception — at the point 
in time when reality is newly understood — it is subjective to that per—
ceiver. To the extent that there is a shared understanding of this new 
conception, the re—construction will become shared knowledge and more 
objective. For a relatively short time, new constructions of reality will 
hold the label 'creative', but will eventually take their place within the 
heritage of knowledge as something 'known'. Depending upon their value to 
society, products and outcomes may be handed down to members of a culture 
within the socialisation process, and for many, therefore, will become 
24. 
knowledge which is 'learned' and not something discovered or constructed 
for oneself. No understanding of creativity is possible without an 
appreciation of the culture in which thought has been socialised. One 
must understand the normative for deviance to exist or to be recognised 
as such by others. 
Chapter 2 
25. 
THE ORGANISATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
26. 
"To know an object is to act on it. To know is to modify, 
to transform the object, and to understand the process of this 
transformation, and as a consequence to understand the way the 
object is constructed. An operation is thus the essence of 
knowledge; it is an interiorised action which modifies the 
object of knowledge." (Piaget, 1972) 
An operation is the essence of knowledge and it must consequently 
be the essence of creative behaviour, which is a way of knowing and of 
transforming objects and events. Full creative thinking, like mature 
logical thinking, requires a high degree of awareness. It involves the 
recognition and understanding of a logical or generally agreed way of 
interpreting reality, and the realisation that there could be other 
ways of acting upon and of interpreting such events. 
What is regarded as creative in a given culture, must be understood 
in relation to the normative of that culture, for whilst creative behaviour 
involves deviation from the normative, it requires a recognition of what 
is normative. Crucial to creativity is the ability to operationalise. 
When an individual is capable of operational activity - especially formal 
operational activity - he is capable of appreciating the wholeness of an 
act or event, its structure and identity. Such awareness can lead to 
realisation and appreciation of other modes of constructing reality. 
This study leans heavily upon Piagetian inspiration, accepting a 
developmental-stage standpoint, but whilst attempting to examine ability 
to be creative, recognition is given to the cultural context in which 
knowledge is necessarily socialised, accepting that intelligent-creative 
behaviour must begin with what is known and in the forms in which know-
ledge is transmitted. 
Piaget, J. (1972) "Development and learning" in: Readings in Child  
Behaviour & Development. Lavatelli.C.S. & Stendler.F.(Eds).P.38. 
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The organisation of knowledge can be viewed from two standpoints: 
it can be concerned with the organisation of the individual's knowledge-
system within his culture ("inside" organisation) or it can refer to the 
ways in which society organises reality and passes on this organisation 
to its members ("social" organisation of reality). Piaget is primarily 
concerned with "inside organisation", though more recently he has been more 
ready to admit the force of culture upon cognitive organisation: 
"Psychology elaborated in our environment, which is charac-
terised by a certain culture and a certain language, remains 
essentially conjectural as long as the necessary cross-cultural 
material has not been gathered as a control." (Piaget, 1966) 
Within any culture, the knowledge system of an individual will normally 
become increasingly organised. Operations may bear upon varying content 
but in themselves they will obey the same structural laws. Conservation 
for instance, is an index of a certain level of organisation within 
cultures where conservation is a reality. The task of the researcher 
is to discover indices which are valid to the culture. 
Culture may not simply affect the content upon which an individual 
is to operate, his attinment of Piagetian stages may also be affected. 
Dasen (1972): 
U
... it can no longer be assumed that adults of all societies 
reach the concrete operational stage... However, it is the rate 
of development which is in question, not the structure of think-
ing. As such, the generality of Piaget's system is not threatened." 
There is a basis of agreement which allows for increasing organisation of 
the individual's knowledge system and for the fact that such organisation 
is characterised by stage-description and explanation. What is required 
Piaget, J. (1966) "Need and significance of cross-cultural studies in 
genetic psychology", Internat. J. of Psy. 1. 1 pp 3-13. 
Dasen, P.R. (1972) "Cross cultural Piagetian research: a summary", 
reported in: Culture and Cognition: Readings in Cross Cultural Psychology, 
Berry, J. and Dasen, P. (eds). P.418 
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however, is a truly cross-cultural approach to such studies as opposed to 
centri-cultural studies (Wober, 1969). Much cross-cultural research falls 
into this latter category, attempting to study thought-patterns which are 
essentially Western, putting Western questions stemming from Western 
logics, sometimes making some concessions to the culture concerned by 
substituting Western materials for more culturally appropriate ones. 
Gladwin (1964) referring to the Trukese describes the different cognitive 
strategies employed by different cultures in problem solving: 
"Both we and the Trukese operate within a 'gestalt' - a conception 
of the problem as a whole. However, we seek a unifying concept 
which will comprehend all the relevant facts more or less simul-
taneously, developing an overall principle or plan from which 
individual steps towards a solution can be derived deductively. 
In contrast, the Trukese work towards a solution by improvising 
each step, but always with the final goal in mind." 
Essentially, what is required is a Piagetian, clinical-type probing 
across cultures to discover non-Western constructions of reality. On 
such a basis, more legitimate indices of cognitive organisation for 
specific cultures might be arrived at. 
Commenting on cultural organisation and interpretation of reality 
("outside" or social organisation) Bruner says: 
"To one raised in Western culture, things that are treated as 
if they were equivalent seem not like man-made classes but like 
the products of nature... but there exists a near infinitude of 
ways of grouping events in terms of discriminable properties, 
and we avail ourselves of only a few of these." 
Okon ii (1971), studying the effects of familiarity upon classification, 
noticed amongst other things that about 25'4 of the Ibusa subjects (in 
the 6-8 years group) in his sample classified on the basis of colour 
Wober, M. (1969) "Distinguishing centri-cultural from cross-cultural test 
and research", Percept. Motor Skills, 28 488. 
Gladwin, T. (1964) "Culture and logical processes". Reported in Berry, J. 
and Dasen, P. (ibid) P.30. 
Bruner, J. et al (1967) A Study of Thinking. P 7 
_ • , • 
Okonjii3O.(1971)1The effects of familiarity on classification", J. of Cross-
Cultural Psy. 2(1) pp 39-49. 
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whilst none of their Glaswegian counterparts did so. Okonjii reports 
evidence in African studies of this relative dominance of colour in 
classificatory activities. Witkin (1969) reported a more marked field 
independence among the Eskimo than among their Western counterparts 
suggesting that so called 'primitive' groups are not uniformly less 
deireloped. 
Coming to terms with knowledge, learning to organise it, involves 
becoming arbitrary, ignoring perceptual persuasions, forceful in their 
immediacy. It requires an understanding of contexts, of cues and of 
rules which transform phenomena irrespective of literal representation. 
This growth includes the development of many abilities: those of language, 
of perceptual adaptation and refinement of perceptual abilities, to 
mention but a few. How the child constructs reality is a function of the 
level of his cognitive organisation, and that organisation has to be 
understood within cultural contexts. 
Socialisation into a culture's way of interpreting reality involves 
a gradual acceptance of a largely arbitrary and abstract-meaning system. 
Cultures vary in their criteria for interpretation, and in so doing, 
produce cognitive styles which reflect these criteria. Maccoby and Modiano  
(1966) in a study of equivalence transformations with North American and 
Mexican children support this point. Both groups of subjects began life 
regarding objects in terms of perceptible and concrete characteristics. 
Both groups of children were clearly impressionistic and immediate in 
their attempts to explain these realities, but with time and age their 
cognitive paths separated, illustrating the very different cognitive 
styles of their cultures. The North American child turned out eventually 
to give great emphasis to abstract qualities: 
Witkin, H.A. (1969) "Cognitive styles across cultures". Internat. J. of  
Pte. 2(4) PP 233-250. 
Maccoby, M. and Modiano, N. (1966) On "Culture and equivalence (I)" ins 
Studies in CoAnitivo Growth, Bruner, Olver, Greenfield. P.261. 
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... at worst, he merely manipulates things in a formal and 
increasingly reductionist manner. In fact, a few of the older 
children completely lose the ability to analyse, because the 
concrete attributes of objects have become buried beneath formal 
and abstract notions." 
The Mexican child on the other hand, became increasingly detailed 
in his perceptions of objects, making finer and finer perceptual dis-
criminations. Maccoby and Modiano were essentially concerned to look 
at equivalence transformations and the generality of stages of growth in 
this area, but their observations illustrate the effects of culture upon 
ways of approaching and of interpreting reality. 
Knowledge can be examined in terms of a culture's knowledge system, 
it can also be considered from the standpoint of the developing knower, 
who, within a given culture, has to come to terms with the meaning of 
reality. 
The child is unsocialised in terms of his culture's meaning system. 
Bruner (1967) discussing the arbitrary dimension of much interpretation 
and with specific reference to ways of categorising says: 
"They (i.e. categories) exist as inventions, not as discoveries." 
An individual requires experience within a culture to learn to construct 
reality from the standpoint of the culture. The child has a yet further 
limitation, for not only does he lack objective knowledge of his culture's 
way of organising reality, he is essentially ego-centric and lacking in 
cognitive stability. Research has suggested that there are perceptual 
inclinations and attractions which are beyond the control of the child at 
different points in his development. Goodenough, as early as 1929, illus-
trated the dominance of colour and form perception at different ages. 
Rabello (1933) supported these findings, noting that colour preference 
Bruner, J. (1967) A Study of Thinking. P.7. 
Brian, C.R. and Goodenough, F. (1929) "The relative potency of colour and 
form perception at different ages", J. of Exptal Psy. 12. pp 197-213. 
Rabello, S. (1966) cited in transl -ition in Kidd and Rivoire, 
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decreased with age, giving place to form perception. Vinacke (1951) 
examined the concept of Imiddleness' — the ability to select middle—sized 
objects as distinct from big or small objects. He found that this concept 
was not well developed until about nine years of age. Gibson et al (1962) 
investigated the matter of the child's perception of orientation. By 
eight years of age she found that the children were attending to the 
orientation of objects. Essentially hers can be described as an atten—
tional theory, and more recently she (Gibson, 1969) has developed the idea 
that in our perceptions, particular dimensions vary in relevance with age. 
Gibson argues that we select what to attend to in a systematic manner and 
according to what past experience has shown us to be of relevance. 
Bruner (1967) summarising the findings of research in this area 
points out that non—schematised imagery is highly characteristic of early 
intellectual operations. He refers to the child as concentrating upon 
surface properties of the environment and preferring perceptual bases for 
organisation and classifications of reality. 
Francoise Frank's (?966) work is based on the classical conservation 
test of Piaget (but in a modified form) and points to the fact that per—
ceptual information, because of its very immediacy, can impede the child 
in his pursuit of a culture's logic and his acceptance of an arbitrary 
meaning system. Frank found, for instance, that when containers were 
screened in the classical conservation task, that is when visual stimuli 
were not present to the subjects, even the four year olds were able to 
Vinacke, W.E. (1951) "The investigation of concept formation", Psy. Bull. 
48. pp 1-31. 
Gibson, E.J. et al (1962) "A developmental study of the discrimination of 
letter like forms", J. Compar. Physiol. 55. pp 897-906. 
Gibson, E.J. (1969) Principles of Perceptual Learning and Development. 
Bruner, J. (1967) A Study of 'thinking. 
Frank, F. (1966) "Percolation and language in conservation" in: Studies in 
Cognitive Growth.Bruner. J. et al. 
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give logically correct responses and explanations such as: "You only 
poured it". Protected from the visual stimuli, they seemed capable of 
accepting what Piaget has termed: "a logical necessity". (Piaget, 1972). 
Perhaps it is worth pointing out that Frank's interpretation has 
been challenged by Bryant (1974) who explains the child's behaviour in 
this instance in terms of conflicting hypotheses, suggesting that the 
child is really suffering from cue conflict, not knowing on what dimen-
sions of the visual evidence he is meant to act. Bryant maintains that 
certain training techniques concerned to indicate the visual cues to be 
employed by the subjects could help the child overcome the problem. 
However, whatever explanation might be correct, in the face of such 
visual stimuli, young children can fail to come to terms with a generally 
accepted logic. 
Miller and Heldmeyer (1975) are critical of such standard conser-
vation tests, and their criticisms offer valuable insights into some of 
the child's problems of cognitive organisation. They argue that conservation 
(of liquid in this case) is not an all-or-none ability but consists rather 
of several levels, and that such levels can only be detected by sensitive 
assessment conditions - "facilitating conditions". Screening procedures 
might be seen as facilitating. Standard conservation tests themselves 
require a certain degree of organisation on the part of the child. 
'Eh ergent' organisation is a delicate commodity. 
Piaget, J. (1972) "Development and learning" in: Readings in Child  
Behaviour & Development. Lavatelli.C.& Stendler.F.(eds). P. 40. 
Bryant, P. (1974) Perception and Understanding in Young Children. 
Miller, P. and Heldmeyer, K. (1975) "Perceptual information in conservation: 
effects of screening". Ch. Devt. 46. 588-592. 
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Theories supporting such researches into the field of perception 
vary in their interpretation of the activity. There are those theorists 
who speak of perception as distinct from more conceptual activities. 
Piaget takes up a somewhat unexpected position for which he has earned 
the name - "the two Piagets": 
"We will call perception the most direct or immediate possible 
knowledge of a present object in the sensorial field without 
affirming, however, that there exists a knowledge which is 
completely direct or immediate." 
Bruner (1957) makes no such distinction, speaking of perception as 
an act of categorisation: 
"... it is evident that one of the principal characteristics 
of perceiving is a characteristic of cognition generally. 
There is no reason to assume that the laws governing inferences 
of this kind are discontinuous as one moves from perceptual to 
more conceptual activities." 
Gibson and Olum (1960) discuss organisational features of perception 
in the child. Perception is characterised by "stuckness" - i.e. it is non-
transformable, its organisation is diffuse and it is dynamic in the sense 
that it is closely related to action. It is further described as non-
schematised and ego-centric - in the sense that the child is the central 
reference point, and there is general unsteadiness. 
Whatever the interpretations underpinning findings, it is evident 
that the perceptions of the developing child are characterised by a lack 
of organisation and that this has critical consequences for the ways in 
which he interprets reality. This lack of organisation and of refinement 
of abilities is found in studies of other areas concerned with cogritive 
growth. 
Piaget, J. (1954-5)  "Le development de la perception de l'enfant a l'adulte" 
Bull. Psychol. Paris, 8. P.183 
Bruner, J. (1957) "On perceptual readiness" in: Beyond the Information  
Given. P.B. 
Gibson, E. and Olum, V. (1960) "Experimental Methods of studying perception 
in children"lat ItasikalsLliat&Zakagitjagb e masen, P. (‘1d) 
34. 
Werner and Kaplan (1950) looked at the acquisition of word meanings 
through verbal contexts and reported impressionistic, subjective responses 
from young subjects and a decrease in such responses with age. They 
noted: 
"Children respond in a manner termed symbolic by society, as 
they have not yet been adequately obliged to accommodate to the 
constraints surrounding words. As yet they do not appreciate 
the arbitrary dimension of meaning. The reactions involve 
searching the stimuli before them and responding and eventually 
classifying on the bases of stimuli which have immediate sig-
nificance for them." 
With language, as with other meaning systems, the child has to come to 
terms with relationships and with rules governing such relationships. 
The sentence is an articulated pattern of words standing in a definite 
relationship to each other. It may be that the child will think that 
the meaning of the word is directly conveyed by its sound pattern, and 
he might not take cognizance of the presented verbal cues in the process 
of signifying. Werner and Kaplan (ibid) have indicated three main types 
of distortions in children's responses during the signification process: 
a) by assimilation of the sentence meaning. 
b) by contamination of the sentence meaning (i.e. parts of one 
sentence being added to another). 
c) concrete, ego-centric and imaginative meanings. 
It is only as the child grows older that his learning takes on a contex—
tual dimension and that he begins to, use language in order to learn 
language. (Ogden and Richards, 1953). 
Jean Berko (1958) investigating the acquisition of morphological 
rules supports the findings of Werner and Kaplan. Using nonsense words 
Werner, H. and Kaplan, E. (1950) The acquisition of word meaning through 
verbal context: an experimental study". J. of Psy. 
 22, pp 251-257. 
Ogden4C and Richards,I. (1930) The Meaning of Meaning  . 
Berko, J. (1958) "The child's learning of English morphology", Word, ig, 
Pp 150-177. 
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(as did Werner and Kaplan), Berko required subjects to supply 
plurals, verb tenses, possessives, derivatives and compounds of those 
words. As might be expected there is a pattern of increasing language 
socialisation with age and exposure to English morphology. 
This mode of responding is not always confined to children. In 
certain circumstances, adults may employ such methods, especially when 
contextual constraints are removed or reduced. Brown. Black and Horowitz  
(1955) found that native speakers of English were able to guess the mean—
ings of words from unfamiliar languages, suggesting, they feel, that 
there is a culturally acquired phonetic symbolism derived from experience 
with a common native language. However, an important distinguishing 
feature between the symbolic responses of adults and those of children 
is that the former have the ability to assess their criteria as subjective 
or perceptual as opposed to contextually controlled, further they have 
accepted what Locke (1964) termed: 
"a voluntary imposition, whereby (such) a word is made 
arbitrarily the mark of an idea." 
This arbitrary dimension of meaning is difficult for a child to grasp. 
Vygotsky (1962) commented on this: 
"We can see how difficult it is for children to separate the 
name of an object from its attributes, which cling to the name 
when it is transferred, like possessions following their owner." 
Employing computing techniques to cope with the extent of her data, 
Entwisle (1966) in her study of word associations of young children 
raises from another standpoint, this idea of stabilisation of a language 
system, and further, the notion that there are patterns of responses 
Black, A., Brown, R. and Horowitz, A. (1955) "Phonetic symbolism in natural 
languages", J. of Ab.and Soc. Psy. 50. pp 388-93. 
Locke, J. (1964) Essay concerning Human Understanding. P.12. 
Vygotsky, L.S. (1962) Thought and Language. P.129. 
Entwisle, D. (1966) Word Associations of Young Children. 
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according to stages of development. As will be mentioned later, such 
patterns must have important implications for association-type creativity 
tests. The determinism, if any, of such patterns, might have radical 
influences on the child's responses. 
Entwisle worked with children aged from four to eleven years. Her 
main intention was to study language acquisition during these years 
through the medium of association data. Amongst her findings she con-
cluded: 
"The chief finding is that paradigmatic responses - responses 
matching the form class of the stimulus - increase over the 
years of middle childhood, but at different rates.... our data 
suggests that the child first learns what-follows-what, (the 
phase of syntactic responding) and then what-substitutes-for-what 
(the phase of paradigmatic responding)." 
As Entwisle points out, the type of response given by the child indicates 
his awareness of rules - for instance, when he gives a paradigmatic • 
associate, he indicates that he knows something of the rules which 
govern a particular form class. Discussing Miller's (1965) work on 
language, artwisle notes that because children have fewer markers than 
adults they tend to have much broader classes of words, which is no doubt 
the reason why many more - and more varied - responses are given by younger 
children to stimulus words. In fact, the younger the child, the more 
various the associations, even though the vocabulary of the younger child 
is necessarily smaller than that of the older or adult subject. 
What is indicated by all of these studies is a gradual stabilisation 
of the child's knowledge system. His increasing awareness of rules and 
constraints governing phenomena affects his approach to, and interpretation 
of;them. 	 It would seem, in some instances, that stages or phases can be 
Entwisle, D. (1966) Word Associations of Young Children. John Hopkins Press 
P.7. 
Miller, G. and McNeill, D. (1965) cited in Entwisle, D. (1966) (above) 
P.125-6. 
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marked out and that certain kinds of responses might be expected at 
different phases or stages. This is a factor which could be of impor-
tance in the assessment of children's responses to creativity items of 
the free association type. Assessment must be made over and against 
what could be a determining sub-structure of the child's knowledge-system. 
At first sight, Nelson's (1974) work on categorisation might seem to oppose 
that of Entwisle's. Working with subjects aged from 4-8 years, and con-
cerned essentially with category membership, Nelson concluded that: 
"Considerable variations amongst the categories in size and 
composition was found by both quantitative indices and qualitative 
analyses. Age changes occurred primarily in an increase in number 
of responses given, and these appeared to be related to the 
increasing articulation and hierarchical expansion of the categories." 
Nelson illustrates that the child's categories (membership) are poorer 
because increasing boundary definitions would seem to be a function of 
age, whilst Entwisle, employing a free association method observes fewer 
markers in the younger child's organisation, and wider associations. 
Both researchers, however, are really concerned with socialisation into 
categories of some form. 
Research into graphic expression reveals similarly that the world 
of the child is disorganised and subject to distortion. Viktor Lowenfeld 
(1959) in a study of children's drawings with subjects ranging from 4 to 
17 years of age found that in the youngest subjects, the interrelations 
of things in time and space were subject to no discernible laws. Lowenfeld 
considers the types of rule-awareness which grow up in the child. The 
7-9 year old stage he describes as the "schematic stage" characterised by 
the discovery of order in space relations. From 9-11 years - the 
"realism stage" - Lowenfeld describes the child as becoming aware of the 
concept of overlap (i.e. a tree growing from the ground will partly 
Nelson, K. (1974) "Variation in children's concepts by age and category", 
Ch. Devt. LL. P.577-84. 
Lowenfeld, V. (1959) The Witureof Creative Activity ;  
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overlap with the sky). Finally, from 11-13 years, there is the "pseudo-
realistic stage" - when the perception of perspective begins to form. 
Presentations might well be distorted through assimilation problems. 
Hermina Sinclair (1974) explains how the child assimilates to his basic 
knowledge what he has heard or seen. She insists that the child's 
problem is not in fact one of memory, as the memory load in the tasks 
set by her was deliberately light, but rather that it is a matter of 
assimilating on the basis of knowledge and experience. (PLATE 1) 
Piaget with Inhelder (1973) in a number of studies on memory, with 
fellow workers such as Sinclair and Bliss, explains the role of memory 
and the relationship between memory and understanding. Piaget explains 
that memory is a mode of knowledge and its special province is the past 
and the reconstruction of the past. Unlike intelligence, it is not 
involved in the solution of new problems. Piaget presents some interesting 
evidence to support the idea that what is remembered is related to what 
is understood. With Mounoud, Piaget examined memory and causal processes: 
"Now the main question our present experiment is designed to 
answer is whether the child's remembrance is purely descriptive 
or whether it is at all times affected by his causal inter-
pretation." (Piaget, 1973) 
In this experiment in which the child is asked to provide a static des-
cription of the model before him (PLATE 2) and then a description of the 
model functioning, Piaget and Mounoud concluded that the child remembers 
chiefly what he has understood. 
Sinclair, H. (1974) "From preoperational to concrete thinking and parallel 
development of symbolisation" in: Piaget in the Classroom. Schwebel & Raph. 
Piaget, J. and Inhelder, B. (1973) Memory and Intelligence. 	 P.20. 
PLATE 1 
P.39 
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The picture of the bottle and the toy car as 
used by Hernina Sinclair. The liquid was 
coloured red and the car had a red strip to 
emphasise the horizontal positions of both. 
The children were asked to draw the objects 
as they would be when standing in different 
positions. 
a typical attempt by subjects in the 4 - 5 year 
old age group. 
Taken from: From Preoperational to Concrete Thinking 
& Parallel Development of Symbolisation in: Piaget in 
The Classroom. Raph. J. & Schwebel M.(E6-37 '74. 
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PLATE 2. 
from: Memory and Intelligence. Piaget.J. and 
Inhelder. B. '73. pp. 199-211. 
In this experiment the subject is provided with the 
two models shown above - B and R. In their static state 
the two models resemble each other, but represent 
two distinct causal mechanisms. Model $ is rigid and 
held in position by a slide. When handle(a) is pushed up, 
the whole model moves in a vertical direction. Model 
R is fixed to the board by a central bolt, and its three 
nogmantn aro connoctad by two screws. Whon hnndlo (a) 
is pushed up the segments (b) and (c) move down. 
The subject is required to provide; 
a. a static description: "What do we have on this 
board" 
b. a description of the processes having operated 
the rods himself. 
P.40 
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Piaget then makes an important distinction between memory concerned 
with the purely descriptive, and that concerned with causal, processes. 
The distinction is really about whether the subject is simply required 
to reproduce what he perceives or whether he is called upon to trans—
form or re—structure that material in some way: 
"... if memory were confined to recoding, retaining and re—
calling perceptions, and hence involved no intellectual 
transformations, then it would rest exclusively on the 
'observables'... the observable is the purely descriptive, 
no doubt associated with an increasingly searching analysis, 
but never transcending the data." (my underlining) Ibid. 
This distinction between the descriptive and the transformative has real 
implications for creativity as understood here. Comprehension of the 
essential structures and functions of items and events is necessary, it 
would seem, for intellectual re—constructions of such, and creative tasks 
require such re—constructions. This is perhaps interpretable as another 
Piagetian distinction between passive knowing and active constructing and 
re—constructing. Like Piaget's second task cited from the above work, 
Sinclair's (ibid) was likewise concerned with more than the observables 
and required therefore an understanding of what was being reproduced. 
Piaget, however, recognises that memory is not entirely dependent 
upon comprehension: 
"If the memory comprises the entire conservation of the past, 
and its restoration in the present, there is no reason to think 
that it must confine itself to those aspects of reality which 
have been understood; it is quite conceivable that a child, 
having observed a series of peculiar decantations... may remember 
the general procedure even though he fails to grasp its purpose." 
Ibid. 
In the second part of this present research, this was in fact shown 
to be true: children as young as 7 years of age were sometimes capable 
of remembering and drawing from memory, complex, interrelated forms. 
Piag64 J. (1973) Ibid. P.201 
Sinclair, H. (1974) Ibid. 
Piaget, J. (1973) Ibid. P. 116 
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However, none of these children showed any real grasp of the structures 
on subsequent transfer tasks. The purely descriptive, in the sense 
employed here by Piaget, provides no basis for creative transformations. 
Within different descriptive and theoretical systems, support is 
found for an increase in integration and systematisation with age and 
development. Russell (1956) noted that the formation of concepts moves 
along a continuum from simple to complex, from concrete to abstract, from 
undifferentiated to differentiated, from discrete to organised and from 
ego-centric to social. The idea of gradual differentiation and refine-
ment of abilities is inherent in Guilford's model of intelligence, 
differentiation not coming about until early adolescence. 
Piaget (1948) has considered the child's growth into a system of 
rules. In the Moral Judgement of the Child, he discusses the idea of 
the dawning of a regularity of a physical type: 
"from its earliest months the child is bathed in an atmosphere 
of rules." 
But as Piaget is quick to note, the child is coerced into regularity at 
this point. For any such regularity to develop into rule-consciousness, 
there has to be, as Durkheim with his deterministic concept of society 
owned, the idea of obligation (Piaget, ibid), which is more than recog-
nition of mere regularity. In his observations of children's games, 
Piaget notes the child's passage from this stage of mere regularity to 
a stage of conscious rule-awareness. This passage is, however, "suffered 
not sought" (Piaget, 1950). Later, when the child has some concept 
of an external system of rules and of organisation, he will check his 
Russell, D. (1956) Children's Thinking. 
Piaget, J. (1948) The Moral Judgement of the Child. P.43. 
Piaget, J. (1950) The Psychology of Intelligence. P.103. 
43. 
ideas against this system. Whilst the child's tendency in the ego-centric 
period is to accept outside rules, his inclination is still to play alone 
and to ignore such rules for the most part. He next moves to a stage 
termed "incipient co-operation" where there is an increased awareness of 
rules to the point, usually, of rigidity. Rules take on an almost sacred 
nature. The child has moved from a truly ego-centric position where he 
played in an individual manner with social material to an extreme accep-
tance of rule-recognition and obligation. A more flexible standpoint is 
attained at the "codification of rules" stage where the sacred-mystery 
dimension of rules is minimised, where rules are known to the whole group 
and indeed generally arise from group consensus and group recognition. 
There is a mature notion of obligation here, one which is freely under-
taken, and where rules are seen as open to change if the group desires to 
change them. Berger and Luckmann (1969) presented an interesting analysis 
of socialisation in terms of a dialectical process between objective and 
subjective reality. Though their focus was upon the social construction 
of reality (and their inspiration rooted in Marx's notion of man's con-
sciousness as determined by his social being) a parallel could be drawn 
between this explanation of socialisation and Piaget's explanation, with 
his notions of assimilation and accommodation. On the matter of rules, 
and with specific reference to language, Berger and Luckman (1969) point 
out that: 	 t, 
"In the early stages of socialisation the child is quite incapable 
of distinguishing between the objectivity of natural phenomena 
and the objectivity of social formations. To take the most 
important item of socialisation, language appears to the child 
as inherent in the nature of things, and he cannot grasp the 
notion of its conventionality." 
Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. (1969) The Social Construction of Reality. 
P.77. 
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Though he attributes less importance to the role of language in 
socialisation into knowledge, Piaget has noted some interesting patterns 
of rule awareness in the child's language development (Piaget, 1932). 
The young child is deficient in what Piaget has termed "adapted 
information" in his exchanges with others. He is incapable of true 
criticism or of argument, of true questions and logical answers. This 
is because he is unaware of, or cannot comprehend, the logic governing 
such areas. Instead he indulges in what Piaget has termed "monlogue", 
"repetition" and "collective monlogue". Piaget argues that the child 
responds this way because he is cognitively incapable of doing otherwise. 
Vygotsky (1962) has challenged this point, offering a somewhat different 
interpretation of ego-centric speech, regarding it as a more deliberate 
and chosen action. Interesting though the challenge is, it would seem 
that the term is used so differently by each one as to render the challenge 
a non-challenge, if it were ever intended directly as such. The ability 
to be ego-centric in the sense of 'choosing' implies the ability to 
speak in a socialised manner (Piagetian sense). Piaget defines social 
speech differently, and perhaps Vygotsky does not take up, to the same 
degree or from the same standpoint, the notion of developmental inability. 
In the same work Piaget refers to ego-centrism as an orientation of the 
mind. More importantly he sees ego-centrism surviving in adults, 
"... in all circumstances where they (adults) are still dominated 
by spontaneous, naive and consequently infantile attitudes." (Ibid) 
This is a phenomenon which is quite distinct from behaviour explicable 
in terms of "decalage" (i.e. development which has not taken place 
within a specific area - either horizontal or vertical in type), and it 
is a phenomenon which is to be found in formal operational thinkers too. 
Piaget, J. (1932) The Language and Thought of the Child. 
Vygotsky, S. (1962) Thought and Language. 
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The notion of rule-consciousness is bound up with cognitive 
organisation and the process of structuring reality, for some of this 
process must involve rule-ability. Bruner has been accused of having 
a perceptual model which presupposes an adult perceiver (Wohwill, 1969). 
As one would expect, Piaget as a developmental psychologist has pointed 
a finger here (Piaget and Morf, 1958). True as this might be, and much 
as Piaget is concerned to stress the developing structures of the child, 
his important arrival-point is the adult knower, the mature model, and 
in the case of both Bruner and Piaget, arrival is characterised by a 
level of organisation of thought. Both men are also concerned with 
active construction or representation of reality. 
Bruner's stress is on the process dimension - the ways in which the 
individual comes to conclusions about information, the ways in which he 
scans, focusses, the strategies which he employe in interpreting and in 
going beyond the infrmation given. All of these strategies operate within 
an organisational framework (see Bruner's model - active - iconic - 
symbolic) and imply the existence of some kind of knowledge organisation. 
Categorisation is a way of organising knowledge. It involves ren-
dering discriminably different things equivalent, responding to objects 
and events in terms of their class membership rather than their unique-
ness (Bruner, 1967). Bruner discusses the idea of organisation on a 
perceptual basis and at a conceptual level, pointing out that one of the 
principal differences between the two forms of categorisation is the 
immediacy to experience of the attributes by which their fitness to a 
Piaget, J. (1932) Ibid. 
Wohwill J. (1969) in: Sigel and Hooper, Logical Thinking in Children. 
 P.475. 
Piaget and Morf 	 (1958) in: J.S. Bruner et al, Logique et perception. 
Etudes d'Epistemologie genetique. Vol 6. pp 49-116. 
Bruner, J. et al (1967) A Study of Thinking. 
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category 	 is determined. This ability involves learning the criteria 
which a given culture regards as relevant. It is a matter of finding 
predictive defining attributes that distinguish exemplars from non-
exemplars of the class one seeks to distinguish. 
This cultural dimension in the organisation of knowledge could be 
closely related to the perceptual mode of classifying reality. Comment-
ing on the problems of cultural concepts, Baldwin (1968) points out, with 
specific reference to the concept of invariance, that invariance of 
quantity, for instance, is partly a matter of definition. Quantity is 
simply that aspect of the liquid (or substance) that does remain invariant. 
What is culturally normative about the invariance is the definition of 
quantity in such a way that it is independent of location, shape and 
arrangement. There is no reason at all, according to Baldwin, why these 
latter factors should not be taken into consideration in a definition of 
quantity or of some other yet uninvented concept regarding changes in 
the presentation of amounts of given things. Part of acculturalisation 
is learning to ignore what at first strikes as highly relevant, largely 
because of its pressing perceptual immediacy. 
Bruner discusses identity categorisation (Bruner, 1974). This form 
of categorisation is concerned with classifying a variety of stimuli as 
forms of the same thing - e.g. the moon is always the moon even when seen 
from different angles. Nadinitially the child has identity problems with 
such issues. Piaget has illustrated this with the problem of the elipse 
- i.e. the child at a certain stage shows an inability to recognise flat 
round objects from an eliptical position. Identity categorisation is a 
Baldwin, A. (1968) Theories of Child Development. 
Bruner, J. (1974) Beyond the Information Given. 
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fundamental problem in conceptual organisation. After the actual 
recognition of such objects (and this could be explained in terms of 
shape constancy), there comes the process of categorisation which involves 
learning that objects seen from different angles still merit the same 
category because of a basic common identity which is culturally agreed 
upon. The task is always about reducing the complexity and disparity 
of reality to a state of affairs that gives common identity. Classification 
on the basis of equivalence is equally concerned with the reduction of 
complexity, requiring individuals to respond to a set of discriminably 
different objects as the same kind of thing, or more or less so. The 
criteria may not be at all visible. The learner-categoriser is likely to 
operate on faulty criteria from time to time, producing in so doing, 
'interesting', perhaps symbolic, relationships and groupings. But dis-
tinctions must be made between the hesitations of the novice and the 
deliberate, novel categorisations of a mature and flexible knower. In 
spite of persisting faults, the child has reached an important point in 
terms of the organisation of knowledge when he realises that there are 
criteria for classifying and ordering phenomena. This realisation implies 
an awareness of organisation itself. 
The passage of the knower is described by Piaget in adaptive terms. 
His central concept of accommodation implies that the environment does 
bring about changes in cognitive structures, though he is cautious about 
the weighting he gives to this dimension, referring to it more as the 
"American Question". Bruner (1966) makes the point that: 
"mental growth is in very considerable measure dependent upon 
growth from the outside in... a mastering of techniques that 
are embodied in the culture and that are passed on in a con-
tingent dialogue by agents of the culture." 
Bruner, J. (1966) "On cognitive growth" in: Studies in Cognitive Growth, 
Bruner, J. et al. P.6.  
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Knowing involves perceiving and organising — that is recognising, 
naming, categorising and reIting, and such activities take place within 
a cultural framework. The knower requires a relationship with the agents 
of his culture to develop the world view of his neighbours, he also 
requires a certain level of transforming interaction to develop and 
effect changes in his cognitive structures. 
An understanding of Piaget's concept of 'operation' is crucial to 
this study and is central to many of its assumptions: 
"To understand the development of knowledge we must start with 
an idea which seems central to me — the idea of an operation  
an operation is the essence of knowledge; it is an interiorised 
action which modifies the object of knowledge." (1972) 
Piaget continues to elaborate on this central concept, explaining that 
an operation is not isolated. An operation is always linked to other 
operations and as a result, it is always part of a total structure (ibid). 
As a developmental psychologist, Piaget's main task is about understanding 
and explaining the development and formation of such structures. 
The idea of operation is further important because of its implications 
for the idea of consciousness of knowledge and consciousness of one's 
actions upon phenomena. The identity, the complieness of an operational 
act allows it to be repeated, to be approached from other angles, to be 
knowingly modified, and most important it can be observed from an objec—
tive standpoint by the knower. The formation of formal operations and 
the consciousness that such a development brings about, allows the thinker 
or doer to regard his own activity as an object for reflection. 
Piaget, J. (1972) "Development and learning" in: Readings in Child  
Behaviour & Development. Lavatelli C.S. & Stendler. F. (Eds) P.185. 
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The foundations of this type of regularity, this patterning and 
this structural wholeness are to be found in earlier non-operational 
activities, which at an earlier level of development had their own 
coherence and their own patterning, but were limited by immediacy and 
ego-centricity of an extreme type. Early schemas had their form, thus 
earning them the title. The child in the 4th sub-stage of development 
attains combinations of schemas and Piaget talks of 'sensori-motor 
concepts'. However, it is only around the 5th sub-stage (c. 2nd year 
of age) that the child attains object-constancy. Here, when the object 
is: 
"sought in accord with its successive displacements, the group 
is really made objective and the combinativity of displacements, 
their reversibility and conservation of position are achieved." 
(Piaget, 1967) 
Whilst sensori-motor intelligence lies at the source of thought and 
continues to affect it throughout life, it is important to stress its 
limitations. Piaget refers to sensori-motor intelligence as function-
ing like a slow-motion film where the pictures are seen in succession, 
but where there is no real fusion or relationship drawn. Because of 
this, there can be no continuous vision, which is essential if one is 
to understand the wholeness and identity of acts and events. This type 
of pre-operational intelligence can lead only to immediate understanding 
and satisfaction. Any knowing must be tied to the objects of knowledge 
themselves and not to knowledge and an objective understanding of the 
knowledge system: 
"Thought alone breaks away from these short distances and 
physical pathways." (Ibid) 
In brief, the conscious reflective dimension is absent from this early 
type of knowing. 
Piaget, J. (1967) The Psychology of Intelligence. P.115 
Piaget, J. (1967) Ibid. P.120 
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Piaget sees that at a given moment in development, intuitive 
relations of a given system are 'grouped'. He has also offered 
criteria by which groupings are to be recognised. Operational ability 
exists at two levels: concrete, and formal or abstract. Cognizance of 
the characteristics of these two levels is essential to an understanding 
of creativity as defined here, for it is argued that full creativity is 
not possible in the absence of formal operational ability. Creativity 
in its mature state requires a high level of consciousness: conscious-
ness of the identity of phenomena and consciousness of the transformations 
brought about on such phenomena. Creative thinking is therefore highly 
reflective. The creative knower, conscious of his culture's way of 
organising reality, has sufficient understanding of rules and relation-
ships to be able to transform such relationships and inspire new groupings 
and new identities. Piaget uses the term 'grouping' to describe the 
structures of the concrete operational period. Whilst they have some 
properties of a 'group' such as reversibility, associativity and complete-
ness, concrete operations do not form a 'group' as such. The term 'group' 
is reserved for those structures in the formal operational period, 
(Baldwin, 1968) (Flavell, 1974). Nine basic groupings exist within this 
period. They are all concerned with ways of organising phenomena and of 
understanding events in relation. They are all about the concrete, the 
immediate, the non-hypothetical. 
Piaget (1967) notes several new abilities arising from these group-
ings. These abilities allow a certain level of reflection and at this 
point, the possibility of a "concrete creativity" comes into being. The 
development of creative structuring of knowledge at this stage is a 
direct result of factors such as: 
Baldwin, A. (1968) Theories of Child Development. 
Flavell, J.H. (1974) The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget. 
Piaget, J. (1967) The 	 logy 
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1. The possibility of the combination of successive actions. 
2. Reversibility. 
3. The fact that the same point or conclusion can now be reached by 
more than one path. 
4. The individual is now capable of returning to the starting point of 
an action and knows that the starting point can be found to be 
unchanged. 
5. When the same action is repeated it either adds nothing to itself 
or else is a new action with a cumulative effect. (Ibid) 
Such factors are required for early creative structurings. There is a 
further essential factor — that of needing to know that one is departing 
from recognised paths. 
The point at issue throughout this discussion, is that the child is 
making constant attempts to arrive at a level of cognitive organisation 
which will give him some control over phenomenon, by means of his own 
structurings of it. Until he can organise it to some degree, it can 
never become an object of reflection, never be considered, and inferences 
not drawn. This kind of problem is illustrated in recent work by 
Flavell. J.H. and Drozdal. J.G. 
 (1975). They were interested in the 
"concept of a critical search area". They employed a cartoon figure which 
lost a toy walking through its house. Working with subjects aged 5-10 
years, they found that it was not until the age of about 7 or 8 that the 
children readily made the inference that the critical area was the only 
reasonable place to search for the lost toy. They concluded that the 
ability to make such organisations might be explained in terms of: 
11 
eee a concrete—operational conception of temporal order." 
Flavell, J.H. and Drozdal, J.G. "A developmental study of logical search 
behaviour", Ch. Devt. 
 .1, pp. 389-393. 
52. 
Often, Piagetian stages are conceived of in terms of a description 
of the state of the child. It is important to stress equally, that they 
must also be descriptions of the child's organisation of reality itself. 
This idea of the ordering of reality is illustrated in Potter's work 
(1966) on perceptual recognition. Essentially, Potter's subjects were 
required to recognise objects which were presented with fewer distortions 
and more cues on each presentation. Potter noted that with age, subjects 
ceased to guess but checked out hypotheses against data. A growth in 
cognitive organisation made possible the maximum use of information. In 
a somewhat different task Mosher. A. and Hornsby. J.(1966) required sub-
jects to ask questions in order to arrive at conclusions. They found 
that with development, the child attains a more organised and constrained 
strategy for using information. 
With the advent of formal operational thought comes a reflecting 
upon operations and a consequent second-degree grouping of operations. 
The formal operational thinker is capable of the hypothetical and in 
Piaget's words, of: "delighting especially in what is not" (Ibid, 1967). 
Thought is freed from the concrete and immediate and the world of the 
possible becomes available for construction and re-construction. 
The notion of consciousness of one's structuring of the universe 
is important to this discussion of creativity. It is related to a 
realisation of identity of phenomena, to reversibility and to the dawning 
of self-awareness, and of self as structurer and intervener. References 
to this dimension of development are scattered throughout Piaget's works. 
Commenting on children's definitions, he writes (1928): 
Potter, M.C. (1966) "On Perceptual Recognition" in: Bruner, J. Studies in 
Cognitive Growth. 
Mosher, A. and Hornsby, J. (1966) "On Asking Questions" in: Bruner, J. Ibid. 
Piaget, J. (1967) Ibid. P.148. 
Piaget, J. (1928) JpAgemenl rid B soning in the Child. P.114 
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"... children's definitions are interesting but they are not 
easy to interpret, for all definition is conscious realisation." 
Ego-centricity necessarily involves a certain lack of such consciousness. 
This means that whilst the young child might offer 'interesting' inter-
pretations of words and events, the label 'interesting' (even creative) 
is one which is placed on the event or action by the observing adult 
perceiver, who is sufficiently cognitively mature to identify the process 
itself. The actual thought processes of the child at that time are gover-
ned by ego-centric characteristics and the relations or distortions of 
reality stemming from these. Because of this, childish thought lacks 
logical necessity and genuine implication (ibid). 
In his detailed examinations of childish thought, in numerous con-
texts and with varied content, Piaget illustrates types of distortions 
of relationship and logical implication. He discusses the concept of 
'juxtapositioning' - which implies a non-understanding of objective 
logical relations. The poor use of words such as 'because' for instance, 
reveals a poor grasp of relations - for example: "The sun does not fall 
down because it is hot..." (ibid). It may well be that there is a private, 
symbolic logic, sensible to the child, but it is not part of the commonly 
agreed pattern of relations and explanations. 
Piaget (ibid) uses the term 'syncretism' to describe the way the 
young child has a spontaneous tendency to take things in by means of a 
comprehensive act of perception instead of by the detection of, and atten-
tion to, detail. The child finds immediately and without any real analysis, 
analogies between words or objects that have nothing to do with each other. 
He manages to find some 'reason' for every chance event. Commenting on 
Piaget, J. (1928) Judgement and Reasoning in the Child. P.114. 
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syncretism and juxtapositioning, Piaget(1928) says: 
"Syncretism is therefore an excess of relating, whilst juxta—
positioning exhibits a deficiency in the same function." 
In Piaget's framework, lack of consciousness is explicable in terms 
of the balance of relations between the concepts of assimilation and 
accommodation. When solidarity is established between these two dynamic 
features: 
thougltbecomes increasingly capable of reversibility. 
For the capacity of leaving one's own viewpoint and entering 
into that of other people robs assimilation of its deforming 
character and forces it to respect the objectivity of data." 
(Ibid) 
This same theme of confusion and distortion and its relationship to a 
lack of consciousness is taken up in other investigations of Piaget,(1954). 
He comments on the significance of self—consciousness for the child's own 
behaviour: 
"With increasing differentiation and equilibrium of assimilation 
and accommodation during the sensori—motor period, there comes 
a development of great significance for intelligence. There is 
a process of objectification of external reality and the develop—
ment of the awareness of the self." (1954). 
This state has real implications for imagination, to be distinguished 
from phantasy, for without the ability to measure events against external 
realities, imagination is not a possibility: 
in reality the child has no imagination, and what we ascribe 
to him as such is no more than a lack of coherence and still more 
subjective assimilation as shown by his transpositions." (Piaget, 
1962) 
Ruth Griffiths (1965) has reiterated this idea of confusion in the 
young child's mind, but she fails to make a clear distinction between 
phantasy and imagination in the way that both Piaget and M. Lowenfeld do. 
Piaget, J. (1928) Judgement and Reasoning in the Child. P.4 and P.180 
Piaget, J. (1954) The Construction of Reality in the Child. 
Piaget, J. (1962) Play Dreams and Imitation in Childhood. P.30. 
Griffiths, R. (1965) A Study of Imagination in Early Childhood. 
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Within Lowenfeld's (1969) analytic framework, imagination is defined 
as having a definite relationship with reality, whereas phantasy is con- 
trolled by the wishes and desires of the child. This matter of imagination 
will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapter and then in 
relation to symbolic behaviour. The point at issue here is the tenuous 
relationship between the world of the child (characterised by phantasy) 
and the 'objective world'. 
To understand what Piaget intends by 'image' it is necessary to 
remember that he regards knowledge as an assimilative process and that 
"objectivity is the result of progressive conquest" (1971). He rejects 
the 'knowledge-as-copy' hypothesis in favour of the view that the object 
can be known only by being conceptualised. Consequently, any mental 
re-construction of an object (reproductive images) and any mental 
explorations of, or adjustments to, objects (anticipatory images) require 
an operational framework. But the image has a role to play too: 
"The image ensures finer analysis of 'states' and even aids 
figural anticiaption of 'transformations'. this makes the 
image an indispensable auxiliary in the functioning of the 
very dynamism of thought - but only as long as it remains 
consistently subordinate to such operational dynamism, which it 
cannot replace, and which it can only express symbolically with 
degrees of distortion or fidelity according to circumstances." 
(1971) 
Imaginative behaviour therefore has no essential role in providing struc-
tures for intellectual development, but it is as Piaget terms it an 
'indispensable auxiliary' to thought. 
As might be expected, the stage notion is reflected in Piaget's 
treatment of imagination. The most critical step is that from pre-
operational to operational thought: 
Lowenfeld, M. (1969) Play in Childhood, 
Piaget, J. and Inhelder, B. (1971) Mental Imagery in the Child. P.390, 
"Generally speaking pre-operational thought may be thought of 
as a system of notions within which figurative treatment of 
states takes precedence over comprehension of transformations. 
Consequently at this level images govenathought, while the 
situation is reversed at the operational level." (1971) 
Here, no doubt, is the point of distinction, for Piaget, between imagin-
ation and phantasy. Operational ability is essential for interpretation 
of reality or as Piaget puts it: 
"The operations carry out the transformation; the image 
represents them." (Ibid, P.228) 
Sarbin and Juhasz (1970) are critical of Piaget's explanation of 
imagination - more precisely its genesis - in terms of "deferred imitation" 
of that which is signified, suggesting that it is adequate only up to a 
point: 
"This analysis works well enough for tasks which call for 
'visual' descriptions, which Piaget, like so many others 
employed almost exclusively, but like the pictures in the 
mind analogy, it collapses when applied to the somasthetic 
senses 	 when one tries to consider 'deferredly imitating' 
the tastes of tutti-frutti ice cream or the fragrance of a 
freshly cut rose." 
Such criticism would seem to suggest that Sarbin and Juhasz have failed 
to take account of Piaget's explanation of knowledge, and in particular 
his idea that an image is fundamentally symbolic. According to knowledge 
and experience, one will construct, adequately or otherwise, a mental 
image - a symbol - of what has been experienced - or of what could be 
experienced. Sarbin is perhaps a little too concrete in criticising what 
Piaget is supposed to be about. It is just as possible to have a mental 
construct of a taste or smell as it is to have a mental construct of a 
pencil. In all instances, we are talking about symbolic approximations 
to 'reality'. 
Piaget, J. and Inhelder, B. (1971) Ibid. P.197. 
Sarbin, T. and Juhasz, J.B. (1970) "Toward a theory of imagination", 
J. of Personality. Elj 
 pp 52-72. 
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Sarbin and Juhasz propose their own explanation of the development 
of imagination which is based on the notion of imitation, but with 
modifications. Essentially, imagination is explained as 'muted role-
taking', an explanation which has some of the difficulties of behavioural 
explanations of 'inner speech' as language gone underground via whisperings 
Piaget is saying once again that imagination requires certain cog- , 
nitive structures by which to function. Imagination is crucial to mature 
creative thought, for without it, subjects would be tied to mental 
explorations only of what is known. Formal operational thought brings 
the individual to the stage where he can be independent of concrete props 
to thought; imagination, essentially about symbolic representation, is a 
way of representing operational thought. 
Before the possibility then, of even an elementary type of creativity, 
the child is in need of some operational ability. Intuitive thought 
involves a direct relationship between a schema of internalised action 
and the perception of objects, and can only result in configurations 
centred on this relationship. Intuitive thought is still essentially 
phenomenalistic because: 
"... it copies the outlines of reality without correcting them, 
and ego-centric because it is constantly related to present 
action." Piaget, 1967. 
Intuitive thought is no basis for creative behaviour. 
The dynamics of Piaget's model are of importance here, for they 
raise the whole matter of the possibility of training for, or accelerat-
ing, cognitive organisation. Assimilation and accommodation are the 
Piaget, J. (1967) The Psychology of Intelligence. P.138 
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dynamic agents of change. Piaget (1972) makes a strong distinction 
between learning and development. He describes the development of 
knowledge as: 
"... a spontaneous process, tied to the whole process of 
embryogenesis. Embryogenesis concerns the development of 
the body, but it concerns as well the development of the 
nervous system, and the development of mental function..." 
Learning, on the other hand, has an almost contrived element for Piaget. 
It is seen as tied to specific situations or events, with little pos—
sibility of generalisation: 
"In general learning is provOked by situations — provoked by 
a psychological experimenter, or by a teacher with respect 
to some didactic point; or by an external situation. It is 
provoked in general as opposed to being spontaneous. In 
addition it is a limited process, limited to a single problem 
or a single structure." 
	 (ibid.) 
Piaget cannot accept the notion that development is the sum total of 
a number of discrete learning experiences summed up to signify the 
individual's ability. At the same time, he does not deny the role of 
all experience or experiences in the formation of cognitive structures. 
This immediately raises the question of what is to be defined as 
experience to the experiencing individual. Piaget agrees, moreover, 
that operational structures can be learned if the 'learning' is based 
on simpler more elementary structures; in other words, if there is a 
natural development of structures. Further, his explanation of growth 
is quite definitely not a maturational one. He himself argues the 
inadequacy of such an explanation, citing work carried out on African 
peoples to illustrate the fact that the order of the succession of the 
stages remains constant but that the chronological ages of these stages 
vary a great deal (ibid). 
Piaget, J. (1972) "Development and learning" in:Readings in Child  
Behaviour & Development. Lavatelli. C. & Stendler.F.(Eds.) P.38. 
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If we are to employ Piaget's categories of 'experience' (and he is 
no Existentialist!) we must talk of 'physical experience' and of 'logical 
mathematical experience'. The former always involves: 
"acting upon objects and drawing some knowledge about the 
objects by abstraction from the objects 	 this is experience 
in the usual sense of the term, in the sense used by 
empiricists." (Ibid, P. 41) 
For Piaget, the more important type of experience in terms of 
transformation of structures is the logical-mathematical type of 
experience. Here: 
"knowledge is not drawn from the objects but is drawn by the 
actions effected upon the objects. This is not the same thing. 
When one acts upon objects the objects are indeed there, but 
there is also the set of actions which modify the objects." 
(Ibid, P.41.) 
Piaget goes on to give an example of this latter type of experience 
involving the discovery of a property of the action of ordering by a 
child of about four or five years of age. The child was playing with 
pebbles, and began 'ordering' them. The child discovered: "a property 
of actions and not a property of pebbles." (Ibid). 
This kind of experience is both reflective and transforming. It is 
crucial to the transformation and development of cognitive structures. 
An important question is - how do such experiences take place? Can 
one structure for them? How does one become a Brunerian 'interpreter' 
or 'translator' (Bruner, 1968)? It is not easy to contrive situations 
leading to this transforming type of logical-mathematical experience, 
which involves bringing the ordering effects in the child's consciousness. 
This may well, of course, be more of a comment on our inabilities as 
'translators', or on the problem of trapping learning moments in a child's 
experience, rather than an indication of the pointlessness of training 
Piaget, J. (1972) Ibid. P.41. 
Bruner, J. (1968) Towards a Theory of Instruction. 
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endeavours. Some training attempts have met with apparent success, for 
instance the work of Kingsley and Hall (1967) and their use of learning 
sets based on Gagne's work. In their programme, their subjects were 
not passive recipients, but were required to structure meaningfully, 
which might account for some degree of generalisation which resulted. 
However, there is the deepest caution to be found in Piaget concern-
ing training attempts generally. His concern is not with an empirical 
surface learning, but with a deeper logic, not always 'visible', and 
which cannot necessarily be made to be so, for it concerns aspects such 
as relationships and organisation, and such dimensions are usually implied, 
or agreed implicitly. 
Discussing the conservationcf substance, for instance, he writes: 
'To experiment, no experience, can show the child that there 
is the same amount of substance. He can weigh the ball and 
that would lead to the conservation of weight. He can immerse 
it in water and that would lead to the conservation of volume. 
But the notion of substance is attained before either weight 
or volume. This conservation of substance is simply a logical 
necessity (my underlining)... even though no experience could 
have led to this notion." (Piaget, 
This is an extreme position and one which is perhaps not always consistent 
with Piaget's own thinking. Without doubt, with logical-mathematical 
experience there is the problem of ever knowing when - if at all - a 
situation or structured learning situation is able to bring about under-
standing in terms of logical necessity. At the same time, adaptation (a 
key Piagetian concept) takes place within cultural contexts, and whilst 
we cannot guarantee the influence of everyday contexts upon cognitive 
structures, neither can we deny effects of general adaptational experiences, 
most of which we never attempt to define or measure. Piaget has obviously 
admitted the transforming effects of the general environment: 
Kingsley. and Hall. (1967) "Training conservation through the use of 
learning sets", Ch. Devt. 38, 1111-1126 
Piaget, J. (1972) Ibid. P.40. 
61. 
"Society 	 changes the very structure of the individual, 
because it not only compels him to recognise facts, but also 
provides him with a ready made system of signs which modify 
his thought." (1967) 
The aim of those concerned with learning is surely to trap these moments 
of cognitive change and to re-construct them for experimental and 
acceleration purposes. There is something analogous to the study of 
chromosomal patterns here. Such patterns are usually most clearly per-
ceived at moments of cell division and such moments have to be trapped. 
Those concerned with 'acceleration', and understanding in the.Piagetian 
sense, have yet, it would seem, to isolate and study instances of struc-
tural transformations. 
For the most fundamental explanation of change in the organism, we 
are asked to return to the organism itself. Furth (1969), explaining 
this point, says: 
"When asked to name the chief determinants of change, why and 
how a structure changes, Piaget answers that the fact and 
process of change still find their ultimate explanation in the 
basic notion of a living organism with which we started." 
Here we have the idea of self-perpetuating cognitive structures which 
because of their very nature will function and will continue to function. 
A further basic explanatory assumption of Piaget's is that of a particular 
regulating force - namely equilibrium. As defined by Piaget, it means: 
a fundamental factor in development. I use this term in 
the sense in which it is used in cybernetics, that is in the 
sense of processes which feedback and which feedforward, of 
processes which regulate themselves by progressive compensations 
of systems." (Piaget, 1972, ibid) 
If the development of intelligence is explicable in terms of adaptation, 
it is important that the developing individual be challenged, and 
Piaget, J. (1967) The Psychology of Intelligence. P.156 
Furth, H. (1969) Piaget and Knowledge. P.18 
Piaget, J. (1972) "Development and learning" in: Readings in Child  
Behaviour & Development. Lavatelli. C. & Stendler.F.(Eds) P.42. 
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initially even coerced, into adaptation. Piaget speaks of coercion 
(Piaget, 1928). Hans Furth (University of London, Institute of Education 
Lecture, 1974) spoke of the need to provide'bhallenging situations" to 
bring about what might be termed: "directed adaptation". Piaget's request 
is for active construction and in one sense no growth can be based solely 
on experience (Tanner and Inhelder, 1956). Placed within another 
philosophy, in another framework, that of personal construct theory, one 
might well cite George Kelly (1963): 
it is not what happens around him that makes a man 
experienced; it is the successive construing and reconstruing 
of what happens 	 that enriches the experience of his life." 
As will be discussed more fully in the second section of this 
research, a problem in studies of learning and of development is that 
of really understanding "inside" mechanisms and processes. Changes in 
external behaviour are not difficult to note; understanding the internal 
cognitive mechanisms assumed to be responsible for such changes is more 
difficult. Piaget's theory has some such difficulties, some of which must 
stem from his concepts. The notions of assimilation and accommodation, 
for instance, present certain problems: we are required to assume their 
operation or existence, make inferences about these very abstract struc-
tures. Bryant makes comment on this matter: 
"It is very easy to show that the most direct experimental 
evidence offered for any theory about child development is 
always about what the development changes are and not about 
their causes... It is also true of Piaget's theory. Take 
for example the idea of a pair of complementary mechanisms, 
assimilation and accommodation... These are interesting ideas, 
but very general, and as such difficult to pin down in any 
experiment. Not surprisingly, Piaget does not offer any direct 
experimental evidence for assimilation and accommodation." (1974) 
Tanner, J. and Inhelder, B. (1956) Discussions in Child Development, Vol IV. 
Kelly, G. (1963) A Theory of Personality: The Psychology of Personal  
Constructs.  P.73.  
Bryant, P. (1974) Perception and Understanding in Young Children. P.178 
This kind of comment has been directed more extensively by Wohwill  
(1969) who has accused Piaget of employing mentalistic terms and of con-
structing a conceptual apparatus of schemas, operations, centrations, etc, 
which appear to lack direct empirical reference. On this issue, Piaget 
must be as guilty as Freud whose concepts of psychic energy, for instance, 
seem even less available to empirical scrutiny. 
In this study of creative thought, a further Piagetian assumption is 
that the child's creative behaviour will pass through defined stages. Such 
behaviours will be dependent upon his general cognitive development, and 
his creative responses should be distinguished by different characteristics 
at different stages. 
Flavell (1963) offers a very adequate definition of what is intended 
by stage: 
"Granted that a developmental series is amenable to stage des-
cription, the stages abstracted must possess certain properties. 
First they must emerge in development in an unchanging and con-
stant order or sequence: stage A must, by this criterion, appear 
in every child before stage B occurs. If the behaviours which 
define the two stages do not occur in a constant ontogenetic 
sequence, it is erroneous to speak of them as stages. Although 
sequence is taken as invariant, the age at which a given stage 
appears may of course vary considerably." 
In his discussions of stage-development, Piaget has been accused of 
employing a highly idealised model of adult thought (Wohwill, 1969). The 
accusation is perhaps overstated, for whilst Piaget's model might seem to 
imply this, in practice he allows for variations by means of "decalage", 
both "horizontal" and "vertical" in kind (see notes 1 and 2 below). When 
he talks of stage progression therefore, it is not without recognition of 
what might be termed 'uneven development'. 
Wohwill, J.F. (1969) "From perception to inference" in: Logical Thinking 
in Children, Sigel & Hooper. Pp472-93 and P.481. 
Flavell, J. (1963) The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget. P.19 
1. Horizontal = when a cognitive structure characteristic of a given level 
can first be applied to task X but not to task Y. 
2. Vertical = refers to the case where the repetition occurs at a distinctly 
different level of functioning, rather than within the same level. 
Flavell, ibid. (adapted from Flavell, 1963, P.22) 
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With each stage there is an initial preparatory period where struc-
tures are in process of formation. Because of the formative period, there 
is, prior to the appearance of a stage, a time of instability and dis-
organisation of structures. There follows upon this, a point of stage 
achievement and of general stabilisation: 
"As will be seen, the concept of intellectual development as a 
movement from structural disequilibrium to structural equilibrium, 
repeating itself at ever higher levels of functioning, is a 
central concept for Piaget." Flavell (ibid) 
The three main types of structures as described by Piaget are: the 
sensori-motor group structures; concrete operation "groupement" structures; 
combined group and lattice structures. Structures defining earlier stages 
are incorporated into those of subsequent stages. 
An attempt has been made so far to look at the 'knower' and his 
early developmental state, to examine his ways of organising and of 
explaining phenomena, and to attempt to explain this behaviour largely 
in Piagetian terms. The major assumption is that creative organisation 
of phenomena must follow these same routes, for here, creative thought 
is seen, not as a separate intellectual mode, but as one which is closely 
bound up with the development of intelligence. The structures required 
for intelligent functioning are essential to creative functioning and both 
types of functioning take place within a cultural context. Interaction 
with the environment contributes towards the kind of active experience 
required for the formation of structures. However, this same experience 
can encourage the individual to accept a particular "world view". And 
so the development of creativity takes place within tension; on the one 
hand, there is need for stable, logical structures, on the other, an ability 
to venture beyong known ways of interpreting and of organising reality. 
Flavell, J. (1963) Ibid. P.21 
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Solley and Murphy (1957) make the point that: 
"Except in the new born, there is always as a result of past 
experience, some anticipation of what a given situation may 
portend; every situation is somewhat like the previous 
situation which had implications for the organism." 
Earlier, William James (1890) had made this point in terms of the selec-
tive nature of perception. James was strong in his proclamation of the 
chaos surrounding the world of the infant; stimuli without selection 
would continue to lack meaning. Experience is therefore what the 
individual decides to attend to; there is, in consequence, much which 
never reaches the individual's experience. 
There arise, then, factors such as expectation and set, and the 
idea that we begin to be socialised into a particular knowledge of our 
world. The Whorfian hypothesis of linguistic determinism is one 
explanation of this kind of socialisation. Piaget himself has agreed 
that: "Society provides (the child) with a ready made system of signs 
which modify his thought" (1967). Maccoby and Modiano (1967) have 
maintained that the "manner in which a child goes about abstracting 
equivalence should reflect the nature of his society." So in general 
and in specific matters cultural influences would seem to be at work 
affecting interpretations of reality. It is anticipated, because of 
the development of expectation and set in children, that at certain 
stages, they will have difficulty with creative type problems or 
questions, for directed by their own particular set, of which they are 
unaware because of their own lack of objectivity, and being rule-conscious 
citizens, they will tend towards rule-bound, cultural interpretations. 
Solley, C.M. and Murphy, G. (1957) "Learning to perceive as we wish to 
perceive". Menninger.Clinic.Bull. 21. 225-237. 
James, W. (1890) Principles of Psychology, Vol 1. 
Piaget, J. (1967) The Psychology of Intelligence. 
Maccoby, M. and Modiano, N. (1967) "On culture and equivalence" in: 
Studies in Cognitive Growth. 
 Bruner, Giver, Greenfield. 
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Pronko, Ebert, et al (1966) give support to this notion. Bruner (1967) 
speaks of the anticipatory nature of cognitive activity and the effects 
of such anticipation. 
There is the whole problem of how, in the light of experiences to 
facilitate creativity, one might overcome such deterministic factors. 
Solly and Murphy (1960) point out that there is clinical evidence to 
suggest that once a perceptual set has been developed it resits modification 
or replacement. Martin Scheerer (1963), using a Gestalt frame of reference, 
discusses the problem of habituation in problem-solving and the matter of 
re-structuring. The Gestalt notion of 'insight' is seen as stemming from 
a re-structuring of the situation or problem, though there is still the 
prior question of what brings about such a re-structuring. 
Solley and Murphy (ibid) talk about competition amongst the various 
perceptual tendencies and the fact that this competition is eventually 
solved by the establishment of a culturally based priority-system. 
Creative behaviour could be seen in terms of the establishment of a new 
priority-system. 
Vernon, commenting upon Bartlettls idea of schema as a mode of 
organising thought, talks of schema as: 
"persistent, deep-rooted and well organised classifications of 
ways of perceiving, thinking and behaving..." (1966) 
He notes that each individual builds up his own schemata in accordance 
with his own personal life experiences and the interests which have led 
him to seek such experiences. 
Pronko, M., Ebert, R. et al (1966) "A critical review of perception 
theories" in: Perceptual Development in Children. Kidd & Rivoire. 
Bruner, J. (1967) A Study of Thinking. 
Scheerer, M. (1963) Problem Solving. Scientific Amer. 
Vernon, M.D. (1966) "Perception in relation to cognition" in: Perceptual  
Development in Children. Kidd & Rivoire. Pp 389-391. 
Solley, M. and Murphy, P. (1960) Development of the Perceptual World. 
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The effects of set on perception are subject to more than one 
explanation. Haber (1970) explains that at least two basic and dissimilar 
explanations have been put forward. One, places the locus of the effect 
of set in the perceptual system itself, and set is regarded as occurring 
as the object is being viewed. Alternatively, it is argued that set has 
no effect upon perception itself, but only on some aspects of the memory 
trace. 
Bruner (1964, reviewed by Haber) argues that perceptual experience 
is an outcome of categorisation. In other words, an object is only 
adequately perceived after it has been classified. Haller is quick to 
point out that Bruner's explanation contains serious theoretical weak-
nesses, for such an explanation would surely prevent the perceiver from 
perceiving the 'novel' which he could hardly categorise correctly in 
advance. Such an explanation wolid have serious implications for creativity. 
A critical issue for those concerned with new thought-patterns, new 
ways of perceiving and interpreting, is that of attempting to overcome set 
by some means. 
Witkin et al (1962) concluded that children tend to be more field 
dependent than adults and that such dependency diminished with age. 
Reese (1963) concluded that formation of set to expect a particular figure 
does not occur in children to the same extent as in adults. He found 
that when children aged from four to eight years were shown the 
ambiguous rat/profile figure (after Bugelski) preceded by drawings of 
animals or faces, only those aged seven years onwards showed the effects 
Haber, N. (1970) "The nature and effect of set on perception" in: 
Contemporary Theory & Research in Visual Perception. Haber N. 
Bruner, J. (1957) "On perceptual readiness", Psy.Rev. 
 .6.1. 123-204. 
Witkin, H., Goodenough, F. et al (1962) Psychological Differentiation: 
Studies of Development. 
Reese, H.W. (1963) "Perceptual set in young children", Ch. Devt. 4. 151. 
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of set in subsequent judgements. It might seem, therefore, that the 
perceptual organisation tendencies of young children lack a level of 
organisation required to make meaningful relations to previous experiences. 
With adults, however, it would seem that it might be possible to 
create expectations through the formation of general schemata (Vernon, 
1970) which, relate to the situation and which govern a variety of specific 
instances. Luchins and Luchins (1955), for instance, found that ambiguous 
stimuli were more accurately perceived when they were preceded by other 
ambiguous stimuli, than after presentation of non-ambiguous stimuli. 
Bruner and Postman (1949) attempted to manipulate set, but found a 
high degree of resistance on the part of perceivers when expectations 
were challenged: 
"When such expectations are violated by the environment, the 
perceiver's behaviour can be described as resistant to the 
recognition of the unexpected or incongruous... Among the per-
ceptual process which implement this resistance are (1) the 
dominance of one principle of organisation which prevents the 
appearance of incongruity and (2) a form of 'partial assimilation 
to expectancy' which we have called compromise." 
Such works speak of the potency of set and whilst Luchins et al (ibid) 
seemed to have had some degree of success in terms of facilitation - or 
preparation for perceiving, their work is tied to a limited and very 
specific input in a given situation, whereas perception and interpretation 
of reality is an ongoing process, vast and difficult to monitor. 
With regard to creativity, it would seem that education for this 
must concern itself with the formation of general schemata (Vernon, ibid) 
- with perceptual attitudes that are disposed to perceiving and inter-
preting reality in more varied ways. 
Vernon, M.D. (1970) Perception through Experience. 
Luchins and Luchins (1955) Cited in Vernon (ibid). 
Bruner, J. and Postman, L. (1949) "On the perception of incongruity" re-
printed. in Experiments in Visual Perception, Vernon, M.D. (1966) pp 285-92. 
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This second chapter has attempted to examine the ways in which 
knowledge is organised. Knowledge has to be understood within the con-
text of the culture in which it is socialised and transmitted. 
Attention must also be given to the cognitive state of the knower, for 
an adequate study of the organisation of knowledge requires some analysis 
of the interactive process of adjustment between the developing knower 
and the socialising context. If creativity is about the reconstruction 
of reality, it must be studied in relation to culturally accepted con-
structions, for reconstructions are dependent upon initial constructions. 
This dependence poses problems. A cognitively mature individual is well 
able to interpet reality through the eyes of his culture, at the same 
time the stability of his cognitive system can make him less capable of 
novel constructions of reality. It is for this reason that much of the 
training for fluency in creativity has attempted to overcome the problem 
of 'set,. Set is an inevitable concomitant of cognitive stability and 
cognitive stability is essential to mature transformations of reality. 
Socialisation for creativity must therefore concern itself with this 
point of conflict - namely the dependence of what might be termed 
divergent constructions of reality upon more convergent and culturally 
acknowledged constructions. 
Chapter 3 
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APPROACHES TO CREATIVITY 
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"Not only all thought, but all cognitive and motor activity, 
from perception and habit to coneptual and reflective thought, 
consists in linking meanings, and all meaning implies a relatiOn 
between a significant and a signified reality..." Piaget (1950) 
True creative thought requires a certain degree of cognitive maturity. 
It involves the ability to recognise normative modes of signifying and of 
linking meanings, and the ability to depart from normative categories to 
more subjective and symbolic types. It is a dimension of cognitive 
ability inseparably related to Piaget's concept of intelligence. In its 
final stage, based on formal operational structures, creativity is highly 
reflective in nature. 
Various notions have been examined under the label of creativity. 
These different concepts have obviously led to varied attempts at assess—
ment, and differing ideas with regard to the facilitation of creativity 
by means of training programmes. 
Shouksmith (1970) points out that a clear definition of what is a 
creative product has not yet emerged. His is a useful comment, for apart 
from highlighting the confusion surrounding the concept, it reminds one of 
the distinction between creative process, as opposed to creative product, 
which needs to be made. Guilford (1965) comments fully on this distinc—
tion: 
"First it is necessary to make a distinction between creativity 
as such, and creative productivity. An individual may have all 
the necessary attributes of a creative person, yet his creative 
output is not very great. Secondly, from the point of view of 
scientific psychology, creative productivity does not necessarily 
mean the output of socially useful or desirable products... the 
scientist must regard inventions and clever ideas as being 
creative productions regardless of their value." 
Piaget, J. (1950) The Psychology of Intelligence. P.124 
Shouksmith, 	 (1970) Intelligence, Creativity and Cognitive Style. 
Guilford, J.P. (1965) "A psychometric approach to creativity" in: 
Creativity in Childhood & Adolescence, Orthopsychiatric Assoc. Symposium. 
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This standpoint is accepted in this study, and the concern here is with 
process and ability rather than with output or product. Guilford's idea 
is not in accord with that of Cyril Burt (1962), who, within the British 
tradition, has confined the concept of creativity to useful creative 
activities, with general intelligence being an essential component. Burt 
pointed out that with the exception of Spearman, the majority of British 
investigators have, in their research, isolated a factor termed 'productive' 
as distinct from 'reproductive' imagination. 
The question of what is to be deemed useful is a difficult one. This 
study assumes that it is possible to recognise and evaluate some of the 
abilities and strategies involved in cognitive deviance, and that such 
abilities and strategies could lead to 'products' labelled creative; 
however, the labelling process is a highly subjective one, dependent upon 
cultural evaluation. There is no attempt therefore to define creative 
'products'. Such attempts, it is believed, would be concerned with 
cultural approval and evaluation rather than with the nature and essence 
of creative behaviour. 
McKinnon (1962) spoke of creativity as involving an idea or response 
that is novel or at the very least, statistically infrequent. Mackworth  
(1965) too has stressed the notion of originality, making an interesting 
distinction between persons whom he describes as 'problem-solvers' and 
those whom he sees as 'problem-finders'. The latter have a great deal to 
contribute to society for they have the ability to throw up new ideas, to 
re-structure reality and to view it in a new, to-be-solved light. 
Burt, C. (1962) "Critical notice: the psychology of creative ability", 
Br. J. of Ed. Psy. Vol 32. pp 292-8. 
McKinnon, D. (1962) "The nature and nurture of creative talent", Amer.Psy. 
jj, pp 484-95. 
Mackworth, N.A. (1965) "Originality". Amer. Psychol. 20. pp 51-66. 
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Wertheimer (1958), working within a different theoretical frame of 
reference and employing concepts such as vectors, structural determinism 
and re-structuring, all derived from the Gestalt School, touches on an 
idea similar to that of Mackworth's: 
To envisage, to put the right problem, is often a far more 
important achievement than to solve a set task." 
Piaget has been critical of orthodox Gestalt theorists who deny a 
developmental aspect, but the less extreme positions of Gelb and Goldstein 
for instance, who have rejected the notions of 'physical gestalten', are 
more acceptable to him. Wertheimer, however, in spite of his Gestalt 
inspirations, does not hold a passive concept of the individual, stemming 
from an emphasis on structural determinism, rather, he sees the individual 
as playing some more active role in the construction and reconstruction of 
problems. It is important to stress here that the Gestalt School has an 
important contribution to make to the discussion of the creative process, 
in terms of re-structuring, though the motivational or dynamic aspects of 
their explanation are not always accessible to a developmental explanation. 
One of the problems of reviewing literature in the field of creativity 
is that because of the vagueness of the concept there are many territories 
into which one might wander, but they bear other labels. There is the 
further problem of selection, in view of the varied array of definitions 
and approaches. At this point, therefore, it might be helpful to consider 
more closely some of those theorists who have attempted to analyse the 
process of creativity, returning, at a later point, to consider the 
implications of definitions and explanations for assessment and for a 
qualitative understanding of the concept of creativity. 
Wertheimer, M. (1958) Productive Thinking. P.45 
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P.rlier this century, George Wallas (1926) provided an analysis of 
the birth of thought, which well illustrates the problems of attempting 
to trap such complex processes in test measures, especially when the 
thought processes are concerned with divergent issues. Wallas made an 
important point concerning the consciousness of such processes: 
unless we can recognise a psychological event, and distinguish 
it from other events, we cannot bring conscious effort to bear 
directly upon it..." 
Commenting on Helmholtz's analysis of thought processes, Wallas continues 
to explain the problems of unravelling thought processes, which are rarely 
clear cut and usually intermingled with other thought processes: 
"... our mental life is a stream of intermingled psychological 
events, all of which affect each other, any of which at a given 
moment, may be beginning or continuing or ending, and which, 
therefore, are extremely hard to distinguish from each other." 
(Ibid) 
One might conclude from such observations that a difficulty in attemp—
ing to assess the creative process, is that one is forced to present a 
problem to a subject, and request that the subject focus upon that problem 
in a way which isolates it from a rich medley of background processes and 
problems. 
Wallas has given some consideration to the processes leading to the 
emergence of thoughts, and in particular to the emergence of 'creative 
thoughts'. He takes Helmholtz's three stages,names them and adds a fourth 
stage of his own. The first stage is termed Preparation during which the 
problem in hand is considered and investigated by the individual from as 
many angles as possible. This stage of thought is followed by a period 
called Incubation. There are two aspects with regard to incubation: the 
one concerned with the unconscious and involuntary mental events which may 
take place during incubation (and which might lead to the third stage of 
Illumination), and the fact that during this stage we do not voluntarily 
Wallas, G. (1926) The Art - F Thought. p.79 
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or consciously think on a particular problem. Incubation is clearly a 
period which requires time, and further, the length of time cannot be 
specified in advance - a further problem for standardised assessment. 
Similarly, the 'best' conditions for this period would be difficult to 
define and to apply in a controlled way, and yet this is the critical 
period for the genesis of ideas. For assessment purposes, it is perhaps 
the stage we would most like to understand and control, and most need to 
control. In practice, so far, much research has proceeded as if the process 
could be explained and controlled and timed. During the third period of 
Illumination, a solution may be recognised and realised, and during the 
fourth period of Verification, the processes are characterised by conscious 
and logical activities. Wallas talks in association terms - of trains of 
through - he raises problems such as insight (Gestalt) and terms such as 
'fringe' (William James) in his attempts to describe the processes 
preceding illumination. 
Carl Rogers (1959) has discussed creativity in terms of a process 
within the context of his personality theory. He makes reference to the 
processes which Wallas has called Incubation and Illumination: 
"From the very nature of the inner conditions of creativity it 
is clear that they cannot be forced, but must be permitted to 
emerge. The farmer cannot make the germ develop and sprout from 
the seed; he can supply only the nurturing conditions which will 
permit the seed to develop its own potentialities." 
Once again, in this comment, the problems of trapping creativity in assess-
ment situations are stressed. Rogers describes the creative process in 
the following terms: 
"My definition then, of the creative process, is that it is the 
emergence in action of a novel relational product, growing out 
of the uniqueness of the individual on the one hand, and the 
materials, events, people or circumstances of his life on the 
other." (Ibid) 
Rogers, C. (1959) "Towards a theory of creativity" in: Anderson, H.H. 
Creativity and its Cultivation. P.78 and P.71. 
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More importantly, in terms of the standpoint of this study, Rogers 
insists that such a process is not restricted to some particular content. 
Neither does he make distinctions between what he terms 'good' and 'bad' 
creativity which would involve one in social evaluation and which is, as 
Rogers notes, subject to fluctuations. 
The motivational aspect of creativity is explained, by Rogers in 
terms of "man's tendency to actualise himself, to become his potentialities". 
Whist he feels that it is of little help to examine the intentions and 
purposes of the individual participating in the creative process, because 
something deemed creative might well emerge from apparently unrelated 
intentions, Rogers does believe that certain conditions facilitate creative 
behaviour. To become truly involved in the creative process the individual 
requires "openness to experience", an "internal locus of evaluation" and 
"the ability to toy with elements and concepts". Rogers also cites 
important external conditions which will lead to psychological freedom 
and safety and allow the individual freedom to actualise his potential. 
Much research into creativity has attempted to satisfy some or all of 
Roger's conditions. Unlike Rogers, there are those (e.g. Osborn, 1953) 
who believe that creativity can be deliberately facilitated, but most have 
attempted to structure "free", "playful" and "non—threatening" situations. 
How effectively one can structure for these in the microcosm of the assess—
ment situation is, at best, questionable. 
Ghiselin (1955) in his editorial to The Creative Process explains 
that it is only as the creative work is done that the meaning of the 
creative effort can be appreciated. Production by a process of purely 
conscious calculation seems never to occur. One may attempt, according 
Rogers, C. (1959) Ibid. 
Osborn, A. (1953) Applied Imagination: Principles and Procedures of 
Creative Thinking. 
Ghiselin, B. (1955) (ed.) The Creative Process. 
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to Ghiselin, to calculate the conditions, even the materials upon which a 
subject is to work but there is no certainty that the outcome of these con-
ditions, materials and processes will be one of creative structuring. 
Ghiselin (1955) writes: 
"...the creative order 	 which is an extension of life, is 
not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond 
the established, or at the least a reorganisation of it and 
often of elements not included in it... New life comes always 
from outside our world as we commonly conceive that world." 
It would seem once again that whilst one might well analyse the parts of 
a creative process, it would be extremely difficult to set up situations 
in which to assess these, especially as there is no guarantee that creativity 
will come about. 
The process notion is an important one in the considerations of 
Freud (1938). Essential to the creative process is productive conflict. 
The creative person is one who is able to accept freely rising ideas. When 
creative processes are in action, the ego, which is governed by the reality 
principle, and which controls the access of ideas to consciousness, sus-
pends its censoring functions. This release is obviously only temporary 
- a sustained state would patently be pathological. Freud is speaking 
in personality terms, but, within a cognitive explanation, freedom stems 
from the realisation that culturally accepted logic is simply one way of 
structuring and interpreting, and further, that at points it might be 
profitable to examine the potential of other logics. 
Freud (1959) likened creative behaviour to aspects of child's play, 
stressing as he did so the awareness of reality that creative behaviour 
always maintains: 
"The creative writer does the same as the child at play. He 
creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously -
that is, which he invests with large amounts of emotion - while 
separating sharply from reality." 
Ghiselin, B. (1955) Ibid. 
	 P.14. 
Freud, S. (1938) The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud. A.A. Brill (trans/ed) 
Freud, S. 1959) "Creative writers and 
Stanctwzd itlw the Complete Works  
daydreaming" in: Stratcher, J. (ed.) 
of Sigmund FiEd. Vol 9, P.143. 
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The stages of Wallas, and the conditions of Rogers speak of the need of 
a link with reality at points within the creative process. McKellar  
(1957) speaks of the need for a right relationship between autistic 
thinking and reality-adjusted thinking, in creative behaviour. Clark, 
Veldman and Thorpe (1965) require that individuals should have mature and 
adequately controlled ideational processes. They investigated the 
relationship between divergent thinking and certain perceptual tasks 
using the Holtzman Inkblot Test. The material led to free phantasy res-
ponses in the subjects, and such responses were 'often found to be uncon-
ventional', but, according to Clark et al, such responses were not 
pathological and were ideationally controlled. Shouksmith (1970) asks 
that the individual should have the ability to highlight the essentials 
of the associations he makes, should be able to evaluate the relationship, 
and further, that he should follow it through or develop it from the 
initially conceived idea. In short all of these theorists are concerned 
to state that the creative process, at certain points, must be characterised 
by conscious, deliberate activity. Creative processes are not to be con-
fused with phantasy. 
George Kelly (1955) is concerned with constructs of reality and the 
ways in which an individual construes reality. There is a place for 
creativity within his personal construct theory. Kelly talks of the con-
struing process by means of two separate but inter-related cycles: the CPC 
Cycle (Circumspection, Preemption and Control) and the Creativity Cycle. 
McKellar, P. (1957) Imagination and Thinking. 
Clark, C. Veldman, D. and Thorpe, J. (1965) "Convergent and divergent 
thinking abilities of talented adolescents", J. of Ed. Psy. 56 pp 175-63. 
Shouksmith, 	 (1973) Intelligence, Creativity and Cognitive Style. 
Kelly, G. (1955) The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Vols 1 and 2. 
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"The CPC Cycle starts with circumspection, which enables the 
person to look at his elements propositionally, or in a multi-
dimensional manner.., he selects what he believes to be the 
crucial issue... Thus, by preemption he sets up a choice point, 
a cross-roads of decision... but the CPC Cycle does not end 
with preemption. There is still the choice to be made... as we 
have indicated before in our Choice Corollary, a person chooses 
for himself that alternative in a dichotomised construct through 
which he anticipates the greater possibility for extension and 
definition of his system." 
Though couched in somewhat different terms, Kelly offers an inter-
pretation of knowledge-construction which is in harmony with this study, 
though he does throughout his theory confine himself to an adult model. 
Apart from the ability to view reality from other dimensions, he requires 
that the individual be capable of conscious selection and choice. Having 
described his CPC Cycle which starts with propositional constructs, and 
which is concerned with viewing constructs from different angles rather 
than with the birth of new constructs, Kelly describes his second cycle - 
the Creativity Cycle: 
which starts with loosened construction and terminates 
with tightened and validated construction." 
and: 
loosened construction is that which is characterised by 
varying alignment of elements, while tightened construction 
involves rigid assignment of elements within the construct's 
context. 
The Creativity Cycle starts in the loosened construction as the individual 
shows what Kelly terms a shifting approach to his problems: 
what makes the ambiguity meaningful in the Creativity 
Cycle is the person's ability to experiment minimally with 
each transient variation, then to seize upon one of the more 
likely ones, tighten it up, and subject it to a major test." 
Kelly goes on to explain that a person who is in the habit of employing 
tight constructs cannot be creative - though he might be very productive. 
Kelly, G. (1955) Ibid. Vols 1 and 2. P. 516, P.528 and P.529. 
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He will, however, always turn out alternatives which have been blue-
printed. Similarly though: 
"... just as a person who uses tight constructions cannot be 
creative, so a person who uses loose constructions exclusively 
cannot be creative." 
Whatever the terminology or frame of reference, after the loosened 
construction, after the processes following the relaxation of the ego, 
after re-construction of reality, there has to be a process of recognition 
and of definition of the reality identified. Further, there seems to be 
much general agreement so far that what is recognised and defined as 
'creative' by the individual might not receive the same valuation by 
society. Kelly echoes this point, reiterating the distinction between 
process and product: 
"When he is finished his idea is expressed in a form which is 
somewhat more communicable, though it may still defy verbal 
description and it may still look like a shapeless mass to 
unsympathetic spectators. 
Kellynakes the points that constructs are usually preverbal at first, and; 
"As his new construct begins to take shape, the creative thinker 
is likely to be hard pressed to find a suitable symbol for it." 
There is some relationship here with Piaget's idea that understanding of 
phenomena is related to ability to define (not necessaribt verbally) that 
phenomena. 
Whilst a number of theorists can be included in a discussion of 
processes of creativity, it is important to point out that different 
strategies are often included under 'process' according to definitions 
and understandings of what creativity is about. There are those who regard 
the process in'associational' terms (Wallach and Kogan, 1965), whilst 
others approach creative behaviour in terms of elaboration of ideas, 
Torrance, 1973). 
Kelly, G. (1955) Ibid. P.529, P. 999 and P.1051. 
Wallach, H. and Kogan, M. (1965) Modes of Thinking in Young Children. 
Torrance, E.P. (1973) Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking.(Tests & Manual) 
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Shouksmith (1970) commenting on Wallach and Kogan (1965) explains the 
process in terms of: 
"the ability to produce associates, and especially unique 
associates freely." 
Bartlett (1958) speaks of closed-system and of adventurous thinking. In 
this latter category he includes both creative and scientific thought, 
though there are distinguishing features. Of adventurous thinking, he 
writes: 
"The conditions for original thinking are when two or more 
streams of research begin to offer evidence that they may 
converge and so in some manner be combined. It is the com-
bination which can generate new directions of research." 
Mednick (1964) concerned with creativity as process, explains it almost 
wholly in associational terms; 
"Creative thinking consists of forming new combinations of 
associative elements, which combinations either meet specific 
requirements, or are in some way useful. The more mutually 
remote the elements of the new combinations, the more creative 
is the process or solution." 
This stress on the need for mutually remote elements is enshrined in 
Mednick's Remote Associates Test. However, as will be discussed later, 
it is questionable that remoteness is essential to creative outcomes. It 
is on this point that Mednick seems to confuse process with product. 
Edward de Bono (1970) in his work on lateral thinking is concerned 
with the idea of escaping from restricting thought patterns to new ones. 
He is very process-conscious in his approach to the subject and, as will 
be seen later, in his attempts to foster thinking in its different forms. 
Lateral thinking according to de Bono is: 
"... closely related to creativity. But whereas creativity is 
too often only the description of a result, lateral thinking is 
the description of a process." 
Shouksmith, G. (1970) Intelligence, Creativity and Cognitive Style. P.125. 
Bartlett,F.C. (1958) Thinking: An Experimental Study. 
Mednick, S.A. and Mednick, M.T. "An associative interpretation of the 
creative process", Psy. Rev. Vol62, No 3, pp 220-232. 
de Bono, E. (1970) Lateral Thinking. P.11. 
PLATE 3.  
"If you were a zoo keeper and wanted to know how 
heavy an elephant was how would you do it?" 
'The purpose of this problem was to see how children 
dealt with this matter of size and weight. . 
	
would 
they take the great weight into account? 
	 . Would 
children grasp the principles involved (of weight and 
balance) or just borrow complete machines for the 
purpose?" 
De Bono classifies the above response of a 10 year 
old boy as a "lateral thinking solution". As a problem, 
in terms of structure and direction, it falls somewhere 
between a Wertheimer type task where "the problem itself 
arises from the structure of the given material"('61), 
and an open type creativity task inviting imaginative 
responses. 
Taken from: Children Solve Problems. de Bono. E. '72. 
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Wertheimer. M. Pm! Hiv, mviinkintr. '61. 
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Essentially, the formation of new categories and new associations 
involves the individual concerned in what might be termed 'code-breaking' 
for 'new' associations as such cannot be patterned and passed on by a 
culture, as is the case with common, generally held associations: 
"Now the content of categories are built up through experience, 
so that to members of the same culture, systems tend to be 
highly similar. This in turn means that a given event will tend 
to be coded in a similar way by most members of a given culture 
- coding becomes highly stereotyped in fact. Nonetheless, some 
people, despite their common cultural background, retain the 
capacity to make novel and unusual codings, which manifest 
themselves as creative thinking." Cropley, 1967. 
Such new codings or free associations of ideas are well exemplified in 
the efforts of say a Virginia Woolf or an Eliot, where disparates are 
collapsed to create new relationships and where communication is based on 
poetic symbolism. And in the case of Virginia Woolf (1953 and 1932) there 
is much evidence of a conscious struggle to achieve a new logic, a new 
construction of reality. Eliot (1944) who has struggled to create new 
patterns and relationships, has a comment to make on the problem of 'set': 
"There is it seems to us 
At best, only a limited value 
In the knowledge derived from experience, 
For knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies, 
For the pattern is new in every moment 
And every moment is a new and shocking valuation." 
This is the heart of the tension which must characterise any creative 
process. On the one hand there is need for experience, for an accepted 
way of knowing and of interpreting reality, for only on the basis of such 
can one depart to other realities. At the same time, there is a need for 
a level of consciousness and understanding which will enable the individual 
to realise that categories are man-made - and that man can be free to 
create other categories. 
Cropley, A.J. (1967) Creativity. P.38 
Woolf, V. (1953) A Writer's Diary. 
Woolf, V. (1932) The Common Reader. 
Eliot, T.S. (1944) hist Coker: TheloustetB. 
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Research into creativity has many points of departure with various 
findings. Because of the diversity of the assumptions and resulting 
methodologies, comparison clearly becomes a problem. One common factor, 
however, in much of the research discussed so far, is that most of it 
assumes, implicitly or explicitly, an adult model. Perhaps this assump-
tion is a way of saying that a certain level of cognitive ability is 
necessary for creative behaviour. However, such a model does not attempt 
to explain the development of creative behaviour or the stages, if any, 
of such development. 
In a developmental approach there is an admission of differences on 
an age or stage basis. This admission leads to some attempt, in any 
measures of creativity employed, to discriminate against childish, ego-
centric responses, distinguishing them from objective, adult responses. 
Different qualities or levels of response would be anticipated at different 
stages or ages. 
Much of the early work in the area of creativity was descriptive and 
lacked the controls which are now seen to be essential. There is inadequate 
explanation of terms such as "imagination", "phantasy" and "creative", and 
at times they are used almost interchangeably. Ribot (1906) talks of the 
idea of rivalry between the growth of reason and the growth of imagination. 
McMillan (1924) identified three stages of imagination. She described the 
first stage as one in which the child possessed a "sense of beauty". In 
the second stage, he comes to terms with reality, asking about cause and 
effect for instance, and in the final third stage, he begins to work out 
some order in the world as he perceives it. In spite of the essentially 
descriptive approaches of both, there are aspects of these findings which 
have been developed and empirically investigated by more recent researchers. 
Ribot, T. (1906) Essay on the Creative Imagination. 
McMillan, M. (1924) Educaticx, throuel Imagination. 
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For instance, Torrance (1965) takes up,in his own terminology, this 
idea of rivalry between imagination and reason, and whilst McMillan 
used 'stage' in no technical sense (Tanner and Inhelder, 1956) the idea 
of growth into some more organised way of perceiving reality has been 
developed and much investigated. 
In 1930 Andrews set about a study of the area in a more systematic 
manner. He concluded that total imaginative scores are highest between 
four and four and a half years of age and that there is a sudden drop 
around five years of age. However, one is left questioning a number of 
Andrews' distinctions - especially his apparent confusion between phan-
tasy and imagination which might explain the sudden drop in scores around 
five years of age or so. 
Ruth Griffiths (1945) identified two stages in the creative drawings 
of children and she related them to a study of imagination in early child-
hood. As well as a consideration of these drawings, she also employed a 
method Qf observation of free-play in a structured situation. However, 
systematic though she is in many ways, she too makes no real distinction 
between terms such as imagination and phantasy. At one point, she refers 
to phantasy as "the manner of thinking natural in childhood" (chapter XVII) 
and at another to the fact that: "imagination has long been recognised as 
the characteristic mode of thinking during the period of early childhood" 
(chapter XX). What she does delineate, however in the eleven stages she 
draws up on the basis of her examination of children's drawings, is a 
passage which indicates growing organisation and complexity of thought. 
Torrance, E.P. (1965) Rewarding Creative Behaviour. 
Tanner, J. and Inhelder, B. (1956) Discussion in Child Development. Vol IV. 
Andrews, E. (1930) The Development of Imagination in the Preschool Child. 
Griffiths, R. (1945) A Study of Imagination in Early Childhood. 
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Mearns (1931) discussing creative activity, maintains that this 
activity enjoys free expression during the first three grades (of American 
schooling), and to some extent, remains in the fourth and fifth grades. 
According to him there is a rapid decline of free expression in the sixth 
and seventh grades and by the eighth grade the ability would seem to be 
lost, though Mearns argues that the ability to be creative can be revived 
at any age, even adulthood. What is required here is some systematic 
investigation as to the nature of such activity at different grade levels, 
and suggestions for the reason for decline, and possible re-appearance, of 
creative ability. For in spite of a certain vagueness, the idea of changes 
in response-rates is an interesting one, and might be explicable in terms 
of phantasy versus imagination (Piaget, 1951), rather than in terms of a 
rise or fall in the same ability. 	 The drop in 'creative output' in 
Mearns' investigation could be interpreted as the child coming to terms 
with the demands of rules and contexts, in other words, a lessening of 
ego-centric responses. The revival of 'creative output' would be explained 
as recognition of other modes of signifying and relating phenomena. 
Torrance (1964) considered the developmental curve of imaginative 
abilities. He found during the course of this research that there was a 
steady increase in imaginative ability from first through third grade. 
A sharp decrease was noted too, between the third and fourth grades, 
followed by some recovery during the fifth and sixth. That there is a 
strong similarity between the findings and interpretations of Torrance 
and Andrews (1930) is not surprising as Torrance based this part of his 
work on Adnrews'. Concerned to find reasons to explain this develop-
mental curve, Torrance studied the process in other cultures, drawing 
Mearns, H. (1931) The Creative Adult. 
Piaget, J. (1951) Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood. 
Torrance, E.P. (1964) "The Minnesota Studies of Creative Thinking" in: 
Widening Horizons in Creativity, Calvin W. Taylor (ed). 
samples of both rural and urban subjects from Western Samoa, India, 
Australia, Norway and Germany. Torrance (1964) found different develop-
mental phenomena taking place in these cultures: 
"In brief, we find that in cultures or subcultures where there 
are few discontinuities, there is no drop in these develop- 
mental curves. In cultures which have the cultural discontinuities, 
as our culture has, at about ages 5,9 and 13 we find these drops." 
It is Vernon (1948) who makes a distinction that this study would 
prefer to rest upon. He maintains that constructive imagination does not 
occur in the child of normal intelligence and emotional development until 
at least the age of eleven. Vernon based his conclusions on the ability 
of subjects to understand a series of pictures and to show ability to inter-
pret these pictures as a whole, rather than focussing on details, indicat-
ing a lack of syncretic perception. Vernon found that at the age of 
eleven years, children could invent explanations of the scenes depicted, 
in terms of thoughts, emotions and activities of the characters protrayed. 
Such findings fit in well with Piaget's, in terms of the onset of formal 
operational abilities at about the same age. 
Liam Hudson (1966 and 1972) much influenced by the work of Getzels 
and Jackson, and researching into convergence - divergence (the latter 
not to be treated as synonomous with creativity), draws conclusions which 
have some relevance for developmental studies of creativity and related 
areas: 
"The identity of convergent and divergent children can be seen, 
in other words, as chrystallising to different extents and at 
different stages: the convergent during the latency period, the 
divergent in adolescence. The internal economy of the conver-
gent child, the future scientist, might be said to gel at the 
stage in his development when issues of rationality and internal 
control are paramount. That of the divergent child, the future 
arts specialist, sets less firmly, and at a stage when emotional 
considerations are again more pressing." (1972) 
Torrance, E.P. (1964) Ibid. P.136. 
Vernon, M. (1948) "The development of imaginative construction in the child," 
Br. J. Pay. 
 39, 102-111. 
Hudson, L. (1966) Contrary Imaginations. 
Hudson, L. (1972) The Cult of the Fact. P fin 
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Whilst Hudson's investigations are generally concerned with personality 
dimensions of the problem, his developmental outline is in accord with the 
notion that logical thinking will precede and be the foundation for what 
is here termed creative thinking, and that creative thinking could reach 
its developmental peak in adolescence. 
E.S. Schachtel (1959) puts forward an explanation of creativity in 
perceptual terms. Whilst his theory is a theory of personality, he 
employs concepts which perhaps bear some relation to those of Piaget, 
though within a different frame of reference. Further, his theory is a 
developmental one. Schachtel proposes two perceptual modes - the first 
being autocentric, and the second the allocentric. By autocentric, he 
means that in the process of perception there is little objectification, 
the process being affected by the subjective state of the person. There 
is perhaps here, some pa'rallel with Piaget's concept of 'assimilation'. 
Similarly, the allocentric mode of perception might be compared with 
Piaget's concept of 'accommodation', for in both instances there is a 
process of objectification, although the reasons for lack of objectification 
are quite different in the two theories, Schachtel's being essentially an 
explanation of personality. Whilst underpinned by different rationales, 
both can be seen as equilibrium-theories of behaviour, and in both there 
is a movement towards objectification with age. During the process of 
development, there grows out of the autocentric mode of perception what 
Schachtel terms secondary autocentricity, by which he means that: 
"objects are most frequently perceived from the perspective 
of how they will serve a need of the perceiver, or how they 
can be used by him..." Ibid. 
Schachtel, E.S. (1959) cited in Getzels and Jackson (1962) creativity and 
Intelligence. Pp 112-117. 
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Further, this mode is characterised by a fear of events or of objects and 
situations which might disturb or threaten by their newness or strangeness 
(what Schachtel terms: "embeddedness"). Creativity within this develop-
mental framework is defined as: 
"...the art of seeing the familiar fully in its inexhaustible 
being, without using it autocentrically for purposes of 
remaining embedded in ti and reassured by it." Ibid. 
It is when this allocentric mode of perception has some real measure of 
control that creativity is possible, because this mode of perceiving 
obliges one to go about perceiving reality in ways and from angles other 
that those normally selected for reasons of 'safety'. Creativity stems 
then, in this theory, from a kind of tension. Cropley and Rogers refer 
to the role of tension in the creative process when they speak of creative 
individuals as being capable of supporting a high degree of cognitive 
dissonance or conflict; however, they speak within different theoretical 
frameworks. 
There are numerous other pieces of research which, whilst not 
directly concerned with creativity as such, might well have implications 
for this area, especially in terms of measures of creative behaviour, or 
more precisely, the construction of such measures. 
Rhoda Kellog (1969) for instance, analysing children's drawings, has 
suggested some interesting developmental trends. The subjects in her 
studies represented a wide age-range, starting as young as two years old . 
and drawn from a wide socio-economic range. Essentially, this was an 
observational task spread over 20 years. Kellog was primarily interested 
in line formations in children's scribble and drawings, maintaining on 
Schachtel, E.S. (1959) Ibid. P.113 
Kellog, R. (1969) Analysing Children's Art. 
the basis of her observations that "there are lines and designs that 
occur regularly and quite clearly in the drawings of many children" 
(ibid). Herbert Read, in his Presidential address to the Society for 
Education through Art, supported this notion: 
we have a hypothesis that should hold the field until 
it has been proved to be false. According to this hypothesis 
every child in its discovery of a mode of symbolisation, 
follows the same graphic evolution." 
A point here that might of interest in this study, is simply that 
until we are aware of such developmental determinants, and their effects, 
if any, upon expression, the assessment of graphic creativity might well 
be inadequate. A number of researchers (Franck, Torrance, Barron and 
others) attempt to assess creativity by means of drawings of some type. 
Kate Franck's Drawing Completion Test is one such instance (PLATE 4). 
Franck required subjects to elaborate on basic stimulus lines, and these 
elaborations were then evaluated, according to stated criteria, as 
"creative" or otherwise. If, however, elaborations are determined by 
this 'graphic evolution' of which Herbert spoke (1963) then such an 
evolution should be taken into account in any evaluation of children's 
graphic output. 
Many more recent studies, especially those concerned specifically 
with creative behaviour have been non-developmental in their approach. 
Wallach and Kogan (1966) had two major aims: 
we wished to determine whether solid evidence could be 
found that would support the validity of a distinction between 
intelligence and creativity as modes of cognitive activity. 
Second, if a distinction between these concepts could be given 
acceptable empirical support, we wished to investigate the 
possible psychological correlates of individual differences 
in creativity and intelligence when variations along these two 
dimensions were considered jointly." 
Read, H. (1963) Address to 4th Gen.Ass of Int. Soc. for Educ. thro' Art. 
Montreal. 
Franck, K. (1952) The Drawing Completion Test. 
Wallach, M. and Kogan, N. (1966) Modes of Thinking in Young nillrftp, p 1 
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The Drawing Completion Test (Kate Franck. 1951-52) 
a. the simple figures on which subjects were required 
to elaborate. 
b. instances of non-creative responses (according to 
Franck et al.) 
c. and d. instances of creative responses. (according 
to Franck et al) 
Torrance and Barron et al used modified versions of 
this test in their assessments of creative behaviour. 
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As they explain themselves, Wallach and Kogan were asking if something 
like Spearman's 'G' could exist within this area termed "creativity". 
Wallach and Kogan defined creativity in associational terms - the produc- 
tion of associative content which would be unique; and further, they 
wished to include in their definition a playful, permissive task-attitude 
on the part of the person making the associations. They drew up five 
measures of creative behaviour defined as follows: Instances, which 
required that the subject generate possible instances of class concept 
specified in verbal terms; Pattern Meanings where the child was asked 
to provide possible meanings or interpretations for a number of abstract 
visual designs; Alternate Uses, where this time the subject was asked to 
generate possible uses for a verbally specified object; Similarities,  
which required the c hild to supply possible similarities between two 
objects, and the final measure Line Meanings, a further visual measure, 
adapted from Tagiuri 1960, required the child to interpret or provide possible 
meanings for the stimulus lines. In all instances, free associations could 
be involved. Wallach and Kogan were concerned in the case of each measure 
to assess two related variables, namely the number of unique responses 
produced by the child and the total number of responses produced by the 
child. Within their research, "intelligence" was defined as measured by 
standardised tests, namely 3 sub-tests from the WISC, SCAT and STEP. 
It is important, in any attempt to relate creativity to intelligence 
to be clear as to what is intended by both concepts. As already indicated 
earlier in this chapter, concepts of creativity vary and this could have 
some implication for correlation of item results at later stages of inves-
tigation. There ist it would seem, a need for some closer examination of 
starting concepts. To say that intelligence and creativity do, or do not, 
relate is not to describe or necessarily understand the nature of the items, 
and the nature of the relating of these items. One might ask, for instance, 
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why results based on criteria such as statistical uniqueness (Wallach and 
Kogan, 1966), or results based on fluency (Ibid), should necessarily 
correlate with IQ measures dealing with, for instance, logical development 
or ability. Whilst one is not denying IQ-Creativity relationships when and 
where they exist, there is a definite need for a psychological as well as 
a statistical definition of the relationships. To know statistically that 
X and Y relate, is to know that they relate. It is not necessarily to 
imply that X and Y are the 'same', though they could be. X might, in fact, 
be dependent upon Y. This could be isolated statistically, but more is 
required. To speak of a relationship is to speak ofmany potentially dif-
ferent things. To speak of a creativity-intelligence relationship is to 
imply, in the first place, a distinction between the two factors, to see 
creativity as a separate cognitive function. Significant statistical 
relationships may be doing little more than uniting factors which should 
never have been conceived of as distinct, in the initial definitions and 
theory. 
Hudson (1970) raises this question for slightly different reasons: 
"I cannot for the life of me see why research in this field 
(i.e. creativityrintelligence) has placed so little confidence 
in demonstrable differences between convergers and divergers. 
If convergers and divergers differ, and in ways unconnected to the  
tests used in their definition (my underlining), this is evidence 
that low intercorrelations among measures of divergence have been . 
misconstrued." 
Hudson goes on to suggest the need for a more detailed examination of this 
area as a topic of interest in its own right, suggesting that differences 
may exist but have yet to be clearly defined. It would seem certainly 
from this statement and from findings such as those of Wallach and Kogan  
(1966) that the notion of a coherent trait termed 'creativity', distinct 
from intelligence needs further examination, especially at the theoretical 
stage, before it can be upheld or dismissed. 
Hudson, L. (1970) Frames of Mind. Penguin. P.125 
Wallach, M. and Kogan, N. (1q66) Thid. 
Working with 150 children (American fifth grade) Wallach and Kogan 
concluded that their measures of creativity possessed a high degree of 
internal consistency (the average correlation among the ten creativity 
measures was on the order of 0.4), and further they concluded that: 
"...a dimension of individual differences has been defined 
here which, on the one hand, possesses generality and pervasive- 
ness, but which, on the other hand, nevertheless is quite 
independent of the original notion of intelligence." (Ibid) 
The correlation between the creativity measures and the intelligence 
measures was low. 
A.J. Cropley (1968) lends only modified support to this finding, 
having re-examined their data, and Cropley and Maslany (1969) whilst giving 
some support to the Wallach and Kogan findings, do so with qualifications 
on the basis of a replication study. Cropley (1968) pointed out that: 
H
... the Wallach and Kogan battery did indeed retain the property 
of internal consistency when administered to university students, 
while cross correlations with the intelligence tests were usefully 
low... However, it is by no means clear that they elicited a new 
and separate intellectual mode. Although a substantial degree of 
separation of the two batteries was effected by factor analysis, 
a large general factor on which all tests loaded substantially was 
still obtained." 
In spite, therefore, of an initial research hope, it would seem that 
there was no clear evidence that the two abilities, intelligence and 
creativity, as they defined them, could be regarded as separate. 
Getzels and Jackson (1962) earlier worked with a somewhat select 
sample of subjects - the average IQ being over 130, and the representative-
ness of their sample therefore dubious. They assumed that creative think-
ing abilities would be found to some extent in all persons and were con-
cerned with: 
Cropley, A.J. (1968) "A note on the Wallach and Kogan tests of creativity", 
Br.J. Ed.Psy. Q, 197-201. 
Cropley, A.J. and Maslany (1969) "Reliability and factorial validity of 
Wallach-Kogan creativity tests", Br.J.Psy. 
 60, 395-98. 
Getzels, J. and Jackson, P. (1962) Creativity and Intelligence:tholorations  
with Gifted Students. 
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H... a fairly specific type of cognitive ability reflected 
in performance on a series of paper and pencil tests." 
In all they employed five measures of creativity, involving verbal and 
numerical symbol systems and tasks dealing with object-space relations. 
The score depended not upon a single pre-determined response, but on the 
number, variety and novelty of the responses for each task. Apart from 
criticism of their sample, there are comments to be made on the diffuse-
ness of their starting concept (Wallach and Kogan, 1966). Though Getzels 
and Jackson had hoped to provide some evidence on the relationship between 
intelligence and creativity, the evidence was in fact inconclusive. 
Torrance and Gowan (1963) examining the intelligence-creativity relation-
ship, make the point that, on the measures employed by Getzels and Jackson: 
"There are low correlations between verbal and nonverbal creative 
abilities and they appear to be largely independent..." 
Hasan and Butcher (1966), in their study, which was a partial rep-
lication of the Getzels and Jackson study, concluded that creativity and 
intelligence overlapped to such an extent that it was virtually impossible 
to make any kind of distinction. 
Cropley (1966) concluded that: 
"... it would be wrong to argue either that convergent and 
divergent thinking cannot be distinguished from each other 
factorially, as some authors have suggested, or that they are 
completely independent of each other... it is unacceptable to 
think of creativity as a separate basic intellectual mode..." 
Getzels, J. and Jackson, P. (1962) Ibid. P.16. 
Wallach, M. and Kogan, N. (1966) Ibid. 
Torrance, E.P. and Gowan, 
	 (1963) "The reliability of the Minnesota tests 
of creative thinking", Research Memorandum. Bur. Ed. Res. A, 
Hasan, P. and Butcher, H.J. (1966) "Creativity and intelligence", Br. J. 
.21. pp 129-35. 
Cropley, A.J. (1966) "Creativity and intelligence", 13r.J. of Educ. Psy. 
311 pp 259-66. 
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In his research, using an unselected group of children, Cropley employed 
seven measures of divergent thinking and six to assess convergent think-
king. Like Hasan and Butcher (ibid), some of his divergent measures 
were based on Torrance's and Mednick's work. Cropley factor-analysed a 
representative selection of both types of tests employed, and found five 
significant factors, two of which he identified as factors of both con-
vergent and divergent thinking. Orthogonal rotation suggested that it was 
impossible to find a factor of divergent thinking that did not also have 
high loadings on some convergent measures. Hence his conclusions about 
the intelligence-creativity relationship. 
Yamamoto (1965) came to similar conclusions working on a sample of 
primary school children in the USA. Creativity tests, he concludedlo were 
best to be seen as complementary measures, and no clear distinction could 
be made about the creativity-intelligence issue. 
The work in this current study is not concerned with theoretical 
systems which conceive of intelligence and creativity as separate cognitive 
modes. Neither is it satisfied that associative-type definitions of 
creativity are adequate, though they may cover certain kinds of creative 
functioning. Intelligence, as understood in this research is conceived of 
in Piagetian adaptive terms; it is a way of knowing, as is creative behaviour, 
and they are not to be regarded as distinct from one another. As ways of 
knowing and of interpreting reality, they require the same operational 
structures to govern the different stages of behaviour. If there is any 
distinction to be made it is simply in terms of the how of cognitive 
functioning: knowing can address itself to conventional logical systems, 
similarly it can be concerned with more divergent ways of apprehending 
Yamamoto, K.(1965)`Effects of restriction of range and test unreliability 
on correlation between measures of intelligence and creative thinking", 
Br.J.Ed.Psy, 
	 pp 300-5. 
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and interpreting reality. Here lies the distinction. But it is a dis-
tinction rooted in the function and not in the structure of the behaviour. 
Creativity is not a behaviour per se. Any act could become creative 
depending upon the dispositions of the knower, and his level of cognitive 
functioning. There are not different types of creativity - e.g. verbal or 
pictorial - but creativity can be expressed in different forms, and fluency 
in any one form is related to an individual's experience in that form. 
Bearing this in mind, it becomes necessary to ask to what extent, 
if at all, previous measures of creativity have attempted to discriminate 
against ego-centric, phantasy responses as opposed to conscious creative 
responses. In other words, for a yet further clarification of the concept, 
consideration of scoring methods is necessary. Unless discriminations are 
made against ego-centric, phantasy responses, one could simply end up 
correlating "ego-centricity" with "intelligence" - and it is likely that 
the relationship will be favourably lows 
The Wallach and Kogan research (1966), on the assessment of creativity, 
is concerned with two main measures - the uniqueness and the number of 
responses (PLATE 5). These measures are applied to all of the creativity 
tasks. Both measures raise problems. Uniqueness is defined by Wallach 
and Kogan in statistical terms. It refers to a response which is given 
by one child only out of their entire sample of 151. Such measures make 
no attempt to explain a response, especially in terms of its nature. 
They have little, if anything, to do with the structure of the response, 
and whilst Wallach and Kogan hope to discriminate against 'bizarre' res-
ponses (still somewhat subjective and subject to evaluation) there is no 
certainty that they, on the basis of such measures, discriminate against 
ego-centric responses. 
Wallach, M. and Kogan, N. (1966) Modes of Thinking in Young Children. 
PLATE 5. 
From: Modes of  Thinking in Young Children. 
Wallach-Kogan. 1966. 
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Stimulus Materials for the Line Meanings Test. The 
actual Test Cards measured 4 x 6 ins. The Test was 
adapted from Tagiuri (1960). 
In this test the subject was asked to generate 
meanings or interpretations relevant to the form 
of the line in question. Variables of uniqueness 
of responses and number of responses were scored. 
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One item assessed in this way is that of Alternate Uses. Here the 
subject is required to respond by stating all the different ways in which 
particular objects could be used. The child does not work to time and 
the tasks were described in terms of games. Wallach and Kogan cite 
instances of different types of responses: 
regarding uses for a newspaper: "rip it up if angry" (unique) 
"make paper hats" 	 (not unique) 
Whilst one is obliged to accept the statistical notion of unique as 
employed by them - how did the subjects arrive at such responses? How do 
the responses relate to the issues in hand? Making paper hats out of a 
newspaper, though no doubt a learnt ability, is at least one way of re-
structuring that newspaper's use. It is 'about' the newspaper. "Ripping 
it up" is about the emotions and need not relate to the newspaper in any 
way at all. There is no information on the nature of the link which might 
be formed by the respondent. In a response such as this, how does one 
establish criteria to distinguish 'connected' mature responses from non-
connected, thoughtless, impulsive responses. This type of assessment, 
which has the neatness of standardisation, allows no room for such dis-
tinctions. Perhaps the real question is - what is the value of such 
statistical concepts and measures? The same type of problem is encountered 
in their Similarities items. The child is asked to form associations 
between objects, but there are no clear criteria, as in the case of 
Mednick's associative tasks as to what constitutes acceptable associations, 
For instance, subjects are asked to list all the ways in which they think 
- "a cat and mouse are alike" or "meat and milk are alike". Again Wallach 
and Kogan cite instances of acceptable responses, for example - 'ban make 
women scream" and "are government inspected" are both regarded as unique 
Wallach, M. and Kogan, N. (1966) Ibid. 
Mednick, S.A. (1962) "The associative basis of the creative process", 
L62. pp 220-32. 
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statistical responses. It may well be that such responses could also be 
rated as creative in qualitative terms, but given the method employed, 
responses of a flippant nature such as "a split hair" or a "flattened 
zig-zag" might well satisfy the requirements of the Line Meanings Items, 
such is the lack of a structural relationship between the items and the 
responses. 
There is much of Torrance's work Which has inspired the early pre-
paration for this particular research project. One of Torrance's concerns 
when developing the Minnesota Tests of Creative Thinking was to find a set 
of tasks which could be administered from kindergarten right through 
graduate school (Torrance, 1965 and 1973). His initial attempts involved 
adapting Guilford's Unusual Uses Test involving bricks. Underpinning his 
tests are principles which Torrance proposes might be used in attempts to 
develop creativity. He refers to such as 'props' or 'starters'. They are 
of interest here because they relate strongly to the concept of identity 
as employed in this study. The questions concerned all involve adaptation 
extension or development of "identity". For instance: 
What would happen if we add something? 
take something away? 
multiply it? 
divide it? 
make it bigger? 
take something away and 
place? 
	 etc. 
put something in its 
These and other questions suggested by Torrance for encouraging creative 
responses can all be interpreted as questions of 'identity', and responses 
could be examined in qualitative terms. His Product Improvement Test, 
using stuffed toy animals, is a test reflecting what can be interpreted as 
the 'identity dimension': 
Torrance, E.P. (1965) Rewarding Creative Behaviour. 
Torrance, E.P. (1973) Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (Tests & Manual). 
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"We believe that the ability to elaborate an idea is a valuable 
kind of creative ability. The successful creative person must 
sustain his original insight, elaborate upon it and develop it 
to the full." (1965) 
Other items of Torrance might well be said to have influenced measures 
developed for this project, but as with Wallach and Kogan there is very 
real disagreement with regard to his scoring techniques. Torrance scored 
for fluency, flexibility and originality. Fluency was measured by the 
number of appropriate or relevant responses, flexibility by the number 
of different categories into which items could be classified (he adapted 
this from Osborne's categories, 1957) and originality assessed on the basis 
of statistical infrequency. Once again, then the concern is quantitative 
rather than qualitative, and perhaps mention should be made of the fact 
that Torrance sets time-limits to his tests. Throughout his tests, in 
both figural and verbal type questions this matter of a statistical definition 
repeats itself. 
	 In his examples of scoring (1973) (see PLATE 6), it can 
be seen that the elaboration score is simply a summation of points for 
additions to a structure. An interesting question might be - is it the 
number of elaborations which transform a structure - or is this done by 
the nature of the elaborations as they relate to the initial structure? 
Presumably, were one to take item 1 (PLATE 6) and cover the pear-shaped 
object with varied lines, dots, etc, one could score quite highly - and be 
more creative? 
It would be inaccurate to assume that Torrance is wholly product-minded. 
He is not, but is interested rather in the processes involved in creative 
behaviour; 
"a process of becoming sensitive to problems, deficiencies, gaps 
in knowledge, missing elements, disharmonies, and so on; iden-
tifying the difficulty; searching for solutions, making guesses 
or formulating hypotheses about the deficiencies: testing and re-
testing these hypotheses and possibly modifying and retesting 
them; and finally communicating the results." (1973) 
Torrance, E.P. (1965) Rewarding Creative Behaviour. P.40 
Torrance, E.P. (1973) Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking. (Manual P.B.) 
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	 Elaboration Score: 8 
Note: The basic object is the .block of cheese made from the 
stimulus. Credit is for ideas added to basic object. 
PLATE 6 
Two examples of the Torrance method of scoring. 
From the Torrance Test Manual. 1973. 
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His statement of intentions and his ideas for the encouragement of 
creative behaviour would seem to be somewhat in conflict with his mode of 
assessing creative responses. This encapsulates the dilemma of having to 
choose between qualitative or quantitative ways of analysing and assessing. 
What is required is an approach which can treat of qualitative dimensions 
in quantitative terms — a point to be developed later. 
Other areas become problematic when responses are recorded only in 
quantitative terms. Torrance (1965) reported that he employed, in his 
earlier work, measures of creativity requiring subjects to make guesses 
about events in pictures. (A not unsimilar task—"questions"— exists in 
his recent tests, 1974). The pictures which were all Mother Goose prints, 
depicted children's behaviour problems. For instance, one such picture 
showed a boy holding a cat over a well. A girl of about the same age was 
looking on and another boy had his back turned to the scene. The subjects 
were encouraged to ask questions and then to make guesses about the events 
in the pictures. Work in other areas suggests that this type of measure 
might be inappropriate, especially with younger children, because of 
important variables not taken into account. For instance, Dorothy Flapan 
(1968), in a project directed by Jersild„ attempted to examine the child's 
ability to comprehend, through motion pictures, sequences of behaviour. 
She worked largely within a Piagetian framework accepting Piaget's major 
assumptions about development. Flapan found that subjects in the younger 
age group (6+ years), had difficulty in going beyond the immediate infor—
mation. They were factual in their responses. They tended to focus on 
detail and were poor in terms of causal relationships and explanations. 
Burns and Cavey (1957) in an earlier piece of research came up with similar 
supportive findings with regard to the younger child's difficulties in 
interpreting events in drawings. 
Torrance, E.P. (1965) Rewarding Creative Behaviour. 
Flapan, D. (1968) Children's Understanding of Social Interaction. 
Burns, N. and Cavey, L. (1957) "Age differences in empathetic ability amongst 
children", J, Caned. 'OY. XT. 227-230 
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In any assessment of creativity, then, one has somehow to plan for 
responses which, to the adult, might be of interest, but which in fact 
stem from the confusion and distortions of the ego-centric thinker. On 
the same count, many tests as they stand would hardly distinguish against 
marginally psychotic thinking. McKellar (1957) points out: 
"The thinking of a psychotic may exhibit curious discontinuities. 
These peculiar connections, or absences of connection have been 
linked to the Knight's move in chess 
	
because of an apparent 
gap between where the thought begins and where it ends." 
Given these problems in assessment, the call might be for a method which 
is essentially clinical in type and which makes some attempt to examine 
the quality of the responses and the underpinning logic - or lack of one. 
Bruner's (1962) type of creativity would clearly call for something 
more reality-adjusted than is often required in some measures of creativity. 
He talks of an act that produces "effective surprise". Such an act, he 
sees as resulting from combinatorial activity: a placing of things in a 
new perspective. This type of activity takes individuals beyond common 
ways of experiencing reality, but his statement assumes, of course, that 
the subject knows reality in its usual or common forms. This knowledge 
is essential to the experience of surprise. Bruner's model is, of course, 
an adult model. One could add as a rider that Bruner sees the "exercise 
of technique" as a part of the success of combinatorial activity. 
Technique is both acquired and conscious at some stage. 
Other measures of creativity have relied on verbal abilities rather 
than on the child's response to pictorial images- e.g. Getzels and 
Jackson's Word Association Measure or Mednick's Remote Associations Tests. 
Here developmental variations in ways of signifying and of relating would 
seem to be of importance and yet again there is little attempt to 
McKellar, P. (1957) Imagination and Thinking. 
 13.97. 
Bruner, J. (1962)"The conditions of creativity" in: Knowing: Essays for  
the Left Hand. 
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discriminate against such factors. Bruner and Oliver (1963), for instance, 
in a study of Equivalence Transformations, noted that with increasing 
age, there is an increase in functional groupings of objects. Children 
would appear to attend more to the uses of things than to the structure 
and appearance of the object. Werner and Kaplan (1952) reported that: 
"Many childish words are subjected to the process of conven-
tionalisation till their meanings are fairly congruent with 
the word content of the adult." 
This obviously has implications for the type of tests requiring free 
associations, for there may well be developmental patterns in signfication 
and association which could affect the interpretation of some results of 
creativity. 
Entwisless work, cited earlier, is of especial importance here. She 
studied the word associations of young children in a game-like situation. 
Her instructions to the children were as follows: 
"I want you to tell me the first word you think of each time I 
read you a word..." 
Amongst her findings was the conclusion that children give many more 
associations than do adults, owing to their lack of language socialisation. 
A further difficulty which may blight the assessment of creativity, 
and an understanding, in empirical terms, of that concept, must be the 
conditions in which that concept is assessed - the mode of presentation - 
the test-like circumstances, etc. Rogers and others have emphasised the 
need for a permissive and playful atmosphere. Wallach and Kogan attempted 
this and set no time limits - the only limit being when the child showed 
no desire to continue with the task. However, even in such un-timed 
Bruner, J. and Oliver, R. (1963) "The development of equivalence trans-
formations in children", Soc.lies.Child.Devt. 28, 125-141. 
Werner, H. and Kaplan, E. (1952) "The acquisition of word meanings: a 
developmental study", Soc.aes.Ch.Bevt.Monog. 15. No.51. 
Entwisle, D. (1965) Word Associations of Young Children. P.30 
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conditions, so—called, there is timing, in so far as creative output is 
tied to a specific situation and to a degree of motivation and interest 
on the part of the subject. However, many assessment situations are more 
demanding than these. Guilford, in his tasks, gives instructions such as: 
"In the next 30 seconds write down as many words as you can think 
of which are similar in meaning..." (Fluency task) 
The Torrance tests place specified time limits on responses. Getzels  
and Jackson (1962) go so far as to print on the test—like instruction 
booklet: 
ft
... your score will depend upon the number of different words 
you write, and on the number of different meanings the words 
remind us of..." 
Joan Barker Lunn (1970) made similar demands at Primary School level: 
"each item on the test was strictly timed: two minutes was 
allowed for the majority of items." 
Again, one is forced to ask the question — can creativity be assessed? 
And if so, in what kinds of conditions? Strictly timed tests and conditions 
of assessment require a subject to "switch on" to creativity in ways which 
are opposed to the spontaneity and the suddenness contained in so many 
of the definitions. Assessment of what might be termed normative thinking 
— where responses are limited and known in advance — is beset by many 
problems thought to interfere with performance. The assessment of 
creativity has enormous problems surroundilgit — especially when both the 
subject and the assessor have yet to recognise an outcome as creative. By 
nature, the outcome cannot be known in advance. 
It is with many reservations such as those already outlined — about 
definition and the relationship of assessment to definition; about the 
need to distinguish between product and process — that this study has 
Getzels, J. and Jackson, P. (1962) Creativity and Intelligence. P.224. 
Barker Lunn, J. (1970) Streaming in the Primary School. 
 P.315, Appendix 4. 
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adopted a largely clinical approach, and, moreover wishes to focus on 
essential cognitive structures believed to be essential to creative 
ability. It is extremely difficult - perhaps impossible - to assess 
creative behaviour in any objective way - but perhaps it is possible to 
evaluate abilities thought to be essential for creative interpretations 
of reality. 
Guilford (1965) offers a comprehensive theory of intellect and con-
siders creativity within this general framework. He starts from a very 
different standpoint from that of Piaget - the one applying minimal stan-
dardisation and justifying it - the other engaged in multivariate analysis. 
Guilford (1967) supports a multivariate view of intelligence (which 
encompasses creative abilities). His concern is with establishing 
factors of ability. A factor is initially described in statistical terms 
by a series of intercorrelations. The next task is to provide a psycho-
logical description of that statistic - important, for as Guilford pointed 
out earlier: 
ft where the factor can be given a psychological definition 
and meaning we have a powerful new concept, not only for des-
criptive purposes but also for thinking about human nature." (1954) 
Crucial of course to this approach to intelligence and creativity is a 
sound grasp and isolation of the actual factors and the certainty of a 
factor being a factor: Guilford recognises this problem and notes it as 
a criticism often employed against this particular method of analysis: 
"Resistance to the fact of numerous intellectual factors is 
sometimes expressed in another way. It is pointed out that 
additional factors come about by splitting of already known 
ones. One implication is that there is no end to splitting, 
and another implication is that splinters cannot be of much 
consequence. The conception of 'splitting' is erroneous. 
What usually happened is that early attempts at analysis did 
not represent all the factors adequately." (1967) 
Guilford, J.P. (1965) "A psychometric approach to creativity", Am.Orthopsy. 
Ass. Symposium. 
Guilford, J.P. (1967) The Nature of Human Intelligence. P.36. 
Guilford, J.P. (1954) ;)eYchometric Methods. P.471. 
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Guilford goes on to explain that assurance is attained by means of 
statistical trials. In general terms, Guilford speaks of a factor as: 
"an underlying latent variable along which individuals 
differ." (Ibid) 
Having isolated factors Guilford then places them in his model of 
intellect: 
"The placement of any intellectual factor within the model is 
determined by its three unique properties: its operation, its 
content and its product..." (1967) 
Guilford explained these three organising principles. "Operation" refers 
to the kind of action carried out on a given material; "content" describes 
the nature or kind of material of thought, and "products" are the result 
of the application of certain kinds of operations to certain kinds of 
materials. A product could be, for instance, a unit of thought, a concept 
or a pattern. Guilford has isolated 47 such factors, within which he has 
a class of abilities which he refers to as 'divergent-thinking abilities', 
and he sees these abilities as emphasising "searching activities with free-
dom to go in different directions" (1959, 1950). Guilford has isolated such 
divergent traits as: sensitivity to problems; fluency of thinking; flexibility 
of thinking; originality of ideas; the ability to analyse; a basic ability 
to redefine (a trait inspired by Gestalt psychology) and an ability to 
penetrate problems. After analysis Guilford found support for his traits, 
except for the ability to analyse for which no factor could be identified, 
and though he found a 'penetration factor', he later re-classified this as 
"cognitive ability". 
Guilford's model is a model of the mature intellect. Differentiation 
of abilities is a function of growth and maturity. The developmental 
dimension is not treated of by him. If we could do an unlawful mix of 
Guilford, J.P. (1967) Ibid. P.65 
Guilford, J.P. (1959) "Traits of creativity" in: Creativity and its  
Cultivation. Anderson, H.H. pp 142-61. 
Guilford, J.P. (1950) "Creativity", Am.Psyohologist. 5.0 pp 444-54. 
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Piaget and Guilford, it might result in a promise of a model of knowing 
which would include - or rather consist of - a developmental-factorial-
dimension or explanation of intellect, including of course divergent 
factors. Piaget could well be contained within Guilford's three 
organising principles and these same principles are open to developmental 
investigation. Meanwhile we have to be content with a developmental 
explanation of intelligence which promises to include creative dimensions 
of ability, and with an adult model of intelligence which takes maturity 
and differentiation of abilities as its starting point. 
The study of any problem forces choices. Practical considerations 
limit dimensions of consideration. Philosophical standpoints direct the 
initial thrust but there are areas of profitable overlap for research 
conceptions and methodologies. Piaget, employing what he has termed his 
clinical approach, offers a wealth of information which gives valuable and 
essential qualitative insights. Although he himself has quibbled over the 
word 'test' and refused to standardise, his disciples have employed a 
certain degree of standardisation. Essentially, Piaget's research is about 
observation and organised description. Description can be a very free 
medium. Unless he so chooses, the individual is not bound by categories, 
though categories might well be extrapolated from the descriptions. This 
is a qualitative advantage, and in developmental and exploratory type 
investigations, this kind of unconstrained information is crucial to 
future accurate consideration. As an interesting exercise Piaget's clinical 
method might well be regarded as an exploratory, preliminary way of 
gathering information. The further question must then be how to organise 
and shape this information. This returns us to the questions: how does 
one give psychological explanation and meaning to factors which have been 
statistically isolated, and how adequate are such factors? 
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An examination of Guilford's factors reveals that there are differences 
in the nature of some of the factors. For instance, one factor isolated 
by Guilford is that of redefinition - referred to as "changing Gestalts" 
in the Koh's Block Test. This is a fundamental ability. Another factor 
is "originality". This is of a very different order. It is a factor 
which is more affected by culture and experience, and one which will also 
be affected by the evaluations of the assessor - even criteria for 
originality require interpretation. This criticism must lead back in 
turn to modes of assessing abilities at the initial testing. 
Guilford has expressed some concern at assessments which focus heavily 
on the amount of output, stating that to "score on the amount of elaboration 
demonstrated can be very misleading" (1959). However, in spite of this, 
his scoring of certain tasks is largely in these terms. Discussing the 
Elaboration Task, he says: 
... the examinee is given one or two simple lines and told to 
construct on this foundation a more complex object. The score 
is the amount of elaboration demonstrated..." (1957) 
This same stress on quantitative dimensions is found in both earlier and 
later work. Working with Wilson et al (1954), Guilford hypothesised that 
fluency of thinking would be an important factor in creativity. He regarded 
this in quantitative terms, concerned with the amount of ideas in stated 
times. 
Guilford's model is very attractive. However, much depends on the 
nature of the factors, what it is - in psychological terms - that they 
Guilford, J.P. (1959) "Traits of creativity" in: H.H. Anderson (ed) 
Creativity and its cultivation. Harper. pp 142-61. 
Guilford, J.P., Berger, R.M. and Christiansen, P.R. (1957) "A factor 
analytical study of planning abilities", Psy. Mono.  Al2. 
Wilson, R.C., Guilford, J.P. and Lewis, D.J. (1954) "A factor analytical 
study of creative thinking abilities", Psychometrika, 19, 297-311. 
explain or represent, and on what this explanation is based. Goldman  
(1967) points out that Guilford's tests were each designed to identify 
or represent a single factor. Torrance soon initiated more complex tests 
each of which could be scored on several factors. 
Piaget would obviously wish to avoid cutting intelligence up into 
factors - but Piagetian, operational-type tasks could be scored on several 
factors - in other words - could be presented - generated in wholistic 
ways and then understood in terms of factor analysis. The underlying 
comment here is that there is a need, in initial stages of research to 
give serious consideration to what is being observed and to its assessment. 
Analysis is dependent upon such work. It is interesting to speculate on 
the outcome of a Guilford-Piaget type model - a model built of factors 
of operational ability - allowing a developmental dimension. The first 
task is to search for factors in qualitative terms. The second is to 
make factorial sense out of unwieldy Piagetian data. 
Few studies of creativity have been truly rooted in Piagetian 
structural conceptions, in fact the major amount of research in the 
field has adopted a trait-type approach. David Feldman (1974) argues 
for a developmental or Piagetian process view of creativity. Feldman 
states that an emphasis on process focusses on interactional dimensions 
- between the organism and the environment, with behaviour viewed in terms 
of changing, acting, constructing constructs. Unlike trait conceptions, 
Feldman believes that process psychology refuses to see the individual 
as "a cluster of potentials which determine his future behaviour" (Ibid). 
Feldman rightly points out that there has been very little conceptual work 
in this area of process creativity, and even less empirical activity. 
Goldman, R.J. (1967) "The Minnesota tests of Creative Thinking", in: 
Explorations in Creativity. Mooney, R.L. and Razik, T.A. 
Feldman, D. (1974) "The Developmental Approach: universal to unique" in: 
Essays on Creativity. Rosner, S. and Lawrence, E.A. 
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Essentially, Feldman sets out to draw an analogy between the 
creative process itself and Piagetian stage formation and achievement. 
Some of Feldman's inspiration for such an analogy seems to stem from 
Piaget's own comments on the idea of novelty (1971): 
for me the real problem is to explain novelties....Beilin 
(a critic) has made me into a nativist, a preformist, and he 
has missed the crux of my problem, which is to try and explain 
how novelties are possible and how they are formed." 
Elucidating this point, Feldman explains that Piaget has shown no direct 
interest in creativity bur rather, his reflections on 'novelty' are 
related to newly completed thought operations, which are unique in the 
sense that an individual achieves such cognitive organisation for the first 
time. This present study would argue that Feldman's analogy, by virtue of 
being an analogy, makes a distinction between 'creative' and other cog-
nitive organisations, and that this distinction should not exist. It is 
true that each individual has a subjectively unique experience in arriving 
at various levels of cognitive organisation for the first time, and such 
an arrival could be described as a "creative" experience; an interesting 
point, but an inconclusive one, for it is surely through the application  
of such newly attained cognitive structures that individuals construct 
. creative interpretations of reality. Feldman suggests that such creativity 
is not necessarily dependent upon public approval, but can be a subjective 
notion. Duckworth (1972) is in agreement on this point: 
"The wonderful ideas I am referring to need not necessarily look 
wonderful to the outside world... the nature of the creative act 
remains the same, whether it is an infant who for the first time 
makes the connection between seeing things and reaching for them 
or an astronomer who develops a new theory of the creation of the 
universe." 
Piaget, J. (1971) "The theory of stages in cognitive development", in: 
Green, D.R. et al (eds) Measurement and Piaget. P. 192. 
Duckworth, E. (1972) "The having of wonderful ideas", Harvard Ed. Rev. 42 
pp 217-31. 
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In his analogy Feldman illustrates how universal stages of intellec-
tual development and stages in creative thought have certain common attri-
butes. Briefly, criteria for a stage might well be said to explain the 
creative process in terms of stabilisation of behaviour, achievement, 
reversibility of the solution once achieved then application. As an 
analogy then, it can be said to sled some light on the creative process. 
It does not make any attempt to root creativity in a structural theory. 
In fact, having drawn the analogy Feldman then goes on to explain its 
limitations; 
"Creative thought... differs from Piagetian stage achievement 
first and foremost on the continuum of universality. The Piagetian 
stages are achievable by everyone, whereas a powerful creative 
thought is unique not only in the history of the individual (as 
is the case with Piagetian stage achievement), but in its extreme 
form is unique in the history of ideas as well." 
Analogy is a weak link - if indeed it is a link. This current research is 
concerned to find unity in conceptions of creative - cognitive functioning 
and for such an analysis of the genesis of structuring is essential, an 
aspect to which Feldman gives no consideration. 
To conclude, this study attempts to re-define creative ability within 
the context of operational structuralism. Consequently, some previous 
definitions have been criticised or rejected, most often because of that 
narrowness of their statistical, non-explanatory concepts of creativity. 
The opening part of this chapter dealt with problems of definitions, 
focussing on approaches to creativity which are concerned more with process 
or product than with personality explanations. Assessment and scoring 
problems, regarded as stemming from initial definitions, and the occasional 
lack of a supporting theory, were discussed and wholly quantitative 
methods of scoring were rejected, in favour of a method which would take 
account of qualitative aspects of responses. 
Feldman, ll. (1974) Ibid. P.68. 
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Very little research into creativity has examined the subject 
systematically from a developmental standpoint. Most research has been 
product-orientated or interested in the supposed intelligence-creativity 
dichotomy. Some reference was made in this review to early developmental 
studies of creativity and to more recent work by Torrance. A separate 
section, in the second part of this research will examine the role of 
training in creative behaviour. 
Mention should perhaps be made of the fact that this research has 
been confined to what might be termed 'cognitive' aspects of creativity; 
personality-studies receive little mention. In the last analysis, the 
reason for selection and focus must stem from the researcher's own 
interests - even bias, There is no intention, however, of suggesting 
that personality and group variables are not of importance, but it is 
argued that cognitivemriables are more fundamental to an explanation of 
creativity. Without an understanding of the construction of reality, no 
individual - converger or diverger (Hudson) - 'open to experience' (Rogers) 
or otherwise, can bring about intentional and understood re-constructions. 
Personality and group factors may well inhibit ability but they are no 
replacement for it. 
PART ONE 
Chapter 4 
EXPERIMENT AND PROCEDURE 
The following section contains a description 
of the sample and of general preparation. 
This is followed by an explanation and 
description of the tasks used in the assess—
ment. Information on both pre—pilot and 
pilot work is placed next, for it is felt 
that adjustments resulting from such work 
will be more fully understood when the final 
tasks have been considered. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The first part of this research is essentially exploratory. The 
main aim is to re—define creative ability, attempting to examine this 
ability within the context of operational structuralism. The following 
assessment is an attempt to examine the aim empirically. 
At its zenith, operational structuralism is concerned with the 
ability of the individual to reflect upon knowing and upon knowledge. 
Because of the interrelatedness of intelligence and creative ability- within 
this theoretical framework, it is expected that with age, there will be 
qualitative differences in responses to the tasks of creative ability. 
The notion of qualitative changes in responses, with age, is the 
only stated hypothesis. Given that the explanation of operational 
creativity is rooted in that of operational intelligence, and that Piaget 
has offered much evidence which points to qualitative differences in res—
ponses with age, qualitative changes in responses is perhaps less a hypo—
thesis than a stated fact, or accepted knowledge. However, within the 
field of creativity, such operational notions have yet to be explored. 
Further, the idea of some systematic form of assessment of creative ability, 
based upon operational structuralism, has hardly been hinted at by Piaget 
himself. 
A problem of hypotheses is that they give direction, In essentially 
exploratory work too much direction is to be avoided. However, there are 
assumptions without which one could not begin to questioh or to formulate, 
and these assumptions bring their own constraints to bear upon research 
design. Amongst them, in this reasearch, are: 
a) dissatisfaction with previous definitions of creativity, especially 
because of their narrowness and/or context specific natures, 
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b) dissatisfaction with previous categories of assessment which have 
often been biased towards quantitative evaluation; 
.c) the lack of an adequate, comprehensive theory of creative thinking; 
and the implications of this lack for research; 
the influence of Piaget's contribution to the theory of knowledge - 
especially the notion that the mature knower is capable of a high 
level of reflection; 
e) the influence of Piagetian principles underpinning cognitive 
organisation, which led to the establishment of related principles 
believed to govern creative transformations of reality. 
In addition to the main hypothesis, there is interest ins 
a) the possibility of a stage explanation of creativity; 
b) the possibility of establishing some systematic method for the 
assessment of operational creativity. 
THE SAMPLE 
96 subjects (an equal number of girls and of boys) were included in 
this first part of the research. These figures do not include subjects 
who participated in pre-pilot and pilot work. The subjects came from two 
Inner London Primary Schools and from two Inner London Secondary Schools. 
One reason for choosing the Primary Schools was that some weight is given, 
by the schools, to Piagetian philosophy. Children are grouped and taught 
on a stage rather than an age basis for the most part, and some assessment 
of progress is carried out by means of Piagetian type tasks. Though 
there was a somewhat more formal approach in the Secondary Schools, most 
of the children in the sample, had in fact been pupils in one of the 
Primary Schools and because all of the Secondary School children were in 
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pre-examination classes, there was still a fair degree of informality in 
their school experience. Most of the subjects came from homes where 
parents fell into Social Classes 3 or 4 (Registrar General's Classification), 
The subjects were divided into the following age bands with an equal 
number of boys and girls in each: 
6-7 years of age (24 subjects) 
8-9 years of age (24 subjects) 
10-11 years of age (24 subjects) 
12-13 years of age (24 subjects) 
Selection of Subjects  
In the selection of the subjects, no standardised IQ test was 
employed. The concern was with operational ability (which is not regarded 
as distinct from operational creativity) and not with accrued knowledge. 
It could be argued therefore that sub-tests from, for instance, the WISC 
could have been employed in selection, but as concern was not with con-
cepts such as "IQ", a system of teacher rating was thought to be adequate 
and was adopted as a method of selection. 
The schools involved either worked on a Team Teaching basis (Primary) 
or had some inter-disciplinary work (Secondary). In both cases, all 
children in both schools were well known to at least three teachers. 
Consequently, three teachers, involved with each of the children were 
asked to rate the children in their Team, Class or Group on the following 
five point scale; 
below average just average average good average above average  
Children who were rated as "good average" by at least two of their 
teachers were listed for selection. The first 6 boys and the first 6 girls 
so rated in each age group were included in the sample. Teachers had been 
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asked to rate children on their general performance as opposed to ability 
in any one specific area. 
Reading scores were also considered because of the verbal ability 
required for some of the items. The gap between chronological and reading 
age was never allowed to exceed two years in advance of chronological age. 
PREPARATION AND METHOD 
Pre-pilot and pilot work was carried out in all of the schools 
involved in the research. I spent six days across the four schools 
engaged in this work, and a further two days working in the schools, 
with groups of children on school projects. This was done deliberately 
to become known to and more accepted by potential subjects. 
A full explanation of the research was given to the teachers after 
they had rated the children for selection. The children were told that 
I was interested in finding answers to a number of problems and puzzles and 
that I would be grateful for any ideas they had. No-one was obliged to 
take part - but no child refused. Older children were given a slightly 
different explanation in that it was couched in more sophisticated terms. 
It was stressed that this was not a test in any sense and that the results 
would not be given to the school or to their teachers. The task items 
were not presented in test-booklet form, but on separate sheets on paper. 
Papers given to the children bore no official-looking headings, e.g. 
spaces for names, numbers,etc. 
School interviewing rooms and school libraries were used for the 
assessment, on the whole bright informal kinds of rooms. During the first 
part of the assessment, when the tasks involved drawing, there was a back-
ground of music. The examiner appeared to have other tasks in hand when 
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the subjects were drawing - as it was thought to be restricting to 'watch' 
the subject. However, detailed observations of remarks and actions were 
made. Younger subjects sometimes left the table and walked about the 
room between items. This was allowed. 
For some items (verbal) a tape recorder was used. The machine had 
an internal microphone and was switched on and off discreetly from a wall 
switch beneath the examiner's table. No reference was made to it. 
Generally, there was a non-evaluative attitude. Attempts were 
never criticised and 'errors' never commented upon. Younger children 
sometimes raised quite different subjects for conversation. These were 
taken up and the child was steered back to the tasks as possible. 
An attempt was made to avoid discussion of tests between subjects 
before they were tested. This was effected by not interviewing any one 
age group at a time, but by moving across age groups, trying to separate 
subjects by means of timetabling and age and team membership. In fact, 
observations showed, that the younger subjects were incapable of explain-
ing the details of the tasks to their fellows - so distorted were the 
explanations overheard! 
Minimal note-taking was carried on in front of the subject. Notes 
and numberings were made immediately after each session. Tape transcripts 
were carried out each evening before the next set of interviewing. 
Each interview took at least one hour on average, with some slight 
variation up to about one and a quarter hours. 
This lack of strict time limitsboth for the individual items and 
tasks and for the assessment as a whole is in keeping with the essentially 
clinical method employed. Though the tasks were standardised as such, 
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in exploratory research the aim is to allow maximum freedom of response 
to the subjects. Consequently, individual comments and approaches were 
followed up or allowed respectively and time limits were not imposed. 
Principles Underpinning the Tasks  
In the introductory section to this research, the principles 
believed to underpin transformations of reality were outlined. These 
principles were arrived at after a consideration of the kinds of trans-
formations of reality believed to be possible and in the belief that 
creativity must begin with existing realities which, when transformed, 
can lead to new creative outcomes. 
A more detailed explanation of these principles is now offered 
below: 
Al Apprehension and re-definition of reality: An initial step in all 
re-structurings is that of apprehension and re-definition of the identity 
or structure involved. Definition is regarded as an index of apprehension, 
and re-definitions will vary according to apprehension and re-apprehension 
of the problem. Handling of identities will vary according to ability 
to define and re-define, for according to the manner in which the object 
is initially perceived, so it will be related and re-constructed. All 
identity transformations are dependent upon this ability to apprehend, 
define and re-define. This initial process is one of conceptualisation. 
The following processes, in their different ways, all involve changes to 
the initial concept. 
B1 Re-structuring or re-organisation of component parts: Without adding 
to or detracting from the identity, an individual will re-organise the 
parts of that structure (or structures) to arrive at a new conclusion or 
a modified structure. 
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B2 Addition to an identity: Here the individUal defines an identity 
and on the basis of that definition, adds to it in a way which will 
incorporate it into another identity or create a further identity. 
B3 Subtraction from an identity: By removing part of an identity, a 
subject is able eitherio modify an existing identity or to produce a new 
identity. 
B4 Multiplication or increase of identity: This transformation would 
include increasing the size of an identity or increasing numbers of iden-
tities to arrive at a different conclusion. 
B5 Division of an identity: This would involve a fundamental structural 
change in an identity. Divisions would take place according to the manner 
in which the structure was initially perceived. Divisions could be equal 
or unequal. 
B6 Relating and re-relating of identities  (including combination and 
synthesis): When identities or component parts of an identity are re-
defined in relation to one another they can lead to a formation of a new 
identity. Re-structuring or re-organisation was concerned with all the 
component parts of an identity; re-relating has its focus upon the outcome(s) 
of re-relating or fusing some of the component parts of an identity or 
system of identities. 
B7 Adjustment to an identity: This process requires modification of 
existing component parts or of the whole identity - e.g. change of colour, 
bending of form, etc. 
Each of the principles can be applied to 'convergent' as well as to 
'divergent' transformations of reality. In the one, the task parameters 
and outcomes will be specified, in the other they will be discovered and 
recognised. Knowledge of 'convergent' transformations based on each of 
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the principles is essential, if the same principles are to be knowingly 
applied to 'divergent' transformations. 
TASK CONSTRUCTION  
In the construction of tasks for assessment, a frequent problem is 
that of selection and ordering of items. Such a process of selection is 
normally concerned with the nature of the items, the skills required to 
carry them out, and with what might be termed the "degree of difficulty" 
of the items in relation to one another. 
Within the context of operational structuralism very different 
questions need to be posed and examined. An act can be understood and 
carried out at many different levels of cognitive, understanding, according 
to the state of cognitive maturity of the knower. Concern is then not so 
much with the selection of appropriate items and their placement in order 
of ascending difficulty, but with attempting to identify levels of cog-
nitive organisation in responses to the tasks, and in so doing, move 
towards identifying the levels of a task which are attainable at different 
stages of maturity. 
Every event or object will be constructed by the knower according to 
his ability to understand that object or event. Knowing moves from simple 
to complex, and every act of knowing can be seen as having "levels of com-
plexity". An object may be elaborated upon. It may also be added to or 
modified in some way, and each of these different transformations can take 
place at different levels of understanding. The question for operational 
structuralism is not - can a child elaborate or divide? - but at what 
level can he divide or elaborate, and how does oneidentify tasks levels 
across different tasks? 
• 
124. 
Piaget has obviously provided much ground-work here, focussing as he 
does upon the nature and quality of responses, but he has resisted sys-
tematisation of a kind which might have led to the establishment of a 
scale of assessment, and to precise comparisons across different areas of 
development. This is partly due to the fact that he has been very context-
specific in his classifications of responses to tasks. It is clear, for 
instance, that both moral judgement and language development can be des-
cribed in terms of a movement from ego-centricity to a more objective 
state, but because Piaget's categories of description have generally been 
context-specific, it has not been possible to find precise corresponding 
levels across different, yet fundamentally related, areas of development. 
This matter of "task-levels" was a key issue both in the construc-
tion of the tasks and in the subsequent construction of categories for 
their assessment. The final section of this research discusses the idea 
of a tentative scale for the assessment of operational creativity based 
on this notion of task-levels. 
In the construction of tasks, for this research, focus was not on an 
end product or outcome, but with ability to interpret and to re-interpret 
reality. There was a need to construct a series of tasks which would 
make possible the study and observation of such ability. Further, these 
tasks, which embody the principles believed to underpin creative ability, 
could not be context-specific. The intention therefore was not to assess 
"figural creativity" or•"verbal-creativity" (if there are such things) but 
to attempt to see if individuals could understand and operate upon essen-
tial underpinning principles. For instance, as will be seen, adjustment  
(a principle) is not something which must be tied to verbal assessment, or 
assessment in a particular medium. An individual may be skilled  in the 
application of this principle in.a particular medium, but here, focus 
was upon a grasp of the principle - not upon the ability to handle the 
medium. Consequently, the tasks could not require a high level of skill 
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in a partidular medium, and assessment would have, to focus upon ability 
to operate to understand, and not upon skill or upon presentation. 
Tasks would also need to be suitable for a wide age-range for there is 
no particular task for particular ages; the distinction is in the nature 
and quality of the responses to the tasks. An attempt was made to main- 
tain a balance between verbal and non-verbal tasks. 
Whilst changes in the nature of responses were anticipated as a 
function of age - the question of "stage" in the Piagetian sense could 
not be ignored. However, whilst the notion of stage is generally assumed 
within this explanation of creativity, it is not possible, as will be 
explained later in this research, to arrive at adequate and final categories 
for the description and assessment of stages of operational creativity 
on the basis of this very exploratory research. This is not, however, to 
deny a movement in that direction or to suggest that no such tentative 
conclusions might be drawn. 
The matter of stage was borne in mind during the construction of the 
tasks. Can one speak of concrete or formal creativity? Ought tasks to 
be constructed with such questions in mind? Simply, whilst one can speak 
of 'concrete-creativity' - essentially a description of a response - 
there are no particular acts or activities which lend themselves or 
properly belong to concrete or formal creativity. Such "stage-labels" 
are comments on levels of cognitive organisation. A task may be presented 
to a subject in a 'concrete' form. By this might be meant that a number 
of concrete props are employed in the presentation. However, an 
individual who brings to bear upon such a task, a formal operational 
quality of thought, will execute the task with an understanding and 
reflectiveness not possible to the concrete operational thinker. In 
other words, it is not the task which earns the label "concrete" or, 
"formal", or "normative" or "creative" for that matter, but the response  
to that task which can vary in qualitative terms. 
- task levels 
Re-apprehension 
and definition 
Addition 
Subtraction 
Multiplication 
Re-relating 
Adjusting 
Division 
A continuum from inability and ego-centrism, 
to formal, reflective ability. Principles 
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Accordingly, any conclusions about stage must be based on. the 
analysis of responses, and the categories generated for such an analysis 
Will be of prime importance. 
A final point needs to be made concerning the principles of 
creativity believed to underpin creative transformations. All creative 
transformations are governed by one or more of these principles. 
Therefore, these many different creative expressions can be classified, 
according to these principles, and, at a certain level, their apparent 
diversity and differentiation reduced. All principles can be acted upon 
with, increasing understanding and reflectiveness. All creative transfor-
mations could therefore be classified as follows: 
A more detailed discussion of this tentative system of classification is 
given in the final chapter of this research. 
In conclusion, Piagetian principles of organisation have been con-
cerned largely with normative organisation (e.g. seriation, correspondence), 
but the structures underpinning the principles are the structures which 
underpin creative transformations of reality. Indeed, creative trans-
formations are dependent upon normative transformations. They are an 
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integral part of the structural explanation of intelligence as propounded 
by Piaget. However, whereas Piagetian principles tend towards normative 
logical organisation and reflection upon such, the principles.underpinning 
creative transformations tend, when applied to more open-ended tasks, to 
lead towards re-organisation and to reflection upon such. 
A list of the principles as they relate to each of the tasks is presented 
below: 
Task 	 Principle(s) 
ELABORATION TASK 
	
Addition (non-verbal) 
FREE PROBLEM SOLVING 	 (i) Re-organisation (non-verbal) 
(ii) Re-relating of identities (verbal) 
RECOGNITION OF IDENTITIES 	 Definition/re-definition (non-verbal) 
IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION (1) 
(i) Definition (verbal) 
(ii) Re-organisation (non-verbal) 
(iii) Division (non-verbal) 
(iv) Re-organisation (non-verbal) 
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF TASK 
(i) Re-organisation (verbal) 
(ii) Re-organisation (verbal) 
RE-CLASSIFICATION 	 Re-relating of identities (verbal) 
IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION (2) 
(i) Definition (verbal) 
(ii) Re-organisation (non-verbal) 
All transBormations governed by these principles could lead to novel con-
clusions. Conclusions are always attained by the manipulation of what is 
known, to arrive at what is not known and what requires recognition and 
identity. 
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THE TASKS AND THEIR ORDER OF PRESENTATION  
In presenting the tasks to the subjects, an attempt was made to 
vary pictorial and verbal items and to separate items which might be 
thought, by the child, to be similar. 
The tasks, explained on the following pages, were presented in the 
order given below: 
1. Elaboration Task 
(it was thought that a pictorial type test might be regarded as 
'easier' by the subjects, and was therefore placed first) (PLATES 7 and 8) 
2. Free Problem Solving 
3. Recognition of Identities (PLATES 9 and 10) 
4. Identity Re-construction (1) (PLATE 11) 
5. What Would Happen If Task 
6. Re-classification Task 
7. Identity Re-construction (2) (PLATE 12) 
Each item was presented on a separate sheet of paper. There was no 
space on the sheets for the subject's name or for any type of coding. 
This was done deliberately to avoid the impression of a test. Each subject 
was interviewed alone. 
Materials: 
	 the task sheets 
black pencils 
129. 
1, The Elaboration Task  
This task is influenced by the work of K. Franck (Drawing Completion  
Teat, 1952) and that of Wallach and Kogan (1965), though the assessment 
is different in nature. The intention is to see how the child will 
elaborate at different ages, and to see if there are any patterns related 
to age which might emerge. 
Each of the stimulus lines was presented twice in order to enable the 
subject to become more familiar with its form and thus have a firmer grasp 
of its identity and its potential. Each stimulus line was presented on a 
separate sheet of paper. 
The task was explained as follows: 
"I want you to have a look at the lines on this sheet of paper and 
see if you can turn them into something really interesting by 
adding lines. It can be anything you like. Turn the paper 
around and look at it from different angles like this (Examiner 
turns paper around) and then you might get another idea." 
After the subject's first attempt, the examiner continued: 
"Now see if you can make something different out of the second set." 
Questions put by the child were answered and, as necessary, the above 
information was repeated as the child thought or drew. 
The child was always asked to name what he had drawn. 
Though it was not in fact employed, a practice stimulus line had 
been prepared in case a subject found it difficult to understand the 
instructions. 
The four stimulus lines used are presented on the following pages. 
(PLATES 7 and 8). 
item. 1. 
item. 2. 
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Items (exact size) used in the ELABORATION TASK. Each item 
was presented twice and could be used from any angle by the 
subjects. there was no strict time limit. 
PLATE 8 	 1 31 . 
item. 3. 
item. 4. 
4 items in all were used on the ELABORATION TASK. 
 Again 
these couldbe used from any angle by the subjects. 
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2. Free Problem Solving 
This task was influenced to some extent by the problem-solving work 
of Wertheimer and Scheerer (1945 and 1963), and that of de Bono (1972 and 
1975) with his open-structured problems. Such influences led to a task 
described as Free Problem Solving. No one solution is required and the 
intention is to see how children, at different ages, will handle the 
problem. 
The problems were presented in the following ways: 
a) Matchstick Problem  
In the case of younger subjects, it was first established that they 
knew what a triangle was. This was done by asking them to make a triangle 
out of three matchsticks. 
"Nail would like to see if you could make a triangle out of these 
four matches. You can do anything you like with the matches." 
Throughout the child was encouraged to: "use the matches in any way you 
like". 
"Now let's see if you can make another triangle using the matches 
in a different way." 
Some subjects asked if they could break the matchsticks and were told 
that this could be done. 
The subjects worked on a flat board. 
If, subjects showed any signs of not understanding the task, the 
Examiner asked them to look carefully at the triangle made out of three 
matchsticks and asked them to think about how they could add the fourth 
and still have a triangle. Most subjects began with this paradigm - simply 
adjusting the three matchsticks until the fourth could be fitted in. 
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The Examiner recorded the child's efforts on a sheet divided into 
numbered blank squares. The child was told that this recording was for 
him in case he wanted to check his own efforts. 
b) The Bottle Top Problem  
The child was presented with a picture of a lemonade bottle with 
a tin top. This was in case subjects assumed that the bottle could have 
a screw top. The card remained with the subject throughout the item. 
The child was instructed as follows: 
"Here's a picture showing the top of a lemonade bottle with a tin 
top on it. I want you to see if you could invent a new way of taking 
these tops off the bottles. Perhaps you could think of a new machine 
or a new little gadget that would take tops off bottles." 
As needed, the child was asked questions about his explanation — e.g. 
"I see, and how would this lever work, etc." 
the purpose of the question was to see to what extent his response was 
related, and whether or not the child was able to grasp the implications 
of his suggestions and carry his ideas through. 
Younger subjects sometimes began by offering already existing 
solutions. These were accepted (though not recorded for assessment) and 
then the subject was, once again, encouraged to think of a solution 
which did not exist. 
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3. Recognition of Identities  
This item was developed from Cattellls Objective (0-A) Analytic  
Anxiety Battery Test (1960) and Witkins Embedded Figures Test (1957). 
The task is divergent in nature in that there are no pre-defined hidden 
shapes to be discovered. The intention is to see how and what the sub-
jects will recognise and structure at different ages. 
Again, each set of lines was presented twice to the subject, to enable 
him to become familiar with them in his attempts to perceive new pos-
sibilities. As with the earlier line task, a practice item was prepared 
for subjects who might have difficulty in understanding the actual task. 
The lines were deliberately different from any employed in the actual 
assessment items. They were used with about half of the 6-7 year old age 
group. In this case, the Examiner picked out shapes, thickened round the 
lines and added minor details. 
The main tasks were put to the subjects as follows: 
"Now here are some lines. Have a look at them and see if you 
can find any interesting shapes or objects hidden in them. It 
can be anything you like, and you can add small details. Just 
thicken over the lines so we can see what you have picked out." 
"Now see if you can get something really different out of this 
second set." 
The three items used in this task are presented on the following pages 
(PLATES 9 and 10). 
PLATE 9  
item. 1. 
item. 2. 
Items (exact size) from the IDENTITY RECOGNITION TASK.  Each 
item was presented twice and could be used from any angle. 
PLATE 10 
item 3. 
The 3rd and final item from the IDENTITY RECOGNITION 
TASK. 
As with the Elaboration Task Items, each item was 
presented alone twice on a sheet of A4 paper, but 
in the frame outlined above. 
Subjects worked with one colour (black) only. 
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4. 	 Re—construction of Identities (1) 
These tasks are developed from the work of Piaget and his followers. 
The roots are in Piaget's notions of object—concept, conservation and 
operational ability. These tasks are seen as fundamental to creative 
knowing for they require the subject to act upon materials, to transform 
them and to give some explanation of his transformations, thus indicating 
his consciousness of his own activity. Both tests require that the subject 
have a sound grasp of the structures before him, in order to be able to 
re—structure. A reproduction of the card used in this task is presented 
over the page (PLATE 11). 
The tasks were presented as follows: 
Item 1: Definition  
"On this card is a diagram of a block of flats. This is the 
ground floor, here (indicates)and here (indicates) you have 
the other floors. The windows on the ground floor are round, 
all the others are square. Now I want you to imagine that.I 
don't know what is on the card I can't see it, and I want 
you to describe to me what is on it. I need to know exactly 
what is on the card." 
Slightly different wording was used with younger subjects who enjoyed 
the idea that the card could not be seen, and most hid the card from the 
Examiner in some way. 
After some description: 
"That's fine. Now do you want to add anything else?" 
No comment was made when information was distorted or not given, 
PLATE 11 156. 
  
IDENTITY RE-CONSTRUCTION (1). all items. 
0 0 0 
item 1. 
	 Ss. were asked to describe what was on the above card. 
(exact size. test card = orange) 
item 2. 	 Ss. were asked to change the building in some way, using 
all the units above and adding nothing. 
item 3. 	 Ss. were asked to turn the building into two unequal ones - 
each different in some way - using only the above units. 
item 4. 	 Ss. were asked to change the shape of the building using 
only the units above. 
all responses were drawn by Ss. there was no strict time 
limit. 
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Item 2: Re—construction  
"Now, I would like you to draw this block of flats so that you 
make it look different in some way. You have to use all the 
blocks shown an the card and you can't add anything, but some—
how you have to make it look different." 
Information was repeated as necessary, but no cues were given. The rules 
of the problem were repeated to confront the child, whenever he seemed to 
be ignoring them — e.g. "No, you can't add a door" etc. 
Item 3: Division of Structure  
"This timef I would like you to reTbuild the building but I would 
like you to make the building into two buildings — you have to 
get two buildings out of this one building. And once again, you 
can't add anything, and you have to use the blocks shown on the 
card. Also, each of your two buildings has to be different in 
some way, with a different number of squares in each. 
Questions were answered. 
Item 4: Shape  
"Finally, I would like you to show me how you could change the 
shape, of the building. The rules are the same. You can't add 
anything and you have to use all the blocks shown there, and yet 
you have to change the shape." 
After all three tasks, the subject was asked to compare his own 
efforts against those of the model,, to test his awareness of his 
'deviation' from that model, 
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5. What Would Happen If Task  
This task is inspired to some extent by the Torrance Tests of 
Creative Thinking (1974). The aim is to attempt to remove some of the 
constraints of our own system of reality to see how children at different 
ages will attempt to cope with the possibilities of a new system. 	 It 
may be that with age there is a decrease in brief unrelated responses, 
which lack implications. 
Two questions were presented separately to the child, as follows: 
a) "What would life be like if there were no such thing as night - 
if it were day all the time?" 
b) "What would life be like if there were no such thing as talking - 
if men didn't speak?" 
Again, there was no time limit. The questions were repeated as 
needed. All responses were recorded by means of a hidden tape-recorder. 
6. Re-classification Task  
This task was influenced to some extent by the word association 
tests of Getzels and Jackson (1962) though the exact purpose of this 
present task was different. Here the subject is asked to group and re-
group words and ideas placed before him. Interest is in the subject's 
ability to classify - to seek out and to establish new criteria - and 
not with a presentation of learnt classifications (Piaget and Inhelder, 
1964. See note (i)). 
Piaget, J. and Inhelder, B. (1964) The Early Growth of Logic in the Child. 
Note (i) (from the above work, P.289) 
"A change of criterion of 'shifting' is simply another expression 
of operational, and therefore reversible mobility, this being 
the hallmark of a complete classifactory system." 
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Subjects were presented with the following words, in the order 
shown, on a card 10" x 10". The words were typed in jumbo size type. 
TRW ANGER COOL CLOUD 
SHADOW GREEN MUSIC LIFE 
STOP SMOOTH PEACE FEAR 
RED BARK KNIFE FLY 
NIGHT BLUE STONE ROUND 
PUNCH SHELL PAPER WATER 
In addition, the subjects were also given a set of small cards (3" x 1") 
each card bearing one of the printed words: 
SMOOTH 
This enabled younger subjects in particular, for they were able to work 
with the cards moving them around as they sought for possible relation-
ships. These cards were also typed in jumbo type. The vocabulary on 
the cards was checked with the schools to see if it was suitable for the 
age groups involved. 
The problem was presented to the subject as follows: 
"On this card you'll find a list of words, and you'll find the 
same words on these small cards. Have a look at this list here 
and see if there are any words which you think could go together 
in some way. You could use these small cards - move them around 
- and put them together when you think the words could go together." 
An example was given by the Examiner to make sure that the child was 
clear. The youngest subjects were first asked to read the list of words 
on the card to establish familiarity with them. 
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After a grouping had been offered, the Examiner continued: 
"Now, could you find some more words that go together. Try to 
use different words, but you can use the same ones again if you 
wish." 
There was no time limit. 
The Examiner ringed the words on a record sheet as the child made 
the associations. Reasons for the associations were also recorded, The 
child was told that the recordings were to help him remember associations 
he had already made. 
All associations were recorded - even bizarre or 'wrong' associations. 
No comments were made upon the responses by the Examiner. 
Identity Re-construction (2) 
The rationale of this task has already been explained under 
Re-construction (1). The Test Card employed in this task is shown on 
page 144. 
There were two problems in this task which were presented as follows: 
a) 	 Definition  
The child was shown the test card with an outline of a square and a leaf. 
"Now I would like you to describe to me exactly what you see on this 
card. Imagine that I can't see the card and that you have to tell 
me everything about it before I can know." 
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b) 	 fte-Construction  
"flow, I would like you to make an object or a design using the 
pieces on this card. In your mind break up the pieces that make up 
the leaf and the pieces that make up the square and mix them up 
to make a new design or object. it can be anything you like. 
But you can't add anything and you have to use all the pieces 
here." 
Then at the end, when we look at what you've done, I shall say 
to you: 'llow show me where you got this line from and you will 
have to say - it came from here (indicating)' etc." 
The explanation was repeated until the child seemed to be clear. A more 
sophisticated explanation was given to older subjects. 
Subjects' efforts were always compared with the model and comparisons 
drawn. 
Again, there was no time limit. 
The task card is presented on the following page. (PLATE 12). 
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RE-CONSTRUCTION TASK (2) both items. 	 PLATE 12 
Item 1. 	 The leaf and the square were presented to the subject 
on a card 8-" X 7" (actual size & position as above). 
Ss. were asked to describe what they saw on the card 
as accurately as they could. 
Item 2: 	 Ss. worked from the same card. This time they were 
asked to re-structure the lines and forms on the card 
in order to make a design or object. They were told 
that they had to use all the lines on the card once 
and that they were not allowed to add to the lines. 
The information on the card was deliberately limited 
in the interests of younger Ss. 
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PRE-PILOT WORK (Part 1) 
Additional details of pre-pilot work are to be found in Appendix I. 
Conservation Tasks  
Some initial pre-pilot work revolved around the concept of conser-
vation. Creative re-structuring requires that an individual have the 
ability to form an accurate concept of the reality to be transformed. 
Rather than simply assume the validity of such of Piaget's work, it was 
believed that it would be of value in the construction of creative ability 
measures, to explore empirically, relevant aspects. Conservation is one 
instance of a construction of reality, and Piagetian work has illustrated 
developmental trends in the formation of the concept. One intention of 
this conservation inspired pre-pilot work was to see if, with certain aids, 
and under different conditions, children of different ages would be able 
to grasp shape changes realising that other dimensions were remaining con-
stant. The work of Hermina Sinclair (1973) was adapted for explorations 
of length conservation. 
As well as being faced with some classical conservation questions, 
the subjects in pre-pilot work were required to imagine certain shape 
changes, to describe and to explain the outcomes and to consider the 
implications. 
Types of cards used. Matchsticks were real. 
Children were provided with matchsticks to work out 
solutions. 
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Sinclair type questions were posed, e.g: 
"Which would be the longer road if you flattened out the matchsticks?" 
"Why would this be so?" 
This pre—pilot work which involved 12 subjects, selected on Teacher Ratings 
(see Note 1) — two representing each of the age groups finally studied — 
gave rise to the Identity Re—construction Tasks for creative re—structuring 
involves understanding the implications of change to a structure. 
The Picture Task: Subjects were shown a large picture 12" x 18". The 
picture depicted a house in the background, a garden with trees and bushes, 
and two children. The questions posed around the picture were intended to 
see if the child could conceive of things from the angles of those in the 
picture and also under changed conditions (important to creative re—struc—
turing). The type of question put was as follows: 
a) What can the girl/boy see from where they are? 
b) If they were in the house looking from this window, what would they see? 
c) If it were winter what would they see (i.e. no leaves on trees would 
allow clearer views)? 
d) If the boy were hiding in the bushes, what would he see? etc. 
After each question the child was asked "why?" 
The House Task: A similar task was given this time using a cardboard 
doll's house, 1 foot high, two small dolls and a small oar. Figures were 
placed in different positions and questions aimed at examining the child's 
ability to: 
a) place himself in the positions of others; 
b) conceive of the scene under changed conditions and grasp the 
implications of the changes. 
These tasks gave rise to questions which were eventually chrystallised' 
into "What Would Happen If Tasks".  
Note 1: A method of selection based on Teacher Ratings was employed in 
the main part of the research. An explanation of the method 
was given earlier in this chapter. 
0 
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Definition and Comprehension Task  
Essentially in this task the child was asked to describe as 
accurately as he/she could what was on the card. In order to motivate 
the child, the task was played in the context of a game, with three other 
children drawing what was described and trying to do so as accurately as 
possible. Essentially, interest was in the organisation of what was 
perceived by the subject describing the card. 
The Cards: 
The actual size of both cards was 6" X 6". 
These tasks gave rise to questions in the Identity Re-Construction  
Tasks (1 and 2). 
The pieces forming the letter 5 
were then scattered to make 
other forms. 
b. 
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RE—CONSTRUCTION TASKS (with concrete props.) 
This was a task more immediately related to the final research tasks 
and one which helped towards the construction and modification of the 
Identity Re—Construction Tasks (1 and 2). 
Material: A card with the Letter shapes A and B (8" x 8") 
A blank card (working board) — (1' x 1') 
The pieces forming the letters A and B — as depicted on 
the first board. 
Subjects were required to: 
a) Construct further named shapes out of the shapes of the pieces of 
the letters. 
b) Construct any further shapes they could think of. 
N 
a. 
It was thought at first that a task of this nature (especially because it 
is 'concrete' in presentation) might be necessary for younger subjects on 
the grounds that they would be quite unable to manage the Re—construction 
Tasks without such concrete props. This was not in fact so as evidenced 
by their responses — in the sense that they could grasp the requirements 
of the tasks. It was decided further that to provide the subjects with 
such shapes (as above) was in fact to provide them with 'definitions' of 
forms and to prevent them from 'dissecting' the parts themselves, accord—
ing to their own definitions. This intended mode of presentation was 
consequently dropped. 
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PILOT WORK (part 1) 
28 subjects took part in the actual pilot work. There was an equal 
number of girls and boys and four subjects (2 boys and 2 girls) represented 
each age range (from 6-13 years). Their responses were not included in 
the final results. The subjects were selected from the schools employed 
in the main part of the research and the method of selection was the same. 
The pre-pilot work had been very exploratory, concerned to clarify 
the areas and to formulate questions. The pilot work by contrast was more 
precise and based upon tasks to be used - in some form - in the final 
assessment. 
The following modifications were made as a result of pilot work. 
Identity Re-construction Tasks (1 and 2) 
In the pilot work for this task, the child was required to do three 
things: 
a) define, describe what he saw on the card; 
b) re-structure the material on the card, using only that material; 
c) finally, he was asked to compare his own efforts against the model 
and to note any deviations, etc. 
It was realised that these tasks did not adequately challenge the 
child, in that it was possible, sometimes, to carry out (b) by turning 
the building sideways-on, for instance, that is, answering the question, 
without really facing the matter of re-structuring. It seemed necessary 
to force the subject to face the problems involved in radical re-construc-
tion. Consequently the tasks were modified to include: 
a) (unequal) division of the building into two; 
b) a change of shape for the building. 
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In the second re-construction task (2), it was expected that young 
subjects might well have difficulty in understanding the question and 
further, find the task itself impossible to carry out at any level (the 
task involved re-structuring the leaf and the square). Consequently, a 
type of 'bridging task' was developed for the benefit of younger subjects, 
In this bridge-task, subjects were to be given an item for re-construction 
which would be presented initially in jig-saw form, and they were to have 
been asked to make as many re-constructions as they could think of. Then 
the subjects were to have been asked to draw some of their attempts. From 
this, they were to have moved to the main item - re-constructing without 
concrete props. However, surprisingly, it was found that even the youngest 
subjects were quite able to understand the logic of the task (as their 
attempts illustrate) though they were not always able to re-construct with 
accuracy. The bridge-task, used only in pilot work, was therefore dropped. 
Symbolic Meaning and Re-classification Tasks  
One item - Symbolic Meaning - was actually dropped from the battery 
of tasks as a result of pilot work. This 'tam, inspired by some of Berko's 
work (1958), required the subject to supply meanings to nonsense words on 
the basis of symbolic cues. or context, the purpose being to note ability, 
at different ages, to respond on the basis of these different criteria. 
However, it was found that the youngest subjects still had sufficient 
difficulty with reading to feel very 'unfree' with words. This difficulty 
was also found with the Re-classification Task, which was in fact retained 
but not for the youngest of subjects. 
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Conclusion  
The pre-pilot work served to develop measures which were eventually 
used in the main part of the assessment. Pre-pilot work is also valuable 
in enabling the researcher to better understand and formulate the questions 
he is seeking to put. The subsequent pilot work resulted in some changes 
to proposed tasks and it provided the researcher with some experience of 
using the tasks in an assessment situation. 
A major outcome of the pilot work was the generation of descriptive 
sub-categories used in scoring. These categories stemmed from a con-
sideration of the responses of the pilot sample. A full explanation of 
these categories is given in the following section. 
Chapter 5 
CATEGORIES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF TASKS 
This section outlines the philosophy behind the 
assessment categories then proceeds to the pre—
sentation and explanation of the actual categories. 
Assessment methods are described and some conclud—
ing reference is made to potential refinement and 
improvement of categories — a point more fully 
discussed in the concluding chapter of this 
research. 
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Assessment is inseparable from the philosophy underpinning the 
research in question. What and how one assesses is related to what one 
thinks ought to be assessed. This research is not concerned with end 
products and their evaluation, but rather, with the abilities regarded 
as essential to creative transformations. It has been argued that 
creative transformations are based upon certain principles (re-definition, 
adjustment, etc). 	 Interest is with the abilities, not simply in terms 
of existence or non-existence, but in terms of genesis and development. 
In research which aims to be very exploratory, there was a desire to 
allow categories to emerge from observations rather than to construct 
them in advance. At the same time, some degree of order had to be imposed 
in advance, if only to give focus to the observations. 
The major categories for assessment were generated before the tasks 
were carried out by the subjects, and are based upon the principles 
believed to underpin creative transformations. An example may help to 
clarify. The Elaboration Teak embodies the principle of addition to an 
identity. It was easy to postulate in advance that a subject would either 
be able or unable to elaborate or would partly satisfy the task. Such a 
postulate led to further questions - such as, "what is adequate elaboration?" 
- what are the criteria, and more importantly, what are the characteristics 
which indicate various levels or stages of the ability? This last question 
led to the construction of a further set of sub-categories. 
The sub-categories, which explain the major categories are really 
criteria for the "passing/failing" of a major category such as Elaboration 
(principle = addition). The sub-categories were not postulated in advance, 
but resulted from observations of pilot work as already mentioned in the 
previous section. A further example may help: 
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In the pilot work, concerned with the Elaboration Task, several 
points were noticed: 
a) before eight years of age subjects were sometimes unable to use 
the stimulus lines purposefully. Some subjects ignored them, drawing 
alongside; 
b) only about half of the eight year olds (and younger subjects) were 
able to re—define the stimulus lines. Re—definition, based on figure—
ground reversal did not appear in the responses of subjects before nine 
or ten years at least; 
c) some subjects made obvious elaborations or additions to the stimulus 
lines. With age, greater subtlety appeared and the stimulus lines were 
more truly embedded in the final elaboration, determining much less 
the eventual outcome. 
On the basis of such observations, sub—categories for assessment were 
drawn up. These categories are explained in detail in this section. 
Without doubt, there is a certain arbitrariness in their construction, 
but such a comment could be levelled at most modes of assessment. The 
focus could well be shifted and produce other aspects for assessment. This 
would be a matter of selection. There is, however, a further, distinct 
point — that of refinement. 
In the introduction to the previous chapter the idea of "task—levels" 
was discussed. The search for such levels which essentially are landmarks 
of task—complexity and corresponding cognitive comprehension, must begin 
at the level of theory and of observations in the light of the theory. 
The sub—categories employed in this assessment, whilst in need of refine—
ment through replication studies, are a first step towards the identification 
and labelling of such task—levels. 
When explaining the tasks, the importance of avoiding context—
specific tasks was mentioned. This same problem had to be encountered in 
the construction and use of categories - and especially sub-categories. 
Getzels and Jackson (1962) touch (unconsciously?) upon the problem of 
the context-specific when they state: 
"Creativity is a fairly specific type of cognitive ability 
reflected in performance on a series of paper and pencil tests." 
The statement requires one to challenge the adequacy of the definition, 
and in turn the generality of the tasks and assessment procedures. If an 
explanation of creativity is to be adequate then it cannot be tied to cer-
tain modes and media. There are not different types of creativity and 
principles of a general nature must be found for its explanation and 
assessment. Context-specific types of assessment tend to throw up 
dichotomies such as verbal and non-verbal creativity (Torrance and Gowan, 
1963). 
This consideration led to an examination of the principles and the 
criteria for sub-categories. The principles (atIstment, addition, etc), 
it is believed, can be applied to all media. With regard to the sub-
categories, it may be helpful to make reference again, by way of example, 
to the Elaboration Task (principle of addition). 
The sub-categories generated on the basis of the type of observation 
already described were: 
a) use of stimulus lines; 
b) re-definition (including re-definition based on figure-ground rever- 
sal); 
c) deliberation; 
d) embeddedness. 
It will be seen from the detailed consideration of these sub-categories 
on the following pages that such sub-categories are not tied to particular 
Getzels,J. and Jackson, p. (1962) Creativity and Intelligence:Explorations  
with Gifted Children. P.16. 
Torrance, P. and Gowan, 
	 (1963) "The reliability of the Minnesota tests 
of creative thinking", RecoMemorandgm, acrad,Reg. A. 
media or events. This is essential in a search for general explanatory 
principles and a comprehensive theory of creativity. As groundwork for 
the establishment of "task—levels", these sub—categories aim to be state—
ments about attainment points in processes of transformation (each of 
which is described by a major principle — e.g. Elaboration). They are 
not descriptions of levels of transformations as tied to specific tasks. 
CATEGORIES AND ASSESSMENT  
Elaboration Task  
There were four items in this task, each item was presented twice. 
a) Use of stimulus lines  
It was noticed that many of the younger subjects found it difficult 
to integrate the stimulus lines into their drawings, tending rather to 
ignore such lines or to draw alongside them. Use of stimulus material is 
regarded as essential. Whilst it is held that the use of stimulus material 
in itself cannot necessarily lead to outcomes deemed 'creative', all 
creative outcomes are necessarily dependent on this ability. 
"Use of stimulus lines" was regarded in all or nothing terms. Pilot 
work revealed that no subject 'partially' integrated the stimulus lines, 
though there was variation in terms of subtlety of integration (a further 
category). Therefore, the following would hold in the assessment of 
this category: 
a. 	 b. 	 c. 
Ob. 
a) is clearly not integrated, and it is an instance of an 'aimless' 
type of elaboration; 
b) uses the stimulus lines in a way that forms an obvious relationship 
between the lines and the outcome; 
c) integrates the lines with greater subtlety. 
However, both (b) and (c) would be regarded as having "used" the stimulus 
lines. A subject who exhbited this ability on at least 6/8 responses 
would be regarded as having satisfied that aspect of the main item. 
b) Re-definition  
This relates to the subject's ability to re-apprehend and so re-
define a structure. In terms of assessment this was regarded as enabling 
the subject to produce a different drawing for each of the two trials. 
Therefore, a subject who produced two 'different' butterflies would not 
score on a particular item, whereas a subject who produced a 'butterfly' 
and a 'wine glass', would score on this particular aspect of the item. 
Where a subject showed the ability to re-define three out of four stimulus 
lines, that subject was regarded as having satisfied that aspect of the 
main item. 
(Figure-ground re-definition) Some re-definition took place on the 
basis of figure-ground transformations - though very few of the younger 
subjects illustrated this type of re-definition. They tended rather to 
produce two different solutions whilst still interpreting the stimulus 
lines from the same base-line, or from the same figure-ground standpoint. 
Others showed the following ability: 
a. 
	 b. 
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In the above responses, the "V" shape stimulus line, is used both as 
'figure' and as 'ground'. Figure-ground re-definition, is essentially, 
therefore, an explanation of the nature of the definition and is not in 
itself a major sub-catqpry but an aspect of re-definition. 
c) Deliberation  
It is argued that recognition of potential involves the ability to 
define, in some way, what is recognised. Children, therefore, who drew 
without a purpose, who could not name their drawing before completion of 
elaboration, were regarded as not having satisfied this aspect of the 
item. 
d) "Embeddedness" 
In elaborating, some subjects showed an ability -tic forge less struc-
turally obvious relationships between the lines and the outcomes. This 
is not the same thing as statistical infrequency, for it is not a matter 
of the number of responses or their infrequency, but a realisation of 
structural implications on the part of the subject. "anbeddedness" 
requires that the stimulus lines are truly integrated into the elaboration, 
and do not in themselves determine the major part of the elaboration. 
Embeddedness was expected to be related to figure-ground transformations. 
The following examples attempt to illustrate: 
a) 
In (a), the "V" shaped stimulus line determines, to a large degree, the 
final form and outcome. In (b) where the same stimulus line is elaborated 
upon, the final outcome is less determined by the "V" shaped stimulus line. 
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A subject was required to illustrate this ability on any 4/8 responses. 
There is no firm hierarchy of relationship of sub-categories, though the 
latter category (d) is seen as being dependent upon sub-categories (a), 
(b) and (c). As a sub-category, it is regarded as qualifying sub-category 
(b) - re-definition - for embeddedness is a quality of re-definition. 
In order to satisfy the Elaboration Task, subjects were required to 
possess abilities needed for sub-categories (a), (b), (e) and (d). 
free Problem Solving Task  
1. The Matchstick Problem  
Observations during the pilot work quickly clarified the fact that 
children who were able to grasp the notion of a basic paradigm and then 
re-organise this paradigm to arrive at as many different variations of it 
as possible, were the most likely to produce a high number of solutions. 
Such systematic examination of a structure is very characteristic of formal 
operational thinking. Such an approach is exemplified in the classic 
experimental situation of Piaget and Inhelder's which requires the subject 
to produce a given liquid colour from a combination of coloured liquids 
(Piaget and Inhelder, 1958), and regarded as essential to mature creative 
explorations if a subject is to comprehend the notion of possibilities. 
A haphazard like examination of a structure, or structures, as instanced 
by many of the younger subjects in this sample seems to be accompanied by 
a lack of realisation of the implications of one's own activities. Two 
sub-categories were developed on the basis of these observationss 
a) Paradigmatic variations  
This kind of variation required that the subject offer a solution or 
solutions, and at some point during the task he explore the possibilities 
Piaget, J. and Inhelder, B. (1958) The Growth of Logical Thinking from  
childhood to Adolescence. pp 108-9. 
of that same solution by varying it, e.g: 
(i) variation of a paradigm 
as opposed to: 
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etc. 
etc. 
(ii) non systematic explorations 
This systematic type of behaviour was easily visible during task performance. 
Its opposite was illustrated by haphazard searchings, refusals to return 
to earlier efforts on the basis that: "I've done that one already", 
inability to remember what had been done, and above all, a small number of 
solutions. A subject who provided a solution and explored that same 
solution to the extent of at least -two further variations (three in all) 
was regarded as exhibiting this organised type of exploration. 
To satisfy this aspect of the item, at least half of his solutions 
had to be obtained in this way. 
b) Fluency, 
In itself, fluency is not regarded as an index of creative potential. 
There are too many complex motivational and orientational problems in an 
area such as creativity to treat fluency seriously. However, where fluency 
might be related to some structural ability, it is believed that it is of 
importance. Here, fluency is regarded as an outcome of paradigmatic 
variation. The discovery and use of a paradigm must increase the total 
output. Any subject offering at least five correct solutions, and satisfying 
category (a) here, was regarded as having satisfied this aspect of the 
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item. The number 5 was chosen quite arbitrarily after initial observations 
of pilot subjects. 5 seemed to be a reasonable average minimum. 
= one solution, because the second is a 
repetition (in reverse) of the first. 
= two solutions, because the second is a 
genuine variation. 
Subjects were required to satisfy sub—categories (a) and (b), to satisfy 
the item itself. 
2. The Bottle Top Problem  
On considering pilot responses to this task, it was evident that a 
critical factor was not simply the generation of a new solution but an 
adequate grasp of the structure of that solution, and of the structural 
implications. Further, the solution had to relate to the structure of the 
bottle top in question. Responses were considered in terms of degrees of 
organisation of response, not simply in terms of verbal organisation, but 
rather conceptual organisation. The following sub—categories were 
developed; 
a) Systematic and organised  
Here the response was related to the task in hand. The subject offered 
an organised description of the solution, showed an understanding of the 
relationships of the component parts and a grasp of implication, and had 
a clear and steady concept of his own solution. 
b) Partially systematic  
There was evidence of some organisation, but there was a lack of 
implication and parts did not always relate well. When questioned about 
their suggestions, such subjects showed that they were not always aware 
of possible implications and outcomes, and further, that they lacked 
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a clear and steady concept of their own solution. 
c) Non-systematic  
Such responses were often made up of bizarre responses, isolated 
statements showing a complete lack of relationship to the problem in hand. 
Examples of responses falling into each of the above sub-categories 
are given in the section dealing with interpretation. 
In order to satisfy this item subjects were required to show a 
minimum of organisation in their solutions and to fall, therefore, into 
either sub-category (a) or (b). Subjects were required to satisfy both 
items in this Task. 
Identity Recognition Task  
There were three items in this Task - each item presented twice. 
This task differs from the Elaboration Task, in that here the subject is 
required to structure and define existing stimulus lines, as opposed to 
developing or elaborating upon basic stimulus lines. The following sub-
categories were employed in assessment: 
a) 	 Use of stimulus lines  
Subjects were required to structure identities from the lines provided. 
They were allowed to add only minor details - e.g. an eye or a tail where 
an animal had been depicted. As with the Elaboration Task it was noticed, 
in pilot observations, that younger subjects had great difficulty in using 
the stimulus lines and tended rather to draw alongside them. Subjects who 
used the stimulus lines on 4 out of 6 of the responses were regarded as 
having satisfied this aspect of the main item. 
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b) Purposeful drawing 
Again as in the case of the Elaboration Task, subjects were required 
to state/name the outcome before completion. Un -named shapes were not 
accepted. When a subject drew without any real purpose, then tried to 
find a label after the drawing, this too was discounted. Subjects had 
to satisfy this criteria on four out of six of the responses. Clearly 
sub-categories (a) and(b) are closely related. 
c) Re-definition  
Essentially, this requires that the subject be capable of re-
apprehending the stimulus lines. This would not include instances where 
the subject would pick out very small areas from the lines, thus using 
different areas of the stimulus lines for each trial, and as such there-
fore not truly re-defining. Instead, a subject would re-use, in a different 
way, stimulus lines, or parts of those lines, already used in the first 
trial of the item. 
d) Constructive integration of at least 4 of the stimulus lines  
With age, it was observed in pilot responses, that subjects were 
capable of integrating increased amounts of the stimulus lines into their 
responses. Subjects integrating at least one-third of the stimulus lines 
were in a better position to truly construct an identity from the stimulus 
lines provided, as opposed to those who picked out a small shape. 
To satisfy this item - Identity Recognition - subjects were required 
to fulfil the requirements of sub-categories (a), (b), (c) and (d). 
Identity Re-construction (1) 
This item has four parts each of which is assessed independently. 
To satisfy the task as a whole, the subject has to meet the requirements 
of all four parts. 
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Item 1: Definition/Description  
Basically, this task is concerned with the ability to comprehend a 
given structure - essential if re-structuring of some type is to come 
about. Three sub-categories were drawn up for the assessment of this 
aspect: 
a) An organised definition with correct information  
The subject was required to give a correct and organised description 
of the information (a block of flats) on the card. This required that 
the subject organise the structure - relate the parts and describe in 
objective terms without distorting the information through assimilation. 
b) Towards an organised description with correct information  
Whilst lacking the precision and organisation ofwb-category (a), 
information in this category was mainly correct and objective, and there 
was some understanding of the relationship of the parts to the whole. 
c) Ego-centric and unrelated information  
Subjects in this sub-category has no organised concept of the block 
of flats, but seemed to conceive of it as un-related parts. Further, 
their information was inaccurate and distorted by assimilation. Infor-
mation was often invented. 
To satisfy this part of the item, subjects had to provide definitions 
which fell into sub-categories (a) or (b) - i.e. a minimum of organisation 
was required. 
Item 2:"Change the building in some way" 
Essentially, this task requires the subject to grasp the structural 
implications of the identity in question, so that he can re-construct 
that identity in some way. Two sub-categories were developed: 
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a) Re—structures correctly on a non—unit basis  
Here the subject retains the rectangular shape of the building and 
simply changes the position of the windows. However, a change is effected. 
b) Re—structures on a unit basis  
This time, the subject does not retain the rectangular shape but 
defines the building in terms of the individual units which comprise it — 
thus changing the outline of the building. Other changes are Emmet,. 
included too — e.g. change in order of windows. 
In terms of assessment of this task, satisfaction of either of the 
above sub—categories is regarded as 'passing' this aspect of the item. 
Further observations were made — observations concerned with details such 
as adding or leaving out material, holding a poor concept of a building — 
i.e. concentrating all the bricks in one corner. However, such information 
is not regarded as forming a further sub—category, but rather explains 
the kinds of errors preventing a subject from falling into either sub—
category (a) or sub—category (b). 
Item 3: Unequal Division  
This task required the subject to come to terms more thoroughly with 
the structural aspects of the problem, for here, the subject was required, 
to some extent, to move away from the rectangular outline. The following 
sub—category was drawn up: 
Correct division of structure  
This required that the subject divided correctly, both the major units 
(squares) and the windows within the structure. Some subjects had dif—
ficulty in allocating the correct number of windows even though they 
managed to divide the actual structure. Subjects were obliged to divide 
the building unequally, a requirement which forced them to consider the 
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building more in terms of individual units. Some subjects just managed 
to avoid this requirement by dividing the building equally, removing the 
top layer from one half and adding it to the other half. Satsfaction of 
this sub—category was essential. 
Item 4: Change of Shape  
This task required a change of shape in the building which required 
that the subject have a very adequate grasp of the structure of the iden— 
tity and of the implications of changes to that structure. To assess 
performance, the following sub—category was constructed: 
Changes shape correctly relating it to units  
By which was meant that the subject was aware of the individual 
units (20) and took their size and shape into account. Subjects unable 
to do this distorted the building to any shape which suited their interest. 
What Would Happen If Task  
Basically, the subject was required to construct an imaginary system 
of relations. At a more concrete level, the Bottle Top problem had 
required the subject to relate identities to solve a problem. Now the 
subject is required to relate identities without concrete props of any 
kind. A grasp of implications of relating is required. 
The following sub—categories were established: 
a) Constructs a system of well related ideas  
Subjects in this category showed a grasp of relations and of the 
implications of relating. They were able to see that a change in one 
area of a system would have implications for another area, and had a 
clear and steady concept of their proposal. 
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b) Towards a system of well related ideas  
A matter of degree. Subjects had well organised ideas for the most 
part, however, there were still traces of disorganised thinking and 
instances of lack of implication, and further, they presented "related 
ideas" as opposed to a %ystem of ideas". Their concept of the solution 
was less clear and steady. 
c) Unrelated, ego—centric ideas  
Such responses consisted mainly of comments — usually brief — on 
unrelated aspects. They were very much tied to immediate experience and 
to the world of the child and showed no grasp of relations or of 
implications. 
To satisfy this item subjects were required to supply information of 
the sub.;.category (a) or (b) type on both items in this task. 
Re—classification  
After consideration of the pilot work it was decided that the res—
ponses of the youngest group could not be included due to their reading 
difficulties. This was further confirmed by the research itself — and as 
a consequence, the results of this age group were not included. 
Essentially, in this task, subjects were required to form associations 
employing different, self—chosen criteria. Sub—categories for this assess—
ment were developed from two sources of experience: (1) an earlier 
project on ways of signifying words; (2) the pilot work. The following 
sub—categories were constructed: 
a) Objective criteria 
When a subject associated words on the basis of common criteria — 
e.g. colour classification. 
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b) Shape—sound criteria  
When subjects associated words because "they sound the same" or 
"they have the same letters in them, they look the same." 
c) Association  
When neither of the above categories was employed, but instead 
the subject formed relationships on the basis of associations — personal 
or common, e.g. 
shadow — bark — shell — paper "because they are all dead things 
taken from a living thing" 
Subjects were required to satisfy this latter sub—category. 
Number and size of groupings  
In any one grouping a subject was required to have a minimum of 
three words associated. It was felt that if two words were allowed 
(counted) subjects would be more likely to 'pair' words according to 
common usage (e.g. red — anger) than to seriously search for associational 
criteria. Beyong this, no extra points were given (i.e. for groupings 
larger than three) as this might then become a 'fluency' matter, and less 
a matter of establishing ability to make associations on new criteria. 
For the same reasons, subjects were required to produce a minimum 
of five such groupings. This was because in order to make the task pos—
sible, at least one fairly obvious grouping was included. It was thought 
that by asking a minimum of five associative groupings, a genuine search 
for criteria would have been essential on at least four of the groupings. 
Subjects were encouraged to go on trying to form groupings until it was 
obvious that they could not continue. 
Trial 1 
2 
0 
3 
4 
5 
6 
The following table illustrates the method of scoring for this  
Re—classification Task. 
Size of 
Criteria 	 GrouninK Score 
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Association 	 5 	 1 
Association 	 5 	 1 
Objective 	 2 	 0 
Association 	 3 	 1 
Association 	 4 	 1 
Association 	 3 	 1 
TOTAL 	 5 
This subject would satisfy the Re—classification Task with a minimum score 
of five accepted groupings. 
A subject was able to employ a word more than once, given that this 
was done in a new association, based on new criteria. The cards on the 
left illustrate the way in wlich the words were ringed by the examiner, 
and the sequence in which they were ordered. 
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Identity Re—construction (2) 
Task 1: Definition  
See Re—construction (1) for sub—categories. 
Task 2: Re—construction  
This task requires somewhat different sub—categories from earlier 
re—construction tasks largely because it does not require a convergent 
type answer. The subject is required to re—structure given identities 
as he wishes. He is required to respect the constraints of the materials. 
The following sub—categories were constructed: 
a) Correct (figural) definition  
This required that the subject, when re—constructing, use the correct 
number of pieces — i.e. did not repeat or miss out lines, and further, that 
he maintain reasonable size—relations. 
b) Constructive use  
Required that the subject show an ability to reconstruct the lines 
to form a well organised shape or form, as opposed to a fragmented series 
of lines. 
Subjects were required to satisfy both sub—categories and the 
definition sub—category to be regarded as having 'passed' this item. 
ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES  
No assessment of responses was made until all data had been collected. 
A two—fold assessment was made: 
a) an assessment in pass/fail terms which stated that a subject did or 
did not possess a particular ability regarded as essential to a given 
type of creative re—structuring, e.g. Elaboration. 
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b) an assessment based on the sub-categories which highlighted the 
particular aspects of the problems which a subject or subjects found 
difficult or impossible. 
This two-fold method was decided upon because there was a desire to 
be able to make some overall statements about ability in given areas - but 
it had to be the type of statement which would lend itself to qualitative 
comment and developmental analysis - possibly stage analysis. It was 
believed that this two-fold assessment method could achieve this. 
Assessment and the use of a panel  
The assessment of abilities in transition can posit problems. 
Miller and Heldmeyer (1975) have noted the problems of assessment of such 
abilities. Piaget and Fraisse (1970) encountered similar problems. 
Examining the development of intellectual operations by means of a study 
of conservation, Piaget and Inhelder first established context-specific 
categories (of weight, substance, etc) and then proceeded to classify 
responsesaccording to the existence or non-existence of the ability, adding 
a further category called "transitional", for which they have criteria. 
The problems of course lie in the application of criteria! 
It is believed that the assessment of abilities in transition could 
be affected by researcher bias especially when criteria deciding various 
degrees of establishment of an ability are, in themselves, in a state of 
development and refinement. 
Because of the problem of application of criteria to abilities in 
transition, a panel of judges was employed. It should be stressed that 
Miller, P. and Heldmeyer, K. (1975) "Perceptual information in conservation: 
effects of screening", Ch. Devt. 46, pp 588-92. 
Piaget, J. and Fraisse, P. (1970) Experimental Psychology: its scope and  
method, YIT. 
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this panel was employed as a form of reliability check only. Assessment 
in this research is not arbitrary in that agreement, in some degree, by a 
panel or group is regarded as constituting 'ability'; a subject is either 
able to adjust a structure or he is not. However, it can be difficult to 
detect and to label emergent abilities. Consequently, a panel was thought 
to be of importance in an anticipated few marginal instances where tran-
sitional abilities might posit such problems. 
The panel consisted of four final year psychology degree students 
and myself. All the students had at least a working knowledge of Piaget's 
theory of knowledge and an explanation on the purpose and aims of the 
research was given. The criteria explained on the previous pages were 
presented, verbally and in written form, and there was a trial run using 
some of the pilot work. The main purpose was to prevent researcher bias. 
It was decided in advance that an agreement of 4/5 at least would be 
required before an ability could be placed in any one class. The raters 
worked together, as a group, task by task. Each rater ticked their res-
ponse on a score sheet. When this had been done responses were shared 
and the conclusion achieved. Working task by task, prevented the raters 
from building up a profile on any one child and so anticipating ability 
from one task to another. It was found, in fact, that agreement by the 
raters was so consistently high (over 95% over all tasks) that the use 
of such a panel could have been avoided. Certainly one was in no greater 
need of this kind of reliability check than Piaget and Fraisse (1970, ibid)! 
Categories not assessed by the panel  
The following sub-categories could not be assessed by the panel. 
They had, for obvious reasons, to be judged by the researcher at the time 
of the assessment. They were not marginal categories, however. 
Task 	 Sub-category  
Elaboration 
	 Deliberation 
Identity Recognition 
	 Purposeful drawing 
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Sub-categories and the notion of stage  
The notion of stage is assumed in this explanation of creativity 
though it is not possible to come to any firm conclusions at an empirical 
level about stages of creativity. However, possibilities for future, more 
refined conclusions lie within the sub-categories of assessment which are 
concerned with the qualitative and transitional dimensions of the responses. 
An attempt to consider stage immediately raises numerous problems - 
some stemming from the concept - others from the difficulties of classify-
ing reality. Beilin (1971) has referred to the fact that Piaget's 
examination of conservation for instance, is most often very context-
specific. This is quite acceptable for he is discussing the development 
of an ability. One problem of categorisation is that of deciding the 
width of the categories. The decision must be made, of course, in relation 
to the purpose of the activity. An aim here has been to strive for 
general as opposed to context-specific categories in an attempt to work 
towards general, explanatory stage-criteria. For this reason, detailed 
criteria explaining the development of each major principle have not been 
developed. Instead, some attempt to classify responses according to 
degrees of organisation has been made. There are, however, variations 
- essential in initial exploratory work - for early systematisation 
brings its own dangers. The implications of the sub-categories for a 
more refined stage-analysis of creativity will be discussed at a later 
stage in this research. 
Bailin, H. (1971) "Developmental stages and developmental processes", in: 
Measurement and Piaget, D. Greent et al. 
Chapter 6 
A CONSIDERATION OF IRE FINDINGS (1 
This chapter is essentially descriptive, 
reporting the findings, including relevant 
illustrations of a selection of responses. 
The following chapter examines the findings 
in relation to the theory underpinning the 
research and makes further interpretations 
in the light of the statistical analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is felt that it would be helpful to have, at this point, a table 
of the major categories in which the findings are to be presented, to 
serve largely as a reminder. Sub-categories regarded as essential to 
satisfying the task are marked *. On the following pages, findings are 
presented in graph form for the tasks as a whole, and for the sub-categories 
of the tasks. A profile of each subject's performance will be found in 
Appendix III. 
Task 1: Elaboration (Principle = Addition) 
Sub-categories: use of stimulus lines * 
re-definition * 
re-definition based on figure-ground reversal 
deliberation * 
embeddedness * 
A subject satisfying all sub-categories marked * was regarded as having 
"passed" the item. Figure-ground reversals, which increased with age, led 
to some interesting elaborations but were not regarded as fundamental to 
the task. 
Task 2: Free Problem Solving (Principle = Re-organisation) 
Sub-categories: paradigmatic varations * 
(task a) 	 fluency * 
(task b) 	 organised response 
partly organised response * 
In task b of this main task, a minimum of organisation was required in 
the response. Either of the sub-categories therefore could satisfy the 
requirements of the task. 
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Task 3: Identity Recognition (Principles = Apprehension and Re—definition) 
Sub—categories; use of stimulus lines * 
purposeful drawing * 
constructive use of at least of stimulus lines * 
re—definition of stimulus lines * 
Task 4: Identity Re—construction (1) (Principles = Definition, 
Re—organisation and Division) 
Sub—categories: an organised response 
a partly organised response * 
correct re—construction on unit basis 
correct re—construction on non—unit basis * 
correct division of structure * 
correct change of shape of structure * 
Categories marked * indicate the minimum amount of understanding of the 
task required to "pass" the whole task. 
Task 5: What Would Happen If Task (Principle = Re—organisation) 
Sub—categories: an organised response 
a partly organised response * 
Task 6: Re—classification (Principle = Re—relating) 
Sub—categories: objective criteria 
shape/sound criteria 
association * 
fluency * 
Task 7: Re—construction (2) (Principles = Definition and Re—organisation) 
Sub—categories: an organised response 
a partly organised response * 
correct figural definition * 
constructive use of stimulus lines * 
it 
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PERFORMANCE ON ALL TASKS BY AGE. 
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THE ELABORATION TASK  
A main characteristic of the younger age groups (6 and 7 years) was 
that most of them began to draw immediately without thoroughly assessing 
the stimulus lines. Only 6/24 subjects knew What their drawings would be 
in advance. The majority simply began to draw, adding, considering, 
attempting to fit their response into some category. Most overcame this 
latter difficulty be drawing patterns of shapes. Generally, there was a 
very direct and obvious relationship between the stimulus lines and the 
elaboration, the most frequent elaborations for Item 1, for instance, 
being - church towers, bird's beaks or hats. Older subjects, by contrast, 
were capable of more remote relationships between stimulus lines and the 
elaboration, further, there was a greater variety of actual elaborations. 
Only 15/24 subjects in the 6 and 7 year group were really able to integrate 
the stimulus lines into their elaborations. The others either drew along-
side the lines or over them, entirely ignoring their direction. There 
was a very real lack of detail in the elaborations and no child from this 
group was able to produce figure-ground variations. 
Four subjects in this 6-7 year old group who produced more detailed 
drawings, accompanied the elaborations with a story and the elaborations 
was developed in line with the tale, Such elaborations were interesting 
examples of phantasy versus imaginative potential. As drawings, they 
were of interest but there was no reality adjusted attempt to build on 
the stimulus, and the final elaborations were quite different in quality 
from those of older subjects who were well able to incorporate these same 
lines into scenes or objects. These younger subjects adjusted the stimulus 
lines to fit their train of thought, whereas older subjects made a more 
obvious attempt to adjust their efforts to the stimulus lines. 
PLATE 13  
boy.6:7. 
Children in the 6 and 7 year old groups did 
not always use the stimulus lines as illustrated 
above. 
The boy here spent about 2 minutes looking at 
the lines from different angles, and then drew 
calling the shape a "big hairy thing". When 
asked about the stimulus lines he explained 
that they were the "monster's stick" then said- ' 
"no, they are not really in the picture". 
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From: Elaboration Task (item 3). 
PLATE 14  
girl.6:7. 
Ss. in the 6,7, and 8 year old age groups 
often drew patterns when they could not use 
the stimulus lines in another way. The 'patterns' 
are quite different in type from the "abstract 
patterns" produced by some of the older subjects 
who not only drew with design and deliberation 
but were also able to name their pattern as 
representing some idea or theme. 
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From the Elaboration Task.(Item 4.) 
AV 
PLATE 15, 
boy.9:3. 
This kind of response was more often found in 
the efforts of the 6 and 7 year old group and 
was not found in the age groups above this 
one. 
Some younger Ss. seemedto find it very difficult 
to use or integrate the stimulus lines, and would 
instead, sometimes draw alongside them or respond 
in the above manner. 
From the Elaboration Task. (Item 1.) 
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With the 3 and 9 year old subjects, there was a marked increase in 
ability to integrate the stimulus lines into the elaborations (24/24 as 
opposed to 15/24 in previous group). There was still a very direct 
relationship between the stimulus lines and the elaborations and there 
was often a lack of detail in the drawings. However, more subjects in 
this group elaborated after reflection and an increased number could in 
fact name the outcome before drawing; in other words, the drawing was not 
defined as it went along.(22/24 as opposed to 6/24 in previous age group). 
In this group there was the beginnings of the use of figure—ground 
variations (2/24 as opposed to 0/24 previously). 
The following age group — 10 and 11 year olds — showed yet a further 
increase in ability in most of the areas discussed. Stimulus lines were 
well integrated, drawings were detailed and almost all the subjects could 
name the outcome of the elaboration before embarking upon it (20/24). The 
number of responses showing remote relationships between the stimulus lines 
and elaborations was 9/24, as opposed to 1/24 for the previous age group. 
Amongst the oldest age group (12 and 13 years) there was a further 
general rise in these abilities. All subjects integrated stimulus lines, 
produced detailed drawings, which they could name in advance and 22/24 
used the stimulus lines from different angles including figure—ground 
variations (13/24). It was anticipated that most of the subjects in this 
older age group would be capable of "embeddedness", i.e. of less direct 
relationships between the stimulus lines and the elaborations, but in 
fact only 12/24 managed this. 5 subjects in this age group included 
abstract type patterns. These were quite different in quality from the 
"patterns" offered by younger subjects, for they were named in advance and 
the theme or topic depicted was apparent. 
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PLATE 16  
boy. 11:6. 
This subject's second attempt on this item 
shows the "V" shape used as 'figure' instead 
of as 'ground' as used in this drawing. Most 
Ss. in this age group were able to offer 
figure-ground variations in their responses. 
From the Elaboration Task  (item 1.) 
PLATE 17  
girl. 10:7. 
Only four children in this age group showed 
themselves capable of perceiving "remote 
relationships" between the stimulus lines and 
the elaborated object. 
In this particular task the most popular response 
was a television ariel. The above response - a 
glass and straw - uses the stimulus lines from a 
very unusual angle. 
185. 
From the Elaboration Task (Item 3) 
PLATE 18  
girl. 12:10. 
The subjects in this age group were capable of 
more remote relationships between the stimulus 
lines and the actual elaboration. By contrast 
for instance, younger Ss. especially in the 
7yrs. - 10 yrs group. tended to elaborate in 
obvious ways turning this "V" shaped line into 
church towers or bird's beaks. The use of the 
same "V" shape here is a much less obvious one. 
From the Elaboration Task. (first item) 
186. 
PLATE 19 
girl. 13:6. 
A small number of subjects asked if they 
could elaborate in an abstract way. The 
topic was named in advance (the above was 
called: Umbrellas). Such attempts are quite 
distinct in kind from the "patterns" produced 
by younger Ss. Such patterns were usually 
offered because they were unable to elaborate 
in other ways. Further patterns were not 
named and were defined as the drawing was 
carried out. 
Elaboration Task. (first item) 
187, 
PLATE 20 
188. 
girl. 13.8. 
Subjects in this age group showed an ability 
to deal with the stimulus lines from unusual 
angles. Further, they tended generally, to 
approach the stimulus lines from a different 
angle (or figure v. ground) on each presentation 
of the same lines. 
From the Elaboration Task (second item) 
189. 
In general, there were marked qualitative improvements with age in 
this elaboration task. Interest here, is with the subject's ability to 
apprehend, define and re-define a stimulus, and on the basis of apprehension 
and definition to perceive potential. It would seem that re-definition 
comes more easily with age. 
In an earlier part of this research, criticism was levelled at 
Torrance's method of scoring in his Elaboration Task (1974). His concern 
was not so much with apprehension and re-definition of a stimulus, but with 
quantitative elaboration. An example of his method of scoring was included.. 
As a basic interest of this research is with categories of assessment the 
attempts of two children were rated according to Torrance and then con-
sidered in the light of categories employed here (see PLATE 21). 
As can be seen, two subjects in the same age group, using the same 
stimulus lines, gain similar scores on the Torrance method of scoring. It 
is likely that they would score differently in terms of uniqueness, but 
again this would be 'statistical uniqueness' - in other words, sample 
specific. Whilst both subjects gain similar Elaboration Scores according 
to Torrance's method, there are very real differences in the nature of their 
elaborations. In the first instance (i),  the stimulus lines dominate the 
form of the finished elaboration. In the second (ii), the subject integ-
rates the stimulus lines into a new identity. It is the apprehension and 
re-definition of the stimulus lines which leads to an important difference 
between these two elaborations, for which Torrance and others offer no real 
qualitative category. The second subject could in fact have gained a score 
of only 2 on the Torrance system (had she depicted only the glass and straw) 
but this would not have detracted from the essential conception, neither 
do details, for which further points would be given, add to the nature of 
conception. 
PLATE 21 
stand 
television m1 
score m 4. 
190. 
Scoring of the Elaboration Task according to 
Torrance. 
191. 
In this task alone, the use of categories (e.g. re-definition, embedded-
ness) concerned to assess different conceptions and consciousness of such 
conceptions, has led to conclusions of a nature somewhat distant from 
statistical assessments. Elaborations or additions in themselves can be 
meaningless. It is the essential idea itself which may or may not lead 
to 'creativity' - or to re-construction of reality. 
FREE PROBLEM SOLVING  
Almost all of the subjects in the youngest age group were able to 
produce at least one triangle (9/12), but they limited their output because 
they confined their attempts to an equilateral type triangle and were very 
concerned that the matchsticks should not overlap but touch end to end. 
They spent more time exploring and trying out combinations than did the 
older age-groups and seemed hindered by the belief that triangles could 
only be made from 3 or 5 matchsticks. None of them, in spite of repeated 
instructions that: "you may do anything you like with the matches" - broke 
the matchsticks. In all the 6 and 7 year olds produced only 7 different 
solutions to the Matchstick Problem and the sum of their individual scores 
was low (41) as opposed to 78 for the 8-9 year old group. Once they had 
achieved a solution, the 6-7 year olds tended to present this same con-
struction from varied angles: older subjects realised that it was in fact 
the same construction and generally did not offer it again. The younger 
subjects also presented a number of errors as efforts to be recorded. 
In the 8 and 9 year old group, 7/24 broke the matches in order to 
offer further solutions to the problem and there was an increase in the 
variety of solutions offered nd in the sum of the individual scores. 
192. 
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PLATE 22  
Some attempts by the 6 and 7 year old age Eroupe to solve  
the matchstick problem. 
194. 
the above was generally the first solution to be offered -
attained by making a triangle from three matches then 
attempting to fit the fourth match in by flattening the 
other out. 
a. 	 b. 
C. 	 d. 	 e. 
in all this age group offered only 4 different solutions. 
(a.b.c. and i. which was a variation on b.) 
d. and e. include some of their errors. 
when questionned on e. this age group said that there were 
2 triangles. by the age of 12 most Ss. replied that there 
were in fact three - or at least the triangle could be so 
interpreted. 
195. 
This trend continued to rise with age and in the 12 and 13 year old 
group, 9/24 subjects broke the matches to produce further solutions and 
the sum of individual scores rose to 148 as compared with 41 for the 6 
and 7 year olds. Further, this older age group tended to offer more 
flexible solutions, not being tied to the idea of the equilateral triangle 
and overlapping the matchsticks without first seeking permission to do 
SO. 
In general, the younger subjects (especially the 6 and 7 year olds) 
were slow to generate further solutions. The discovery of one solution 
did not seem to open up future possibilities - each solution was a new dis-
covery arrived at by exploratory manipulation of the matchsticks. The 
oldest subjects generally applied a more systematic approach holding a 
basic model in their minds, varying it as much as possible, then changing 
to another model when the possibilities of one seemed to be exhausted. 
There was less manipulation of the matchsticks - they clearly thought up 
their solutions and were quicker and more fluent in their efforts. The 
only manipulation of matchsticks in the eldest group took place when they 
were evidently moving from one 'mental model' and searching for another. 
Younger subjects were so unaware of this way of working that they usually 
failed to recognise repeat solutions; older subjects were generally aware 
when they bordered on a repeat solution. It is anticipated that younger 
subjects would find it very hard to attempt this problem without the use 
of matchsticks for this would involve a re-structuring of reality in a 
non-concrete way. The observations here indicate that a purely statistical 
count on the basis of output can be very inadequate. Ce±ainly there was 
an increase of output with age but there were also differences in the 
method of approach and the solutions of the older subjects were more varied 
and flexible. 
196. 
It is suggested that fluency could be affected by training or 
experience. Such training might aim to enable the use of a basic para-
digm, and systematic exploration of that paradigm. The usefulness of 
such basic training will be considered in the second part of this research. 
Solutions offered to the matchstick problem  
(concrete re-structurings by age groups) 
There was a clear increase in thelariety of solutions with age but 
there were also variations in: 
a) the approach to the problem; 
b) the type of solution offered. 
Number of varied solutions by age  
6 years = 4 solutions 
7 years = 6 solutions 
8 years = 7 solutions 
9 years = 9 solutions 
10 years = 10 solutions 
11 years = 10 solutions 
12 years = 17 solutions 
13 years = 19 solutions 
Approach to the problem  
In general, younger subjects had a very step by step approach, 
having to Iiscover' each new solution. Further, the discovery of one 
solution did not seem to lead to the generation of further solutions. 
Older subjects were able to offer a solution then envisage variations of 
that solutions. 
Types of solution offered  
Younger age groups (6 years to 9 years) were less flexible in their 
use of the matchsticks being generally tied to the idea of an equilateral 
triangle. 
The diagrams over the page illustrate some age-group differences in 
terms of variety of solutions. 
197. 
PLATE 23  
Types of solutions  offered illustrating the  
increased flexibility of older subjects. 
The above solutions were offered by the 8 year old 
group who managed 7 variations, the sum of their 
individual scores being 30. 
The above solutions were offered by the 12 year old group 
who managed 17 variations, the sum of their individual 
scores being 56. The 13 year old group offered 19 
variations with a group score of 54. 
198. 
BOTTLF: TOP PROBLFM 
The intention with this problem was, as with the previous matchstick 
problem, to observe how systematically — if at all — subjects could go 
about offering a solution. A picture of a bottle top was provided so that 
subjects could check their efforts against the nature and shape of the 
bottle neck. Few of the younger subjects used the picture in fact; more 
of the older subjects did. Until nine years of age most of the solutions 
offered were non—systematic, consisting of isolated and non—related ideas 
or bizarre solutions, not at all practical and out of all proportion to the 
task in hand. From 10 years onwards, there was a movement towards more 
systematic thinking but it was only at 13 years of age that a number of 
subjects (6/12) were able to put forward a systematic and organised solution 
to the problem. The following extracts illustrate some of the types of 
solutions put forward at different ages. 
jirl 6:8  
"Get a piece of wood and a knife and then you get 3 matchsticks 
... then you put that near the bottle ... you glue it all 
together. Then you get a sharp knife and put it near the top. 
Then you get a big heavy stone and smash the top off and the 
matchsticks fall down and it comes off." 
(non—systematic solution) 
boy 7:7  
"You get plasticine. Shape it like the bottle ... make it quite 
hard. Put metal over then put it on a machine that makes it go 
round. Then put it on the bottle, then pull it off." 
(How would you actually take if off — with your hands?) 
"Yes." 
(Do you really need the plasticine then?) 
"Yes." 
(Why is that?) 
"I don't know. You need it to get the top off." 
(non—systematic solution) 
This type of solution continued strongly until the 10 year old group 
when a more systematic type of thinking appeared. Few subjects in the 6, 
7 and 8 year old groups seemed to generate an idea in relation to the 
199. 
bottle, and few seemed able to assess the effectiveness of their efforts 
From time to time, subjects did appear to relate parts of their solution 
to other parts of it - but rarely to the task in hand - namely the bottle 
top. Re sponses varied therefore from: "grow big teeth then rip it off 
with your teeth" to: "fix it in a stand then shoot the top off with a 
gun". Without doubt, many solutions were rooted in disorganised thought 
and phantasy - none were rooted in creativity in the sense of ability to 
structure and re-structure reality. 
From 10 years onwards, there was a steady movement towards more 
systematic solutions, and this pattern continued until 13 years when non-
systematic solutions almost disappeared and fully systematic and organised 
solutions increased. 
girl 9:9  
"Well you could make a machine that would cut the glass somewhere 
round here (indicates neck of bottle) but so you wouldn't have 
any cracks of glass in your mouth - put a rubber thing around 
where it would cut." 
(towards a systematic solution) 
While the above solution is still unclear and lacking in implication 
the subject would appear to be more aware of the nature of the problem, 
and she is aware of some of the implications - i.e. broken glass in your 
mouth. However, the actual machine and its functioning is not explained. 
boy 10:9  
"A sort of hand crane and the crane comes down - you let it down 
on its string - and you put it on the bottle top, then fix the 
two hooks onto the bottle and wind it off." 
(towards a systematic solution) 
The 10-11 year old age group ranged across the three types of res-
ponse, showing the beginnings of systematic thinking. 
boy 11:6  
"You'd get a machine. The machine would be made of a knife thing 
which goes round the top of the bottle and snips the top off clean 
so that no glass would go in the lemonade. The knife would be 
a rounded pair of scissors." 
(towards a systematic solution) 
200. 
sirl 12:7  
"A small gadget which fits into your land. At the end it would 
have four hooks which would be open and loose when you wouldn't 
be using it. You put the hooks on the bottle top then pull a 
small lever on the gadget. This would make the hooks close 
around the top of the bottle and open it sort of upwards. It 
would grab the sides of the top and flatten it upwards then 
crumple it up. When the top was off you'd let go of the lever 
and the hooks would go loose again." 	
(a systematic solution) 
boy 13:6  
"You could do this if you made the tops a different way. When 
you make the tops in the factory you make the edges of the top 
of like soft tinfoil. Only the middle of the top would be really 
hard. When the top was put on you'd press the soft edges down 
round the neck of the bottle, then you'd fit a metal strip around 
these edges to keep them in place. You'd stick this metal strip 
down. You'd leave a little bit sticking up. When you want to 
open it you pull the little bit sticking up and take the strip 
off, then you would just lift off the rest of the top with your 
fingers. The edges would be soft so it would be easy." 
(a systematic solution) 
In the 1.2 and 13 year old age group, 10 subjects on a possible 24 
offered the above type of systematic solution. With development and age 
one would expect this type of response to increase. Clearly, it is only 
at this stage that subjects are really able to define the problem to them—
selves, to organise a solution and to be aware of the implications of 
each step. Younger subjects offered more 'unusual solutions' but they 
could not on the whole be regarded as true solutions, which is why, yet 
again, a statistical count of efforts is regarded as inappropriate. 
While the partially systematic solutions are still not true solutions, 
they are important in a transitional sense in that they indicate adjust—
ments in the child's thought and the direction towards which he is moving. 
Such observations are essential to an understanding of the nature of the 
child's solutions at different stages. 
201. 
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IDENTITY RECOGNITION BY AGE 
In this Identity Recognition Task, focus was again on the nature 
and type of response. The most striking feature, in general terms, 
amongst the 6 to 8 (and even 9) year olds, was their inability to use 
the stimulus lines and to identify objects or shapes in them. Only 6/12 
of the 6 year old group actually used the lines as opposed to drawing 
beside them and by 8 years of age still only half of the subjects in this 
group were using the lines. Until 9 years of age (inclusive), half of the 
subjects were still drawing without any purpose, not knowing what their 
attempt would turn out to be. Within the 6-7 year old band only 2/24 
subjects were using at least one-third of the stimulus lines: most of 
the others were identifying small fragmented shapes which they were unable 
to name. 
By 9 years there was a definite drop in this aimless type of out-
lining, and an increase in ability to use at least one-third of the 
stimulus lines and to identify whole objects. The 12 and 13 year old 
group were concerned about accuracy and generally showed dissatisfaction 
with their own attempts. Whilst they picked out recognisable shapes, the 
9 year olds were able to accept certain inaccuracies, sometimes re-naming, 
the object to fit them. 
By 12 and 13 years of age, subjects were identifying larger (in the 
sense that 13/24 used at least one-third of the stimulus lines) and more 
intricate shapes and objects. They followed them through carefully re-
evaluating their efforts as they drew and managing not to be distracted 
by parts of the stimulus lines which cut across their identifications. 
Younger subjects found it difficult to ignore this distraction, and would 
more often follow a line, realising afterwards that it did not contribute 
to their identification. 
PLATE 24  
girl. 6:7 years. 
An example of limited use of the stimulus lines. 
This child identified a "fish's head" but madettempt 
to carry the identification further as did older 
subjects. More, she picked out the lines without 
knowing what they would become. 
204. 
From the Identity Reconstruction Task (Item 1) 
PLATE 25  
girl. 9:7 years. 
Subjects in this age-group were using a greater 
amount of the stimulus lines. 
The above identification was called - "a twisting 
fish" 
205. 
From the Identity Recognition Task (item 2) 
PLATE 26  
"Jack-Frost" 	 boy. 9:10. 
From this age-group onwards Ss. began to show an 
ability to carry their idea beyond the frame 
provided and to identify only a part of the object. 
Younger Ss. tried rather to contain their effort 
within the frame and would sometimes distort it to 
make it fit. 
206. 
From the Identity Recognition Task (2nd. Item) 
PLATE 27  
girl. 10:9. 
Ss. in this age group were just beginning to use 
most of the stimulus lines in this task. Younger 
Ss. tended more to use fragments of the lines -
turning them,,in this particular task into objects 
such as daggers, spikes etc. The girl here turned 
all of the lines into a tulip. 
207. 
From the Identity Recognition Task. (2nd Item) 
PLATE 28  
boy. 13.7. 
An item from the Identity Recognition Teak. This 
response is very typical of the 13 year old Sa. 
of this sample. They arutinised the stimulus lines 
with care and could always name their drawing 
before they began to carry it out. As a group they 
used at least one third of the stimulus lines and 
for the most part identified whole objects as 
opposed to small parts of objects or shapes. They 
were concerned about precision and yet were still 
able to recognise and identify objects when these 
were poorly conveyed by the stimulus lines (as in 
the above instance) 
Identity Recognition Task. (first item) 
208. 
209. 
When re-constructing reality, an initial part of the task must be that 
of selecting aspects from the general contexts. How one selects and re-
selects must play a determining role in terms of the nature of the outcome. 
Complex selections are more likely to lead to complex structurings and 
complex solutions. The usual context of such selections would, of course, 
be the medium in which one is working. In an assessment situation, there 
is a certain unavoidable artificiality, in that a context is selected (in 
this case stimulus lines). However, in both the 'life-context' and the 
assessment context much will depend upon the forms selected by the per-
ceiver. A major problem in the re-structuring of reality will always 
involve the struggle to perceive and select 'new' forms which are not 
determined by set and experience. Constructions based on 'new' forms 
are more likely to lead to 'new' conclusions. 
But before novelty can come about, there must exist basic abilities 
of organisation, which enable an individual to identify and define aspects 
of reality,and thith amble him to do so with deliberation and consciousness 
of his own activity. 
A BREAKDOWN OF IDENTITY RE-CONSTRUCTION BY AGE!. 
• 
I:  
••! 
1-7r-r• 
12 
• 
11 
10 
; 	 • 	 9 
—•-• 
! 
! 	 • 	 • 	 8 
7 
' • 	 , 
••••••• •••• 
6 
I I ••• • -- - ......1....... 
O ; 	 • : 1 
••• .. ••••,, ••• • 
i 
/ 4"  • 	 • i 
fr! i 	 • 	 i 	
I 
I 	 1 	 i 	 • 	 1 	 , 	 1 
• i 	 L''';'--1'-!i7. 1- 	 , 
I .6%  
• 
• • 	
, 
•  
0 
5 
4 
3 
as• definition partly organised. : 
= definition organised. 
	 i 
• 
••n•• wows. e•••n• 
• • ••:2 ro-construction correct.on a unit basis. 
= re-construction correct on a non-unit basis. 
division of structure correct. .! 
• 
• '71-  7777 77" 
* 	 ** 	 .•:. 
• • 
••n-•• 
0010"46141k= change of the structure's shape correct; 
1 
2 
' 1 
I
• 
 
12 
6 
5 
3 
. 	 • 
IDENTITY RE-CONSTRUCTION (1) BY AGE. 
• • • 
” --1-7-r-.""•:- 
. 	 1' 	 • 	 ' I 	 • 	 I . 	 ;: 1,.. 
. 	 i 	 , 	 4 	 . 	 .', 81 	 ' 
	
l''' •/-.-  ' 7 ...:... " '. " -I.- "i•• r••• .”---'•••••••••' .,-1•7•-•1 	 •••-;-•-.r..•••• 
• I 	 . 	 I 	 r 	 r : 	 I 	 i • . i 	 I 
' 	 , 	 , 	 , 	 '• 	 , • 	 i 	 1 	 ; 	 . 	 I 	 '. 
	 I 	 1 	 . 
i 	 , 	 , 	 1 	 • 	 • 	 I 
• ''''' .. 	 *-1 - r•-!. i •:-. 
	
, I 	 71  .. 	 ' 1 	 .. 	 . n 	 I. 	 1 	 1.; 1, 
" •1".  
• , 
--4 
212. 
IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION (1) BY AGE 
This task fell into four sections, the first requiring an accurate 
description of the material on the test card, the others involving re-
constructions of this same material. One intention was to see if there 
might be an relationship between ability to define and describe and 
ability to act upon what was defined and described. 
The test card depicted a simple one dimensional block of flats, 5 
floors high with four square windows on every floor, except the ground 
floor which had four round ones. The intention was to present a limited 
amount of material in order to reduce complexity, especially for the 
younger subjects. As subjects had to re-structure this same material 
this consideration was yet more important. Even with such minimal infor-
mation it was only at 12 years of age that subjects stopped missing out 
information in their descriptions. In the 10/11 year old age group, 6 
subjects missed out information of an essential type, and three gave 
inaccurate information. Also, even by 12 years, only 5/12 subjects made 
any reference to size relations in their description. 
Apart from offering very confused descriptions (especially the 6 and 
7 year olds), younger subjects added information of an ego-centric nature: 
boy 7:8  
"It's got square windows. At the bottom there's round ones where 
you do the washing. There are people in there washing clothes. 
There's a washing room, then there's the kitchen here. There's a 
mummy here looking out of the window at her little boy playing 
down here. That's all." 
Perhaps the most striking feature was the paucity of information 
(objective) derived from some of these younger subjects. Later, when they 
began their re-structuring tasks, their efforts here revealed that they 
had not, or were not able to take stock of the essential features of the 
building. 
213. 
girl 6:8  
"There's squares, round windows, lines and colours." 
girl 6:7  
"Lady looking out of the window - a dog (indicates the window 
here) - a snowman - a cat - a mouse - a kitchen - round windows 
at the bottom - a hamster." 
During this description the child looked intently at the card. 
When asked: "Is there anything else I would need to know to 
draw what's on the card, she replied: "Yes, lines and grass." 
6:7  
"Lines, squares, lines, squares and then round circles - then 
square lines - and the orange colour." 
With the 8 and 9 year olds, there was a shift towards more objective 
descriptions but these still lacked organisation and only 4/12 made any 
reference to size relations. 13/24 offered more objective descriptions 
as against 10/24 who still persisted in largely ego-centric information 
composed of unrelated statements. Only one subject in this 8-9 year old 
group offered a truly organised definition. 
boy 8:5  
"It's square - got 12 square windows and 4 circle windows. 5 
blocks high and it hasn't got any stairs." 
(a more objective description) 
girl 8:10  
"Has 4 windows 
circles on the 
altogether and 
at the top, 4 on each later - 4 layers. 4 
bottom layer - hasn't got no curtains. 12 
four of circles." 
(a more objective description) 
girl 9:9  
"It's an oblong standing up and its sort of checked, so that 
it's got 4 along the top and 5 downwards. The first 4 rows have 
square ones and the last four have round windows." 
(a more objective description) 
There were exceptions in every age group but for the most part, 
subjects in the 8-9 years group fell into this middle range, moving towards 
more objective descriptions of an organised type. 
boy 
214. 
By 11 years, 5/12 subjects produced well organised descriptions 
made up of objective information and three of them made references to 
size relations. This trend increased in the top agexoups with 11/24 
of the 12-13 year olds offering this third type of description. 
girl 13:11, 
"It's a rectangular 5 story block of flats with 4 windows 
facing the front on each floor. The ground floor windows are 
round, all the others are square. The pattern of stone-work 
forms a kind of square outline around each of the windows, 
including the round ones. The drawing on the card is about 
5" x 4" - I think, and the windows are about-" square - on 
all the 4 sides. I think that's all." 
(organised with objective information) 
boy 12:6  
"It's a block of flats 5 floors high. At the bottom there are 
4 round windows. On the rest of the floors there are 4 square 
windows on each floor. There are 4 floors with square windows, 
so 16 square windows altogether - 20 windows with the round 
ones. The windows take up most of the front of the flat. The 
whole thing is... 6" wide." 	
(organised with objective information) 
None of the subjects in this age group were offering ego-centric 
type descriptions but 13 had still not attained truly organised descrip-
tions, and not all subjects falling into the category illustrated above 
were making reference to size relations. They were not, however, missing 
out information or being inaccurate in their descriptions. 
Interestingly, five subjects in the 12/13 group added evaluative 
comments on the building - different in type from the ego-centric infor-
mation given by younger subjects. Also, such comments were in addition 
to the descr*ion. 
e.g. "... all the rooms look the same - I think this would not be 
good for people who have to live in flats like this. Also, 
they are very plain. They should be brighter." 
	 (girl 12:7) 
215. 
IDENTITY RE—CONSTRUCTION  
The re—construction tasks were concerned to look at ways in which 
subjects could re—structure information, objects, etc. In the intial 
task of describing, most of the 6 and 7 year olds showed clearly that 
they paid little attention to the number of units and other essential 
features of the building; most missed out information or gave inaccurate 
information. It was expected that this would show up in the following tasks. 
The first re—construction task — "make the building different in 
some way" — left the way free for the subjects. This was deliberate. 
Later tasks forced them to deal with the units in increasingly difficult 
ways. Out of the 6 and 7 year old group, only 1/24 could correctly "change 
the building in some way". 12/24 illustrated a very poor concept of a build—
ing — putting all the units into one corner or spreading them over the paper 
into "space" that could not exist given the number and type of units com—
prising the building. About half of the group began without ever counting 
the units. Those who did count were clearly unable to envisage what the 
finished product could look like. This was obvious from instances when 
the child began confidently, having drawn a rectangle, then realised that 
he could not 'fill' the rectangle with the number of units he had to use. 
Some attempted to cope by cutting a bit off the rectangle, spreading the 
remaining units out to fill more space or adding doors and 'concrete 
strips' to fill the space — though they were told repeatedly that they 
could not add anything or take anything away. Illustrations on the 
following pages explain these points. 
By 10 years of age the majority of the subjects (9/12) could change 
the building correctly, but even up until the 13 year old age group, the 
majority preferred to maintain the rectangle, and simply effect the change 
by varying the position of the units. After 10 years, there were no 
actual errors in this task. 
21o. 
boy. 7:7. attempt to change the model in some way. PLATE 29 
  
without any assessment of the model this subject immediately 
divided the whole of the section into pieces. By chance he 
divided into rows of ten but he only discovered this by counting 
twice across. he also counted down. after filling in the four 
circles correctly he then filled in the squares along the top 
row and counted again. he filled in 6 more squares and re-
counted. when he got to the end and realised he had used all 
the blocks available he commented that he didn't know what to 
do with the rest of the spaces. 
217. 
girl. 7:6. attempt to make the building different 	 PLATE 30 
by re-organising the component, parts. 
like the previous subject this child immediately divided up 
her paper without counting. she then filled in some squares 
and circles in the top left hand corner. after a while she 
realised that she could not fill up the whole space so 
decided to spread the squares across the whole, adding a door. 
218. 
boy. 11:8. attempt to make the building look different 
in some way. 	 PLATE 31 
like most subjects in this age group, the boy here did 
not depart from the rectangular shape of the building 
but chose to vary the position of the circles. a girl 
choosing the same solution, considered a more radical 
variation (of shape) but said she would get it wrong 
were she to try it. 
219. 
In task 3 of Identity Re-construction (1),  a more fundamental grasp 
of the units comprising the building was required - especially because 
the division of the building was to be unequal. As can be seen from 
examples of attempts, some younger subjects totally ignored or failed 
to grasp the constraints (structural) of the units. Some of the younger 
subjects managed an equal division - by merely drawing a line down the 
centre of the building, but because they failed to regard the building 
in terms of units, they were unable to move from this stage of equal 
division to one of unequal division. Further, some subjects had difficulty 
in allocating the correct number of windows to each building - e.g. one 
subject put four round windows in each building - instead of 2 in each. 
By nine years of age, half of the subjects could carry out this task 
correctly and in the 13 year old age group all of the subjects were able 
to handle it with ease. 
True re-construction of an object or event requires that the 
individual understand the structure of that same object or event, for 
a structure is defined and formed by its component parts. A change in 
any one of those parts will lead to a change in the total structure. 
Young subjects seemed unable to perceive the reality in such terms. 
Their changes in this particular identity - a building - were in fact 
distortions. They were unable to shift their definition from a 'whole' 
to the parts of that whole. Real grasp would enable a subject to make 
yet further sub-divisions realising that any one object can be perceived 
and re-perceived very differently according to the criteria employed. 
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girl. 7:4. attempt to make two buildings out of one. PLATE 32. 
this subject began by counting the squares in the original 
model and the went on to draw 2 buildings with twice as 
many squares and circles as there should have been. at the 
end she was challenged on this. counted again and noted a 
discrepancy, but explained this away by saying here buildings 
were smaller and so it was right. 
221. 
girl .7:6. another attempt to make two buildings 
out of one. 
	 PLATE 33• 
this subject instantly drew two buildings and then counted 
the blocks. she left out the circles completely and simply 
added the correct number of squares onto the side of the 
buildings. when questioned she appeared to be quite satisfied 
about the buildings, and not concerned about the spatial issues. 
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"two buildings out of one building" 	 boy. 10:5. 
PLATE 34  
This subject stayed closely to the model retaining the 
essential rectangular shapes. he divided the building 
equally and in one sense correctly, but he used the 
set of circular windows twice. (a common error until about 
11 years with this group of children.) 
From the Identity Re-Construction  Task (1) (item 3) 
223. 
boy.11:6. attempt to get two buildings out of one. 	 PLATE 35  
this subject counts correctly and varies the circles 
with ease. however, he stayed closely to the model, 
halving it, counting and checking as he drew. he was 
unable to divide the building unequally. 
PLATE 36  
"make this building into two buildings." 
	 girl. 9:9. 
This girl works correctly on a unit basis and is well able to 
re-structure this material. Generally, it was only at 12 years 
that Ss. in this sample worked with any ease on a unit basis. A 
number of Ss. in the 8 and 9 year old age band were still have 
difficulties over the actual division of the units. 
From the Identity Re-Construction Task (1). 
 (Item 3.) 
225. 
The third and final item of the Identity Re—construction Task  
obliged subjects to deal yet more radically with the structure of the 
building. This was clearly the most difficult task for at 13 years of 
age only half of the subjects could manage it, though all of the subjects 
in the same age group were able to divide the building correctly. 
None of the 6 and 7 year olds gave any consideration to the units 
comprising the building as was evidenced by their approach. In general, 
for instance, they began by drawing the final outside shape into which 
they fitted the units — the bricks and the windows. In other words, the 
units were adapted to suit the new shape. They bore no relation to that shape. 
Amongst the oldest age group — 12-13 years of age, it was evident 
that they still found it difficult to envisage what the final shape could 
look like. Unlike the youngest subjects, they were aware generally, that 
the units would determine the outcome and thus did not begin by drawing 
the final outline. However, even with this awareness, theirs was still 
very much a step by step approach. For example, subjects in this, the 
oldest age group, would draw, building unit upon unit (correctly), but then 
they would find themselves obliged to cross out a unit because they had not 
always grasped the implications of its position, or were short of units to 
complete what they thought might be a final outcome. An interesting example 
of this is given by a girl aged 10:10, who attempted to avoid this problem 
by distorting one unit (i.e. one brick) and making it into one large unit 
(PLATE 41). 
With time and development, no doubt these subjects, in this oldest 
age group will become certain enough of structures, their composition and 
the relationships of component parts to handle them knowingly. New struc—
tures emerge from modifications of known structures, but unless modifications 
spring from understanding, however 'interesting' they may be, they cannot 
be regarded as true re—constructions, but must be seen rather as distortions 
of reality. 
2 26 . 
"change the shape of the building" 	 Boy. 6:4. 
PLATE 37, 
Until 12 years of age Ss. in this sample still made errors 
regarding the relationship between the shape of the building 
and the units comprising the building. 
When asked to change the shape this subject like most others 
in the 6 - 10 age band, immediately drew a triangle shape, then 
counted the units and put them in the triangle. He simply 
added a piece onto the side when he found he could not fit in 
a fourth window on the third floor. 
From the Identity Re-Construction Task(1). (Item 4) 
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Boy. 7:7. attempt to change shape of building. 
PLATE 38  
the above is an example of the most typical solution offered 
by the seven year old age group. by now, the third task, the 
subjects were generally more careful about counting the units 
and this boy has the correct number of squares and circles, 
but he is unable to relate the structure and re-structured 
attempt to the units themselves. He saw no conflict between 
his own attempt and that of the model. 
228. 
"change the shape of the building" 	 boy. 9:8. 
PLATE 39  
An attempt which reminds one of some of Piaget's findings in 
classical conservation tasks. This child triedto change the 
shape by adding a strip of four units down the left hand side 
of the building. This could have satisfied the requirement of 
the task, but he then confused himself by counting this strip 
as four units, then including this same strip in his counting 
of each floor of the building (i.e. counting 4 across from left to 
right instead of 3). He was certain that he had 20 units. He 
forgot about the circular windows. 
From the Identity Re-Construction Task (1) (Item 3.) 
229. 
! 
"change the shape of the building" 
	
boy.10:8. 
PLATE ko  
The most common error in this age group was that of not relating 
the units comprising the building to the shape of the building. 
In fact this error persisted significantly until the 12 yr. old 
group. 
230, 
PLATE 41 
	 girl. 10:10. 
Only 4 Ss. in this age group managed to change the shape 
of the building correctly - relating the shape of the building 
to the units composing it. 
This child grasped the notion of the units and the fact that 
they must determine the shape. However, she found it hard to 
envisage the final building. Although she counted carefully 
at the start, she recounted four times as she drew. Also, 
she was obliged to draw one large window (top right hand corner) 
in an attempt to fill out the space which she had miscalculated. 
From:Identity Re-Construction Task. (Item 4) 
231. 
boy. 11:5. a way of changing the shape of the building. 
PLATE 42  
this subject carried out the task correctly. he was well 
able to divide the building up into units and re-construct 
on a unit basis. he worked quite slowly and counted aloud 
as he drew the squares, stopping from time to time to re-
check the number. only 5 subjects out of this age group were 
able to offer a solution on a unit basis. all other solutions 
were tied to the rectangular shape of the model. 
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233. 
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF TASK  
The main purpose of these items was to see if the subjects could 
conceive of a hypothetical system of relations. There were two main 
questions: 
"What would life be like if there were no such thing as night?" 
"What would life be like if there were no such thing as talking, 
if men didn't speak?" 
It was hoped to distinguish between ego-centric based phantasy and 
reality adjusted imagination, which is capable of creating new systems 
by adjustments to present ones. 
Only at 12 years were a small number of subjects (6/12) fully capable 
of conceiving a hypothetical system, and of realising the inter-relatedness 
of a system and the idea of implication. 
Within the 6 and 7 year old age group, 12/24 subjects confined 
their responses to the first task to personal reactions: 
"It would be horrible, I wouldn't like it. You could play 
out all the time." 	 (girl 6:5) 
"It would be very boring and dull, You couldn't sleep at night." 
(boy 6:7) 
Some of the responses in this 6-7 year old age group were comprised 
of a series of ideas or comments on the situation but for the most part 
the ideas were unrelated in terms of 
"I wouldn't like it very much. 
I would get under the bed and I 
I'd play scary games that way. 
night." 
a system. 
You couldn't play scary games. 
would make it be night and then 
It would be sun all the time, no 
(girl 6:7) 
The above example suggests that the child might be aware of adjust-
ments that society would or could make (getting under the bed to make it 
dark) but her ideas are essentially about her own immediate world. Apart 
from offering unrelated ideas, a number of subjects seemed to forget what 
the main change in the system was to be: 
234. 
boy 7:6  
"Lights wouldn't shine. You could play out all day. You 
wouldn't be able to go to sleep. You wouldn't have to shut 
the curtains because it's daytime. You would shut the cur— 
tains when it got dark." 	 (non—systematic) 
Those offering ideas as opposed to personal reactions seemed unable 
to realise that one change in a system — such as the disappearance of 
night would lead to further changes and adaptations and new inventions. 
Most of the 6 and 7 year olds could only think of the idea as a loss to a 
system — the present one — which they know. They showed no real ability 
to go beyond this present system. 
In the 8 and 9 year old group there was a drop in responses based on 
personal feeling (only 2/24 responded thus) and an increase in responses 
composed of related ideas (7/24), though only 1/24 put forward a response 
composing a hypothetical system in either of these tasks. There were, 
however, marked changes in the quality of the responses: 
girl 9:11  
"Well, all the people would be tired and their eyes would have 
all black lines. And the flowers wouldn't close ... you'd get 
tired. You'd never see the stars and the moon. People would have 
to work all the time and you'd never know which time it would be." 
(partly systematic) 
The above subject seems to be aware of events affected by night — 
i.e. stars and moon, the closing of flowers, etc. To this extent, she is 
aware of the inter—relation of events, but again she fails to make adjust—
ments to the present system and so, instead of an alternative system, she 
thinks mainly in terms of 'loss' to the present one. 
The second task revealed the same pattern of findings. 
In the 10 and 11 year old group there was an increase in related 
ideas (13/24) with 2 subjects putting forward responses which were truly 
systematic in nature. The pattern of responses was very similar for both 
tasks througholit 
235. 
boY 11:6  
"We'd,all learn dumb language. We couldn't have pop-stars or 
ventriloquists because you wouldn't have the voice. It would 
be difficult to ask for fares on the bus and you wouldn't know 
the conductor wouldn't know where you're going." 
(party systematic) 
Though there is some grasp of the implications, there is still the 
essential notion of 'loss' against the system known to him. The follow-
ing example was the first systematic solution from this age group (from 
task 1): 
girl 11:9  
"W ell most probably - if people had already known night presumably 
they would take a lot of the day to sleep in. It would be quite 
difficult to tell the time because it's not getting dark. You 
wouldn't be able to tell the time from the sun. If there was no 
night and no dark then I suppose the sun wouldn't go down - it would 
just have to stay in the middle somewhere - and it wouldn't rise in 
the morning because there wouldn't be one. We'd have to use watches 
a lot and I think we would have to invent a time centre so that if 
your watch broke someone in the world would still know what the 
right time was. We'd have a lot of shift working because you could 
work at any time, and everyone wouldn't sleep at the same time. It 
would be safer from robberies because there wouldn't be any dark time 
to do them. Most probably people wouldn't take it seriously if you 
stayed up all night because it wouldn't be the same thing." 
(systematic) 
In the 12 and 13 year old group there was an increase in the above 
type of response (13/24). There were no responses based on immediate 
personal reactions and only one composed of unrelated ideas. 
boy 13:11  
"A new method of communication would have to be developed. This 
could be by mime - very detailed kind of mime or by using the deaf 
and dumb language. High-speed typewriters might have to be invented 
so communication is easier. The world may not be such a developed 
place as it would take more time to get ideas going, from one person 
to another in different countries. It would be a much quieter place 
to live in and people might find it hard to put up with any kinds 
of noises." 	 (systematic) 
Again this subject has the ability to go beyond the system he knows 
to a system which could be. It is felt that true creativity requires this 
ability. Creative transformations can be confined to the concrete: subjects 
can structure and re-structure reality in immediate ways - as, for 
236. 
instance, with the matchstick problem, but full creative behaviour 
requires that individuals have the ability to go beyond what they know 
- not in a lawless phantastic manner, but in a creative, reality-adjusted 
manner. It would seem that this operation does not begin to be possible 
until about the age of 11 according to this sample. 
RE-CLASSIFICATION  
The most important aspect of this task was the ability to understand 
classification and to seek out new criteria for new classifications. The 
kinds of criteria selected were also of interest - and to some extent, 
for reasons already given - the size of groupings and the number of 
groupings. Unlike classification tasks in standard IQ assessments, in 
this task the subject was not required to exhibit learnt knowledge of 
categories, but rather to show an understanding of categories by the 
formation of 'new' ones. 
A number of the 6 year olds still had reading difficulties, in spite 
of the fact that the vocabulary employed in the tasks was checked with 
staff of the schools concerned and was regarded as being well within 
their competence. Because of the difficulties shown by this group, their 
results were not included. They would have resulted in a "no score" for 
this task. 
In the 7 year old group, there was no overall score, but there was 
an improvement against the 6 year olds in the sub-categories. There were 
4/12 subjects who employed genuine association as criteria, two of whom 
came very near to scoring on this task. This trend -.i.e. the shift to 
use of associative criteria, instead of reliance on objective or shape-
sound criteria - continued, and by 10 years half of the group were employ- 
'T.7-•1... 
 
I I 
8 9 10 11 12 
(years), 
= objective l criteria 
OWN. MN= OM 	 = shape/sound criteria. 
association. 
THE RE-CLASSIFICATION TASK BY AGE 
• ,• 
•••••1•••••••••• 
r 	 I 	 • 
I!!  
• -7 ' !'"•••••••• '•77 	 7' 1 7" ' 	 •••• 	 • • •• • I 	 . 	 . 
1.•• • r•n•••••• 
- 	 ... ... 
I 'L I". 
. 	 , 
' . 
, 	 • . -•r • 1 . 	 , , 	 • 
-1' • • . 	 r rIr•H•rr 1 	 ' 	 . 
r I ••• •••n • 	 fr• 	
•1••• 	 • 
I • . a 	
" • ; • 
•,• 
• , 	 . 	 " . 
• 
.!:: .1: , 
*nib. 
I 	 !! 1 
.1 	 nn •• • 	 ... 	 . I 	 ..; 
1 
	
••-• •-•.-1• - --• --• •••••• 	 .—.-- 	 .....__. 	 ---..•••- r---:-.- • I ••• -4-1--- 
'•1.:.. 	 . 	 .  	 • 	 .• . 	 .. 	 :1;•, 	 • 
___... _.—_- 
	 —,....' _.:,....-,_.. 	 7.1-1.---1-7" !7 ... r ' •'''''': '7 '7 
I 	 • ' 	 It 	 ' 	 ..1 	 ; 	 ... 	 ' 	  • 4 
:.. . 	 . 	 ..! 	 1 	 i! 	 I. . 	 ! 	
1 	 .1: i. 	 • 	 • • 
	
j•••-• ! 1•••-••-• . • ••••"!!! 	 ''!r -  1 - r•r• 
. 	 1 
; 	 . • 
1.1;,•• !' 	 ; ... !1• 
scores of 6 year...old group 
included. ' 1 , 	 A 	 1 
239. 
ing association, and whilst two subjects only scored on the overall task, 
there was an improvement on the sub-categories. 
By 13 years, 9/12 of the subjects were using genuine association 
as criteria and no subject used shape-sound criteria. Further, 7/12 of 
this age group scored on all of the sub-categories, and thus on the total 
task, with three others very near to doing so. 
In the light of Eritwisle's work it was thought that the younger 
subjects would form larger groupings of words, largely because they are 
less word socialised and produce looser associations. In fact, it was 
found instead that the youngest subjects produced the smallest groupings 
and that generally the size and number of groupings increased with age. 
However, it might be accurate to say that Entwisle employed a method 
which encouraged free associations by providing a word stimulus and 
requesting responses to it. In the method employed in this research both 
simuli and the responses were in fact provided; the subjects were required 
to form some kind of relationship between the two. This is a more con-
straining and more determined type of task, as the subject had to search 
amongst already provided responses and justify his associations - not 
simply generate them. It is felt therefore that there might well be no 
contradiction between the two sets of findings. 
Entwisle, D. (1966) Word Associations of Young Children, Johns Hopkins. 
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IDENTITY RE-COUSTOCTION (2) 
In this second re-construction task there was an initial definition 
task, again to see how well individuals apprehended the structures, and, 
in a sense, the test was also an attempt torrake subjects concentrate on 
the structure as preparation for re-structuring. 
The trend here was very much the same as for Re-Construction (1), 
namely a decrease with age in ego-centric and disorganised descriptions 
and a movement towards organised descriptions with objective information. 
The actual re-structuring task was somewhat different in nature for 
here the subject was free to decide the outcome, whereas in the first 
task he was somewhat restricted in terms of the relationship of the units 
to the building possibilities. However, in this task, subjects were still 
required to comprehend the essential structure of the objects concerned - 
this time a simple leaf and square - and comprehend them enough to be able 
to re-structure them. 
Surprisingly, even the youngest subjects were able to understand 
the essential idea behind the task, namely that the components of the leaf 
and square were to be 'cut up' in some way and re-used to create a new 
structure or structures. Their efforts indicated their comprehension of 
this dimension. What did vary with development was the ability to adequately 
carry out this task, and eventually the ability to carry it out with ease 
and so really re-create. 
A major difficulty of the 6 and 7 year old group was that of defining 
the pieces - as a result lines were re-used without subjects realising it. 
Size relations were altered greatly by 10/24 of the subjects of this age-
group and 11/24 produced no real change in the basic shapes. 
Some children used the structures on the card as a kind of 'inspiration' 
for a design or drawing. One child, for instance, drew a kind of spider 
243. 
PLATE 43 girl. 6:7. 
  
To some extent the child here grasped the idea behind the 
task but was unable to be fully re-constructive in the use 
of the lines. However, she was able to identify the lines with 
accuracy which was surprising in that it was thought that Ss. 
of this age would find the task impossible. 
From: Reconstruction of Identity Task.2 (item 2) 
244. 
PLATE 44 	 girl. 6':7. 
This illustrates a very elementary grasp of the task of 
reconstruction here. The child understood the kind of 
change that was required but was unable to carry it out. 
Generally, the task was beyond this age group and the following 
group, but their attempts were surprising and more accurate in 
basic understanding than expected. 
From: Identity Re-Construction Task 2 (item 2.) 
245. 
If  
girl. 7:7. attempt at re-structuring the leaf and square. 
PLATE 45  — 
without doubt the child's attempt is 'inspired' or based 
upon the leaf and the square, but it is not an accurate 
re-construction of the parts of the leaf and square. It 
is perhaps an instance of the 'phantasy-based' type 
drawing of younger children, which can be confused with 
creative work. 
246. 
boy. 7:4. an attempt at re-structuring the leaf & square. 
PLATE 46  
not only does this boy fail to make any radical change 
to the basic shapes, he adds extra veins to the leaf 
and alters the size relationship between the leaf and 
the square. when challenged on these issues, he saw no 
conflict between his efforts and the model. 
247. 
girl. 7:6. attempt at re-structuring the leaf and square. 
PLATE 47 
this is one of the more accurate attempts for this seven 
year old age group. the child has grasped the essential 
idea of the task. she has the correct number of pieces 
and she attempts a design. howevever the design is rather 
fragmented. she alters the size and shape of the leaf. she 
cleverly includes the central leaf vein in the square as 
part of a longer leaf stalk. 
248. 
web based on the shape of the leaf and the veins (PLATE 45). She 
explained this as she went along. However she departed from the essen-
tial structures and finally added a spider to complete the attempt. 
Those children in this age group who were able to define the correct 
number of pieces (or almost so) still found it difficult to structure the 
pieces into another identity. Thej stayed very close to the model, touch-
ing the model then drawing a line, then another. This step by step 
approach prevented them from envisaging a final outcome and from embarking 
upon it, and instead they simply drew line after line adding to whatever 
form was being built up. Other responses in this age group involved not 
really changing the basic shapes at all but simply putting the leaf (some-
times wrongly drawn) inside the square or vice-versa, or putting the leaf 
on top of the box with the veins of the leaf around the outside of the 
box, etc. sThe most striking feature was their inability to anticipate 
in their re-structuring. As in the case of the matchstick re-structuring, 
they only knew what was coming about as they drew. This gave them no 
real control over the direction of the emerging pattern or design. This 
kind of immediate approach continued into the 10 year old age group. 
By 10 years of age ability to envisage what could be in terms of 
re-structuring was coming into being for many of the subjects (8/12). It 
is interesting to note that this same age group had more problems with the 
first re-structuring problem (only 3/12 managed to change the shape of 
the building correctly and relate the shape-change to the units comprising 
the building). This no doubt relates to the fact that in this second task 
subjects were told to re-shape as they, wished. Those subjects exhibiting 
foresight were able to define and re-define the structures accurately, 
(though not all did so verbally in the definition task) and further, to 
re-use them in a controlled way to build up a recognisable shape or well 
balanced pattern. 
249. 
Generally, most subjects found this task to be less difficult than the 
first re—construction task — which led to the consideration — is there 
some kind of problem which they encountered which might be termed "shape 
conservation"? The re—construction involved in the second main task was 
freer in that there was no determining relationship between the units 
comprising the structures and the identity to be structure. Task 1 
provided an interesting example of the problems involved when the child 
does not understand the structural constraints governing transformations 
of identities. 	 In such instances, he is not able to truly re—create 
out of what is. 
Briefly, then, here, as in the first re—construction task, there 
was an increase with age in ability to re—structure the identities. It 
was only at 11 years that subjects were beginning to re—structure with 
some measure of control and foresight. 
girl. 10:6. PLATE 48  
This is a very typical attempt at the second Identity 
Reconstruction Task by a subject who appeared to grasp 
the essential idea behind the task but could not carry 
out the idea. 
The girl here had a very step by step approach to 
breaking up the pieces of the leaf and square. She touched 
the model, measuring her own attempts against it. In a 
very distorted way (i.e. she changes size relations greatly) 
she almost manages to use the correct number of pieces in 
the above task. She was well able to describe her effort 
and aware of some of the errors. 
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From the Identity Re-Construction Task.2 (2nd.item) 
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PLATE 49 	 girl. 9:11. 
a very competent attempt at identity re-construction. this girl 
maintains reasonable size-relations and forgets only one part. 
she labels it: "a kind of fish". she clearly understands the task 
and is capable of transforming the objects. 
From the Identity-Re-Construction Task (2) (Item 2) 
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gir1.10:5. 
	 PLATE 50, 
This child grasps and in able to carry out the Identity 
Reconstruction Task(2). She called her re-construction: 
"some kind of insect" 
As well as grasping the idea and using the correct number 
of pieces she maintains good size relations on the whole 
and is able to produce a well balanced product. There was 
great variation in terms of ability to carry outthis task 
in this age-group. 
Interestingly, this same subject had difficulty with earlier 
reconstruction tasks (1) 
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boy 11:6. a design out of the leaf and square properties. PLATE 51 
correct use of all the pieces (except for stalk of leaf which 
he forgets) this is one of the most competent efforts for the 
eleven years old age group. 
Chapter 7 
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
This section examines the findings in relation 
to the underlying theory. 
In the light of the statistical analysis, the 
coherence of the battery of tasks is considered, 
changes in performance with age and sex are 
discussed, and the possibility of a stage—
explanation of creativity is raised. 
254. 
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Essential to this whole discussion is the idea of an operation. In 
the initial chapters, the implications of operations for creativity were 
brought out. 
"....an operation is... the essence of knowledge; it is an 
interiorised action which modifies the object of knowledge." 
(Piaget, 1972) 
Implicit in the discussion continued by Piaget, and of course 
explicit in his theory and findings, is the notion that without a certain 
degree of cognitive organisation operational activity is not possible, 
and so ways of knowing, which involve transforming reality, are more 
limited. The wholeness of an operational act allows it to be reversed, 
to be repeated, to be adjusted, to be returned to its original state 
In other words, it involves levels of reflection and allows, in varying 
degrees (concrete to formal), the acting individual to objectify the 
phenomenon and his action upon the phenomenon. At its peak, this level 
of reflection finds completion in formal operational ability. 
In the matchstick task, the effects of this ability were apparent. 
6, 7 and 8 year olds subject (as well as a few individuals in odder age 
groups) structured and re-structured in a non-systematic way. Each 
solution was very much a new discovery and gave little help towards 
the generation of another. Older subjects, by contrast, clearly 
generated what might be termed 'mental models' (see figure over the page) 
They structured and re-structured by means of adjustment to a model, and 
only when they sought a new model did they revert to concrete explorations 
with the matchsticks. They showed ability to know an action, to know 
what its possible modifications could therefore be, and further, they 
Piaget, J. (19 72) "Development and learning" in: Readings in Child  
Behaviour & Development. Iavatelli C. & Stendler.F (Eds). P.38. 
SYSTEMATIC PROBLEM SOLVING (RE-STRUCTURING) 
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a. 
cl. 	 e. 	 f. 
the above sequence of attempts by a girl 12:10 illustrates ' 
a gradual adjustment of a basic model. the subject clearly 
knew the basic structure of the model and worked from b. to 
f.• inclusive without any concrete experimentation with the 
matchsticks, apart from making the necessary adjustment. 
Having exhausted most of the possibilities of the above 
basic model, she then explored more with the matchsticks 
to find another basic model, and then continued with further 
solutions without further experimentation. 
A 	 \ 
/ 
for this second series 
the matchsticks were 
broken. 
not all Ss. in this age group responded this way. in general 
though younger Ss. did not apply this approach. each solution, 
in their case, was a thoroughly new discovery. 
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had broken away from the step by step approach which Piaget (1950) 
associates with pre—operational forms of thought: 
"Thought alone breaks away from these short distances and 
physical pathways." 
	
(P.120) 
This level of reflecting is crucial to creative re—structuring for 
it enables an individual to envisage what "could be" out of "what is". 
However, it takes place at two levels of functioning — namely concrete 
explorations or abstract constructions or imagining. Concrete explorations 
make possible some creative output — or at least could make it possible. 
As an exploratory process concrete exploration could be said to be an 
ingredient of creative behaviour — but it is a limited process because 
it is about the immediate, and one can only know the conclusions after 
concrete exploration; mental anticipation of what might be or could be 
is never fully possible at this stage. At different developmental 
stages, therefore, with creative behaviour, as with other dimensions of 
intelligent behaviour, there are qualitative differences in terms of the 
operations performed. 
Whilst the matchstick task allowed for concrete exploration, but 
gelded a different level of performance from those capable of construct—
ing "mental models", tasks in the Identity Re—construction Tasks (1) and 
(2) forced subjects increasingly to come to terms with the structure of 
the phenomenon in question, and allowed very little opportunity for con—
crete exploration. A grasp of the identity in this task involved a realis—
ation that the building could be seen as being made up of 20 blocks, each 
block with a window. With this understanding, all types of re—construction 
became possible. However, many of the younger subjects only 'knew' the 
building as a rectangle. Thwfailed to comprehend the relationship — 
Piaget, J. (1950) The Psychology of Intelligence. P.120. 
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even realise it - of the units comprising the building to the total 
shape. Of those who did comprehend this relationship, not all were 
able to work on it. There are illustrations of efforts where children, 
working on a unit basis, could clearly not envisage what the final shape 
of their building could be. As a result, in one instance, one block was 
enlarged by at least twice its size to fill the 'gap'. A grasp of 
identity is not therefore an instant process for it involves a learning 
to 'use' the understanding one has attained. This is no doubt what 
Piaget means when he points out repeatedly that structures take time to 
'settle down'. 	 Similarly, this is why subjects in the settling period 
appear to offer inconsistent responses at different levels - sometimes 
appearing to grasp the issue - at others losing sight of the logic 
governing it. 
So far, it would seem, on this sample, that re-constructions, seen 
as one type of creative process, are not wholly or formally possible 
Until roughly 12 years of age - or in stage terms, until an individual 
comes to terms with formal operations. Concrete re-structurings, whilst 
an earlier possibility, are limited. Such re-structuring tasks essen- • 
tially touch upon the same problems as the classical conservation tasks. 
Both are about conservation in different media. Both require that the 
subjects comprehend the essential identity and logic of the phenomenon 
and 'know' it well enough to be able to recognise it under changed con-
structions. Further it might involve knowing the 'limits' to be placed 
upon re-constructions in order to maintain the initial identity, e.g. the 
components parts of a cupboard might be re-organised to constitute a desk 
- but this comes into the area of cultural labelling and identity boundary 
and involves learning, further, it is a less radical level of 'knowing' 
phenomena. 
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In the bottle top problem subjects were asked to structure rather 
than re-structure, further they were required to set their own limits - 
which were really those of practical usefulness and an invention related  
to the task - namely the removal of the bottle top. Here again, there 
was no real opportunity for concrete exploration. The subject was 
required to structure a whole identity in relation to another identity, 
be aware of its wholeness and the effects of one part upon another. 
Piaget has illustrated the problems of causal understanding in younger 
children (Piaget and Inhelder, 1973) and it was clear from solutions to 
the bottle top problem that young children were unabel to 'know' the 
whole identity of their own invention, and the implications of its 
separate parts. In fact, again they tended to be somewhat syncretic  
(Flavell, see note *) in approach, conjuring up the whole in a vast 
impressionistic way, just as they conjured up a whole change of building 
shape without reference to the separate parts which defined and deter-
mined its shape. It is only with the advent of formal operational think-
ing that such structuring, believed to be an aspect of creative behaviour, 
becomes possible. 
The What Would Happen If Task required a lightly different type of 
structuring. It was in fact a form of re-structuring which required 
the subject to envisage present systems with stated adaptations. 
Essentially, therefore, the task was/about adapting structures. Again 
Note *: (Flavell) "Syncretism.... describes a type of thinking or per-
ception which assimilates reality into global, undifferentiated 
schemas; the individual contents of the assimilated reality 
interpenetrate and fuse with one another, anything being joined 
to or combined with anything else... (Piaget 1928)" P.273. 
Piaget, J. and Inhelder, B. (1973) Memory and Intelligence. pp 199-211. 
Flavell, J.H. (1963) The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget. P.273. 
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the task allowed for no concrete experimentation, and again it was evident 
that formal operation structures were required for such adaptations to a 
system. Younger subjects found it hard to move beyond responses based on 
immediate, personal and concrete remarks. Further, none of them saw the 
implications of proposed changes to the structure - e.g. of the absence 
of night or of speech. It was only by 11, 12 or 13 years that subjects 
were aide to envisage a system as an integrated and inter-related whole, 
and realise the implications of inter-relatedness and of adjustments to 
such. 
Similarly, in tasks such as Elaboration Task which were really con-
cerned with addition to and development of an identity, and the Recognition 
Task which involved apprehension and definition, the matter of operational 
ability proved crucial. Both of these tasks illustrated the qualitative 
differences between the responses of subjects still bound to a step by 
step approach in elaborating and identifying, and those, freed by thought 
and mental anticipation who could envisage the outcome and make further 
mental explorations before embarking on the task. 
This necessarily leads into the question of imagination, and to the 
whole idea of structuring and re-structuring in concrete and abstract 
ways. 
The formal operational thinker is capable of "delighting especially 
what is not..." (Piaget, 1950). Much confusion centres around the area 
termed 'creativity' often, as mentioned earlier, because no real distinc-
tion is made between phantasy and reality adjusted constructions or 
Piaget, J. (1950) The Psychology of Intelligence. P.148. 
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inventions. Piaget believes firmly that the young child is not capable 
of imagination (Piaget, 1951). In some of the tasks set in this research, 
younger subjects illustrated their ability to indulge in phantasy-like 
responses, moving into worlds of their own, uncontrolled by actual 
situations or the necessary implications of their suggestions (PLATE 52). 
Even in Re-construction Tasks where factual information was required - 
in the case of definition, until 10 or 11 years, a small number of sub-
jects (decreasing with age) added information of an ego-centric and 
phantasy based type, e.g. they offered (as already recorded) descriptions 
of people looking out of windows, dogs, etc, which did not exist, but 
were clearly 'real to the child'. This type of fluency is limited and 
non-productive. It is concerned not with the creative potential of 
phenomena but with distortions and the imposathle. Such a phantasy base 
is not generally the breeding ground of ideas. It is this inability to 
imagine - to develop mental constructs of what could be, which distinguishes 
the formal operational solution from those tied by immediacy. Imagination 
has been confused with phantasy (Griffiths, 
 1945) and without doubt the 
same mistake has been made by Mearns (1931) and Torrance (1973) when they 
describe a fall in creativity around the age of concrete operational think-
ing and then a revival later, after what they believe to be an initial 
period of creative activity during the first three grades or so. This 
present research would explain the curve in terms of (1) phantasy, (2) 
operational growth and a subsequent reduction in phantasy, and finally 
(3) the growth of constructive imagination (PLATE 53). 
Piaget, J. (1951) Play Dream and Imitation in Childhood. P.30. 
Griffiths, R. (1945) A Study of Imagination in Parly Childhood. 
Mearns, 	 (1931) The Creative Adult. 
Torrance, E.P. (1973) The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking. 
262. 
PHANTASY VERSUS CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 
0 
PLATE 52. 
	
girl. 7:6. 
The above drawing was accompanied by a story which was told slowly 
as the drawing was carried out. It is about the house the moon 
goes into. He is just about to go into his house when he 
sees a strange house so he has a very surprised look on his 
face. The second attempt was about a monster which arrived to 
eat the moon's house. This type of response is rooted in 
phantasy and not constructive imagination. However, were the 
response to be scored for statistical uniqueness in terms of ideas 
and amount of detail, this subject would have received a high 
rating for her age group. 
From:the Elaboration Task (item 4) 
HYPOTHETICAL CURVES OF PHANTASY & IMAGINATION WITH ABILITY  
9 
8 
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= the nature of responses. 
= the development of operational ability. 
Whilst the above is very much a hypothetical curve from 
present observations and assessments it is believed that 
the relationship between the development of constructive 
imagination and operational ability must approximate 
closely to the above. 
In terms of training and fluency it has important 
implications, for both training and fluency must rest on 
certain levels of developmental ability. 
PLATE 53. 
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Imagination is not concerned with some underworld of ego-defined 
realities. It enables individuals to envisage at the level of mental 
constructs what other younger individuals must experience in concrete 
translations. Imagination is an integral part of intellectual develop-
ment. In terms of both convergent and divergent structures it enables 
one to move beyond the immediate. Freud spoke of the creative person as 
being one who is able to: "accept freely rising ideas" (1938) - this type 
of freedom is vital and related to notions of training and fluency - but 
the source of such ideas is equally important too. 
The kind of knowing of which Piaget (1972) speaks and which is 
required for re-construction and creative re-construction must derive 
from formal operational abilities, involving imaginative constructs: 
"... knowledge is not drawn from the objects but it is drawn 
by the actions effected upon the objects." 
The construction and re-construction tasks were about this type of know-
ledge. They required the ability to build up mental constructs not only 
of what could be, but of self effecting the process. For unless one can 
objectify oneself, one cannot appreciate the role played by the self in 
the transformation of phenomena, and as a consequence, cannot understand 
fully that same transformation. Formal operational thought brings about 
a control, a smoothness in transformations of a type not encountered in 
this sample in subjects younger than about 11 years of age. 
Operational inadequacy is a consequence of general immaturity of cog-
nitive structures in younger subjects, and aspects of this immaturity 
revealed itself in other dimensions of the tasks put to these subjects. 
Freud, S. (1938) The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, tr. and ed. by 
A.A. Brill. 
Piaget, J. (1972) "Development and learning", in: Readings in Child  
Behaviour & Development. 
 Lavatelli C. & Stendler.F.(Eds) P.41. 
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Varied research in the area of perception has underlined the per-
ceptual distortions which affect children (e.g. Bryant, 1974). In the 
Elaboration Task, it was only by 10 years that a least half of the sub-
jects is that age group were able to produce elaborations from different 
angles and including figure-ground variations. Prior to this point, 
their responses tended to be immediate - "V" shapes became beaks or 
just triangles, and theywere generally perceived as 'figure'. More com-
plex perceptions of the stimulus lines leading to 'remote' relationships 
between the stimulus lines and the elaboration only really developed in 
the 12 year old group in this sample. In the Identity Recognition Task, 
there seemed to be an inability to sustain what might be termed a "per-
ceptual search" for complex outlines and forms before about 9 years of 
age (when 9/12 subjects used more than 1/3 of the stimulus lines). In 
the organisation of forms in space there was a marked increase with age. 
In the second Re-construction task for instance, it was only at 12 years 
of age that subjects made verbal reference to the position of forms in 
space and to size relations. 	 It was in fact anticipated that such 
references would have been made much earlier - perhaps around 10 or 11 years. 
Generally, it is perhaps accurate to say that Piaget has used language 
in his studies of children to come to a closer understanding of thought 
organisation, rather than make a study of language itself. However, his 
categories of ego-centric speech and socialised speech are applicable to 
certain findings here. Ego-centric speech is seen as lacking communication 
as its main aim and thus lacks adaptation to the listener. The world is 
described very much from the speaker's standpoint. Socialised speech 
on the other hand is concerned to communicate and thus to include other 
perspectives. In both re-construction tasks subjects were required to 
Bryant, P. (1974) Perception and Understanding in Young Children. 
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"... children's definitions are interesting, but they are 
not easy to interpret, for all definition is conscious 
realisation." 	 (Piaget, 1928) 
A double problem exists therefore - a lack of conscious realisation 
for younger subjects, and the task of adapting what is realised to the 
standpoint of the listener. Ego-centric and unrelated information per-
sisted in definition tasks until 9 years in the first Re-Construction 
task and 10 years in the second. By about 8 years at least half of the 
subjects were making verbal attempts to organise their information and 
some attempt to adapt it to the listener. 
As described in earlier chapters Entwisle (1966), using an 
association method, noted that the younger the child the more the 
associations produced. This was explained in terms of a lack of language 
socialisation, and work such as that of Berko (1958) support the general 
idea. The findings here support the notion. Unlike Entwisle's subjects, 
here children's groupings tended to increase with age, but the task here 
was essentially concerned with relating words to one another - not with 
freely generated associates. It is true that because children have 
fewer markers than adults they tend to have broader classes and therefore 
larger groupings in some test situations; it is equally true that their 
inexperience with words and their associations makes it difficult for 
them to relate, or group together, associations which are not of their 
own free choosing. Interestingly too, as further support, there was an 
increase with age in the use of association as a criterion and. a drop in 
rather 'arbitrary' links by means of stores "stretched" to include words 
which did not always easily associate. 
Piaget, J. (1928) Judgement and Reasoning in the Child. P.114 
Entwisle, D. (1966) Word Associations of Young Children. 
Berko, J. (1958) "The child's learning of English morphology", Word, a, 
pp 150-77. 
These types of associations lead back into concepts such as"assimilation" 
and "syncretism". In all re-construction tasks, assimilation to varying 
developmental frameworks was noticeable. For instance, younger subjects 
missed out parts of the structures, altered them in some way, or imposed 
structures on units which were inappropriate, and vice versa. In the 
Bottle Top Problem and the What Would Happen If Tests, there was much 
evidence of what Flavell terms: 
"anything being joined to or combined with anything else..." 
(syncretism) 
- systems were offered which could only be described as a series of non-
sense relations. 
Essentially what is under discussion from different angles, is the 
notion of the organisation of thought. Depending upon philosophies and 
research intersts, the abilities of children have been investigated from 
several standpoints, but the total picture is one which incorporates 
several inter-related abilities (often separated for research convenience) 
which eventually become sufficiently stable, both as separate abilities 
and in their inter-relating, to be regarded as a form or organisation. 
This organisation, brought about by interaction and adaptation - is essen-
tially what intelligence is about. It includes creative dimensions. 
This discussion believes that it is false to distinguish between creative 
and other abilities. This is supported by Cropley (1966 and 1968). 
Everything, of course, depends on what creativity is thought to be. Here, 
in the findings in general, it is clear that the ability to structure and 
re-structure reality is one which increases with age and with the accom-
panying development of cognitive structures. It is admitted though, that 
given different starting points very different conclusions about the 
Flavell, J. (1974) The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget. P.273. 
Cropley, A.J. (1966) "Creativity and intelligence", Br.J. Ed.Psy. 
pp 197-201. 
Cropley, A.J. (1968) "A note on the Wallach & Kogan tests of creativity", 
Br.J. Ed.Psy. 
 21, pp 197-201. 
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"creative abilities" of young children might be arrived at, as indeed 
they have been. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION  
David Lykken (1968) in an examination of the concept of statistical 
significance makes statements which have much to say to those engaged in 
exploratory research: 
ft
... the finding of statistical significance is perhaps the 
least important attribute of a good experiment; it is never a 
sufficient condition for concluding that a theory has been 
corroborated, that a useful empirical fact has been established 
with reasonable confidence... The value of any research can be 
determined, not from statistical results, but only by skilled 
subjective evaluation of the coherence and reasonableness of 
the theory, the degree of experimental control employed, the 
sophistication of the measuring techniques, the scientific or 
practical importance of the phenomena studied, and so on." 
Whilst one may accept Lykken's statement with some reservations, the 
very exploratory findings of this research need to be viewed with some—
thing of this caution. They should be seen as contributing to a re—
conception of what 'creative ability' is, and as such, giving direction 
to necessary replication studies. 
Statistical analysis has, however, a very valuable role to play in 
exploratory work. Statistical confirmation leads one back to the theory 
to seek a more adequate explanation for this confirmation. A lack of 
statistical support should do likewise. Further, both confirmation and 
lack of confirmation should be adequately questioned lest they stem from 
some statistical artefact as opposed to being rooted in the theory. This 
comment will be amplified as different statistical relationships are 
considered, and analysis will finally be related to the theory. 
Lykken, D.T. (1968) "Statistical significance in psychological research", 
Psy Mill, Vol 70, No 3 Pt 1, cIPIA- 
Aims of the StatistiCal Analysis  
A major aim of this analysis was to examine the coherence of the 
battery of tasks by considering 3eiationships between each of the tasks, 
both generally and for specific age ranges, and by examining any variations 
in performance between boys and girls. 
It was assumed that there would be a marked improvement in performance 
with age on all of the tasks, and the researcher wished to examine this 
assumption. The two main statistical methods used for this analysis were 
contingency tables and analysis of variance. 
Chi—Square Contingency Tests  
Contingency tests were used to examine the following relationships: 
a) relationships between each of the tasks based on the responses of 
all subjects; 
b) relationships between each of the tasks based on the responses of 
the older (10-13 years) subjects only; 
c) differences between the sexes. 
Siegel (1956) points out that the contingency table is perhaps the 
most commonly employed form of the Chi—Square Test. The formula contains 
a correction for continuity (Yates) intended to make the approximation to 
the theoretical chi—spare distribution more precise (McCall, 1970 and 
Siegel, 1956). 
The Test requires (Cochran, 1954 and Siegel, 1956) that the expected 
frequencies in each cell should not be too small. The two groups must, 
of course be independently and randomly sampled and each observation must 
qualify for one category and only one category. Discussing the power of 
the X2, Siegel points out that this is in fact difficult to compute for 
often the X2 test is employed when there is no clear alternative. 
Siegel, S. (1956) Nonparametric Statistics. pp. 107, 110. 
NoCall, R. (1970) FuRdamantal Statlotioo for PnYchology. P.259+. 
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The test is used to discover whether two (as in this case) or more 
factors are independent. The statistical test criteria used is: 
I 
X2 = i=1 
where I is the total number of 'cells' or classes (in this case four - 
pass/pass, pass/fail, fail/pass, fail/fail). 
O.1  is the observed frequency in cell i 
E.1  is the expected frequency in cell i 
(methods of calculating the Eis will be shown later). It can be shown 
that (see S.D. Silvey - "Statistical Inference") this X2 statistic has 
in fact a X2 distribution with the number of degrees of freedom equal to 
(No. of rows - 1) x (No. of Cols - 1) as we are subjected to the one 
linear constraint: 
I 	 I 	 I (oi - 	 = 0 as :E o1  . 	 2. E.1  = N i=1 
	 i=1 
	
i=1 
where N is the total number of observations. 
For all tests on relationships between tests in the analysis, a 
standard contingency test was used for testing independence between each 
pair of tasks. The statistical assumption (the 'null hypothesis' - H
o
) 
is then: 
H
o
:the two tests are independent 
Assuming we have two tasks, A and B, denote class i of test A by Ai, 
similarly for B. 
Then letting 
Pij 
 = y (observation falls in (A,, B.) when chosen at random) 
= 
	 1P(observationfallsinA.and in B. when chosen at random) 
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Now under the null hypothesis (that is when the two tests are independent) 
we can write this: 
= P (observation falls in A.) x P (observation falls in B.) Pij  
= P.1q.. 
Now the expected frequency fcr cell (Ai, Bj) under Ho is nPi qj, but we 
do not usually know the values of Pi or qj. So we estimate these prob— 
abilities by (estimates denoted by an "n"). 
P. = R.in 
q.
J 
 = C 
where R.1  = Sum of row i 	 assuming the first factor, A, has its 
Ci  = Sum of column j 	 different levels as the rows. 
n = Total number of observations. 
Hence the standard chi—squared statistic with one degree of freedom 
is given by: 
R C. 2 
2 	 l 
rs(i1. -- i 	 ) j 
i=1 j=1 	 (R. C.) 
N 
where r = Number of rows (i.e. levels of factor A) 
= Number of columns (i.e. levels of factor B) 
nij 
 = Number of observations in cell (i, j) 
d.f = (r — 1) x (s — 1) 
The expected frequences are calculated from: 
nPi j 	 Pi q = n  q = n x 
Ri x 	 R1 C1 = 1  
n 	 n 	 n 
We then test our X2 against the standard X2 statistic with relevant 
degrees of freedom. 
= X2 
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However, with only two factors with two levels, we are dealing 
essentially with a Binomial type problem. A mathematical difficulty 
arises from the fact that the X2 distribution in continuous whereas the 
Binomial is not. This difficulty is overcome by using a correction 
suggested by Yates which consists of reducing the value of (0i - Hi) by 
before squaring, in other words, we decrease those observed frequencies 
which exceed the expected frequencies by a half and increase those that 
are less than the expected by a half. Denoting these new, corrected, 
observed frequencies by n..ijlour run test criterion is: 
r 	 s 	 (nii - 
 
R. C.1)2 
X = 
2 	 i=1 j=1 	 (a. c.) 
n 
and we test this for significance against the percentage point of the X2  
distribution with one degree of freedom. 
-note: 3.84 X2 - 5,i(j 
X 	 6.63 
Analysis of Variance  
This test was used less widely than the previous statistical test. 
Its particular value lies in the fact that it enables more than one con-
dition to be studied simultaneously and it was employed to examine any 
variations in performance due to age or sex. 
Several assumptions need to be satisfied before a parametric 1' Test 
can be applied to data. When these assumptions are valid, this Test is 
one of the most likely to reject Ho, when Ho is false (Siegel, 1956) 
Ussential assumptions include those required for the t Test, namely that: 
Siegel, 	 (1956) nIonparametric Statistics. P.19. 
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a) populations from which the groups are drawn have equal variances; 
(However, McCall, 1970, points out that: 
"If a sufficient number of cases are sampled and the number of 
subjects in each group is the same, moderate violations of this 
assumption do not alter the result of the analysis of variance 
very much." 	 P.231.) 
b) that the groups involved are composed of randomly sampled subjects 
and are independent from one another; 
c) that the distribution of each population is normal in form (this 
should be reflected in each of the groups sampled) (McCall, 1970). 
In addition, analysis of variance (F — Test) requires that: 
c) 	 the variables involved be measured in at least an interval scale. 
It is accepted that this latter condition can be the most contentious 
in the matter of choosing a powerful parametric measure. However, it is 
argued that the 'intervals' of measurement employed in the tasks in this 
research are not open to any special or added problems. The 'precise 
distances' between 'passing', 'partially—succeeding' and 'failing' are 
no more problem—loaded than the 'precise distances' between responses on 
say, a five point scale (see Siegal, 1956, on the assumption that "yes/no 
responses" can be used to crealzan interval scale). In this research 
where transformations of reality are seen as having starting points, 
qualitatively different intermediary points and completion points, it 
has been assumed that such points have equivalence across tasks, and that 
"pass"/"fail" categories in particular have this equivalence. 
Analysis of variance is a technique by which variations attributed 
to different defined sources may be isolated and estimated. It is generally 
used for two main purposes: 
McCall. R (1970) Ibid. P.231. 
Siegal, S. (1956) Ibid. P.56. 
a) to make estimates of variance components; 
b) to test whether variability that is suspected of being systematic 
in character, attributable to a specific cause, is significantly larger 
than that which is considered to be random in character. 
To test for significance the standard F statistic was used. The 
basis of the method is to split up the total variation within the obser-
vations into "Sums of Squares" which represent the variation attributable 
to certain causes. The calculations of the analysis of variance table 
were set down as follows: 
Source of 
Information 
Degrees of 
Freedom Sum of Squares 
Mean 
Squares 
Sex 
Age 
Sex x Age 
Error 
1 
7 
7 
80 
L 	 2_ 	 1Z 2 
	 r\r,k- - 	 rN. R. hte-.. 1..  
--r 
 . a I  2 J./ rvi.. rn r 	
I 
NOV\ 
_- 	
_...... 	 I.  
›... 
	 - Co( 
	 1-. '...5.' 	
-4-I' ' 174- rl k 	 EN-E-c_t 	 ts.e-C-&e { 	 5 
Total - Sex - Age - 
Sex x Age affects 	
kt. h.,111(C. 
c A :: 01 Ss 
S5'5/47 	 " n1 SQ. 
:1 
csp 1.. ins ck 
SS/30 -: nil 
TOTAL 95 y_i-- „ j 	 .. 	 21 	 IL i t 	 tit. 0.J  nks. 
	
F ratios are: F (1,80) 	 MS
sex 
/Mu
ror 
	
F (7,80) 	 NS 	 /usMSError 
	
F (7,80) 	 NS 	 /MS_ 
sxa Error 
Where in this case (Part 1), there are 96 pupils in total, 2 sexes 
(d.f = Number of sexes - 1), 8 age groups (d.f = Number of ages - 1) 
i.e. 
	 n. = :Number of sexes = 2 
n. = Number of ages = 8 
nk = Number of observations in each group = 6 
T. = Total for sex i 1 
T.= Total for age group j 
T.. = Number of successes in age group j for sex i ij 
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The error terms are a measure of the variation attributable to error 
or random variation. So using this technique it is possible to dissect 
the variation to attributable causes and a random effect represented by 
the error terms. By testing the ratios of 'factor Sum of Squares' to 
error sum of squares significance of variation can be tested. 
An added advantage is that one can test for variation within each 
factor, independently of the situation with the other factors. (i.e. it 
is possible to test for a significant difference in ages regardless of the 
possibility of a difference in sexes.) The interaction term gives a 
measure of the effect of each factor (sex and age) upon the other (e.g. 
whether in this analysis (Part 2) - girls tend to perform better than 
boys during the ages 9-10 but not when younger.) 
Summary 
Hence the analysis of variance is a powerful method of disentangling 
the relationships present in the data by taking the overall variance and 
breaking it down into a number of components each of whbh can be assigned 
to a specific factor, plus an error (or 'residual') component which rep-
resents the inherent variability of the data when the assignable effects 
have been removed. 
Significance level  
When testing statistical hypotheses, one can never be absolutely 
certain in the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis. The researcher 
works with the knowledge that it is possible for a test to reject a 
hypothesis (e.g. two tests are independent) when in fact the hypothesis 
is true in reality. The 'significance level' of the test overcomes this 
difficulty somewhat. 
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One-Tailed Tests  
All the analysis of variance tests were one-sided (one-tailed tests) 
since we were comparing the hypothesis that the variation due to sex or 
age is greater than the underlying random variation. We were not interested 
in the case where this "explained" variation is less than random. The 
contingency tests are also one-sided as we again test for large values 
of X2, ie cases where the computed X2 is greater than that which could 
arise 50 of the time by chance. 
A one-tailed test is more powerful than a two-tailed test (Siegel, 
1956). 
EXPLANATION OF TABLES (which follow) 
Set 1 - Standard F Tests (Analysis of Variance) 
These tables are the standard Analysis of Variance tables for detec-
ting variation amongst several factors. The first table for each test is 
simply a tabulation of the number of passes obtained by each sex at each 
age. 
The ANOVA table shows the calculations up to the calculation of 
the F ratio. 
Set 2 - Relationships between Totals  
Initially the overall totals for each pair of tests was tested (that 
is, totals over age and sex). This set shows the frequencies for each 
possible pass/fail combination. Figures in green represent observed 
frequencies, black the observed corrected by Yates Correction and the 
red the expected frequency calculated by: 
Siegel, S. (1956) Ibid. P.11. 
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Row x Col 
Total 
We are hence testing for independence between the two tests (a significant 
result representing dependence). It will be noted that in all cases but 
two, significance was obtained on the 59() level 
	 (X2 
 - .5% = 3.84). 
Set 3 - Relationships between tasks for Sexes  
After testing the total scores and obtaining a high degree of sig-
nificance, tests were carried out for any differences between the tasks, 
comparing the older girls'(i.e. 10, 11, 12, 13) scores with one half of 
the total scores for older boys plus girls (thus testing for differences 
between sexes). The tables show the observed frequency in green, black is 
the corrected observed frequency and red is the expected frequency, being 
in fact ;IT x total scores. 
SET 1 — STANDARD F TESTS 
278. 
(Differences between sexes and ages) 
279. 
CALCULATIO:S FOR THE VARIOUS EFFECTS  
Sex 
I C 
J 
 
Sex x Arne 2: 5-1.6 
I- 
L 
  
Total 11-1.3 
tN,` 	 lc_ 
 
e 
Residual 	 Ics -t AL- - SEX- cie- - c 4B-4.)( Ac_ . 
Correction factor 
	 2_ 
kjkL. 
n. = Number of successes = 2 
n. = Number of ages = 8 
nk = Number per cell = 6 
6 	 8 	 10 	 11 ' 12 	 1 	 Total. 
o o o oS a- 3 1+-  t 2-- 
0 o I 7- 1 3 3 2. 12 
o o i 2.. 4- 5 ez,  6 Z9-. 
(years) 
GIRLS: 
BOYS: 
TEST: ELABORATION 
280. 
ANOVA: 
   
 
SS df F-ratio 
SEX 0 I 0 — 
AGE Z'en /4- (:). 5S 3' 335 	 Ilk 
SEX x AGE il 64,-+ 4- 
. 1663- I 6 02.6 
ERROR 13 20  0.1624 
TOTAL a °I S 
* Significant at the 0.S % level. 
10 	 11 ' 12 	 1 	 Total. 
7 7 
(:) 417 0 . 0 2. 2 it 13 
o 0 0  t 2. 2 3 4- tg 
0 O 0 2., ci, Lt. - 9 23 , 
(years ) 
GIRLS: 
BOYS: 
TEST: FREE PROBLEM SOLVING 
281. 
ANOVA: 
   
 
SS MS F -ratio 
SEX 0 1 0 
AGE 6.11L ?" 0 . ”02. 6•41 6 Y 
SEX x AGE Q.$ ?' 0.0 ?-1 of 0 ' 4- 2 2 
ERROR 11. 613 RO 0.14 6 2, 
TOTAL 
1.10S 1S, 
• Significant at the O.1 % level. 
7 	 8 	 9 	 10 	 11 	 12 	 1 	 Total. 
1 0 1 t g 3 cir 9'.. I/ 
0 0  z 1 3 3 4- cf. 14 
1  o 3 44- 6 6 3 ? 36 . 
(years ) 
GIRLS: 
BOYS: 
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TEST: 	 IDENTITY RECOGNITION. 
SS 	 df 	 MS 	 F -ratio 
ANOVA: 
SEX 
AGE 
SEX x AGE 
ERROR 
TOTAL 
0.0440, 
SAmt 
O. 4673 
119'6666 
I 
R- 
Vo 
0'04164 
°4611 
 
0.0 6 S4 
0.2,02 1 
0' 2., . 
3 ' 6"4 
	 litw 
O. %Id+. 
az, s  ci s  
Significant at the 0 1 % level. 
0 0 0 2 I r 
, 
3 3 1 0 
0,c)t 1 2.2. 2. 3 ,a 
c) 0 2 3 1 3 S 6 2.2, 
(years)  
GIRLS : 
BOYS: 
7 
	 8 	 9 	 10 	 11 • 12 	 1 	 Total. 
TEST: IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION (1) 
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ANOVA: 
   
 
SS di F-ratio 
SEX 
AGE 
SEX x AGE 
ERROR 
TOTAL 
'0446} 
czs 
0 . 4, 25 
It, 
 q-2-21, 
/ 
7- 
1" 
20 
0 • 04-469- 
0.34- 
0 C) 81 Z. 
O. 1 4s 6 
0 ' 2-4- 3 
A. las 	 14 
() . 1; 2. . 
'L. dice 1 5 
* Significant at the S % level. 
0 0 / 2 1 3 .5 S l et 
o 0 / 3 & Li- s it- , 20 
ooLS 6 10 , 27, 
(years)  
GIRLS: 
BOYS: 
6 	 7 	 8 	 10 	 11 ' 12 	 Total. 
TEST: WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF. 
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ANOVA: 
   
 
SS di F -ratio 
SEX 
AGE 
SEX x AGE 
ERROR 
TOTAL 
0.0l04, 
g '3-tiS 
0 .23916 
4. go/ 
I 
q-  
71- 
510 
0.0loct. 
1'2-44S 
ocl sko 
0. /.13.1 . 
0. 0Sd. 
$0S 
0.013 
0/3./56 3 	 'If-S.  
• Significant at the O.1 % level. 
8 	 10 	 11 • 12 	 1 	 Total. 
o ,  
- 
0 0 ID 1 
, 
2. 2 . 4-,10 
o 0 1 I 1 2, 3 3 It 
0 0 I i L + 6 7-  7_i 
(years )  
GIRLS: 
BOYS: 
285. 
TEST: 
	 RECLASSIFICATION 
SS 
	 di 	 MS 	 F -ratio 
ANOVA: 
SEX 
AGE 
SEX x AGE 
ERROR 
TOTAL 
.0 t04.2. 
•12 VI 
0 Artia 
b593?. 
I 
3-• 
4- 
20 
tpw *4-2. 
0.6'9-6 
O. 014-2. 
0 .os 
0. 12 2.. 
to, Ns 	 tit  
O• s 1 4 
./666 el  
" Significant at the O.1 % 
O 0 0 Z a 2  2  ti-  12- 
o 1 L I 3 ce  3 3 , ? 
o I 2. 3 S t, S 3- zet 
(years) 
GIRLS: 
BOYS: 
8 	 9 
	
10 	 11 ' 12 	 1 	 Total. 
206. 
TEST: 	 IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION(2) 
SS 
	
di 	 MS 	 F -ratio 
ANOVA: 
SEX 
AGE 
.2.60si. 
 
'‘ S62 
/ 
?-. 
0:260Y. 
0.S2.2.1 
l' 19-41` . 
A. 416 	 0 
SEX x AGE O. ?It 1- 0 • II 9-4 
 0. 61)3 
ERROR IS. S 20 0.1 919-5 
TOTAL 
.2.396 MC 
* Significant at the ,,•S"/, level. 
SET 2 — CONTINGENCY TESTS 
287. 
(Relationships between Totals) 
...A----------,,_   FAIL PASS -rcrrfiL. 
p-A I L 
'PASS 
()1 	 6 D'h C,,..,1 . 
t1 
	
II Y.I. II.  
1 	 414 	 I ?-;12. 
. 
S 
 I4-''2 6%L 
1 c. ) 
. 	 . 
. 	 . 
16  
To-rqL 
. 
2: A-LF qt) 
18-oo 
\-:::„.... FAR- PaSS -ro-rfiL 
'PASS q 9/2- is 1 	 14-i/Ln. ... ±.. 
-rcrrqL 6 0  .`.`,14. 164 
zrz 
288. (A) 	 (a) 
RELATIONSHIP: ELABORATION/FREE PROBLEM SOLVING 
GA) 	 (c) 
RELATIONSHIP: ELABORATION/IDENTITY RECOGNITION 
6)  
RELATIONSHIP: ELABORATION/IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION(1) 
16-71-- \13 FAIL PASS 
-r 
-rc1r6._ 
PA i L a 63 si.-.5 ti 	 s /17.• '.1 	 ') 
1 0 10.S gad 
• 
?ASS a. (3. 	 g. .2.±.  
I" crrq L. 11 IL.  
11111nn• 
• a• 
KEY: Green = observed frequencies. 
Black = observed frequencies corrected by Yates'. 
.Red 	 = expected frequencies. 
(63 
	 289. 
RELATIONSHIP: ELABORATION/WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF? 
pi-----:."--\:: ' FFI 1 L PASS -rcrrAL- 
re a L 4::0 /1-9.5 ,.**4 2- ‘;12'S 3o .1 Z... 
• 
. 	 . 
#POSS 6 	 .5 	 1 (4. 
4"  
re 0.5 io  
sm.. 
..4.±, 
-rcirc) L 5 6 tp 0 CI i LIZ. 
RELATIONSHIP: ELABORATION/RECLAS IFICATION  
fi-------.....L, F-A)L... PASS 
 -ro-r A L. . 
FA $ L. 1:!1:6 3. :% 2- 	 icq-s - 	 • 	 . 
'PASS 
!1I-s' 
13 	 12.1.2s  c?...t . 	 . 
-r crrq L 71,:,,c ,!...11. _ V) 
= 14- 09, 
(A) 	 (1) 
RELATIONSHIP: ELABORATION/IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION(2)  
li-----\.'----&,.1 FA 1 L PASS -rcrr A L- 
rA i L '-:.:1 	 ' 	 L13- 114.itP' .2.1.3 
PASS 1 19.1 1..t2 3-66.1. ,2.3 
-rcrre L 4g al 'I b 
KEY: Green = observed frequencies. 
Black = observed frequencies corrected by Yates'. 
.Red 	 = expected frequencies. 
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RELATIONSHIP: FREE PROBLEM/IDENTITY RECOGNITION 
.-----Q-„, FAIL PASS -ro-rci L 
F-19 IL. 
?ASS 
f.;(...b4-1- tfzis--... 
-1 	 /6 .6 
.... 
1-)19-s• 
.24.6 
--- 	
/.2....i. 
„ 6./ 
. 
 
-1-crre L a_ ,,, 	 ..1... et  
(g) 	 (D) 
RELATIONSHIP: FREE PROBLEM/ IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION(1) 
= 
-4-----an-,:,....,° FAIL PASS -rcrr/iL 
AL. 
PASS 
(".: ..,6I. S. :.; 	 8 ." 	 Lk 
. 
 13. 
.. 
.2.6 . 	 . 
. 
a.s 
IL 
._.... 
..--. 
crrq -r 	 L -7- (L.  2 7 1 6 
Xa• 16 
(a) 
RELATIONSHIP: FREE PROBLEM/ WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF? 
‘1.-.---nCif- FAIL PASS -rcrrAL 
...... 	 itail ...÷.. 	 .12,2h.  
:-„„ 1.. .x... 
?piss sises 
 i.§.LIL. -.... A o -S A i.  .2 4 • 
1" cITC) L 61, 1.L.t1 (11.  
KEY: Green = observed frequencies. 
Black = observed frequencies corrected by Yates'. 
.Red 	 = expected frequencies. 
(F) 
RELATIONSHIP: FREE PROBLEM/RECLASSIFICATION 
n . FAIL PASS -rcrt 41 L . 
FAIL 6,i- 66,.." 
..... 	 _... t.:2- ; g- .? 0  
.. 
'PASS 2 2' 5  ig 14-S 
(g) 
RELATIONSHIP: FREE PROBLEM/IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION(2) 
291. 
"-"..........„ FA1L. PASS -rcrtfiL. 
F-A IL ..211ejt.- 'is, /41, 	 CI .2  :1° 0 
. . 
1:)f)S I1 	 id: ..i..  1.01 	 4..9  cz6 . 
l'cirgL 6a- c,,-, 16 
RELATIONSHIP: 
6!) 	 () 
IDENTITY RECOGNITION/IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION 
C7....'•:. FF"))1— PASS -rcrrAL 
. 
F.A 1 L 
?Ass 
. 
's- cti--s- 6-SC .11  
• 
KS  igigo 13 16°S i!,:j 
-16.6 
TarG)L 7.3.  A3 IL. 
KEY: Green = observed frequencies. 
Black = observed frequencies corrected by Yates'. 
.Red = expected frequencies. 
cus___. 	 ..........„ FAIL PASS -ro-rfil.- 
F.A sL 
MISS 
SO 4-1.5 
..•-- 4..ca 
I 47 - .• 
I!-4 	 ZIA 
.... 
.11
il .S.- 
. 	 . 21 .3 ‘1.1. 
• 
_ 
21.c"'(). 
 
.....n 	 1,/,. 2 
1- 
 of rg L &St.- . 32 X14 
SC 66 . 
(ct) 	 (&) 
	
292. 
RELATIONSHIP: IDENTITY RECOGNITION/WHAT WOULD  HAPPEN IF? 
(7. -----...q......- FAIL 
— 
PASS -ro-rfiL 
rf) L 
?ASS 
fLL.It-i-e'S  1S6 
4 •i 2. 
44a. 
I 	 15s.5 
........ 	
2...beas 
21/.....23-S 
t,..a.  
t!) 0 ........, 
IlL 
• 
f A , 
RELATIONSHIP: IDENTITY RECOGNITION/RECLASSIFICATION 
C, 	 .t FAIL. PASS .tcrrA L._ 
V' "fi i L. 
'Pecs 
s's 6'.9 " -,.., t. 	 t, 
• 
L.,..3-8 
61 
KS* 	 • 
(az ..e.. 
al 	 ,,./. 
6:2) 
RELATIONSHIP: IDENTITY RECOGNITION/IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION(2) 
KEY: Green = observed frequencies. 
Black = observed frequencies corrected by Yates'. 
Red = expected frequencies. 
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RELATIONSHIP: IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION(1)/WHAT  WOULD HAPPEN IF? 
-1- -3 ----..:,.......'  FAIL- PHS5  -rcrrilL 
_ 
, 
? 06S 
ital.2- 
. 
5  9:,..---- 1 2, ,I, 
 
. 	 aze 
„11-S 
-r- arc) L ./j .1::1 ` 	 e., 
F) 
RELATIONSHIP: IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION(1)RECLASSIFICATION 
"-.---;- FA 1 1- P OS -rcrrfi L. 
re i L 
?06S 
62-- -S. 6 3 
	 . 
....... 	 Seo (t) 
. n 	 II- 
ii. 
. 	 • 	 t .S:. 221; 
. i g-
I
S 1. 
—a. 
	 lia c 	
9. 
l. 
 
 
L 
.1"01-C) L 
) 
:th .72ita 1(2. 
RELATIONSHIP: IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION "(1 )/IDENTITY RECON, (2) 
'%.14.4L-.,. FA 1 L. P AS5 
r 
-rerrii L. 
F-19 s L 
?ASS 
i , , _ t„, 
k..) ..., 
	 sal.% 
 
1.2d.a-s 
. 
	 . aia  
1 	 - 
/ 6 
	 t  
....... ,,,,, .1 
Ts- 
....... 
• 
A_1 
......... 
S---- 
S 
..... 
	 1,4„. . 
'c
, 
-rcire L 6 Z r 96 
zr. c.2C. • I 
KEY: Green = observed frequencies. 
Black = observed frequencies corrected by Yates'. 
.Red 	 = expected frequencies. 
(e) 
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RELATIONSHIP: WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF?/RECLASSIFICATION 
"...2\.....t FA I L 
 *ASS rcfr A L. 
rici IL 
 5:161.S. .. s...C
1 
1 it  id, 
. 
. 	 . 
. 4-2" /6 • S 
?PISS 7.12- 0. I 
.., 
.-r crL) L :Li: c....... ,...- ) 
(E) 
	
(5) 
RELATIONSHIP: WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF?/IDENTITY  RECONSTRUCTION(2) 
":-.-e-n..6'7 FAIL PASS -rcrrilL 
Vic) s L, 
-poss 
114/4-9-' 
c"....)-° 	 . 
P-.2•  
eg.w"a "'a:2 
II . 
 :72‘4. 
Its" 
—..w... 	 . 
I 7- • Li il.1 
....-• 
-r 0-rti L 1_1w% ,,...L 7.14 
(F.) 	 6;)  
RELATIONSHIP: RECLASSIFICATION/IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION(2) 
t_.7_- . FAIL PASS - -TAL  
rel i L 
?Piss 
S4-1i. .!-.)  
17-6._ I 2. 	 - 
kOh 
26' aill, 
 
e
l 31/2.. 
— 6.3 
. 
.1.. 
1'01-0 L .i  
KEY: Green = observed frequencies. 
Black = observed frequencies corrected by Yates'. 
Red = expected frequencies. 
SpT 3 - CHI—SQUARED TESTS 
(Relationships between Tasks for Sexes) 
(Older subjects, 10-13 years aiy) 
295. 
Note: After testing the total scores (Set 2 Tables) 
and obtaining a high degree of significance, tests 
were carried out for any differences between the tasks, 
comparing the older girls' scores with one half of the 
total scores for the older boys plus girls. (Thus test—
ing the differences between sexes.) 
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A 
RELATIONSHIP: ELABORATION/FREE PROBLEM SOLVING. 
GIRLS — OLD/TOTAL. 
i'L---C-----..?.......„1 FAIL. PAS -1- crr s 1 L. 
rAiL 
"SASS 
i...6.66.s 
s 
ema• 	 Sa.:1 
c 	
`'.. .s 
q 7-•5 
woo' 	 Li§  
IL 
1,S 
...a  
I' o1  '1 L 12- t?... ‘3/4- 
0. g 
A 
RE' ATIC,TISHIP: ELABORATION/FREE — PROBLEM SOLVING. 
OLDER Ss. 
pc.,.... 
A F A I L PAS -r i..7-r FIL. 
r ri t L 
e" t) -`-) 
it, 
 tS",s 
...... 	 I S• s 
It..5 f )1.5 
" tga 
t 1 
 12 .s 
..... 
Z..t 
r cirq L 4.13" l a 
P..• It (6 
A 
RELATIONSHIP: ELABORATION/IDENTITY RECOGNITION. 
Girls -01d/3 Total. 
11---.0n•\ 	 --...c.,..- 4 FAR_ PASS -rcrrfi L. 
P-1) I L 1414;' li...4•1...s. 1 2.. t. 
POSS .Z 2`•S  
.•••• 	 g , s 10
7-5 
....... 	 2 • S I a 
1 -i- aTc) L 10  
A 
RELATIONSHIP: ELABORATION/ IDENTITY RECOGNITION 
Total Old. 
ii------t1/4---& FAIL POSS -ra-rfi L. 
ril n L 
'PASS 
13 12..5 
.... 
	 12:11. 
?aS 
?.  n-• t-1______"5 
.--- 
lu. 11.5 
rA lual 
• 1-3 1,* 
/W I 
e....1  
. 
azi 
• 
-ro-ro L ao .2_2 (a. 
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A 
RELATIONSHIP: ELABORATION/IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION(1) 
ti 
Old Girls/ 1 Total. 
frim----i---- FA I 1.- P 6S l'crril L. .. 
rici 1 L 
Pic)s 
10 1 1 	 1S,s  
5 6.S' 
I 	 i•SI 
 
....„ 
	a s t2- 
a 
-- •S'. 
-rcrrq L ll?.... 8 .. la- 
A 
RELATIONSHIP: ELABORATION/IDENTITY RECONSTRUCTION(1) 
Total Old. 
FA 1 L. POSS -rcrrfi 1- 
'DHSS 
;.34  
11.45 
, c*.f..st. 
i a it- 
2z.1 
-rcrrq L II 14,  ti- 	 _ 
298. 
299. 
A 	 6 
ELABORATION/ WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF. RELATIONSHIP: 
Old Girls/4- TOTAL. 
Ii ik -'s• -- 
 PRI I— PilS S -rcrrfl L_ 
C-f) 1 L- 6 c.s 
....... 	 s  6 1 '6'. 1.. .1  1 a 
'Fess 2.. if, 1.s • 2 
I' crie L ./.... 
RELATIONSHIP: 
A 
ELABORATION/WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF. 
TOTAL OLD. 
 
pl‘.-----F,......,  riqii... PF)5 -ccr-rfiL... 
rF) I L 
esS 'F s
 
/0.1 
11 1 
5 s.5 
/6'S 
11 	 i t 
/6.s 
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-- 
-r cy-f-ci L It, 
_ 
3 1.- 9-43 
RELATIONSHIP: ELABORATION/RECLASSIFICATION. 
Old Girls/4- Total 
f 'e(-,  . FAIL. PA55 -rcr-rfi L. 
P-A 1 L 
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3 • S 
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_ -ro-roL 1., to ..°.L 
RELATIONSHIP: ELABORATION/RECLASSIFICATION. 
Total Old. 
'..-p; --- --e:., FAIL- PASS 
-rarrfi I_ 
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INTERPRETATIU, OF RESULTS  
Differences between Sexes and Age-Groups (see Set 1 Tables) 
(all age-groups, i.e. Totals) 
Sex 
The results for the analysis of variance for each of the seven tests 
showed a very similar pattern in every case. The sex effect has no sig-
nificance in any of the tests, that is to say there are no differences 
between the boys' and the girls' performances. This finding was not 
surprising, such a difference had not been hypothesised and was in no way 
anticipated. (Hopefully such a condition had no effect upon the outcomes) 
(Rosenthal, 1963). 
The age effect is, as expected, highly significant in five out of 
seven tasks (i.e. above the 0.5% level). 
	 The other two tasks are sig- 
nificant beyond the 
	 level. One of the two tasks - Identity Re-construction 
(1) shows a spread of successes over all ages but does not indicate a steady 
increase of success with age as do the other tasks. It should perhaps 
be noted that only 22 out of a possible 96 pupils passed this task. 
Sex-Age Interaction  
The sex-age interaction is also insignificant for all tests. 
	
It 
is, however, interesting to note that for all tests the pattern of 
development differs between the sexes with age (see graph, over page). 
The boys indicate an almost steady growth with age; the girls are slower 
starters but make more rapid progress once they begin to score. The girls 
do not start to succeed significantly until nine years of age, one year 
later than the boys, but by 12 and 13 years of age, their performance is 
better than that of the boys. 
Rosenthal, R. (1963) "On the social psychology of the psychological 
experiment:the experimenter's hypothesis as unintended determinant", Amer. 
Scientist. VoL 51, flo. 2, pp 268-83. 
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COMMENT  
Whilst differences in performance between the two sexes was not a 
central consideration in the study or in the analysis, the fact that 
there were no such significant differences is a contribution to the 
coherence of the battery of tasks, in that it would not seem to be weighted 
in favour of any one sex. The slight difference in the pattern of develop-
ment between boys and girls could be worthy of consideration especially 
if an eventual aim is the construction of a scale of assessment for both 
boys and girls. It would, however, be premature to draw any firm con-
clusions without replication work. 
The most important finding in this analysis is obviously the very 
significant improvement in performance with age. This was clearly 
anticipated. 	 It is an expectation which is rooted in Piagetian theory 
and reflected in the tasks constructed. As a "pass/fail" mode of assess-
ment (i.e. where interest is not with qualitative changes in performance 
over time, as assessed by the sub-categories), the battery would be best 
employed with subjects in the oldest age groups (11+ years), for younger 
subjects, though able to satisfy aspects of the various tasks (as illus-
trated by the sub-categories of assessment), are generally less able to 
score on a pass/fail assessment. 
RELATIOIISIIIPS -nimma,f THE TASKS  
This is clearly a central question in research which is attempting 
to re-define an area and to assess what has been re-defined. 
Relationships between Totals (Set 2 Tables) 
The overall total scores for each pair (21 pairs) of tests were 
tested for independence: H
o 
- that the pairs are independent. The Test 
applied was a X2 contingency test (one-tailed). 
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In all cases but two (Identity Re-construction (1) with Re-
classification and Identity Re-construction (2) with Re-classification) 
significance was obtained at 5/,, level. At this stage, (i.e. without 
further research) it is not possible to give firm reasons for low 
correlations between these particular tasks. The following points 
could, however, be made: 
1) The level of cognitive ability required for the Re-classification 
task might be different from that needed for the other two tasks. 
2) The low correlations may be attributable to the fact that the tasks 
require refinement. They need not be a comment on the abilities required 
for the tasks or upon the relationships between such abilities. 
The high correlations stemming from the total scores need, perhaps, 
to be interpreted with some caution. 	 It will be noted (see subject 
profiles, Appendix III) that amongst the younger subjects there was a high 
non-response rate in the sense that younger subjects were unable to 
execute the tasks. This could obviously have implications for the 
nature of the relationships between the tasks. 
However, given that the main hypothesis expected improvement with 
age, such "failure" is to be expected in the lower age-groups, and, as 
was seen in the analysis of performance with age, the age-effect is very 
significant (above the 0.% level). This is clearly a battery of tasks 
which requires abilities not possessed by the younger age group, and their 
inability is consistent across the tasks, a point which is important in 
terms of the relationships between tasks. 
b) Relationships between Tasks for Sexes (Set 3 Tables) 
Having tested the total scores and having obtained a high degree of 
significance, relationships between the tasks for sexes were considered. 
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It was decided to exclude the youngest subjects from this part of the 
analysis (ages 6-9 years), for the number of actual passes was too small 
to make any statistical analysis efficient. The first step was to test the 
hypothesis that the older girls (10, 11, 12, 13 years) were not sig—
nificantly different from the results one would expect to obtain if the 
boys and girls were gaining similar results. 
Findings  
The only significance was for pair: Identity Re—construction (1) with 
Identity Re—construction (2) (X2 = 4.5 sig. at V, level). 	 It was con— 
cluded therefore that generally there was no significant difference between 
the boys and girls for the ages 10-13 years. Again, such a finding con—
tributes to a coherence of the battery, in that the tasks would not seem 
to discriminate against either sex at any age. 
c) 	 Relationships between Tasks for Older Subjects: 10-13  
Years Inclusive (Set 3 Tables) 
The second step was to test for independence between all tasks for 
all subjects aged 10 to 13 years inclusive (i.e. 48 subjects — 24 boys, 
24 girls). The only comparisons giving significant results were as follows: 
Tasks Showing Dependence for the 10-13 Year Age—Group 
Relationship X2 Significance Level 
Elaboration/Identity 
He—construction (1) 
Free Problem Solving/ 
8.55 1% 
Identity Re—construction (1) 5.83 
Free Problem Solving/ 
He—classification 17.08 
Identity Recognition/ 
Identity Re—construction 4.80 5% 
Identity Re—construction (1)/ 
Identity Re—construction (2) 5.75 55') 
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The second analysis of task inter-dependence raises some interesting 
questions, the obvious conclusion being. that 16 test-pairs would appear 
to be independent. It is interesting to notice that 4 out of 6 of the 
pairs involving Identity Re-construction (1) show association and that 
only one out of the remaining 15 do so. 	 It seems that Identity Re- 
construction (1) is associated rather generally with an otherwise independent 
set of tests, in this age-band. These findings, when viewed in relation 
to the first finding on task association, lead to the following comments: 
1) 	 In this analysis, the tasks are being scored on a pass/fail basis. 
The battery of tasks is not standardised for any one age-group, but is 
expected to be most suited to the upper age ranges (perhaps beyond the 
scope of this sample), for complete success on the tasks requires formal 
operational ability. It is to be expected, therefore, that the develop-
mental response pattern to the battery would be: 
(a) failure, 
(b) a mixture of passing and failing, and finally, 
(c) success for the most part. 
The upper age group in the total sample (10-13 years inclusive) are 
possibly in a transitional stage in terms of their ability to respond to 
the tasks (i.e. in section (b) of the response pattern). 	 This condition 
may well explain the findings of low task association in all except five 
pairs of tasks for the 10-13 years age group, especially in view of the 
high task association found for the whole sample. 
2) There is a need to administer this same battepgrof tasks to an older 
age group (i.e. 13+ years). In the initial planning of this research, the 
present age-bands were chosen, for the development of creative ability was 
believed to parallel that of normative cognitive development. However, 
given that creative ability is believed to be dependent upon normative 
cognitive ability, it may be that stages of creative ability do not 
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exactly parallel those of normative cognitive ability, but appear 
slightly later. In which case, subjects in the 10-13 year old group 
would not have attained the stage of 'formal' creative ability and would 
be unsteady and inconsistent in their responses, as is typical of persons 
in a state of stage-transition. 
3) It is perhaps important to note that the analysis of only the upper 
half of the age group reduced the initial sample by half (from 96 to 40). 
If a larger sample had been involved in this particular set of analysis, 
it is possible that all cells of the contingency tables would have had 
values greater than or equal to 5. This could make the tests more 
efficient. It has been noted (e.g. HcCall, 1970) that small values in 
a X2 test tend to make the test conservative in accepting the null 
hypothesis. It is conceivable that larger samples could detect reldion-
ships more readily, but most likely only in those cases for which the 
calculated X2 is 'close' to the tabulated (V, significant) value. 
	 In a 
number of cases here, the value was less than 1, and in these cases no 
major alteration, due to increased sample size, would be expected. 
4) It is possible that inaccuracies in scoring could explain some of the 
task independence for this age group though serious weighting is not given 
to this explanation. As noted, subjects in this age-group are likely to be 
in a transitional stage of creative ability and responses of such subjects 
are not always easy to classify. 
Comment  
Though replication work is required, and whilst there is a need to 
administer the battery to an older age-group of subjects, it is believed 
that the analysis so far reflects task inter-dependence and not independence. 
This is argued because the battery is clearly intended for older subjects 
and failure in the youngest age range, followed by uncertain responses in 
a transitional stage are the obvious theoretical precursors to success. 
324. 
However, this assessment has been two-fold: 
a) it has operated on a pass/fail basis; and 
b) by means of the sub-categories, it has attempted to note the 
improvement in subjects with age. An analysis of the sub-categories 
is therefore called for and follows later in this section. The Graphs 
presented in Chapter 6 also indicated improvement in performance on the 
different sub-categories of each task. 
Interdependence of Transformations: Theoretical Support  
Creativity is not about accrued knowledge. Information and experience 
do not in themselves constitute creative ability. Creativity involves the 
ability to re-conceive of phenomena. It requires therefore the ability to 
conceptualise. 
Thought can be examined in terms of content and process and form. 
This research is primarily interested in form. Elaboration and addition 
are examples of different forms of thinking. They lead to different 
transformations of reality. 
Progress in any one form would appear to develop with age and experience 
According to one's experiences the openings, the fields for re-conceptions of 
reality will expand and vary. This is a content matter. 
Thought processes therefore have various forms and can operate upon 
different content. 
A process is a complete event; it has a starting point and a terminal 
point and phases or levels between. Theoretically, the mature thinker 
is capable of completing a thought process. Younger subjects are more 
likely to manage only certain levels of any one process. 
Level of Transformation Principle 
e.g. 
ELABORATION 
1. 
Re-apprehension 
2. Deliberate 
Transformation 
(concrete) 
3. Deliberate 
Transformation 
(formal) 
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This study has attempted to examine these processes of transformations 
of reality. It has attempted, in an exploratory way, by means of the 
sub-categories of assessment, to establish and define different aspects 
or levels of any one of the processes. Through training schedules, it 
has attempted to better understand the transitions from one aspect or 
level of a process to another. 
Inter-relation of Processes. 
All processes have the same starting point: the initial apprehension 
and construction of reality. Processes of transformation re-structure or 
modify these initial conceptions in some way. Theoretically, such 
processes must inter-relate, must result, empirically in test inter-
dependence. Each process requires the same abilities: those of conception, 
re-conception, ability to anticipate, to grasp implications and ultimately 
to manage this without concrete props. 
The sub-categories of any one process are ways of describing that 
process and the individual's performance on it. Such categories are 
context-specific in that they relate largely if not solely to that one 
process, though not solely to a particular context or medium. 
A further question is - what is the inter-relationship, if any, in 
terms of sub-categories across processes? To answer this question a 
further step is required - the generation of less context-specific 
categories. After consideration of the findings in part one of this 
research, more general categories might be, e.g.: 
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This is not a firm proposal simply an indication of future direction, 
and an attempt to find common (i.e. inter—task) levels along a continuum 
of increasing cognitive organisation. Examination by correlational tech—
niques would be important. It would provide assurance and direction, 
given that one returned to the theory. 
This is the essence of the proposal for a scale of operational 
creative ability to be outlined in the final chapter. 
Separation of Content and Form  
According to familiarity with/skill in a particular medium, so one 
can operate upon that content (Cf. UAcalage'). Distinctions must be made 
therefore between assessment of a process in itself (i.e. where skill or 
knowledge requirement is low) — and application of that same process in 
a knowledge laden context. For different reasons both are valid. 
An individual who actively understands the process of division should, 
theoretically, always succeed on tasks of such which do not require special 
skill or knowledge in a given area. 
Where he is expected to apply that same process in a knowledge laden 
context then understanding of the context must be taken into consideration. 
Given that such distinctions are made, theoretically these processes 
of transformation of reality must inter—relate. Between the theory and 
the final correlational verification is a problematic empirical process 
of accurately establishing levels of accomplishment of processes. The 
starting point is zero — the terminal point must be complete success — the 
search for clearer identification of the intermediary levels continues. 
Similarly, the searchfbr tasks which adequately reflect these levels goes 
on. When replication work contributes to confidence in these areas, statis—
tical analysis could provide firmer assurances and clearer directions. 
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The Concept of Stage in relation to the Analysis  
It would be highly premature at this stage of the research to come 
to other than very tentative conclusions about a stage explanation of 
creative ability, though the concept of such is upheld at the theoretical 
level. An initial main question is: "What kinds of responses (if any) are 
characteristic of which age groups?" 
There was no attempt to develop a set of tasks to represent each 
stage. It is not the tasks which are believed to characterise stages of 
ability, but the ways in which the tasks are interpreted and handled. 
Accordingly, one set of tasks was developed and an attempt was made to 
establish qualitative categories of assessment (sub-categories) which 
would give some indication of changes in degree of cognitive organisation. 
In analysis of the sub-categories, comparison across tasks is not 
always possible. It is too early yet to say that any one sub-category 
(e.g. "an organised response") speaks of the same or equivalent degree of 
cognitive organisation across tasks. Whilst sub-categories avoid being 
context-specific in terms of being tied to a particular medium, they are 
still more ordinal than interval in nature (Appendix IV). 
Bearing such limitations in mind, and aware of the need for rep-
lication work and for further consideration and refinement of the sub-
categories, some analysis was made, but of a descriptive rather than an 
inferential nature. 
The system adopted was to grade the standard achieved by the sample 
(of 12 in any one age group) according to the dominant standard of res-
ponse. The standards were set out as follows: 
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1. disorganised response 
2. disorganised/partly organised response 
3. partly organised response 
4. partly/fully organised response 
5. organised response 
It should be noted that not all tasks were suitable for this con-
sideration - only those which had a threefold response classification 
based on increasing organisation. Tasks examined were: 
Free problem solving (Part 2 of Task) 
Identify Re-construction (1) (both parts of task) 
What Would Happen If Task 
Identity Re-construction (2) (Part 1 of Task) 
The procedure for each test was to take each age in turn and 
associate it with one of the five grades of achievement given above. 
The five tasks concerned fall into two broad types by the pattern of 
development of the sample: 
Group 1: Tasks - Identity Re-construction (1) (Part 
Identity Re-construction (2 (Part 1  
(identical pattern for each task) 
Grade of Achievement 	 Ages 
1 	 6 and 7 years 
2 	 8 and 9 years 
3 	 10 years 
4 	 11, 12 and 13 years 
5 	 ONO 
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Group 2: Tasks - Free Problem Solving (A), Identity Re-construction (1) 
Part 2 (3), What Would Happen If (C)  
Grade of Achievement  Acres 
A 
 
1 
2 
3 
6,7,8 	 6,7,8 	 6,7,8 
9,10,11 	 9,10 	 9,10,11 
12 	 11,12 	 - 
4 	 13 	 13 	 12 
5 	 WO 
Piaget, in his explanation of the development of intelligence, has 
never attempted to tie stages to specific ages, but has associated them 
with age-bands. Further
, 
definite criteria for the identification of 
stages have been laid down (Tanner, J. and Inhelder, B. (1956)). Two 
important observations, related to these criteria, emerge from the current 
exercise: 
a) There is a pattern of increasing cognitive organisation described 
and classified here by a threefold category assessment. 
b) Assessment sub-categories are certainly hierarchical and irreversible  
(according to the ages associated with the different qualitative responses). 
In addition, there is the possibility that different qualitative 
responses might be associated with age bands as follows: 
Response Age Stage 
1. Disorganised responses 
2. Partly disorganised) 
3. Partly organised 	 / 
4. Partly/fullyorganised 
5. Fully organised response 
6,7,8 years 
9,10,11,12 years 
12,13,14 years 
autistic transformations 
concrete transformations 
formal transformations 
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A problem requiring more investigation is whether progress is best 
described by stage or whether it is more a matter of continuous develop,- 
ment. A closer examination (in replication studies) of the scoring method 
would be required here to decide whether responses could fall firmly into • 
clear stage—categories or whether there were too many exceptions straddling 
categories, thus breaking down the stage—explanation of creative ability. 
Theoretically, a stage explanation should hold, because of the close 
relationship between creative and intelligent abilities. 
One point of interest is that if there is a stage explanation of 
creative ability, it may have a slower development rate than that of intel—
ligence. The age associations would seem to suggest this. Given that 
creative ability is argued to be dependent upon intelligence this is to 
be expected. 
In concluding this sub—section, it could be mentioned that apart from 
suggesting a way to a stage—explanation of creative ability, the sub—
categories are important in describing the progress of individuals through 
any one task. Apart from offering an explanation of an individual's 
behaviour, the graphs representing sub—category responses (Chapter 6) 
suggest that such responses form a general developmental pattern. Such 
qualitative descriptions are of value both in assessment, where the inten—
tion is to understand the nature of the response, and in training attempts, 
where transitional points in attainment are normally of interest. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS  
1. It would seem reasonable to conclude (in the light of the theory 
and the findings) that the tasks in the battery are inter-dependent. 
The lack of such inter-dependence in the upper age-groups may be explained 
by the belief that this group is transitional - falling between two 
stages of ability - thus giving inconsistent, and unpredictable responses. 
2. There is a clear increase in ability to perform on the tasks with 
age. This was anticipated and suggests that the battery will be most 
suited to the older age range when it is being employed on a pass/fail basis. 
However, when levels or degrees of success rather than actual passes are 
being examined then, by use of the sub-categories of assessment, this 
battery could be a useful tool in the assessment of developing ability. 
3. There were no significant differences in performance between the boys 
and the girls. This was not anticipated and is not a serious consideration 
of the underpinning theory. 
4. There is the possibility, based on assessment by the sub-categories, 
of a stage explanation of creative ability. There are indications of a 
hierarchy of ability and of irreversibility, but further refinement of 
the sub-categories is required in order to better examine "borderline" 
responses which appear to straddle categories, thus weakening the stage 
explanation in favour of a pattern of continuous development of creative 
ability. 
PART TWO 
Chapter 8 
TRAINING AND CREATIVE ABILITIES 
A CONSIDERATION OF THE LITERATURE 
In this section creative ability and the 
effects of training are considered, in an 
attempt to understand more fully the problems 
of apprehension and interpretation of reality. 
The section begins with a review of literature 
in this area. 
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Any kind of training scheme has to be understood in the light of 
the theoretical standpoint supporting it. The concern of this study is 
not really with learning-theory approaches stemming from the old empiricist 
tradition, which assumes that the child acquires what is being taught as 
a function of repeated external reinforcements. Neither is it interested 
in theories which are based upon the idea that development is about the 
maturation of the nervous system and not about experience. Its concern 
is with that Piagetian approach which asserts that logical structures are 
not originally present in the child's thinking but come about through the 
process of equilibration. 
Concepts of learning are based upon different notions of man and 
man's knowing. There are those explanations which give freedom to man in 
that he is seen as an active construer of reality (Kelly, 1963) and others 
which speak in terms of external, environmental contingencies (Skinner, 
1972). Opposing schools tend somewhat to caricature their opponents 
regarding them as guilty of solipsism on the one hand, or production-line 
moulding on the other. 
Skinner (1972) argues that behaviour is "shaped and maintained by 
its consequences". He believes that recognition of this fact will make 
possible the formulation of interaction between the organism and the 
environment in a more comprehensive way. Whilst he argues in what Kelly 
has termed the 'language of objects' (Kelly, 1963), there is a place in 
his theory for originality (1965): 
We reserve the term original for those ideas which result from 
manipulations of variables which have not followed rigid formula 
and in which the ideas have other sources of strength... We may 
therefore acknowledge the emergence of novel ideas, in the sense 
Kelly, G. (1963) A Theory of Personality:The Psychology of Personal Constructs. 
Skinner, B.F. (1972) Beyond Freedom and Dignity.  
Skinner, B.F. (1965) Science and Human Behaviour. P.254. 
of responses never made before under the same circumstances, 
without implying any element of originality in the individuals 
who have them." 
As might be expected the reasons for originality are placed firmly out-
side of the individual, and attainment is equally an external process: 
"Reinforcing contingencies shape the behaviour of the individual, 
and novel contingencies generate novel forms of behaviour. Here, 
if anywhere, originality is to be found." (Ibid) 
Given that Skinner sees control of contingencies as important - one might 
ask how - if creativity is explained in terms of being external to the 
individual - any individual can (a) manipulate contingencies for creative 
outcomes, (b) recognise outcomes as novel? In the last analysis, it 
would seem to be an 'inside' question, if only because it implies 
evaluation. 
A very'insidel explanation is offered by George Kelly (1963). 'Out-
side language' is wholly rejected: 
"... it is not what happens around him that makes a man experienced; 
it is the successive construing and re-construing of what happens." 
Prime place is given to man as a construer of reality, and notions such 
as motivation and learning 'evaporate' (1970). In a certain sense, 
much of Kelly's theory is about 'novelty' in that each construct has its 
own uniqueness. However his commonality corollary provides a shared core 
of constructs against which one could assess deviance or novelty. 
Salmon (1970) reviewing explanations of growth, points to shared 
factors in the explanations of Kelly and Piaget. Both adopt a point of 
view which is internalised; both stress the importance of organisational 
factors and in both theories, change is described in structural terms. 
But there is a fundamental difference: 
Skinner, B.F. (1972) Ibid. P.255. 
Kelly, G. (1963) A Theory of Personality: The Psychology of Personal  
Constructs. P.73. 
Kelly, G. (1970) "A brief introduction to personal construct theory", In: 
Bannister, D. Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. P.29. 
Salmon, P. (1970) "A psyohology of personal growth", ;mss Bannister, nil. 
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"Piaget's theoretical account rests upon an absolutist view 
of truth... This view runs counter to the philosophical basis 
of construct theory, whereby reality can never be known in any 
final, absolute way, but only through our constructions, which 
as a result of the varying validational outcomes of the behavioural 
experiments we make are subject to continual revision." P.214. 
Kelly's theory is not of course concerned with developmental aspects 
of a construct system and he is not therefore obliged, as is Piaget, to 
provide genetic explanations. Further, concerning the matter of Piaget's 
theoretical account, much depends on what absolutism implies. Kelly 
does not deny commonality any more than Piaget's explanation denies the 
is true that Piaget's 
constructions of 
'objective', such an 
possibility of novel constructions of reality. It 
interest is more squarely in the area of normative 
reality, and that he regards such constructions as 
admission, however, does not rule out the possibility or existence of 
other constructions. Indeed, if there are to be novel constructions 
there must be more common constructions against which to measure novelty. 
In this sense Piaget provides a starting point for creative re-structurings. 
All training attempts to look at behaviour under a theoretical 
microscope. The behaviourally inspired will seek out minute and detailed 
connections, examining sets of conditions for learning (Gagne, 1970). 
Piagetians will be concerned to note, in an equally detailed way, the 
various mechanisms of transition from one level of development to another 
(Sinclair, 1974; Miller and Heldmeyer, 1975). Most schools give impor-
tante in some way to validation or reinforcement. Kelly speaks of 
validation, Skinner of reinforcement. Even the Piagetian child must 
receive some form of assurance or validation when he is impressed by the 
logic of necessity. Without such he would hardly be aware of the logic 
involved. 
Salmon, P. (1970) Ibid. P.214. 
Gagne, R. (1970) The Conditions of Learning. 
Miller, P. and Heldmeyer, K.(1975) "Perceptual information in conservation: 
effects of screening". Ch. Devt.  A.6. pp 588-92. 
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Piaget himself was not concerned with questions of 'training' - 
an American issue which he left to Bruner; and yet his standpoint has 
tempted many investigators to look at the role of 'experience' and the 
possibility of 'training' to accelerate the formation of these logical 
structures. Immediately one is led to ask - "what is experience?". 
How does one trap an experience which is meaningful to a given individual 
- in the sense that it will challenge his structures and bring about 
re-organisation and expansion? When one examines Piaget's theory of 
knowledge, of knowing - it becomes yet more problematic, because he does 
not conceive of knowing in a cumulative sense, his postulates are rather 
about the construction and re-construction of reality. The formation of 
a structure, whilst a possibility within a theoretical explanation, is 
diffica to submit to empirical investigation, though its presence or 
absence can well be inferred (Sinclair, 1974) 
Piaget himself gives a lead on what is to be looked for in such 
investigations (1972). He begins by making a distinction between learning 
and development. Development, as he conceives of it, is tied to the whole 
process of embryogenesis, which concerns the development of the body as 
well as the development of the nervous system and mental functions. 
Learning on the other hand is seen as being provoked by specific 
situations. Further, Piaget sees learning as a limited process in that 
it is tied to a single problem or to a single structure (Piaget, 1972, 
ibid). Development cannot be explained in terms of a sum of discrete 
learning experiences. 
Sinclair, H. "Recent Piagetian research", in: Piaget in the Classroom, 
Raph, J. and Schwebel, M. (eds) (1973). 
Piaget, J. "Development and learning", in: Readings in Child Behaviour  
& Development. Lavatelli.0 & Stendler.F (Eds) 1972. P. 8. 
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However, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, there is an experience — 
a particular quality of experience which might be 'open to manipulation' 
and Piaget defines this quality of experience. He makes a distinction 
offering two types of experience: 
"Physical experience consists of acting upon objects and drawing 
some knowledge about the objects by abstraction from the objects." 
This is one kind of experience and very accessible to experimentation. 
However, there is a further type, more transforming in terms of logical 
structures and more sought after in terms of experimentation: 
there is a second type of experience which I shall call 
logical mathematical experience where the knowledge is not drawn 
from the objects, but it is drawn by the actions effected upon the 
objects... It is an experience of the actions of the subject, and 
not an experience of the objects themselves . It is an experience 
which is necessary before there can be operations." 
Clearly, this kind of experience is available in different amounts 
and areas in different cultures. Cultural variations on Piagetian type 
tasks suggest that certain kinds of experiences can be lacking in par—
ticular cultures, thus hindering the formation of particular logical 
operations. There are numerous instances to support this, but that of 
Marks Greenfield in Senegal will suffice for the moment. Similarly, 
within a given culture there are variations. Different children move 
through Piaget's stages at different ages. Exposure to the same 
'experiences' is no guarantee that there will be uniform transformation 
of structures within any one age group. Aniso once again, the crucial 
question is — how does one invent, structure for, an experience which will 
affect the cognitive structures of a child, and in so doing discover 
something of what happens to a child when experience, in this specific 
Piagetian sense, becomes "meaningful"? 
Piaget, J. (1972) Ibid. P.41. 
Greenfield, P.M. (1966) "On culture and conservation" in:Studies in 
Cognitive Growth, Bruner et al. (eds). 
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Such was the question put by Kingsley & Hall in a training attempt 
based on Gagne's idea of learning sets. Having evaluated previous 
research attempts in the area they go on to point out that: 
"....(we) would offer an alternative hypothesis for the train-
ing failures emphasising experiential rather than internal 
variables. We would contend that most of the training attempts 
referred to above have ignored the large amount of background 
knowledge necessary and thus time needed to train children for 
conservation mastery." 
Their own efforts obviously attempted to put into operation what 
other failed to do. Their effort was based on Gagne's approach which 
divides the material to be taught into a hierarchy of sub-tasks. Like 
Smedslund (1961) before them, they added a further check - an extinction 
task. With Smedslund they found that subjects who had been "trained to 
conserve" failed to resist extinction (on7y3 on 17 could resist). Smedslund 
points out that this is consistent with equilibration theory. 	 It should 
be pointed out, however, that in Kingsley and Hall's work even the 
'natural conservers' failed to resist extinction. A Piagetian reply could 
well be that their structures were not well founded, that they were on the 
brink of attainment but still in formation. 
Piaget has his own comment to make on such attempts. 
H
... he (Smedslund) was successful in obtaining learning of what 
I called earlier, physical experience (this is not surprising, 
it is simply a question of noting facts about objects), but he 
was not successful in obtaining learning in the construction of 
the logical structure. This doesn't surprise me either, since 
the logical structure is not the result of physical experience. 
The logical structure is reached only through internal 
equilibration..." Piaget, 1972. 
Kingsley, R.C. and Hall, V.C. "Training conservation through the use of 
learning sets", Child Devt. 2£3 (1967) pp 1111-26. 
Smedslund, J. (1968) "The acquisition of conservation of substance and 
weight in children", in: Logical Thinking in Children, Sigel, I. and Hooper, 
F. (eds) 
Piaget, J. (1972) "Development and learning", in: Readings in Child  
Behaviour & Development, 
 Lavatelli. C. & Stendler. F.(Eds). P. 44. 
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The attempt by Kingsley and Hall is reminiscent of some of the 
philosophy of Jerome Bruner with his concern to act as a "translator" 
- a person who can digest information and pass it on in a mode which 
will be readily understandable to those who as yet can only represent 
their world in certain modes. His ideas and practices are not, however, 
always confined to a controlled experimental situation but addressed more 
widely to "agents of culture" - such as teachers: 
... by giving the child multiple embodiments of the same 
general idea expressed in a common notation, we lead him to 
'empty' the concept of specific sensory properties until he 
is able to grasp its abstract properties..." (See PLATE 54) 
The basic idea is always the same - how does one accelerate the movement 
of the child's cognitive development - what props, supports does one 
employ until somehow the 'logic of necessity' takes over (Piaget, 19. 
Wood and Middleton (1975) attempted a form of training whidais in 
fact shot through with Piagetian clinical techniques. Working with 12 
mothers and their children, they described their approach as assisted 
problem solving. After assessing attempts on a toy-like, block construc-
tion set, they concluded that: 
"...those mothers who systematically changed their instructions 
on the basis of the child's response to certain interventions 
were most likely to see their child perform effectively after 
instruction... effective instructing is a dynamic, interactive 
process somewhat akin to problem solving." 
Gagne (1964) regarding problem-solving as a form of learning in itself, 
points outa number of problems regarding the measurement of problem 
solving performance. In problem solving, as Gagne indicates, time could 
Bruner, J. (1968) Towards a Theory of Instruction  
Wood, D. and Middleton, D. (1975) "A study of assisted problem solving", 
B.J. Pay.  66, pp 181-91. 
From: Representation and Mathematics Learning by Bruner. J.S. 
and Kenney. H.J. 
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Balance beam and rings used on quadratic 
construction. 
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Squares of ever increasing size constructed 
with components. 
PLATE 54  
"The problem sequences were designed to provide, first, an 
appreciation of mathematical ideas through concrete constructions 
using materials of various kinds for these constructions. From 
such constructions the child was encouraged tO form perceptual 
images of the mathematical idea in terms of the forms that had 
been constructed. The child was then further encouraged to 
develop or adopt a notation to describe his construction. After 
such a cycle, a child moved on to the construction of a further 
embodiment of the idea on which he was working, one that was 
mathematically isomorphic with what he had learned although 
expressed in different materials and with altered appearance." 
341. 
not be regarded as an adequate measure, neither could the number of 
presentations. 
	
In research concerned with qualitative dimensions of 
performance, Gagne points out that: 
"Much depends upon the degree to which the subject's responses 
are limited or controlled by the problem situation. Where there 
is some degree of control, kinds of errors might be a useful 
criterion as the structure of the situation will mean that 
these errors will be made by a number of subjects as opposed to 
each subject making their own errors." (1964) 
Hermina Sinclair (1974) has made attempts to approach training in 
interactive terms, though the intention was not to train or to accelerate 
for the sake of such, but to learn more about transitions from one sub-
stage to another. Summarising the research conclusions of the work 
carried out by the Centre d'Epistemologie in Geneva in the 1960s, Sinclair 
concludes that: 
"Empirical methods whereby the subject has to accept a link 
between events because this link is imposed upon him, do not 
result in progress; progress results when the subject discovers 
the link." P.57 
Sinclair, expanding this idea in relation to these and her own research 
points out that: 
ft
... in situations specifically constructed so that the subject 
has active encounters with environment - the same mechanisms as 
in development are at work to make for progress..." P.58 
Essentially, therefore, learning situations of the type acceptable 
to Piagetians must be microcosms of what might be termed 'normal develop-
ment' and because such development takes place in a variety of contexts 
and manners, and at different speeds, there can be little standardisation 
of such 'microcosms of development'. 
Gagne, R. (1964) "Problem solving", in: Categories of Human Learning. 
Melton, A.W. 
Sinclair, H. (1974) "Recent Piagetian research in learning studies", in: 
Piaget in the Classroom. 
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Whilst one intention of much training research is to enable subjects 
to come to terms with logics which were incomprehensible on pre-test 
runs, paradoxically, the very research attempts and 'translations' (in 
the Brunerian sense) might prevent the subjects from facing the challenge 
of the situation, and instead they may be faced with easy short-cuts to 
the issues, which is hardly the same thing. Whilst a Brunerian subject 
might well cope with formal concepts in concrete terms and expressions, 
he is still not coping formally. Sinclair (1974), presenting a conser-
vation of length problem by means of matchsticks (discontinuous quantities 
or units as opposed to continuous quantities - such as string) notes: 
"Using matches of equal length means that the experimenter has 
already solved part of the problem for the child, who can now 
simply discard his intuitive solution." P.62. 
Such must be a hazard of attempting to discover something about the 
mechanisms of development in microcosm. 
The problem is reflected in a number of research efforts, usually 
stemming from the actual attempt to make the logic more obvious to the 
child. Frank's screening procedure was an attempt to expose the logic 
of the problem to the child by removing distracting perceptual infor-
mation. The test, of course, was what happened (or rather, did not 
happen) when subjects next faced the conservation of liquid problem in 
its classical form. Where research provides 'props' for subjects, it 
cannot be said that any real development of structures has taken place. 
What such research does do is to help explain some of the blocks and 
problems encountered by the young subjects. Real development of struc-
tures sets in motion a process which leads to further and different 
Sinclair, H. (1974) Ibid. 
Frank, F. (1966) cited in: Bruner, J. et al, Studies in Cognitive Growth. 
PP 193-4. 
conclusions on the basis of the first conclusion. Eleanor Duckworth 
(1973) considering the relationship between language and knowing, and 
knowing as expressed through language, says: 
if we really understand what we have been told, we make 
new connections for ourselves. We are now the masters of 
these new connections and can express them our own way (my 
underlining)." P.136. 
More hope lies perhaps for observing the development of structures, 
in research attempts which, instead of "translating problems to a manage - 
abel size, attempt to make subjects participate very actively. Greenfield 
(1966), already mentioned, has made this type of attempt. She concluded 
that the extent to which subjects were allowed to take an active part in 
the experimental situation would affect thdr grasp of conservation. It 
should be pointed out that this method was 'successful' with only one 
group of subjects - unschooled Wolof children in Senegal. The other 
group - exposed to Western schooling - was not aided by this active 
participation. 
Soenstroem (1966) looked at two major factors in training procedures: 
the effect of active manipulation of materials and the effect of labelling 
the shapes produced. She concluded that together, manipulation and 
language could take a stand against the force of appearance. 
Training can concern itself with two dimensions: 
1. with the development of structures or the acceleration of that 
development; 
2. with fluency - which tends to assume the presence of abilities 
fundamental to the task in hand and which is concerned with output in 
terms of facility, ease, speed, etc. 
Duckworth, E. (1973) "Constructing what we know" in: Raph, J. and Schwebel, 
M. (Ibid) P., 136. 
Greenfield, P.M. (1966)"On culture and conservation's in: Bruner et al, Ibid. 
Soenstroem, A.M. "On the conservation of solids" ins Bruner et al, 11, 4. 
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The studies reviewed so far have been concerned largely with the 
first dimension and, interestingly, vmfew, if any researchers of 
creativity have applied this approach in their attempts to facilitate 
creativity (which varies widely in definition). It is believed that this 
has been so because no adequate explanation of the relationship between 
intelligence and creativity has been proposed. 	 If it is held that 
creative ability is rooted in the same operational structures as is intel-
ligence, then training for creative behaviour must concern itself with both 
dimensions - namely with the establishment of the necessary structures and 
with fluency training at the appropriate operational level. The lack of 
developmental studies of the relationship between intelligence and creativity 
/May be a further reason why training in creativity 
has for the most part confined itself to older subjects, allowing one to 
assume, no doubt, the existence of basic abilities. The following 
studies, as will be seen, are interested mainly in what might be termed 
'personality dimensions' of creativity. Cognitive blocks are less 
frequently scrutinised and hardly ever explained in terms of cognitive 
structures - or their absence. 
Brainstorming - introduced by Osborn (1953) - is a method which is 
largely if not wholly concerned with the fluency dimension of training. 
Brainstorming attempts to overcome some of the 'inhibitions' or 'sets' 
which individuals develop over a period of time. It aims to facilitate 
the expression of the pre-conscious imagination in a group situation and 
this is done largely by deferring conscious evaluation. This, of course, 
is a method which rests on the assumption that individuals have the 
necessary cognitive structures to generate 'other' concepts of reality. 
It consists largely of abandonning constraints which hinder such generation. 
Much depends also upon the concept of "creative" behind such training 
sessions. If creativity is to be defined in, say, associational terms, 
Osborn, A.F. (1953) Applied Imagination: Principles & Procedures of  
Creative Thinking. 
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with scores translated into "statistical uniqueness" then one has no 
qualitative measure of what is being generated. 
This is not to undervalue such techniques as brainstorming, but 
simply to stress that a more valuable approach might be to: 
1. establish the structural operational abilities of subjects; 
2. on the basis of such abilities train subjects in fluency according 
to his/her level of ability. 
In other words, if it is possible to train to accelerate the develop-
ment of structures, the techniques required must surely be very different 
from those concerned with fluency. That such fluency techniques are 
required is no doubt true. In this present study, it was noted that 
whilst subjects in the 12 and 13 year old age groups had the ability to 
conceive of hypothetical systems, to elaborate and identify in such task's, 
they became increasingly embarrassed and inhibited about doing so. By 
contrast, younger subjects usually less self and less rule-conscious, 
would more easily elaborate on stimulus-lines and identify shapes and 
objects from further stimulus lines - less concerned that the identifications 
were not wholly accurate or that their system was 'silly'. The place of 
fluency testing and training is therefore stressed, but it must follow 
the establishment of operational structures if it is to be truly concerned 
with fluency, for even brainstorming involves evaluation of one's efforts 
- though it is deferred evaluation. 
Interpreting Osborn (1953), what might be described as "tension" with 
regard to the nurture of creativity comes out clearly. It is best 
expressed when he deals with factors tending to hinder creativity. As 
Osborn, A.F. (1953) Applied Imagination. 
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pointed out earlier much work on creativity has dealt with older sub-
jects, subjects who would have developed particular sets, outlooks, 
perceptual expectations - "einstellung" or whatever. Literature, 
dealing with such 'problems', tends almost to "blame" experiences which 
have contributed to the formation of cultural logic because they would 
seem to hinder creative logics. Such comment is based - implicitly or 
otherwise - on a dichotomous approach to what is referred to as the 
creativity-intelligence split. It argues for one at the cost of the 
other, whereas in fact, creative logics are dependent by definition upon 
cultural logics. 
Osborn (1953) takes up this discussion: 
"Our thinking is mainly twofold: 1) a judicial mind which analyses 
compares and chooses; 2) a creative mind which visualises, foresees 
and generates.... As a result of education and experime we develop 
inhibitions which tend to rigidize our thingking." P.39. 
He goes on to point out that Torrance (Gliding Creative Talent) has 
confirmed the fact that imagination tends to contract in proportion as 
knowledge and judgement expand. His concern therefore (i.e. Osborn's) 
is to "de-condition" subjects - remove factors which tend to block 
creative output. 
This dichotomy exists, I suggest, because a cons tent developmental 
approach to creative output has not been applied. Osborn, Rogers and 
others, anxious to facilitate creative output are right to be concerned 
about rigidity, but they need to consider 'flexibility and fluency' in 
its wider context of intelligence. A programme of training (developmental) 
could best be carried out on the following paradigm: 
A first step would be to establish the operational level of the subjects 
with regard to the task(s) in hand. 
Osborn, A.F. (1953) Ibid. 
Torrance, E.P. (1962) GlidiniK Creative Talent. 
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Experiences might then be used to: 
a) bring the subject to a particular operational level more rapidly; 
b) establish the subject more firmly at a particular operational level. 
"Creative training" aims essentially to deepen a subject's knowing of a 
particular identity (or identities) or his knowing of identities in 
relation. This increased knowing is rooted in his basic knowing. 
Creative training would next seek to: 
Increase flexibility/fluency in the application of such knowledge by: 
a) increasing the child's awareness of possibilities; 
b) increasing the child's awareness of the actual processes of the 
transformation involved, and of his own knowing in that process; 
c) increasing his awareness of implications of his actions upon iden—
tities and identities in relation; 
increasing his flexibility in his apprehension of an identity or 
identities in relation; 
e) increasing his output of interpretations of that reality. 
"Fluency" training of the type employed by Osborn, is inappropriate 
without a certain level of cognitive development. Because we do not 
really know empirically how "equilibration" comes about, and because we 
cannot always be around when a meaningful experience in the Piagetian 
sense confronts a child and transforms his structures in a samewhat 
mysterious manner, it is difficult to construct expe3dences of the first 
type — i.e. those accelerating structures. In another theoretical con—
text it is rather like watching 'insight' at work and this is just as 
elusive as equilibration. From current observations of training attempts 
with individual children certain points are to be made: 
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1. Work concerned to accelerate structures, training based on 
logico-mathematical expeAbnces must have a largely clinical 
and therefore individual approach, following the logic and 
thought of a particular subject at a particular point in time. 
2. Given the above, it may well be possible to discover from the 
child the experiences he needs in order to grasp the logic 
before him. This would not simply be about noting facts. 
3. Fluency training, in the sense just described, is possible at 
the operational level of the child concerned. Little would be 
achieved at any higher level. 
In Osborn's fluency training there are two fundamental principles 
which he describes as "the essence of procedure called brainstorming" (ibid) 
a) deferment of judgement; 
b) striving for quantity with regard to production of ideas. 
Evaluation follows later. 
The process requires therefore that subjects be capable of judgement 
and of evaluation of their ideas, though at some later point. 
The striving for increased output is a deliberate process, and 
Osborn cites Parnes to explain how such processes can be stimulated. 
Parnes likens the mind to a kaleidoscope: 
"....if you manipulate you get countless patterns - ideas produced 
by combination and re-combination of existing elements 
	 add a new 
fact or experience... and you add one new pattern. However, as soon 
as you begin to manipulate, combining and re-arranging the new fact 
with the old, you get an even greater number of new possible 
patterns of ideas." P.113. Ibid. 
The concern of brainstorming then is to remove any barrier, Cognitive or 
emotional, in order to increase output of ideas with a view to evaluation 
of these later. 
Osborn, A.F. (1953) Ibid. P.113. 
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Not all creative training programmes are group-based in the 
Osborn sense. Charles Whiting produced the idea of a technique named 
- "forced relationship technique" which he defined as: 
"A technique for inducing original ideas which rely upon the 
creation of a forced relationship between two or more normally 
unrelated products or ideas as the starting point for the idea 
generation process." P.213. 
An instance of this method would involve considering relationships 
between listed ideas, each idea would be related to every other idea in 
an attempt to forge or highlight a relationship. From such a starting 
point attempts would be made to start a chain of free associations which 
might lead to new products or ideas. 
W.J. Gordon (1961) in his work entitled "Synectics" describes his 
own approach to this area of training as: 
"An operational theory for the conscious use of the pre-conscious 
psychological mechanisms present in man's creative ability." P.3. 
Gordon holds that: 
"Creative efficiency in people can be markedly increased if 
they understand the psychological processes by which they 
operate... that in the creative process 
	
the irrational is 
more important than the rational... (and that) 	 it is these 
irrational elements which must be understood in order to increase 
the probability of success in a problem-solving situation." 
Like others in this particular field of training for creativity, he is 
concerned to employ "play... to evoke new viewpoints with respect to 
problems"... "to make the strange familiar.., and the familiar strange." 
In brief, he attempts to help individuals retain what he terms - "their 
peripheral vision", but he requires a high level of cognitive function-
ing. 
Whiting, C.(1958) Creative Thinking. New York. cited in Osborn, A. (1963) 
Gordon, W.J.J. (1961) Synectics: the Development of Creative Capacity. 
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Mednick with an associative concept of creativity has also shown 
interest in ways of inducing creativity. Creativity is here described as: 
the forming of associative elements into new combinations 
which either meet specified requirements or are in some way use-
ful. The more mutually remote are the elements of the new com-
bination, the more creative the process or solution... however, 
it is only when conditions are such that this answer is useful and 
that we can also call it creative." 
Training as such comes under categories such as: 
Serendipity: the requisite associative elements may be evoked 
contiguously by the contiguous environmental appearance of 
stimuli which elicit these associative elements. 
Associations under categories of Similarity and Mediation of  
Common Elements are also part of such training. 
His tests are clearly based on the processes emphasised in the train-
ing undertaken and generally require subjects to relate in a remote way 
mutually distant realities. 
In all training, it is not simply the structure of the situation 
which is of importance, but also factors such as time, length of training, 
amounts of training at any given time, and numerous other factors dif-
ficult to control, many of which must too often remain as 'hidden 
variables' in research designs. Parnes and Meadow (1959) hint at the 
problem of time in creative training schedules when they note in their 
own conclusions that: 
"Those trained in brainstorming produced a significantly greater 
number of good quality ideas than those not trained... brain-
storming is even more effective if preceded by extensive train-
ing." 
Mednick, S.(1962)"The Associative basis of the creative process", 
Psychological Review, 62, No 3, pp 220-32. 
Parnes,S. and Meadow,A. "L1ffects of brainstorming instructions on 
creative problem solving by trained and untrained subjects", J. of Ed. 
21., No 4, (1959) 
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Edward de Bono employing terms such as "lateral thinking" believes 
that: 
"... Creativity ought to be treated as a skill which can be 
taught, learned, practised and developed." (1970a) P.25. 
De Bono, in an analysis of thinking, pinpoints the delimma between the 
effectiveness of the human mind, which stems from its ability to create 
rigid patterns and to use them, and the consequent inability of the mind 
to escape from such patterns into new creations (1970a). De Bono's 
concern is to make individuals aware of their own thinking. He argues 
that such awareness of the processes of thinking can enable one to 
appreciate patterns, deviations and new processes. De Bono has further 
(1970b) analysed thinking into major types and his CoRT Thinking Programmes 
(1973) are attempts to put much of this analysis into practice. These 
programmes attempt to teach the various categories of thinking as a 
skiL 
A problem with Programmes such as CoRT is that of de Bono's inten-
tion which is to make those taking part conscious of thinking as a 
process. Here the presentation of materials for such training is impor-
tant. It is arguable that to benefit from this type of programme subjects 
require an understanding of the underpinning principles of thought if they 
are to avoid becoming engrossed in the details of presentation. "All 
leaves are orange" could be a generally agreed assumption for a logical 
discussion; however, to be freed from the absurdity of such a statement, 
some knowledge of logical argument might be essential. This problem 
would seem to be particularly acute when children are the subjects. It 
is not perceived as a problem in work aimed at older subjects, when one 
might assume a certain consciousness of thinking processes and of principles. 
de Bono, E. (1970a) The Thinking Class. P.25 
de Bono, E. (1970b) The Five Day Course in Thinking. 
de Bono, E. (1973) CoRT Thinking Programmes. 
Crutchfield (1966 and 1969) has, at different times, attempted to 
train in this area (PLATE 55). His concern has been largely with what 
one might term fluency as opposed to acceleration: 
"... regardless of whether or not specific training can sig-
nificantly speed up the time at which the various cognitive 
capacities emerge, it seems clear to us that the ability to 
use these capacities efficiently and effectively at any given 
stage of development can benefit substantially from direct 
training." (1969) P.68. 
Overemphasis, in current education, on the known, with little attempt 
to enable students to cope with the unknown, is a concern of these 
authors. Both studies involving Crutchfield used the Productive Thinking 
Programme (1969, with modifications and additions). Again, the criticism 
might be - to what extent is the student able to disentangle the purposes 
and principles underpinning the programme from the comic-strip like 
presentation of much of it (see PLATE 55). It is believed that a certain 
grasp of such aims and principles is essential. 
James Adams (1974) like previous researchers, shows concern to 
make individuals conscious of their thinking. He maintains that: 
"The process of consciously identifying conceptual blocks, takes 
one quite a distance towards overpowering them." P.75 
Like de Bono, Adams considers different types of thinking, and 
further, he examines different types of "blocks" to creative output, 
mainly perceptual, cultural and emotional; however, unlike de Bono, he 
would seem to regard the 'perceiver' as the one who must identify his 
own "Blocks" - in other words, such identifications and training require 
a certain level of cognitive maturity. 
Crutchfield, R. and Covington, M. et al (1966) The Productive Thinking 
 
Programme. Berkeley. 
Crutchfield, R. and Olton, R. (1969) "Developing the skill of productive 
thinking" in: Trends and Issues in Developmental Psychology, Mussen, P. 
and Langer, J. et al, Berkeley. P.68. 
Adams, J. (1974) Conceptual Blockbusting. P.75. 
• 
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If creativity is about novel ways of apprehending and interpreting 
realities any training programme must take note of the subject's ability, 
to comprehend the realities under consideration. Apart from such neces-
sary cognitive maturity a training programme must provide opportunities/ 
for a subject to view realities from different standpoints. Put very 
simply, and with reference to the training undertaken here, a subject 
needs to realise, at his own level, that a square can be re-organised to 
make a number of triangles that these same triangles can contribute to 
a larger triangle and so on. An important element here can be that of 
perceptual shift and re-interpretation (PLATE 56). Koffka (1936) dis-
cussing problem-solving says on this: 
9... at first the problem cannot be solved, later on it can. 
The transformation which takes place in such cases implies as 
a rule that trace systems at first out of communication with 
the present processes are brought into communication with it." 
(P.615) 
Koffka goes on to illustrate by means of a joke, how an individual 
can fail to make use of information even when confronted by it. Until 
he apprehends it differently - until the appropriate trace system is con-
tacted - he cannot re-interpret, and only the most superficial response 
is possible. The joke well illustrates both aspects: 
"A asks B: 'What did Noah say when he heard the rain patter on 
on the roof?' 
B does not know the answer so A has to tell him, 'Ark!' 
A little later B puts the same question to C who also has to 
be supplied with the answer. 
B explains: IListent." (P.615) 
In some of the pre-pilot work for the training schedule, this same 
problem was encountered - and of course it is found in final results. 
Koffka, K. (1936) Principles of Gestalt Psychology. P.615. 
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Items from Witkin's Embedded Figures Test showing 
varying degrees of "embeddedness". 
PLATE 56  
Koffka points out that. not all 'total situations' interfere 
with or obliterate the shape of a special part. Gestalt 
Psychologists have attempted to explain the factors 
governing such organisations. In re-structuring or 
'creativity-type' tasks, a subject needs to be able to 
focus and re-focus upon the problem. An aim of creativity 
training could be to enable subjects to perceive and to 
re-interpret differently. 
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One subject (see Appendix II) did not at first realise that the block of 
flats could be conceived of as units. He was given this information 
(verbally and figurally), and to some limited extent he was able to act 
upon it, but not fully. It would seem that when an individual arrives 
at such re-definitions himself, there accompanies such re-definitions 
a grasp of the structural implications and possibilities. The question 
remains how does this come about and how open is it to experimental 
manipulation. Koffka continuing with this line of thought, talks of the 
notion of "embeddedness" and explains that: 
"A trace strongly embedded in a trace system is less available 
for a new process than a trace loosely embedded." (1936) 
How to 'loosen' a trace is of importance to creativity training. The 
concept of "embeddedness" is well illustrated in Witkin's Test, and it 
is clear that the surrounding context - in this instance, visual - plays 
a role in the visibility of the trace. It is believed that if a subject 
adequately understood the structure of a reality he would be less per-
suaded by context and more capable of an objective structural examination 
of the phenomenon under consideration. It is true that perceptual shifts 
can be chance events, but an understanding of the shift requires some 
understanding of the structure of a newly interpreted structure. New 
relationships develop from new emphases and interpretations. In the first 
part of this research it became evident that subjects able to perceive 
stimuli from numerous viewpoints were able to produce more varied and 
more numerous combinations. This is not to say that they were more or 
less creative as such, but that their field for the creative process would 
be wider. 
Koffka. K. (1936) Principles of Gestalt Psychology. P. 615. 
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Frog this review, it can be seen that creativity training has 
focussed on different aspects of the creative process. Some schedules 
have paid little attention to the subject's cognitive ability (or 
'intelligence'), others have concerned themselves with perceptual 
shifts, and yet others with non-evaluative environments. Only a com-
prehensive approach, which attempts to pay attention to these several 
dimensions can hope to offer a comprehensive solution. The first 
section of this research attempted to offer a more comprehensive 
explanation of creative ability. On the basis of that definition and 
in the hope of understanding it yet more fully a training schedule is 
undertaken. 
Chapter 9 
EXPERIMENT AND PROCEDURE (2) 
In the following section the rationale and 
aims of this second part of the research are 
set out. This is followed by a description 
of the sample and of general preparation. 
There then follows a description and explanation 
of the tasks after which pilot work and the 
method of constructing assessment categories 
is presented. It is felt that pilot work, and 
consequent adjustments due to such, will be 
better understood if the finished tasks are 
presented first. 
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INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE 
A major assumption of researchers such as Osborn (1953) is that 
a lack of fluency in creative output stems mainly from variables which 
are more nearly personality type variables than from variables of a 
cognitive type. 	 Whilst the current intention is not to underplay the 
importance of such personality dimensions, it is argued that cognitive 
variables are of prime importance. Unless an individual has understand-
ing of the problem in hand, the use of non-evaluative techniques, etc. 
cannot bring about such understanding, though they may encourage a flow 
of responses of sorts. 
Comments such as these force a return to starting concepts of 
creativity. Creative ability is here understood to be about transfor-
mations of reality, but a distinction is made between the kinds of trans-
formations which show little or no understanding of the phenomena involved, 
and those transformations which stem from an adequate grasp of the initial 
items or events. True transformations require understanding. Fluency 
therefore can only be regarded as genuine fluency if the subjects under-
stand the objects or events to be transformed and more, their own trans-
formations of the objects or events. Fluency training, which is usually 
about attempting to increase easy expression and output, cannot therefore 
be separated from training schedules which attempt td increase understand-
ing. Ultimately, training cannot be separated from the cognitive 
capabilities of the individuals involved. 
Fluency training must therefore involve the following: 
1. 	 the establishment of the operational level of the subject(s) concerned; 
Osborn, A.F. (1953) Applied Imagination: Principles and Procedures of 
Creative Thinking. 
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2. 	 the subject(s) need to become familiar with the subject or area 
under consideration according to their level of operational ability; 
	
3, 	 the construction and presentation of tasks must relate to the 
operational level of the subject(s). Subjects characterised by concrete 
operational thinking, for instance, are not likely to be able to imagine  
(accurately and with implication) the consequences of factors X and Y 
being removed from a given situation. 
SPECIFIC AIM  
With these considerations in mind and in the light of findings in 
the first part of this research, an attempt was made to consider the 
effects of training in relation to the operational ability of the subjects 
involved, and to look at this in terms of understanding and fluency. 
The training programme is divided into three parts: 
a) a set of tasks which serve as a pre—test establishing the level 
of ability of the subjects; 
b) a training session involving a set of tasks based on the structures 
and principles employed in the pre—test and eventual post—test, the aim 
of which is to familiarise the subjects with the structures in question; 
c) a post—test, based on the structures employed in the pre—test and 
the actual training session, 
THE SAMPLE  
100 subjects were involved in the pre—test in the second part of 
this research. They were drawn from three London Primary schools with 
similar catchment areas. Most of the subjects fall into Social Classes 
3 and 4 (Registrar General's Classification). 
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No subjects involved in Part 1 of the research were involved at 
Part 2. The main reason being that a number of the children were now very 
friendly towards the Examiner, and it was felt that this might affect 
their attitudes towards the tasks. Also, there was some task similarity 
between Parts 1 and 2 of the research. The subjects were selected 
according to the method employed in part one of the research (see Chapter 
4 for rationale). Teachers were asked to rate the children, in the age 
groups concerned, on the same 5 point scale as follows: 
below average just average average rood average above average 
Each subject had to be selected as "good average" by at least two of the 
three teachers known to the child. Lists for the ratings were again com- 
piled from the school registers. The first 40 children rated as "good 
average" from Primary School 1 were selected, and the first 30 from each 
of the other two Primary Schools were next selected. The percentages of. 
subjects selected across the three schools were arbitrary and administratively 
convenient. 
As the second part of the research included no verbal items, no 
reading scores were taken into account as in Part 1. In all the 100 sub-
jects were grouped as follows: 
25 girls in the 7-8 year old group 
25 boys in the 7-8 year old group 
25 girls in the 9-10 year old group 
25 boys in the 9-10 year old group 
This age range was selected because findings in Part 1 of the research 
suggested that these subjects were likely to have difficulties in 
transforming structures and objects and the aim of the training was to 
examine further these difficulties and to attempt to induce improvement. 
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All the subjects so far described tockpart in the pre—test. There 
were adjustments to thesample for the training session in the light of 
the performance of these subjects on the pre—test, for clearly the pre—
test acted as a kind of selector for the training, and subjects "passing" 
the pre—test were dropped from the sample. Selection for the training 
was as follows: 
a) in the case of the youngest group (7-8 year olds) the first forty 
subjects (20 boys and 20 girls) were selected. As all of this age 
group failed to carry out the pre—test tasks concerned with re—structuring 
(with one exception), this was a straightforward procedure. 
b) in the case of the older age group (9-10 year olds) the first subjects 
to fail the re—structuring tasks were selected, but because of a slightly 
higher pass rate on the pre—test re—structuring tasks in this group, 3 
extra girls and 2 extra boys were added to the intitial sample. They were 
simply selected by the teachers, according to the usual selection procedure 
(i.e. rated on a five point scale, then pre—tested). In fact, only 3 
extra girls had to be selected, but 3 boys had to be selected as one of 
the additional subjects also passed the pre—test. It should be pointed 
out that when results are reported in tables and profiles, the subject's 
original sample numbers are used. In the older group (9-10 years) the 
numbers are not in sequence because some, as explained, were dropped from 
the sample. Further, subjects added to the sample are denoted by * in 
all such tables. 
PREPARATION AND PROCEDURE 
After children had been selected, an explanation of the research was 
given to staff. The children were told that I was interested in puzzles 
— and wanted to find out more about them. They were asked, in their class 
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groups, if they would like to help me. Staff then selected as if for 
the first time, children who had been formerly selected. No child in 
the sample refused to come or showed any reluctance to do so. They 
were assured that the work was not a test, that it had nothing to do 
with school and would not be discussed with their teachers. 
In two schools, the school library room was used, in the third 
school a small interview room was used. Including pre-assessment, 
training and post-assessment, the time spent on each subject was, on 
average, one hour. 
THE TASKS (part 2) 
Two structures only were selected for this training aspect: 
a square and a triangle 
In keeping with the rationale, the intention was to allow each subject 
the maximum opportunity to explore both of these structures, to change 
their shapes, to anticipate their changes, in other words, to encourage 
them to 'know' operationally. On the basis of a firm understanding, it 
is believed that fluency with a given structure will become a possibility. 
Pask (1976) argues on the basis of his own previous research that: 
"Concepts that are understood... (i.e. for which the learner 
has given an explanation and a derivation) are, in fact, 
stable." 
Pask also argues that a conversational system of instruction is important 
in contributing to this stability for it forces the learner to make 
explicit their learning strategy (ibid). Though Pask's work had not 
Pabk, G. (1976) "Styles and strategies of learning", Br.J. of Ed.Psy. 46  
PP 128-48. 
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been encountered at this stage, the same considerations were in mind 
both in the construction of the tasks and the method of administering 
them. 
In general, there were two types of task, distinct but related: 
tasks where subjects were required to interpret and re-interpret 
a given structure in several ways; 
b) tasks where subjects were required to re-interpret a given structure, 
and on the basis of such interpretations to form a new structure from the 
component parts of the initial structure. 
There was no strict time limit for any part of the schedule, though 
generally, on average, each subject took about one hour to carry out all 
three parts of the training session. 
There is standardisation of tasks and of task questions. Likewise 
the training session itself was standardised in terms of the tasks 
presented and the aid given, though, in addition, the strategies and 
questions of each child were followed up. 
The subjects were allowed two trials on most tasks, more on some 
particular tasks, though the first trial was usually the only trial 
scored. Further trials were encouraged to allow a greater chance of 
exploration of the structures under consideration. 
THE TASKS AND UNDERPINNING PRINCIPLES  
In the first part of this research, eight main principles were 
proposed and assumed to underpin all creative transformations of reality. 
The tasks in this second part are based on those same principles as 
follows: 
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Pre-Test 	 Principle(s) 	 Task Sheet  
Task 1 
	
Apprehension and re-definition 	 (PLATE 57) 
Task 2 	 Addition to an identity 	 (PLATE 58) 
Task 3 	 Apprehension and re-structuring 	 (PLATE 59) 
Task 4 	 Apprehension and re-structuring 
Training Tasks  
Tasks 1 and 2 	 As for tasks 3 and 4 above. 
Post-Test Tasks  
Task 1 
Task 2 
Task 3 
Task 4 
Apprehension and re-definition 
Addition to an identity 
Apprehension and re-structuring 
Apprehension and re-structuring 
(PLATE 6o) 
(PLATE 61) 
(PLATE 62) 
(PLATE 63) 
PRE-TEST TASKS  
Task 1: Shape Recognition (task sheet overleaf) 
This task was concerned with apprehension and re-apprehension. 
Solutions could come about by means of perceptual shifts and emphases, 
or through the ability of subjects to consider each component part of 
the structure in relation to the next. 
All subjects were aided on the first item to introduce them to the 
logic of the task. The first diamond shape (the required response) was 
shaded in, with or for them. It was also established that they understood 
what was intended by a diamond and a triangle shape. Before the second 
item (b) in this task the following Practice Task was given: 
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PRE-TEST. Item 1. 	 PLATE 57  
shade this in so that you have: 
a. 2 diamond shapes. 
b. a triangle with 2 triangles inside. 
c. a triangle with a diamond shape inside. 
d. a triangle with 4 triangles inside. 
e. a square with 8 triangles inside. 
Ss. were given the possibility of two trials for each task. 
There were 10 presentations of the above figure on the test 
sheet. 
"Now this is a triangle" 
"This is a triangle with three triangles inside of it" 
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"Which are the three? 
Show me." 
"Now, looking at these shapes (page 366) I want you to find a triangle 
with only two triangles inside of it." 
The task was a pencil and paper task. 
Task 2: Elaboration (see over for test sheet) 
This task is concerned to examine the subjects ability to anticipate 
change in an identity and to extend identities. It relates to Piagetian 
investigations into concepts such as 'hindsight' and 'foresight' 
(Inhelder and Piaget, 1964, P.196). Such concepts require a certain 
level of operational stability, the need to be able to understand the 
essentials of a structure and to retain a fairly stable concept of that 
structure both in terms of what it is and of what it could become. 
Inhelder, B. and Piaget, J. (1964) The -Early Growth of Logic in the Child. 
368. 
PRE-TEST. Item 2. 
	 PLATE 58  
add to this so that you have: 
a. 2 squares. 
b. 6 triangles . all the same. 
c. 8 squares. 
Ss. were allowed the possibility of two trials for each task. 
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Subjects were given two trials for each task and a certain amount 
of concrete experimentation was possible. To introduce them to the 
task the following trial item was used: 
"If I gave you the following lines - what would you have to add 
to them to turn them into two circles?" 
Subjects were given help if needed. 
"Fine, now I'm going to show you more lines." 
The Examiner then continued according to Plate 58. (see previous 
page). 
Task 3: 
This is a pre- and post-test task. Essentially the task is con-
cerned with apprehension and with re-structuring on the basis of what 
is apprehended. Unless the subject is capable of perceiving the struc-
ture in terms of the related units comprising it, he will not be able to 
re-structure. Similarly, if the subject fails to make figure-ground 
discriminations, difficulty will be experienced in fitting in the parts 
as follows: 
(see page 371 for illustration). 
PRE-TEST. Item 3. 	 PLATE 59  
370. 
How could you fit all of the small triangles into one of 
the large triangles. Draw them in to show how they would 
look. 
Ss. were given the possibility of'6 trials for this task. 
371. 
There is a tendency for certain 
triangles to become !figure'. 
However, the task is possible 
only if 'ground' triangles are 
counted. A sound grasp of iden-
tity and structure could enable 
subjects to overcome such 
perceptual persuasions. 
The explanation of the task was varied slightly according to the 
age group: 
e.g. 7 year old subjects: "Now this is rather like a jigsaw puzzle. 
Here you have nine small triangles. All of these small triangles fit 
into one of these triangles (points) - they will go in if you put them 
in the right way. I'd like you to draw on this big triangle here, 
showing how the small triangles will look when they are all fitted in 
... yes the nine small ones all fitted into this one here." 
Item 4:  
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This is a pre- and post-test item concerned with apprehension of 
the units comprising the structure - and with re-structuring. .Subjects 
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were presented with a sheet on which there was a diagram identical to 
the above and space for drawing. It was explained as follows: 
"Now, on this sheet there is a picture of a block of flats. 
I'm going to ask you if you will change the SHAPE of this block of 
flats in some way. 
Now there is one main (big) rule — you can only use the blocks 
and the windows shown on the picture. You have to use all of these 
pieces and you cannot add anything — you cannot add doors or windows 
— just use what you see here but in a different way. 
Questions of clarification were allowed. 
THE TRAINING TASKS 
 
The Triangle Task  
It is perhaps important to state that the training experience is 
"concrete" in that the subjects are given flat card pieces (jig-saw style) 
of the structures to be handled. 
There is no set time limit and the aim is to work with each child 
until such point as the individual is able to master the tasks with the 
aids provided. 
When it is clear that the child cannot carry out the tasks, prompts 
are given and the child is required to repeat the task until he can do 
it alone. The child is asked to explain what he is doing and why. 
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The tasks have their own sub—logic — for example: 
In Task 1, the child is required to make 4 triangles out of 8 pieces. 
He is then required to make two triangles out of these four. 
The subject may of course not realise this sub—logic. 
An example of the type of prompt given may help: 
In item 3 of this first training item, in constructing the large triangle 
from all of the pieces — after the child has explored without success — 
the following base is provided: 
Then: "What goes in here? How?" 
Then: "What goes on 
This is repeated as needed. 
Task 1: 
Materials — 9 equilateral (or right/left angled) triangles, made in 
thick card. 
Actual size — 
Aim — that by carrying out given tasks, subjects might become more 
aware of the different ways of structuring these same pieces. 
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Items: 
1. Make four triangles, each one the same (material = 8 pieces). 
2. Make two triangles, each one the same (materials = 8 pieces). 
* 3. Make one big traingle using all the pieces (materials = 9 pieces). 
(subject is reminded of pre-task 3 where he had to draw this.) 
4. Make two squares - each one the same (materials = 8 pieces). 
5. Make them into one big square using all the pieces (materials = 8 
pieces. 
6. Make one big traingle using all the pieces (materials = 9 pieces). 
Time: 
No set time limit. Varied according to the understanding of each child. 
* repeated until grasped by the child. 
Task 2: House Task  
For this task, the subject was presented with 20 flat cards, each 
about 1" x 1", (jigsaw style). The cards, when assembled, represented 
the building (flat) used in the pre-test task. The subjects were asked 
to note this fact. 
The Examiner began by putting the pieces together to make the flat 
— 5 blocks high, 4 blocks across. The Examiner then questioned the 
child as follows: 
Item (a) 
"Now you take these pieces and make this block of flats into two blocks. 
Make each block look different in some way." 
Item (b) 
"Now (having returned to the original construction of a block of flats) 
could you change the shape of this building in some way... look, you 
could do this for a start... (an example given)" 
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Item (c) 
"Could you build a building with these pieces so that there are four 
blocks on the ground floor, and two on the very top floor. You can do 
whatever you like in between." 
Item d) 
"Could you build the building so that there is an archway through the 
building and so that the trop floor has six blocks across." 
Item e) 
"What else could you do with them?" 
Further explorations were encouraged. 
POST TEST TASKS  
Tasks 1 and 2 (see overleaf) were essentially the same as the pre-test 
tasks. They were included in this post-test: 
a) to provide some 'interference' between the training experience 
and assessment of that experience. The intention was to try to reduce 
or avoid rote memorisation of structures. 
b) to provide further experience with the two main structures under 
investigation. 
Responses were not scored. 
Tasks 3 and 4 (see over) were the same tasks as employed in both the pre-
test and the training session, based on the triangle and house structures. 
The intention was to see if the limited amount of training could enable 
the subjects either to improve on these tasks or to succeed. Before each 
of these tasks, subjects were reminded of their training session with 
the jig-saw-like pieces. 
POST TEST. Itema.. 	 PLATE 6o 
shade this in so that you have: 
a. a shape like a house. 
b. a shape like two houses. 
c. another shape like two houses. 
Se. were given the possibility of two trialifor each task. 
POST TEST. 	 Item :•' ,,  
add to this so that you have: 
a. 2 squares and 2 triangles. 
b. 8. triangles. 
c. 1 square, with 4 triangles inside of it. 
Se. were given two trials for each task. 
.• 	 stow So 
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Pretest 	 and Post-test Task as required. (Item 3 in POST TEST). 
PLATE 61  
How could you fit all of the small triangles into one of the 
large triangles. Draw them in to show how they would look. 
As in the pre-test Ss. were given the possibility of ,6 trials for 
this task. 
'579. 
POST TEST. Item 4. 
	 PLATE 62  
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Now here is a drawing of a block of flats. I would 
like you to change the shape of this block of flats 
in some way. 
You have to use everything shown on the picture here OM 
you can't miss anything out, and you can't add anything 
either. 
Just change the shape using everything in the picture. 
Task  
This is a transfer task. The intention was to distinguish between 
improvement (which might be exhibited on Tasks 3 and 4 above) based on 
noting of facts and memorisation, and improvement based upon a grasp 
of the essential principles underlying the tasks. 
The transfer task is a re-structuring problem. 
See PLATE 63 over page. 
380. 
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POST TEST. Task 5. (transfer) 	 PLATE 63  
The above diagram (actual size) was presented to the 
child with the following instructions: 
This is a drawing of the top of a table. I would like 
you to change the SHAPE of this table top in some way - 
it can be any shape you like but you can only use the 
pieces shown on the diagram here. You can't add anything 
to the drawing and you can't take anything away. 
How many pieces are there on here? 
This latter question was put, and explanations were 
given until the child replied "eight pieces" 
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PRE-PILOT AND PILOT WORK (2) 
Pre-Pilot Work (see Appendix II for details of these pre-pilot sessions) 
As in Part 1 of the research, the main aim of the pre-pilot work was 
to enable the researcher to better formulate problems for further inves-
tigation. Six subjects were involved in this pre-pilot work: 3 in the 
7-8 age range and 3 in the 9-10 age range. There were three boys and 
three girls - the children came from the same primary schools as those 
involved in the second part of the research, but they did not take part 
in pilot work or in the main assessment. They were selected on teacher 
ratings, as previously used here. The main intention was to attempt to 
understand the kinds of problems, and the reasons behind the problems, 
that the younger child has in understanding and transforming identities. 
The house task, used in Part 1 of the research was used in the pilot work. 
Working with the house task in its initial form, led to a change of 
technique in presentation as a result of the problems encountered, and 
to the use of jig-saw-like pieces, as already described in the explanation 
of the tasks for Part 2. The pilot work revealed that the most fundamental 
problem was that of the child's initial perception of a structure and his 
inability to re-apprehend it in different terms. Further, when another 
interpretation was pointed out, the child was able to note this re-
interpretation but he was not able to act upon it. 
Pilot Work  
Six subjects took part in the pilot work - the group being of the 
same composition as that for pre-pilot work and selected in the same 
manner. These subjects simply worked through the items used in the second 
part of the research. The purpose of the pilot work was to enable the 
researcher to construct categories for the assessment of the tasks, to 
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come to terms with the conversational method employed, and to seek for 
any inconsistencies or problems prior to commencing the main work. The 
pilot findings were not included in the final results. 
CATEGORIES FOR ASSESSMENT (Part 2) 
As with Part 1 of the research, the categories resulted from obser-
vation of the responses of subjects in both pre-pilot and pilot work and 
in the light of responses in the first part of the research. The focus 
in this second part was less on a search for detailed explanatory 
categories but rather on success and failure and the reasons for such. 
Task 1: Shape Recognition (pre- and post- Tasks) 
There were 5 items in the pre-test presentation of this task. Help 
was given with the first item, leaving four to be tackled by the subject. 
A subject was allowed to fail one item only. A subject who passed 3/4 
was regarded as having passed that item. 
In the post-test presentation of this task, there were three items 
and the subject was required to satisfy at least two of these in order to 
pass the task. Two trials were allowed for each item but after permitted 
experimentation, only the first formal attempt was scored. 
Task 2: Elaboration  
In both the pre- and post-test presentations of this task, there 
were three items and the subject was required to satisfy at least 2/3 to 
pass the task. Again, two trials were allowed and a certain amount of 
experimentation was allowed, but only the first formal attempt was scored. 
As already explained, the purpose of the second attempt was to enable the 
subject to become more familiar with the structure, with guidance if 
necessary. 
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Task 3: Re-structuring (1) 
In both the pre- and post-test presentations, six trials were 
allowed for this task because of its assumed difficulty and because it was 
to be one of the central tasks on the training programme. Again, a 
certain amount of experimentation was allowed but only the first or 
second formal effort was scored. Subsequent trials were used for 
experience. In actual fact, no subjects in the younger group 
scorefton this task and only a limited few in the older group did so. 
Task 4: Re-structuring (2) 
In both the pre- and post-test presentations of this task, each 
subject was allowed to experiment in advance. Only the first or second 
formal presentation was scored. Subsequent attempts were solely to aid 
experience and understanding. Again, successes were few. 
Task 5: Transfer  
This task was scored on a pass/fail basis. 
SCORING 
As the categories employed here were quite definite and less open 
to the kind of subjectivity that could affect scoring, no panel of 
raters was employed. 
Chapter 10 
A CONSIDERATION OF THE FINDINGS 
In this section there is a descriptioncf the 
findings, including illustrations, in relation 
to the theory underpinning the research. 
This is followed by statistical analysis of 
the findings, and further interpretation in 
the light of this analysis. 
335. 
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A question arising out of Part 1 and out of the pilot studies 
for Part 2 was that of facing individuals with facts — would such 
encounters bring them to a grasp of structural implications? It 
seems rather that when an individual arrives at definitions and re—
definitions himself there accompanies such definitions, a grasp of 
their structural implications and possibilities. 
The first two tasks of Part 2 of the research were concerned to 
discover more about ways in which children, at different levels of 
operational ability, apprehend and define structures. Both tasks are 
essentially convergent in nature in that subjects have to respond 
according to predetermined outcomes. In the first part of this study 
there were two similar tasks — both concerned with apprehension and 
with elaboration of structures — but both were divergent in that subjects 
could respond as they wished: the outcome was not defined for them. 
Amongst the observations noted then, it was seen that it was only by the 
age of 9 or 10 years that half of the subjects were able to identify a 
shape then draw, as opposed to drawing then naming after the event. This 
divergent task gave a further freedom to the subjects in that they were 
free to identify structures which they recognised and, as noted, the 
younger subjects tended to identify more obvious structures and less 
complex ones, especially in terms of the amount of stimulus lines used. 
The intention in Part 2 was to look at what might be termed 'deliberate 
or conscious' re—structuring as opposed to chance 'recognitions' and 
chance re—structurings. For this purpose, subjects were presented with 
simple structures (squares and triangles) and asked to group and re—group 
them to produce different forms. In other words, to apprehend them 
differently for each of the task items. 
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SCORES ON PRE-TEST ITEM  
(Numbers of subjects passing in initial sample of 100 subjects 
for Part 2) 
Item 1 	 Item 2 	 Item 3 	 Item 4 
Recognition 	 Elaboration 	 Re-structuring 1 	 Re-structuring 2 
7-8 years 7-8 years 7-8 years 7-8 years 
5/25 (girls) 5 (girls) 0 (girls) 1 	 (girls) 
4/25 (boys) 5 (boys) 0 (boys) 0 (boys) 
•n••n••n•n••••••••••••••••••••nn•n•nn••nnn•n••••••nnnn•nn•••••••n•••n•n 	 .mii.M.••••••nnnn•nnMal•nn•=6.11•1••••• 111 	 INIBM111.1i 
9-10 years 	 9-10 years 	 9-10 .ears 	 9-10 years  
21/25 (girls) 	 11 (girls) 	 8 (girls) 	 8 (girls) 
20/25 (boys) 	 12 (boys) 	 7 (boys) 	 6 (boys) 
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn nONnnnnnnnnn•FOONNOMMn 
Totals 
50 	 33 	 15 	 15 
Totals are on a possible 100. 
Figures do not include extra subjects in 9-10 year age band for the 
training programme. 
Subjects succeeding on items 3 and/or 4 were not included in the train-
ing programme which was based upon these items. 
SHAPE RECOGNITION TASK 1  
This task is essentially concerned with apprehension and re-apprehension 
- the realisation that forms and events can be constructed and re-
constructed. to produce different outcomes. 
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There was a practice task and a further explanatory task to ensure 
that the child could grasp the intention of the questions. Of the 
younger age group (7-8 years) only nine on a possible 50 subjects (i.e. 
pre-test sample size) accomplished this task successfully as opposed to 
41 out of the possible 50 in the 9-10 age group. 
This younger age group appeared to have great difficulty in 
following the stimulus lines and would make comments such as: 
"I saw it - now it's gone" and 
"Oh, it's a lot of diamonds 	 I thought it was„." 
In general, they seemed very vulnerable to perceptual shifts and 
impressions, with little control over their perceptual insights, unlike 
the older group who attempted to 'follow through the lines' and who 
illustrated some ability to search and to assess the parts, both 
independently and in relation. 
Apart from this problem, the younger age group failed generally to 
focus upon the double aspects of the questions: 
e.g. "I would like you to find a triangle with two triangles 
inside of it. Only two remember." 
In general, the younger age group either selected two triangles 
(not inside of a triangle), a triangle and another two triangles, or 
found a triangle with more than one triangle in. As illustrated on the 
following page, attainment of one solution seemed to prevent them from 
proceeding to another - especially when structures were similar. 
a) "a triangle with a diamond 	 b) a triangle with two triangles 
inside of it and two triangles. 	 inside of it. 
Having arrived at solution (a) or having been presented with this 
solution, subjects in the 7-8 years age group were generally unable 
to re-construct it. They were unable to understand that the same form 
could be reconstructed by adding a line to form "a triangle with four 
triangles inside of it". Suggestions to this effect were Generally cantamdly 
comments such as: "but I've just used that for this question". Some-
times they tried to avoid this problem of their own invention by moving 
to another section of the square - identical in structure - and working 
there. 
The same difficulties were encountered in problem (b). Most 
younger subjects were uncertain that form (b) could become a "triangle 
with four triangles inside of it by the addition of two lines. 
"A square with only 8 triangles 
inside of it." girl: 7-8 years. 
When asked about the 'other triangles' 
the subject clearly failed to grasp 
the point of the question. The 
triangles were pointed out. The 
subject's reply was that they were 
not part of her picture. 
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Subjects in the younger age group (with the exception of 9/50) had 
great difficulty in re-defining the structure before them in this task. 
More importantly, they did not seem to realise that the same structure 
could be re-interpreted. 
Older subjects who were generally more successful on the task (41/50) 
approached the problems knowing that there could be different construc-
tions and seeking them. This was evidenced by the ways in which they 
tuxned the paper around, hid parts of the pattern with pieces of paper 
to arrive at another form, and mentally traced the lines extending them 
to other possibilities. It would seem that the youngest group was 
hindered by a profound difficulty: that of not fully grasping the fact 
that re-constructions were a possibility, whereas the older children had 
problems which stemmed more from lack of flexibility, set, etc. 
The implications for any kind of creative behaviour are clear. 
A fundamental requirement is the realisation that a thing can become 
something else. This realisation implies a structural grasp of the 
event or object, and will affect the ways in which the problem is approached. 
A second requirement is that of availability/flexibility of ideas (a. 
content versus a structural problem) with regard to what the thing could 
become. 	 In terms of training for creativity, these are two distinct 
problemsrequiring and leading to different methods and outcomes respec-
tively. A grasp of the first issue - the realisation that a thing could 
be 'other' involves an understanding of knowledge itself; the second is 
a matter of leading subjects to an awareness of the kinds of transfor-
mations possible. In the second case, an individual might be hindered by 
factors such as set, habits, illusions, etc. In the first instance, he 
is hindered by a lack of operational knowing. 
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Re-structurings leading to 'creative' outcomes require a further 
condition: the realisation that re-structurings could lead to a 
form not yet 'recognised' and 'known' as a distinct identity. 
Thus, the creative knower must approach issues aware of their struc-
tures, of the possible variations and of the 'yet to be recognised 
structures'. If an individual is incapable of realising that a 
structure can become another structure, if he is unable to recognise 
a named known structure embedded within a total structure, he is not 
likely to structure new events and objects which are equally embedded 
in what is known, which cannot be defined in advance, and which have 
yet to be recognised as identities per se. It would seem from obser-
vations here, that the concrete operational knower has enough cognitive 
organisation to know an identity, to reverse, and re-structure that 
identity in concrete forms. But he is tied to the concrete forms and 
to the definitions such forms impose upon the concrete knower (e.g. 
a triangle made up of 9 smaller triangles can be seen only as being 
composed of 9 smaller triangles, 	 It is the formal operational knower 
who can more readily grasp that it could equally be made up of diamond 
shapes and of triangles or of smaller triangles, etc.) Piaget has 
shown frequently how the relational dimension of events and objects 
escape the concrete knower (e.g. Piaget, 1928). Until he can escape 
from this stage he cannot know the "what is" in terms of the "what 
could be". Indeed his grasp of the "what is" would seem to be 
inadequate for things and events can be more fully understood by 
contrast if they can be known over and against what they could have 
been or could become. 
Piaget, J. (1928) The Judgement and Reasoning of the Child. 
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ELABORATION TASK  
In Part 1 of this research project an Elaboration Task was 
included, but there, in keeping with the intentions subjects were 
encouraged to elaborate freely. However, it was noticed amongst the 
younger subjects that not only did the task provide problems, but 
also many younger subjects elaborated without knowing what their 
elaboration was to be. The matter of being able to anticipate a form 
is one of interest here. It is seen as an aspect of 'knowing' - of 
potential identity. Here therefore, subjects are required to 
elaborate in certain ways to see if they can make such anticipations. 
This proved to be a much more difficult task. Only 10/50 of the 
7-8 year olds were able to 'pass' on the item and only 23/50 of the 
9-10 year olds. In nature, this task is more abstract than the previous 
one as only part of the evidence is before the subjects. They are 
required to provide the remainder. Because they were allowed two 
attempts some chance of concrete exploration (diagrams) was possible 
but did not prove to be of any real help. Errors common to both age 
groups were: 
a) ignoring the partial structure provided and drawing what was 
required without this structure; 
an inability to resist closure and simply join lines - point to 
point, irrespective of the instructions; 
o) difficulty in actually copying a completed structure when provided. 
Subjects in both age groups anticipated badly the effects of their 
own drawings. Strictly speaking, this task needs the abilities of the 
formal operational thinker for the elaborating requires that the subject 
go beyond the immediate information, and further, because the task is 
d. "eight squares" 
Boy: 7:5. 
PLATE 64  
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a. stimulus lines. b. "two squares" 
c. "six triangles" c. "six triangles" 
d. "eight squares" 
Girl: 7:6. 
Responses typical of the majority of subjects 
in this age band. 
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convergent, he must know his direction in advance. Free elaborations 
can allow a subject to extend freely and aimlessly, naming objects 
after the event (see first half of study). 
Piaget (1956) is concerned largely with what Flavell (1975) terms 
"space representation" as opposed to'bpace perception". Dodwell (1968) 
commenting on the distinction in different terms writes: 
"Piaget makes a perfectly reasonable distinction between 
perceived space and conceived space: whereas a quite young 
child may be able to distinguish perceptually between , say, 
a square and a circle, this does not mean that the child 
can conceptualise this difference or marshall the operations 
which are necessary for making anything more than a percep- 
tual distinction." 
	 (P.119) 
This became obvious in the Elaboration Task here. All of the children 
in the sample were familiar with the square as a structure in that all 
could make perceptual distinctions. Many, however, had problems in 
developing a partial structure into a square, and could not anticipate 
the lines of direction, could not conceive of the completed square. 
Even in the 9-10 year old group only 23/50 were able to 'pass' this 
item. Until a child can conceive of a form he cannot re-conceive of 
it and he cannot therefore act upon it in a potentially creative 
manner. 
Piaget, J. and Inhelder, B. (1956) The Child's Conception of Space. 
Flavell, J. (1975) The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget. 
Dodwell, P.C. (1968) "Children's understanding of spatial concepts" in: 
Logical Thinking in Children, Sigel and Hooper. P.119. 
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"8 squares" 
Attempts by girl 10:3. 
PLATE 65, 
"6 triangles" 
Within the 9 - 10 years age band less than half of the subjects 
were able to carry out this task with any accuracy. 
Attempts such as those illustrated on the right hand side of the 
page were still frequent within this age group. 
.....••n•n•••n•• orvii6 y.• • - 
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a. 
	 b. 
a. In spite of the initial example worked with all Ss. response a. 
was the immediate and most general response for the 7 - 8 year 
,old group, and given by about 1/3 of the older age group. It 
was only on completing their response that such Ss. then 
wondered about the second square. 
b. This example shows two attempts, typical of the 9 - 10 years 
group, to turn the initial structure into two squares. Ss. were 
aware that the structure would have to extend in some way, but 
found it hard to see how. When shown the correct solution, they 
still found it hard to anticipate the direction of the extended 
lines, and with the exception of 9/50 of this older age group, 
the remainder had to arrive at the solution by means of drawing 
a line, crossing it out then trying again. 
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TRIANGLE TASK (Pre-test: Re-structuring 1) 
This task was the first actual pre-test task on which, together 
with the subsequent task, subjects were selected for training. Only 
one of the 7-8 year olds carried out this task successfully and only 
15/50 of the 9-10 year olds did so. However, there were subjects in 
both groups who had a better grasp of the solution than others and who 
were able to understand that the nine triangles making up the one large 
triangle, would have to inter-relate. In the 7-8 year old age group 
15/50 did attempt to relate the component parts (8 girls, 7 boys) and 
in the older age group 17/50 (9 girls and 8 boys) related parts, in 
addition to the 15/50 who actually passed the task. 
One problem for those unable to relate the component parts was an 
inability to realise that the outer framework (i.e. the large triangle) 
would in fact form parts of the smaller triangles placed on its bases. 
For many of the younger subjects this outer triangle was approached as 
a separate structure. Some of the problems of failing to relate component 
parts are illustrated in a selection of diagrams of attempts on the 
following page. In some instances, there was considerable distortion 
of the component parts in an attempt to relate them. There was also, 
amongst all subjects failing to relate, poor handling of space (large 
spaces left) and what might be termed "figure-ground" problems. As 
anticipated, some subjects often failed to see that by creating 5 triangles 
they were in fact creating 7 traingles - for they were only regarding the 
5 as figure. They were confused when the 'extra triangles' were pointed 
out. The full implications of their own re-structurings were not always 
grasped. Those children who made no attempt to relate components parts 
sometimes announced that the problems were easy - and simply drew 9 
triangles in the large triangle - each triangle independent of the 
others and of the general structures 
girl 7:5. 2nd. attempt. 
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girl 8:1. 	 1st and 2nd attempts. 
girl 7:5. 1st attempt. 
boy 7:10. 2nd attempt. 
PLATE 66  
Attempts by Ss. in the younger age band to show how the 
nine smaller triangles would fit into the large triangle. 
No subject in this age band carried out the task 
correctly, though about a third of the age band made 
some attempt to relate the triangles to one another. 
(e.g. see above gir1:8:1) 
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PRE-TEST - THE HOUSE TASK  
This task is identical to that used in Part 1 of the study and 
little need be said therefore with regard to the quality of responses. 
It was used largely to select subjects for the training sessions. Of 
the total sample for Part 2 in the 7-8 year old age group only 1/50 
passed this task (a girl). In the older age group only 14/50 succeeded. 
There were, however, in addition to those who succeeded, subjects who 
managed to re-structure the problem, but on a non-unit basis - e.g. some-
times by turning the building longways, or by "cutting" a piece off and 
placing it elsewhere (5/50 such subjects - 3 girls and 2 boys). Both 
groups, but especially the younger subjects illustrated the errors found 
in Part 1 of this study. 
PRE-TEST AND POST-TEST PERFORMANCE ON TRAINING ITEMS  
Score in ( ) indicates pre-test scores. 
Score without ( ) indicates post-test scores. 
- = not applicable. 
Task Age 	 Fails Partial 	
Transfer 
Success Success Correct 
Re-construction 	 7-8 	 (40) 	 (11) 	 (0) 
(1) years 
36 	 15 	 4 	 2 
Re-construction 	 7-8 	 (40) 	 (4) 	 (0) 
(2) years 
32 	 1 	 8 	 2 
Re-construction 	 9-10 	 (40) 	 (21) 	 (0) 
(1) years 
17 	 13 	 23 	 15 
Re-construction 	 9-10 	 (40) 	 (9) 	 (o) 
(2) years 
12 	 4 	 28 	 15 
i) figures denote the number of subjects within any one category. 
ii) all scores are on a possible total of 40 within each age-group. 
A profile of each subject's entire performance on all tasks will be 
found in Appendix IV. 
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TRAINING - TRIANGLE TASK  
There were differences in operational ability between the two age 
groups who were to be trained. Of the younger age group only 11/40 
attempted to relate the triangles. 21 subjects made no attempt to do so 
in the pre-test. Of the older - 9-10 years age group 21/40 were relat-
ing the component parts in the pre-test. Obviously, none of the subjects 
for training had carried out the task wholly successfully. These dif-
ferences of "degree of success" are important and are reflected in the 
final training outcomes. Some subjects 'improved' as a result of 
training - as will be seen - but 'improvement' did not necessarily mean 
attainment of the correct solution or the ability to generalise the 
ability learnt to other similar tasks. 
From the actual training session - certain observations are of 
interest. Subjects were handed the 9 pieces (small triangles) composing 
the larger triangle which they scattered on the table. They were then 
asked to treat the pieces as a jig-saw and to make 4 triangles - using 
all 8 pieces. Only 6 subjects out of 80 (9-10 years group) counted and 
'organised' the pieces. Generally, there was no attempt made to work 
out how many pieces would be required to make each triangle. The second 
task was based upon the first task. It required subjects to make 2 
triangles using all the pieces (8 pieces). The same principle was 
required here as for task one - i.e. putting two triangles together. 
Generally, however, subjects began the second task with no 'mental model' 
of how to approach the problem. 
The central task - "now make one big triangle using all 9 pieces" 
was approached in the same way. Generally, the following was noticed: 
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a) no initial counting of the pieces; 
b) forgetting the shape towards which they were working; 
c) non-systematic examination of the parts, e.g. some subjects 
picked up other identical pieces of the structure in an attempt to 
find the solution. This latter behaviour was very typical of the 
younger age group. 
Other behaviours indicated a lack of systematic knowing. For 
instance, with the exception of one subject in the younger age group, 
all of these subjects would manipulate both triangles when trying to 
relate them - not realising that one had to be held constant (Cf. Piaget, 
- and experimental investigation). About half of the older age range 
showed this lack of systematisation. 
More than half of the younger subjects adopted a figural approach' 
to the triangle problem - outlining a triangle with the pieces - but not 
forming a triangle by inter-relating the component parts, e.g: 
a) a 'figural attempt at a 	 b) a 'figural' approach to 
triangle'. 	 a square. 
After a subject had constructed the triangle from the nine pieces 
(with or without help) he was required to study it, was asked how many 
pieces were on the base ("bottom line") etc. Subjects were required 
to repeat tasks, and especially this triangle task - until they could 
do them with ease. Further tasks were given (see test outline) then 
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there was a return to the triangle task. Some of the younger subjects 
showed hesitation on a return to this task and approached it clearly 
trying to remember a structure but not always clear as to what it was. 
In a number of instances (9/40) during the training, the younger 
subjects reverted to initial non-systematic approaches. In such cases, 
training was continued until such behaviour seemed to disappear. 
The outcome of the training for this task depended upon the level 
of ability at the start of the task. 
In the 7-8 year old group prior to -training the following was so: 
11/40 subjects related the component parts when drawing. 
Of these 11 subjects who related, 4 carried out the triangle task 
successfully on the post-test. 
Of these 4, 2 showed an ability to apply the principles to the transfer 
task. 
Of these subjects from this same age group not relating component parts 
on the initial assessment (i.e. 29/40 in all): 
None passed the triangle task itself, but 6/29 of these subjects not 
initially relating did relate component parts on the post-test. 
In both senses, therefore, i.e. in terms of either a move to 
relating or to carrying out the task 23/40 subjects showed no improvement 
after training of this type. 
In the older age range, subjects seemed to be 'more able' to benefit 
from the actual training - in Piagetian terms, it may well be possible to 
argue that such older subjects were on the brink of such 'operational 
understanding' and that the experience tipped them in the right direction. 
In like terms, it could be argued that the younger subjects lacked the 
structures capable of assimilating the principles involved in the tasks. 
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Boy aged 7:8. 
Girl: aged 7:9. 
Boy: aged 8:1. 
PLATE 67  
Figures on the left of the page illustrate attempts by 3 
different subjects to carry out the triangle task. Figures 
on the right of the page illustrate attempts by the same 
subjects after the training session. 
The 'improvement' of each subject varies according to the 
initial grasp of the task. 
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Of the older age group, on the pre-test: 
21/40 subjects related the component parts of the triangle (including 
correct responses). 
Of these 21 subjects who related the parts, 17 succeeded on the triangle 
task in the post-test and 14 of these 21 showed an ability to generalise 
the principle to a transfer task 
Of these subjects from the same age group not relating component 
parts on the initial pre-assessment (i.e. 19 in all): 
9 of these 19 did relate units on the post-test; 
6 actually passed the triangle test itself; 
and 4 failed to do either after the training experience. 
More subjects in this older age group were able to profit from the train- 
ing than in the younger age group. 
THE FLAT TASK  
(Again subjects were given jig-saw like pieces with which to work.) 
Very similar behaviour was illustrated here, both in terms of the 
training observations themselves and the actual outcome of the training, 
though generally, in the actual training session the subjects found the 
tasks to be much easier - they were in fact provided with the units 
(blocks with windows) and had what was essentially an open-ended task 
to perform, i.e. there was to be a change of shape - but that shape change 
could take any form. :To demands were made on the subjects in terms of 
relating or inter-relating the parts as in the previous training task. 
In concrete form, therefore, the task proved to be very possible for 
all subjects in both age ranges. 
0 
44 1 
Attempts by a girl aged 8:1 before and after training. 
PLATE 68 
Attempts by a boy aged 7:5. before and after training. 
This subject had some difficulty in anticipating the final form 
of his second attempt (see crossed out sections) 
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Of the 7-8 year old group, in the pre-assessment, only 4/40 
subjects could carry out the re-structuring but on a non-unit basis. 
Of these four subjects, 3 carried out the post-test task successfully. 
Of the other 36/40 subjects in the same group: 
5 carried out the house task successfully on the post-test. 
Few subjects in this age range seemed able to benefit from the training 
offered here. Interestingly, at the concrete level these same subjects 
during the training session, when definitions of the structure were 
provided (i.e. jig-saw pieces), were able to offer a variety of new 
shapes for the flat. 
Of the older age group, in the pre-assessment: 
9/40 of the subjects carried out this re-structuring task but on a non- 
unit basis. 
All of these 9 subjects carried out the task successfully on a unit 
basis in the post-test. 
Of the other 31 subjects in the post-assessment: 
19 carried out the task successfully; 
12 failed to carry out the task and in this sense showed no improvement 
at all due to training of this type. 
Again, it could be argued from this that until such time as 
subjects have adequate cognitive structures to assimilate the training 
and its implications for further tasks, such training fails to make 
lasting changes on such strategies. 
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TRANSFka TASK  
Within the 7-8 year old group, whilst eight subjects succeeded on 
Re-construction (2) and four subjects succeeded on Re-construction (1), 
only two managed the Transfer Task. Similarly, within the older age 
group (9-10 years), 23 subjects passed Re-construction 1 and 28 passed 
Re-construction (2) but only 15 succeeded on the Transfer Task. This 
is consistent with the main underpinning theory in that it is argued 
that some 'success' on post-training tasks was based on memorisation 
but not upon understanding of the principles. Thus it was not possible 
to apply understanding to similar problems. 
b. post training attempt. 
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The attempts of a subject (aged 9:6) who could not carry out  
the transfer task. 
• 
a. pre-training attempt. 
d. post training attempt. 
c. pro-training attempt. 
 
   
PLATE 69  
 
e• transfer task attempt. 
     
The attempts of a subject (raged 10:2) who was able to carry out 
the transfer task. PLATE 70  
  
a. pre7training attempt b. post-trainine attempt. 
e. transfer task 
attempt. 
c. nEe-trinine 
aytemp. d. post-training • 
1o. 
1 2 3 
1 = 7-8 yr. old boys. 
2 = 7-8 yr. old girls. 
3 = 9-10 yr. old boys. 
4.= 9-10 yr. old girls. 
1— 	 --a 	 .1. 
No. of Ss. passing  transfer task by age & sex.  
20 
18 
16 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER TRAINING ATTEMPTS  
Depending upon one's concept of the learner, so the 'blame' for 
apparent 'failure' in any training attempt can be placed either within 
the learner himself (i.e. immaturity of structures, etc), or within 
the training schedule. 
Piaget, as cited earlier, is firmly convinced that development and 
not learning is the way of understanding. Learning is seen as limited 
in that it is tied to a single structure and transitivity is not possible 
However, whilst accepting Piaget's main tenets on this issue, it is 
believed that there is a place for some training - depending upon the 
aims of that training. The training carried out here is related to a 
study of structures required for creative behaviour, and in particular 
to an ability which is seen as fundamental to all knowing - creative and 
logical - that of apprehending and of defining reality. 
Training schemes for creativity must first establish that individuals 
apprehend and define reality in ways common to their culture. They must 
be enabled to know those realities operationally - first at a concrete 
level of knowing until abstraction becomes a possibility. But given 
operational ability - fluency training becomes a possibility. Once 
individuals can know the structure of a given reality, once they can 
re-shape that reality, reverse it, re-structure it, they can begin to 
know that it can be re-structured. The possibility of reflection upon 
one's own cognitive behaviour makes creative transformations of reality 
possible. Piaget speaks of the importance of understanding action and 
of knowing oneself in that action. He is speaking here not so much of 
self-knowledge, but of the realisation that reality comes to us patterned; 
that we are the patterners and that as such, once we know the patterns 
and ourselves as patterners - we can change the design. 
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To conclude this section on training, it is important to stress 
that Piaget's theoretical model is perhaps, in the area of training in 
particular, best approached as same ideal type. Formal operational know-
ing is a cognitive ideal - not a guaranteed outcome in every area. 
Piaget himself has room for decalage and for concrete operational 
adults. Creativity training might need to involve one with familiarisation 
in an area. An individual might well have to proceed through concrete 
experimentations to a stage when conceptual knowing takes on. The adult 
learner driver provides a case in point. Whilst he may not wish his 
earliest gropings around the gear box to be described in sensori-motor 
terms he will be far from having a clear, stable, concept of the gear 
box - except perhaps as a learnt fact, and not as knowledge transforming 
his actions and acting. 
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Statistical Analysis a.A. the 17indings (Part 2) 
There are several factors which the researcher wished to examine 
in the second part of this research. The tasks used here are based upon 
the same Principles as outlined in the first part of the research 
Elaboration, 2.e—construction, etc). 	 Therefore, this second part provides 
a further opportunity of examining the inter—relationships of tasks, 
though this was not a prime aim. 
The main intention of this training investigation was to note: 
a) any improvement in performance with experience, and 
b) evidence of ability to transfer to other tasks what is assumed to have 
been gained during the training sessions. 
The statistical tests chosen for this second part of the analysis are 
those tests used in Part 1 of the research. Namely, Analysis of 7ariance 
and Chi—Squared Tests. Though the composition of the sample was different 
in this second part (i.e. two age groups of 40 subjects with an equal number 
of boys and girls in each, as opposed to eight age groups of 12 subjects 
each with an equal number of boys and girls in each group), the methods of 
selection and of scoring were the same, and the assumptions underlying the 
Tests of Analysis of Variance and Chi—Squared Tests (already explained in 
Part 1) were believed to be satisfied. 
Again, as for Part 1 of the research, and for the reasons given then, 
all tests were one—tailed tests. The tables are presented on the follow—
ing pages. 
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I`xplanations of Tables  
Set 1 - Standard F Tests (Analysis of Variance) (sex and age) 
These are for the Standard A71,0VA tests, for identifying variation 
between factors, in this case, sex and the two age groups. Thelii0VA 
table shows which factors are significant, i.e. have variation which is 
significantly larger than would be expected from random effects. 
Finally, Chi-Squared tests were applied, ignoring sex differences, 
assuming there was no difference between the age groups. It was found 
that for all but C and F, there is an age variation. 
Set 2 - aelationships between Pre-test Items  
these are the contingency tables for testing whether each pair of 
tests in A-D are in fact independent. Since significant results were 
obtained for age-groups in the F-tests, this analysis was split into age 
groups. The figures in green are the observed frequencies, those in red 
are the expected frequencies calculated by (dow total x Column total). 
Grand total 
Set 3 - r?.elationships between Post-test Items  
These show first the tabulated scores for each pass/fail combination 
for both age groups (sex ignored). Secondly, the contingency tables for 
each age group are given. Again, green-observed frequency, black-observed 
corrected by 'date's "3orrection, red the expected frequency. 
Set / - _relationships between Transfer Task and Others  
As for Set 3. there are tables for each combination of the Transfer 
Task with all others. 
Set 5 - Improvement in Performance  
The tabulated successes for each pass/fail combination are shown first. 
PART 2 'PULES 
Set 1 - Standard F Tests  
(Analysis of Variance) 
(age and sex) 
Including Goodness-of-fit Tests  
for age effects. 
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RELATIONSHIP: ELABCMATION/RECONS.(1) PARTIALLY CORRECT. 
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F.-A a L. 3 S .1,,, . SL 3,...C? 
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..--. 
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, I' crrc) L 36 `- ‘.... 
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F-A IL )S" ?....311.11: 
, 3 .' 
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-- 
..,-1-s 4 s • s s 
'PASS J.- *63 
• 1.42 • 
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RELATIONSHIP: 
KEY: Green = observed frequencies. 
Black = observed frequencies corrected by Yates'. 
Red = expected frequencies. 
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RELATIONSHIP:REC°17ST*(1) /RECONST.(2) Partially correct. 
it."----------"Z—,C— FAIL PASS -rcrr fi L. 
" , 	 iS 
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1
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c_.."----n,:.„,b 
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it.S.S 
11-1* 	 if•D ' L 
Al •5 
..a.j..at, 
.2. -2.• s 
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./1..  	 4..a.  3 2.  
-i-o-reL 6+ 13 $o. 
• - _ I o • 3-s 
KEY: Green = observed frequencies. 
Black = observed frequencies corrected by Yates'. 
Red = expected frequencies. 
PA LT 2 TABLES 
Set 3 — Relationships between Items  
in Post—test  
(Contingency tables) 
434• 
N.3. Green = Observed frequency 
Black = Observed corrected by Yates 
Red 	 = Expected Frequency 
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RELATIONSHIP: ?Her jirt. Suer fa& Qom. he, LI I + 
k es, GL.c.6:1 t.t.v PrAttc.,,  
Are 
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23 • S 
',,,_ 
	 'a;..a 
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0. .v 
,... 	 N--'t ,9 -. Ii' 
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is, 	 .Z5 
.1... 	
.2-- 3-- 24 
PASS 
, 	 /PS ii. 	 ii-?- 
orio- 
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.U. , A . .2 • S • 4 10  
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I 
FAIL PASS TOTAL 
FAIL 
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....,,L II .S - 	 Le2 ... 19. 
PASS 
2 	 . S 6.1.  
	
, 	 , 	 • S 
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I
u 
  TOTAL
PA ilT 2 TA3LES 
Set 4 — _elationships between the  
Transfer Task and all Others  
(Contingency tests) 
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N.3. Green = Observed frequency 
Black = Observed corrected by Yates 
2ed 	 = Expected frequency 
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PA1T 2 TA3LES 
Set 5 - Improvement in Performance  
(as a result of training) 
4/16. 
• 
RELATIONSHIP: RECON.(1) Partly  Correct (Pre-test)/ C 
RECON.(1) Wholly Correct (Post-test) 
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INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS  
Analysis of Variance Standard F Tests) 
Sex and Age (Table 1, Part 2) 
Analysis of variance tests were carried out on pre—test and post—
test items, to test for significant variation between sexes and between 
age groups (7-8 years and 9-10 years). The following tasks all showed 
similar results, in as much as giving significant results for ages. 
A. Shape Recognition Correct. 	 (1% level) 
pre—test 
C. Re—structuring (1) Partially Correct (5% level)) 
• E. Re—structuring (1) Correct (1% level) 
G. 3e—structuring (2) Correct (1% level) 	 post—test 
I. Transfer Task Correct (1% level) 
The remaining tasks: 
3. Elaboration 	 ) 
pre—test 
D. Re—structuring (2) Partially Correct 
F. ne—structuring (1) Partially Correct ) post—test 
cave neither factor as being significant. 
Sex 
Task H — ae—construction (2) post—test — gave a significant sex 
effect at the 2.5% level, however, only 5 subjects passed this task (all 
boys so the reliability fo the result could be questioned. Generally, 
there were no significant differences in performance between the boys 
and girls. 
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Complementary X2  goodness-of-fit tests for differences between age-
groups (ignoring sex) gave the following results: 
Pre-Pest : 	 Differences between 	 the 	 two 	 age-groups 
A. Shape ttecognition 
3. elaboration 
C. 1 e-structuring (1) 
Partially correct 
D. :e-structuring (2) 
Partially correct 
2 
2 
r 
'2 
'; 
'2 
= 
= 
= 
= 
9.01 
0.64 
2.03 
1.23 
Significant at 0.5% level 
Not significant 
Significant at 10% level 
Not significant 
Post-Test : 	 Differences 	 between 	 the 
	 two 	 age-groups 
E. Correct 
 
Re-structuring (1) 
F. de-structuring (1) 
Partially correct 
G. de-structuring (2) 
Correct 
I. Transfer Task 
Correct 
X2 = 13.42 
K 	 = 0.143 
"1'2 = 11.11 
X2 = 9.94 
Significant at 0.5% level 
Not significant 
Significant at 0.5% level 
Significant at 0.5,L level 
Task H - "Re-structuring (2) - partially correct" - was not suitable for 
this test owing to the very small numbers passing it. 
• These results tend to bear out the results of the first analysis of 
variance. It appears that the tasks A.C.E.G.I. are giving significant 
results for age variation (between the two groups 7-8 and 9-10). Such 
variation was anticipated and has important consequences for training and 
improvement (as will be seen later). 
Differences between pre-test and post-test performance should also 
be noted, in terms of improvement in performance. In the pre-test, the 
main significant difference was on the Shape Recognition Task (0.5% level). 
No subject was achieving total success on either of the Re-construction 
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Tasks (1 and 2), and there was no significant difference for age on 
"partial success" for either of these two tasks. 	 In the post-test, 
however, subjects begin to pass the Lte-structuring tasks (E and IP) and 
there are significant differences in performance for age (0.Z level). 
The same comments apply to the Transfer Task (I). It might be concluded 
therefore that with age, subjects show more ability to profit from the 
training. 
It will be noticed that Task 1' (lie-structuring (1)) is the only task 
for which the total number of passes actually decreases with age. (7-8 
years = 15 passes; 9-10 years = 13 passes). 
	
This is not surprising since 
more of the younger subjects are likely to satisfy this level of the item 
(which requires only "partial success") and more of the older subjects 
are likely to pass E, which requires complete success on the same task. 
The same explanation applies to tasks G and H. Task B (Elaboration) was 
not siguificant. 
Conclusion  
Generally, no difference between the performances of the boys and 
girls was anticipated and no significant difference was found. In this 
sense, therefore, there is coherence in the second battery of tasks in 
that they do not seem to favour any one sex. As all subjects selected for 
the training programme "failed" or "partly failed" both Re-construction 
Tasks, no significant difference in performance on the basis of age could 
have been anticipated, except in differences relating to partial success 
on both of these tasks. Significance for partial success on the pre-test 
was found on only one Ae-construction Task (Task 1) (10 level). 
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What is perhaps more important is that complete success on both of 
these central (Re—construction) training tasks gave significant results 
for ages in the post—test suggesting that the older subjects who were 
generally more capable of "partial success" in the pre—test, were, 
because of this initial degree of success, more likely to benefit from 
training. 
Such findings are in keeping with the underpinning theory, which 
would regard subjects who made this type of progress as being on the 
brink of a new stage of understanding, and as such, 	 able to benefit 
from training of this type. 
RELATIONSHIPS BE WEEK ITEMS IN THE PRE—TEST (Tables Set 2) 
The analysis of inter—dependence of items in this second part of 
the research is interesting in relation to the analysis in part °Ile. 
The task items in this second part are based upon the same principles 
and task inter—dependency is expected theoretically. 
As the analysis of variance gave significant age—effects it was 
felt appropriate to split up this analysis between the two age—groups. 
X2 tests were carried out between each pair of tasks within the pre—test 
to determine independence. 	 (H
o 
= Tests are independent.) 
The pre—test tasks were: 
A. Shape Recognition 
B. Elaboration 
C. de—structuring (1) partially correct 
D. He—structuring (2) partially correct 
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The values obtained were as follows: 
Test Pairs 7-B years 9-10 years 
AB 
AC 
AD 
BC 
BD 
CD 
X2 
X2 
X2 
X2 
X2 
- 2 
= 
= 
= 
= 
4 
= 
.43 
6.57 sig. at 
5% level 
4.0asig. at 
5') 	 level 
5.06 sig. at 
5% level 
1.48 
2.73 
X2 
X2  
X2 
X2 
- 2  
X2  
= 
= 
4 
= 
= 
= 
4.26 	 sig. at 5,;;i level 
2.6 
1.57 
9.13 sig. at.1% level 
2.75 
4.12 sig. at 5% level 
However, it should be pointed out that the results for the older age 
group are more meaningful in the sense that the pass rate was very low for 
the younger age group. In fact, in terms of task dependence, values for 
these age bands require cautious analysis (as indicated in Part 1 of the 
research) either because of the low pass rate in the younger group or 
because the older subjects are argued to be in a 'transitional stage' in 
terms of ability and are thus likely to be inconsistent in their responses. 
Tasks A and •B would be expected to associate (they do for older age 
group - 	 level) but because Tasks C and D require only partial success 
- i.e. are assumed to have a different level of task competence, they would 
not be expected to associate with Tasks A and B. It is interesting to 
note therefore that Task C does associate with tasks requiring complete 
success: 
Task C associates with Task B (older age group only) - 1; level 
Task C associates with Task A (younger age group Only) - 5u level 
This association is a comment on either: 
a) Incorrect identification of task levels for Tasks A and B or C 
itself. 
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b) The unpredictability of the older group because they are assumed 
to fall into a transitional stage (i.e. between major stages of ability). 
c) In the case of the younger subjects - the low response rate which 
leads to a less meaningful association. 
Further empirical investigation would be required to isolate the incon-
sistency. 
itELATIOITSHIPS BETWEELI POST-TEST ITEMS (Tables Set 3) 
Again, the results were split into ages and tested by a contingency 
table for independence between each of the pairs: 
E. ite-•structuring (1) correct. 
	 F. Re-structuring (1) partially 
and 	 and 	 correct 
G. Re-structuring (2) correct 
	 H. Re-structuring (2) partially 
correct 
Test Pair 7-8 years 9-10 years 
EG 
Fll 
K2 = 5.02 (5% level) 
x
2 = 0.04 
X2 = 5.63 	 (550 level) 
X2 = 0.05 
As with the last analysis, the tables for PH gave quite small values 
which may tend to make the test more conservative and inclined to accept 
the, hypothesis of independence. It is useful to note the (empirical) 
probabilities for passing Tests E and G. 
P (passing test A, G, at 7-8 years) = 0.075 
P (passing test 14, G, at 9-10 years) = 0.5 
Such should be borne in mind when interpreting task association. 
Tasks 2, and G would be expected to associate because they require 
complete success based on a firm understanding. Tasks F and H are not as 
likely to associate, for they require only partial success on the tasks, 
and speak of a less firm understanding, and perhaps less consistent ability. 
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RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE TRANSFER TASK A!11) THE REST (Tables Set 4) 
Contingency table results testing for independence : 
(I = Transfer Task) 
Tasks -8 years 9-10 years 
AI 
BI
CI 
DI 
ET
PI 
GI
Hi 
X2 = 3.38 
- 2 - 0 
X2 
  2 = 5• 08 sig. 54 level 
K2 = 9.88 sig. 1; 
	
level 
9.60 sig. 	 , level X2 = - 	 V
X2 = 0.03 
'2 - - 3.98 sig. 56 level 
X2 = 4.37 si. 50 level 
X2 = 3.01 
X2  = 6.83 sig. 1% level 
X2 =  13.53 sig. 1% level 	 • 
X2  = - 6.93 sig. 1% level 
X2 = 9.96 sig. 1";() level 
X2 = 5.54 sig. 5% level 
X2 = 7.73 sig. 1% level 
X2 = 0.14 
The point should perhaps be made in interpreting association between 
items that logically, as already indicated, all items would not be expected 
to associate. f.g. "partial - success" on a post-test item (F and H) is 
not expected to associate with complete success on the transfer task (I). 
In both instances, significance is shown for only one age group, and some 
of this association could be explained in terms of a low-response for both 
tasks. This expected lack of association is because "partial success" 
indicates a limited level of understanding and for transfer of ability to 
be demonstrated a grasp of the logic of the task (complete success) is 
assumed to be essential. On the other hand, complete success (E and G) 
in the post-test, would be expected to associate more with the Transfer 
task. In fact, it does so in all instances. From this analysis it can 
be concluded that there is generally high association between the tranfer 
task and those tasks which would be expected to associate with it. The 
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exception is Task A, where significance was not shown for either age 
group. Tasks C to G are associated with Task I for all ages. As 
indicated, Task A (Shape Recognition) is not associated with the transfer 
task, and Task 3 associates at the older age level only. Tasks F and H 
would not be expected to associate with I, but each does, though at one 
age level only. 
It would be reasonable to conclude that the analysis demonstrates a 
good degree of internal consistency within the task battery. 
Improvement in performance as a result of training (Tables Set 5) 
Questions to be put in the light of the attempt to improve perfor-
mance by training were: 
a) Would subjects who had partially succeeded on the Re-structuring 
Tasks be wholly successful on these tasks after training? 
b) And, of course, (as previously considered (Tables Set 4)), could 
they transfer understanding to another task, different in presentation, 
but based upon the same principles? 
Tasks: C. Partial success on Re-structuring (1) 
D. Partial success on Re-structuring (2) 
 
  
pre-test 
E. de-structuring (1) correct 
de-struCturing (1) partially correct 
G. de-structuring (2) correct 
H. Partial success on de-structuring (2) 
post-test 
A first step was to test for independence between tests C E F 
and tests D G H 
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Pindings were as follows: 
Test Pair 7-8 years 9-10 years 
OE = 10. 	 sig. 	 1'; level X2 = 9. sig. 1% level 
CP x2 = 2.)9 X2 A 3. 
DG X2 = 6.23 siz. 1 level X2  = 3.3 
DH 2 = 1.02 X2 = 1.2 
C were expected to associate, for success on E, the same task at a 
higher level (in the post-test) is thought to be more likely if the sub- 
ject showed "partial success" (c) on the task in the pre-test. 	 C and I? 
were not expected to associate (and did not). Had they done so, there 
would have been no indication of improvement for this Re-structuring task 
(1). 	 (E and P could obviously not associate for therrepresent different 
achievement levels on the same task.) These same comments apply to D and 
G, and to D and H. 
A clear conclusion is that for both Re-construction Tasks (1) and (2) 
improvement (total success) is dependent upon partial success in the pre-
test. 
As with all other cases, the contingency tables had values less 
than 5, which throws into question the reliability of the findings. 
After interpreting probabilities of passing the tests, the following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
a) Given a pass at C, the probability of passing N was increased for 
both age groups. 
7-0 years: P (passing E) = 0.1; P (passing 2/passed C) = 0.364 
9-10 years: P (passing E) = 0.575; P (passing 2/passed C) = 0.810 
b) Given a fail at C, the probability of passing P decreases for both 
age groups. 
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7-n years: P (passing F) = 0.375; P (passing F) P (fail C) = 0.276 
9-10 years: P (passing f) = 0.325; P (passing F) P (fail C) = 0.143 
c) Given a pass at D, the probability of passing G increases for both 
age groups: 
7-8 years: P (passing G) = 0.2; p (passing G/pass D) = 0.75 
9-10 years: P (passing G) = 0.7; P (passing G/pass D) = 1.00 
d) Given a fail for DI the probability of passing H decreases for both 
age groups: 
7-0 years: P (passing it) = 0.025; P (passing fl and failing D) = 0.0225 
9-10 years: P (passing 	 = 0.1 ; P (passing H and failing D) = 0.0775 
-CONCLUSION  
The obvious conclusion, as was anticipated from a theoretical for-
mulation, is that training does not seem able to move subjects from one 
stage of understanding to another. Where a subject is on the brink of 
understanding (partial success) training would seem to be effective. 
Subjects coming to the training experience unable to attain partial success 
on a pre-test task are less likely to improve - in terms of attaining 
partial success on the post-test - than subjects who are already par-
tially successful on the pre-test and able to profit thereby from this 
initial level of understanding. 
One remaining question could be - how does one move a subject from 
no understanding to partial or whole understanding of an identity and its 
transformations? Piaget's scepticism on this issue is well known - yet 
within life's learning context such transitions do take place. The 
problem remains of trapping the actual moment of meaningful, transitional 
experience so as to better understand the mechanisms involved. 
Such training attempts are interesting and useful for they at least 
suggest that there are stages of understanding in the re-construction of 
reality. 
Chapter 11 
QUANTIFYING THE QUALITATIVE: 
AN EVALUATION 
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"In science we are compelled to investigate before we know 
what we are investigating, and as our knowledge increases 
we must continually re-state our questions." (Haldane,  1932) 
Any method of assessment must find its explanation in initial 
starting concepts and assumptions. Assessment might well be seen as 
a way of checking initial hypotheses. This may appear to be a strikingly 
obvious statement, but the zttraction of sophisticated programmes of 
analysis can sometimes encourage one to believe that it is at the 
final point in the assessment process that patterns and relationships 
are to be explained. It is at this point that patterns and relation-
ships are to be described and verified. 
Cattell (1971) discussing this point in relation to factor analysis 
made it clear that the factor analyst, or any analyst, cannot simply 
accept the existence of relationships on a statistical basis; he 
must proceed to understand and explain such relationships. Cattell 
comments that this is most usually done by: 
"... creating a framework of subjective-philosophical-logical 
categories - on present data indications, according to one's 
favoured logic." 
In other words, assessment is a movement from inspirational hunches to 
increasingly sophisticated analysis, then back to the inspiration in 
the light of the analysis. The starting point iscne of real subjec-
tivity. George Kelly (1953) explaining the assumptions underpinning 
his personal construct theory stated quite simply that one either 
accepted his assumptions of found another theory perhaps more compatible 
with one's philosophy of man! 
Haldane, 
	 (1932) The Causes of Evolution.  P.63. 
Cattell, R. (1971) Abilities: their Structure, Growth and Action. P.54 
Kelly, G. (1955) A Theory of Personality: The Psychology of Personal  
Constructs. 
Definitions are drawn up in the light of such initial assumptions. 
Problems of definition in relation to creativity have already been 
discussed in this study, but at this stage of evaluation, it may be 
of interest to consider them further in a wider framework. 
A problem which besets much assessment of human behaviour is that 
of the often covert nature of the behaviour. If nothing else, this can 
produce a scarcity of operational definitions. Tn creativity and 
related areas, attempts at assessment have been made by means of indirect 
measures, measures akin to projective clinical techniques. Weisskopf  
(1950) and Singer et al (1955) investigating imagination, proposed a 
measure called the Transcendence Index: 
"Essentially this method calls for an examination of the 
protocol in terms of what elements have been introduced which 
were not directly given by the objective stimulus." 
Such measures are not unlike those employed, for instance, by Wallach & 
Kogan (1965). One disadvantage is that they involve a high level of 
interpretation on the part of those assessing. Similar problom- 	 e-) 
be cited regarding Klinger's (1969) work on phantasy which he defined as: 
"Verbal reports of all mentation whose ideational products are 
not evaluated by the subject in terms of their usefulness in 
advancing some immediate goal extrinsic to the mentation itself." 
From the days of psychophysics, such approaches have been criticised for 
lack of objectivity, reliability, etc. 
	 The intention is clearly to 
trap an 'inside process' in definitions and assessments. As with much 
assessment of intelligence and creativity, the conclusions are inferen-
tial statements, and everything depends upon thevalidity of such 
inferences. 
Weisskopf, E.A. "A transcendence index as a proposed measure", J. of Psy.  
1950, 22, 379-90. 
Singer,j and Sugarman,D. (1955) "Some TAT correlates of Rorschach Human 
Movement Responses", J. of Consulting Psy. 
 12, 117-9. 
Klinger, E. (1969) "Development of imaginative behaviour: implications of 
play for a theory of fantasy", Psy, Bull A., 72, 277-99. 
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Initial conceptions might well be modified in the search for an 
operational definition; the attempt to present starting concepts in 
clear, measurable states might lead to avoidance of the actual com-
plexities of covert behaviours. It may be intellectually more honest 
to admit that at this point in research time, some forms of behaviour 
are more open to research than are others. 	 Skinner (1973) notes: 
"There is a sense in which it can be said that the methods of 
science have scarcely been applied to human behaviour... we 
have counted and measured and compared; but something essential 
to scientific practice is missing in almost all current dis-
cussions of human behaviour. It has to do with our treatment 
of the causes of human behaviour." P.7. 
Though operating within a different framework, Skinner's distinction is 
of importance to this discussion because it expresses the difference 
between approaches to problems which are essentially descriptive, and 
those which are concerned to explain. Such a distinction must have 
implications for initial operational definitions and for the construction 
of measures. 
It has already been explained that creativity has to be understood 
in relation to culture. Thought is formed within a culture and ideas 
about what is normative are fundamentally cultural matters. Culture 
posits problems both in terms of initial definitions and items for 
assessment. 
A pattern of cross-cultural Piagetian-based research has been to 
apply measures constructed within Western culture to non-Western cultures. 
Such measures have not been presented simply in styles and contexts foreign 
to non-Western subjects, but in addition the logics underpinning the 
measures have been Western logics. Ideally, what is needed is a 
Piagetian-type clinical searching among non-Western thought-patterns to 
Skinner, B.F. (1973) Beyond Freedom and Dignity. P.7. 
 
400. 
establish, through measures reflecting their own realities (and not 
modified Western realities) what their logics might be about - should 
they be discovered to be unlike Western logics. Greenfield's work 
(1966) with Wolof children suggests that schooling plays a vital part in 
cognitive styles, which suggests that schooling, as one kind of experience, 
is not simply a tool for performance acceleration but a tool for affect-
ing cognitive styles. 
In assessing Piaget's comments on the role of culture, it is impor-
tant to point out that his explanation of growth, which is interactional 
and not purely maturational, does not rule out this cultural variation, 
though at times it might appear to do so (1966 and 1971). 
Essentially, what is required for creativity is the ability to treat 
knowledge objectively, to be able to reflect upon it and upon its 
organisation. Whilst the cognitive styles may vary from culture to 
culture, and whilst cultural realities equally may vary, it would seem 
reasonable to suggest, on the basis of Piagetian cross-cultural research, 
that whatever the cultural context, knowing passes from ego-centric non- 
organisation to a state of increased objectivity and organisation. 	 In 
this sense, Piaget is justified in claiming universality for his stages, 
though as yet it would be difficult to insist upon universality in terms 
of the nature of structures, for structures must be affected by the cul-
tural content upon which they operate. Similarly attainment rates must 
vary. Piagetian assessment is directed to the 'how' of organising, 
not to the 'what' of organising - a brief which is very appropriate to 
cross-cultural investigation. 
Greenfield, P.M. (1966) "On culture and conservation" in: Brunet, J.S. et 
al, Studies in Cognitive Growth. 
Piaget, J. (1966) "Need and significance of cross cultural studies in 
genetic psychology", Internat. J. of Psy. 1. pp 3-13. 
Piaget, J. (1971) Structuralism. 
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Within any culture, thought and action become increasingly 
organised. Whatever the cultural manifestation, schemas can be per—
formed with increasing consciousness, action can eventually be repeated, 
modifed, reversed, etc. Cognitive organisation is not tied to 'test—
items'. Cognitive organisation applies to everyday thought, and items 
can be drawn from such ordinary contexts. Piaget himself has moved from 
the street and marble games, through kindergarten classrooms to more 
test—like situations. 
It might be argued that with Piagetian assessment, the problems are 
not so much those of trying to find 'items' as the problem of attempting 
to order measures into some kind of system. On standardisation and 
systematisation Piaget has shown the greatest caution: 
"A scientific epistemology, like any other discipline which is 
at the same time inductive and deductive, can only proceed step 
by step, through the gradual accumulation of partial results 
and without expecting too much too soon. It is from an uninter—
rupted series of well defined studies on individual topics that 
relationships should arise and generalisations emerge, not from 
a system set up in advance... The great danger is that of build—
ing too fast and of succumbing, after the first tentative steps, 
to the seduction of old habits of systematisation." (1972) 
Inhelder (1969) has described Genevan type interaction in assessment: 
"Our experiments have nothing to do with tests, but tend to be 
an exchange of views, a relatively unstructured conversation... 
in most tests, the child, once given the instructions, finds 
himself in front of problems to be solved. In our method the 
examiner must adapt himself to each case in order to stimulate 
the child, follow the lines of his thought and at the same time 
direct it to the crucial points." (1969) 
Smedslund (1969) has already noted the hazards of such an approach, 
but it is believed that as a method it offers excellent possibilities for 
what might be termed "early pilot work". Given that such a flexible 
method might be early employed, what possibilities exist for standardisation? 
Piaget, J. (1972) Psychology & Epistemology:Towards a Theory of Knowledge.P.05 
Inhelder, B. (1969) The Dianosis of Reasoning in the Mentally Retarded. P.282. 
Smedslirnd, 
	 (1969) "Psychological diagnostics", patilu11.11. pp 237-48. 
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Standardisation is usually taken to mean that assessment procedures 
and conditions are so constructed and controlled that precisely the same 
testing procedures can be followed at different times and in different 
places. Tuddenham (1971) makes an important point when he notes that 
Piaget may standardise the questions but not necessarily the responses. 
In fact Piaget does not want standardised responses. However, to 
classify responses, to impose some order after the event, is possible. 
Strictly speaking, no assessment, psychometric or otherwise, can stan—
dardise its responses, in that it cannot wholly oblige the respondent to 
answer within the confines of the possible responses offered. "Rightness" 
or "wrongness" are important categories in Piagetian assessment, and both 
can be explained in terms of organisation or the lack of it. Given 
adequate groundwork therefore, there is no reason why responses could 
not be classified along a continuum of organisation. 
To speak of a continuum of organisation is to raise questions con—
cerning scaling and the concept of stage, often in an interrelated way. 
On the matter of scaling Piaget has commented: 
"The object... initially, was not to establish a scale of 
development and to obtain precise determination of age as 
regards stages. It was a question of trying to understand 
the intellectual mechanisms used in the solution of problems 
and of determining the mechanisms of reasoning." 
In these same discussions Piaget was challenged by Zazzo who suggested 
that the difficulty in establishing a precise age for the Piagetian stages 
was a result not only of a widespread dispersion but also of the fact that: 
"In certain cases an isolated activity does not enable us to 
obtain the same results as when a mosaic—type test is used." 
Tuddenham, H.D. "Theoretical regularities and individual idiosyncracies' 
in: Measurement and Piaget, Green, D. et al. (1971) 
Piaget, J. (1956) in: Discussions on Child Development, Vol 1, P.89. 
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Wielder defended the challenge arguing that generally the dis-
persion within a stage was relatively small compared with the wide dif-
ferences between behaviour in one stage or another. She continues with 
an anticipated Piagetian reply: 
"In the present state of our research we are not able to say: 
'such and such a child is exactly at the level of nine months'. 
However, I wonder if the compensations operating in mosaic type 
tests are any more than compensations of a statistical order 
and whether they reveal the essential characteristics of an age 
level?" 
Piaget (1971) has made it clear that he could not be satisfied with 
scales or classifications that merely specify the dominant characteristics 
of a stage (see Freud for contrast here). 	 Instead, he is concerned to 
discover overall structures of cognition and to avoid the 'dominant 
characteristics' approach. Uzgiris and Hunt (1966) working on object 
concept developed a set of items to form an ordinal scale after the type 
of a Guttman scale. They focussed on identifying levels or landmarks 
rather than seriously accepting the notion of stage. By contrast, 
Corman and Escalona (1969) accept the concept of stage as explained by 
Piaget and constructed a set of items to represent each stage in the attain-
ment of object-concept. They identified the infant as being at a par-
ticular stage in terms of whether he passed a certain number of the items 
relevant to a particular stage androne of the items relevant to the 
following stage. Corman and Escalona expected the stages to be ordinal, 
but they did not expect all the items within a stage to fall into an 
ordinal scale of difficulty. Nivette (1971) commenting on Piaget's own 
assessment procedures notes that whilst the stages themselves might be 
Inhelder, B. (1956) in: Discussions on Child Development, Vol 1. _ P • _ 	 . 
Piaget, J. (1971) "The theory of stages in cognitive development", in: 
Green, D. et al (eds) Piaget and Measurement. P.3. 
Uzgiris I and Huntol (1975) cited in: Infant Perception: from sensation  
to cognition, Salapatek, C. 
Corman, Hand Escalona,S. (1975) cited in: Infant Perception: from sensation 
to ocKnitton, Snlapatek, C. 
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seen as hierarchical and sequential, the measurement process does not 
seem to be. One is tempted to suspect that here, Nivette has forgotten 
that Piagetian measurement is about a continuum of organisation and that 
it is not the tasks that ascend in order of difficulty and points, but 
the responses which are to be classified in order of increasing 
organisation. Nevertheless, Nivette draws attention to the problem of 
how, even starting with a unitary concept (of creativity), one goes 
about 'dissecting' the continuum for descriptive and assessment purposes. 
Once again the problem returns us to initial concepts and definitions. 
On the concept of knowledge, Piaget makes statements which have implications 
for assessment: 
"Knowledge is a continuous process and cannot be chrystallised 
in any one of its momentary states..." (1972) 
Whilst admitting the truth of Piaget's statement, it is believed that 
knowledge can be categorised. This allows one to conceive of knowledge 
as a contilnuwn, but it also requires the construction of delicate categories 
for assessment if the transitional states of knowledge are to be trapped 
in assessment. Miller and Heldmeyer (1975) make a related comment in their 
criticism of some classical Piagetian types of assessment, arguing that 
often such assessments fail to take account of the fact that abilities 
in a state of development require sensitive, facilitating measures. 
Given that a continuum of increasing cognitive organisation under—
lies all such categories, is indeed the ground of all such categories, 
categories must be hierarchical by nature. The stages themselves might 
Nivette, J. (1971) in: Measurement and Piaget, Green, D. et al. 
Piaget, J. (1972) Psychology & Epistemology: Towards a Theory of Knowledge. 
P.47. 
Miller, P. and Heldmeyer, K. (1975) "Perceptual information in conservation: 
effects of screening", Ch. Devt. 
 As,. pp 588-92. 
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well be seen as major categories. Each stage represents a certain level 
of organisation - each more organised than the previous. Within the 
stages themselves (and each stage and every point within a stage is 
essentially transitional) there are likewise degrees of ascending 
organisation. Stage-statements become hierarchical on the basis of 
criteria which indicate changes in the quality of cognitive organisation. 
Finer classifications can take place on the same bases. In other words, 
the researcher is not obliged to order items for assessment - stemming 
from a concept of increasing organisation they arrive in a sense (if 
rightly observed and psychologically defined) ready ordered. However, 
though such an idea may appear to be simple, this is deceptively so. 
Earlier this century Thurstone commented that: 
"The whole study of intelligence measurement can hardly have 
two more fundamental difficulties than the lack of a unit of 
measurement and the lack of an origin from which to measure." 
Thurstone seemed to solve (statistically at least) the problem of the 
absolute zero, but the search for an adequate unit of measure continues. 
Working on a concept of a continuum of increasing organisation (cognitive) 
questions such as intervals between items or categories, context-specific 
probleMs and status and relationships of items or categories across areas 
of assessment continue to arise. To illustrate the complexities, it may 
help to examine one Piagetian concept - that of conservation. Conser-
vation is often a context-specific notion. Ability to conserve certain 
properties in certain forms is attained before it can be applied to other 
forms. It is only at a certain stage of development that one can speak 
of a child as a conserver and mean this in the sense of a general ability 
as opposed to a length-specific-ability for instance. What is required 
Thurstone, L.L. (1928) "The absolute zero in intelligence measurement", 
Psy. Rev. 
	 pp 175-97. 
472. 
then in tentative researches into a Piagetian type scale are categories 
which are in fact statements about levels of organisation, and which are 
not tied to specific abilities or contexts. 
Because Piaget did not intend to systematise he has not really done 
so. This is not to say that his extensive research does not provide 
ground-work for some tentative ideas about systematisation. His stages, 
and in particular his sub-stages, could be seen as starting points. 
Whilst Piaget in his theory has emphasised continuity, with a central 
explanation in terms of organisation, his own research pattern has been 
somewhat unsystematic - in that some areas have been heavily investigated, 
others minimally so, and further, whilst he has always implied relation-
ship across areas, this has rarely been made explicit. It isobvious, for 
instance, that development in moral judgement is governed by the same 
mechanisms that govern development in, say, spatial relations, but 
because Piaget employs context-specific categories to describe and 
classify it is not possible to relate the two areas with any real precision. 
Categories for a tentative scale of creative ability have been 
influenced by Piaget's stage concept and his sub-stages in general, and 
also by the categories (especially sub-categories) of assessment employed 
in the first part of this research. 
In attempting to develop a scale, apart from stressing its tentative 
nature (ideally it should be regarded as a hypothesis for future research) 
certain points must be emphasised: 
a) The intention is to develop an ordinal as opposed to a purely nominal 
scale, but the ordinal nature will derive from the quality of the responses 
and not from the nature of the items (Cf. Uzgiris and Hunt, 1975, ibid). 
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b) Unlike Corman and Escalona (1975, ibid) who developed a set of 
items to represent each stage, the intention, within certain limits, is 
to develop one set of items for use across the Piagetian stages. The 
sensors motor and early pre-operational stages pose problems here, for 
it is clear that minimal skills would be needed for assessment of certain 
items even though these skills in themselves would not be assessed. The 
major reason against constructing sets of items for different stages 
stems from the belief that concern should be with the construction of 
the same realities over and against increasing cognitive organisation. 
It could be more difficult to assess this using different items, for 
variations might then stem from the different items themselves. Items 
would attempt to embody the major principles believed to underpin 
creative abilities. Creative ability is governed and explained by 
these major principles, and each principle, in its expression,is 
believed to undergo qualitative changes owing to increased cognitive 
organisation within the individual. 
The proposed scale could be used for two purposes: 
a) To assess developmentally. This would allow one to consider the 
development of the major principles in relation to one another. 
b) To assess the existence/non-existence of creative abilities using 
the higher categories of the scale only. 
TOWARDS A SCALE FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF OPERATIONAL CREATIVITY 
The rationale underpinning this proposed scale is that of increas-
ing cognitive organisation. Creativity is concerned with the organisation 
and re-organisation of reality, and this 'external' organisation must be 
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understood in relation to the internal cognitive organisation of the 
individual. The intention is to generate general categories (in the 
sense that they are not item-specific) in order to examine the principles 
believed to underpin creative behaviour. Every creative principle has a 
convergent counterpart (e.g. Construction - Re-construction, etc.) 
Of the eight principles stated in the Introduction and employed 
in Part 1 of the research that of Apprehension and Definition is believed 
to be a major principle upon which the others are dependent. This prin-
ciple has its roots in Piaget's object concept and explains an individual's 
growing understanding of the structure of objects and events. Without 
this understanding, he cannot relate, adjust, re-structure reality, etc. 
One has first to understand what is, before going on to what might be. 
APPREHENSION AND DEFINITION PRINCIPLE 
pre-operational 
concrete operations 
 
 
formal operations 
object 
concept 
relative 
interpretation 
ego-centric 
distortions 
concrete 
comprehension 
formal 
comprehension 
Because this is a fundamental principle, a concern in assessment and 
analysis with a scale of this type would obviously be to consider the 
relationship between performance here and performance on subsequent 
principles. The final scale would be ordinal in nature in terms of the 
responses - indicating increasing cognitive organisation. 
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The first principle - Apprehension and Definition - is essentially 
concerned with conception and cannot therefore be classified on the 
scale employed for the following principles, all of which involve 
re-organisation in some way. 
concrete operational 
formal operational pre-operational 	 N 
."‘ 
Principle •random,non deliberate 
i ten- 
tional schematic 
grasp of 
implication 
(concrete) 
grasp of 
implication 
(formal) 
Re-construction 
Re-relating 
Adjusting 
Adding 
Subtracting 
i 
Multiplying 
Dividing 
The major principles have been explained in detail in the introduction 
and throughout the research. The categories proposed would be concerned 
to classify responses as follows: 
a) Random, non-deliberate  
This type of response was found among some of the younger subjects 
in Part 1 of this research. In responding thus they altered structures 
without any clear intention, with no definite outcome in mind and usually 
with no conclusion. 
b) Intentional  
Responses are deliberate and intentional though lacking in organisation 
and coherence. 
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Schematic  
Responses suggest evidence of early organisation though there is 
still much evidence of ego-centric distortion and impressionism. 
d) Grasp of Implication (concrete) 
Where tasks are presented in concrete form the subject is able to 
re-organise and to grasp the implications. 
e) Grasp of Implication (formal) 
Here the subject is able to re-structure reality and to grasp its 
implication without concrete aids. More,even activities carried out in 
'concrete form' are transformed by foresight and hindsight of an 
operational type. 
It should be stressed that this is a mere hypothesis stemming from 
observations in this research. However, it is important as a hypothesis, 
if only because it gives a direction to thinking about scales for the 
assessment of creativity. The categories of the scale, which are des-
criptions of the quality and level of the transformation (e.g. Elaborating) 
are clearly crude at this hypothetical level, but they are important. 
They suggest that constructions and re-constructions of reality be 
evaluated in terms of the level of the act, and not that the act itself 
be accorded a position on a scale of ascending difficulty. According to 
his ability so an individual would be able to carry out a transformation 
either wholly and correctly or to a certain level ("task-level"). The 
search for "task-levels" in the first part of this research and the attempt 
to understand transitions from one level to another in the training section 
of the research forms some of the thinking behind this proposed scale. 
In the research undertaken here, the intention was not to conclude 
by establishing a scale with which to assess creative ability, though the 
possibility of moving towards such an objective in the future is not 
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denied. Whilst a main aim was to re-define and assess creativity in 
structural terms the categories of assessment employed werety no means 
context-specific, and as indicated form the bases for possible categories 
for the proposed scale. The categories were evaluated to see if they 
could be regarded as context-free (as opposed to specific). 	 In the 
Elaboration Task, for instance, "embeddedness" is used as one category. 
It relates in that instance to a drawing task, but can well be applied to 
other media. Essentially, it states that the stimulus provided does not 
dominate or wholly determine the final form of the elaboration. All 
categories were examined in this way, being applied theoretically to 
other media to attempt to see if they were in any sense bound by the 
context of media employed. Similarly, because the focus was on ability 
to construct and re-construct reality, and not upon the form of the re-
construction (but on the conception, the idea) tasks had to be found that 
would not prevent the demonstration of the ability because of the specialist 
knowledge or skill required. For example, an individual may well have the 
ability to re-construct reality, he may well grasp the principle, but may 
not be able to apply it to, say, the re-construction of a car engine. 
This is a problem of a specific skill, as opposed to a basic ability 
dependent upon a certain level of cognitive organisation. 
There is a certain arbitrariness in scoring - if only in terms of the 
narrowness or breadth of the categories employed. Much will depend upon 
the purpose of the investigation. For example, here, where the responses 
were divided into three categories of varying degrees of organisation 
(e.g. What Would Happen If Task, Re-constructions Tasks, etc), subjects 
were regarded as having satisfied the task requirements if they showed a 
minimum of organisation in their responses (i.e. if they fell into either 
category 1 or 2). 
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Whilst ultimately a developmental trend would have been observed 
overall, a stipulation that all subjects should have satisfied the highest 
category would have "delayed" agewise the appearance of ability. This in 
fact is an artifact of scoring. It need not detract from the underlying 
truth, but it does indicate some of the minor dilemmas of scoring, 
especially in a developmental study. To put the question another way; 
one might ask when an ability should be registered on a given scale, when 
it is firmly established, or when there is a certain degree of development? 
Scoring adjustments would be made according to the purpose. 
Abilities 'in transition' can be especially difficult to assess and 
to score. Here rater bias can too easily be introduced. There is need 
for an adequate set of criteria by which one can give accurate psycho-
logical definition to such states. It is not difficult, for instance, to 
assess an individual as a conserver or non-conserver, but it is more 
difficult to establish criteria that place him somewhere between these 
two points. Clearly, Piaget met such problems (1969): commenting on 
this mid-stage, he says: 
"(here) conservation is assumed but without certainty and in the 
case of some transformations only." P. 158 
In areas where Piaget is more detailed, and attempts to seek out actual 
criteria (e.g. 1954 and others) he most often tends to be descriptive 
and above all context-specific. The criteria of the sub-stages relate 
only to those sub-stages in the area under consideration, and could not, 
as they stand, be applied more generally. Is is such general criteria 
that are needed if intelligence, as understood by Piaget, is to be assessed 
in some unitary manner. Clearly, his theory is unified but a more explicitly 
Piaget, J. et al (1969) Experimental Psychology: Its Scope and Method. VII 
Intelligence. P.158. 
Piaget J. (1954) The Construction of Reality in the Child. 
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unified form of assessment would be an advantage. In the proposed 
scale for the assessment of creativity (operational) an attempt has 
been made to propose categories of this general type - not those of a 
context-specific type. 
It seems appropriate to conclude with questions and suggestions 
which are directed towards future research possibilities stemming from 
this current research. If Piaget is to be more systematised, on the basis 
of extensive, less systematised initial research at the level of assess-
ment and scoring, a further question might be: what possibilities of more 
sophisticated analysis of data exist? Piaget has always resisted such 
analysis in accordance with his purpose of attempting to understand the 
intellectual mechanisms used in the solution of problems, and of deter-
mining the mechanisms of reasoning (1956). 
A search by factor analysis is generally a search after the event. 
Hendrickson & White (1966) and Schenenmann (1966)have attempted to state 
in advance what is likely to be a factor-structure in psychological terms 
and have then proceeded to manipulate the data to verify the adequacy of 
their initial hypotheses. Such a procedure would not satisfy Horn's  
requirements (1967): 
"An objective procedure may be defined as one in which the inves-
tigator's theory does not enter into the actual determination 
of the solution." 
Piaget, J. (1956) in: Discussions on Child Development, Vol 1. Tanner and 
Inhelder. P.89. 
Hendrickson,A and White,P. (1966) cited in Butcher, H. (1968) Human 
Intelligence, Its Nature and Assessment. 
Schanenmann,P.H.(1966) cited in Butcher, H. (1968) Ibid. 
Horn, J.L. (1967) "On subjectivity in factor analysis", Educ. & Psychol. 
Measurement, 27, pp 811-20. 
480. 
If Horn means by this that researchers must resist the temptation to 
juggle statistical relationships to reach a desired fit, then he is 
correct. But if he means that initial hunches, theories, definitions 
and questions are not subjective in the sense already suggested, then he 
is setting an impossible standard of objectivity. 
There is a parallel to be drawn here between the concept of the "g" 
factor and the concept of organisation (cognitive). The search for a 
"g" factor was a search for unifying explanation of intelligence. Cattell  
(1971) distinguishing between what he called 'surface traits' and 'source 
traits' stated that the search was for: 
some simple underlying factor which causes things to go 
together... a simple structure... given a unique position by 
confactor rotation." 
Tuddenham (1971) prefers a new type of structural explanation of 
intelligence (which would include creativity) based on Piaget: 
the dilapidation of factor theory has not destroyed the 
possibility that a structural theory of an entirely different 
sort, for example that of Piaget, might succeed where factor 
analysis has faltered." 
If one were to apply some factoring type of approach to operational 
creativity, the approach would necessarily be rooted in the concept of 
increasing cognitive organisation. The factor of factors (Cf. "g) 
would be organisation itself, explicable in terms of operational struc—
turalism. As a fundamental factor it would be hypothesised to be respon—
sible for relationships between abilities based upon it, and the links 
between abilities would be in terms of organisation and intervals in 
degrees of cognitive organisation. Briefly, the approach would be 
that of hypothesis and verification (Hendrickson and White, 1966). 
Such an approach would have implications for the kinds of 
Cattell, R. (1971) Abilities: Their Structure, Growth and Action. P.12. 
Tuddenham, R.D. (1971) "Theoretical regularities and individual idiosyn—
craoies" in: rnasurement and 'ingot, Green et al. P.65. 
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starting concepts one could hold about intelligence. In general, factor 
analysts begin with a fragmented concept of intelligence. Nancy Bayley  
(1954), for instance, says: 
"If the word intelligence' is best used as a broad general term 
that we apply to a great variety of mental functions, then we 
will want to investigate the nature of these functions, their 
inter—relationships and the changes that take place in mental 
organisation ang growth. We should expect a given factor of 
intelligence to be more important at one stage of development 
than at another." 
Essentially, such a statement reflects a non—wholistic view of intelligence 
— a concept eventually welded together by means of statistical relation—
ships. In a Piagetian approach, all questions would be placed in the 
light of the initial theory which postulates a non—fragmented view of 
intelligence. Such a view could not speak of some abilities being more 
important at certain stages. In an organisational notion of intelligence, 
aspects of intelligence must be interdependent, and whilst one may speak 
of a hierarchy, and even of characteristic modes of functioning at dif—
ferent stages, it is not possible to extricate isolated abilities from 
the complexity of the organisation and pronounce them more or less impor—
tant. Whilst such comments stress the importance of initial theoretical 
concepts, and the direction that these will give to investigation and 
analysis, it also stresses the point that rotational techniques might well 
encourage the exploration of relationships not initially conceived of. To 
return to an earlier comment: research is a movement from "hunches" and 
theory to verification — and then a return to the theoretical starting 
point. 
Finally, some comment might be made on the significance of categories 
of assessment for training, for according to our notions of learning, so 
Bayley, 11. (1954) "On the growth of Intelligence", Amer. Psychol. pp 805-18. 
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we shall construct the categories for assessment. In their turn, such 
categories will affect training programmes if only because there is a 
tendency to 'train' to meet certain categories of assessment,(see 
Piagetian work on conservation, etc). On this matter Piaget comments: 
"How does an individual arrive at his own norms of this kind? 
This is in essence a psychological question, independent of any 
competence... with respect to the evaluation of the cognitive 
significance of these norms; it is, for example, the business of 
the psychologist to determine whether these norms have simply 
been transmitted to the child through the adult (which is not 
the case), whether they depend upon a single experience (which 
is in fact not at all sufficient)... or whether they constitute 
the product of a structuring procedure which is in part 
endogenous and proceeds by adjustments and progressive self—
regulatory procedures (which this time is the case)." 
Gagne (1966) proposes a different interpretation regarding such 
norms, and in his own sphere he provides excellent examples of the 
implications which categories of assessment have in fact upon training 
schedules. 
Employing a different philosophy Gagne (ibid) has shown how micro—
structures can be useful in the study of instruction. Finer categories, 
as he illustrates, enable a greater understanding of the formation of 
abilities, for having established such categories one can, he believes, 
manipulate and observe the development of the abilities involved. The 
intention behind the training here was not in fact to train but to attempt 
to gain some closer understanding of the psychological mechanisms operat—
ing. The concern was with 'major categories' only and could indeed be a 
criticism of the schedule. Different though they are, both Piaget and 
Gagne would agree that experience itself makes no necessary sense, it has 
to be 'meaningful' to the individual concerned. 
Piaget, J. (1972) Psychology and Epistemology:Towards a Theory of Knowledge. 
P. 7. 
Gagne, R. (1966) The Conditions of Learning. 
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Observations and training sessions are the breeding ground of 
new categories for assessment. One can only assess what one has become 
aware of. The triangle tasks, whilst assessed primarily in terms of 
pass/fail and eventually of transfer, could be regarded in a more 
detailed way. There is evidence of increasing spatial awareness and 
of the inter-relation of items. Though in many instances this does 
necessarily lead to the solution, it heralds a quite different approach 
by the subject to the process of solving the problem. This development 
may, at this point be 'context specific' - and any training improvement 
might be tied to this particular problem (a matter of'dcalage'), however 
an understanding of the inter-relations of things in time and space is 
generally to be applied to all problems and events. What is required for 
the future if Piagetian thinking is to lead to some systematic assessment 
of intelligence/creativity, is the establishment of detailed explanatory 
categories with clear criteria, and perhaps, a factorial examination of 
such categories in relation to one another. This present research is a 
springboard to this. It attempted to re-define creative behaviour and 
then to assess what was defined. 
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CONCLUSION  
The most fundamental problems of the researcher into creativity 
are well encapsulated in Poole's phrase (1972) - 'a crisis of conceptuality'. 
In his discussion of methodologies and their implications, and paraphrasing 
Kuhn, Poole says: 
"'Normal science' 	 goes on 'puzzle-solving' at a low 
theoretical pressure until it reaches some problem it 
cannot solve under the aegis of its paradigm, there is a 
crisis of conceptuality, and this is when 'revolutionary 
science' is born." 
Like the creative thinker, the researcher into creativity has to be 
'revolutionary'. He has to study what is not yet known, classify what 
has yet to be classified with yet-to-be constructed categories. Research 
itself might well be looked at in terms of the construction and re-construc-
tion of reality for in this sense the researcher truly creates the problems 
(Goffman, 1966). Indeed the very research process could be explained in 
terms of the principles of creativity as here proposed - namely, re-
apprehension and re-definition of reality leading to new constructions and 
knowing. 
In an area such as creativity, that is still open to definition and 
more adequate theorising, research tension stems from the need, on the 
one hand, of an adequate theory as opposed to fragmented explanations and 
comments, and the desire, on the other hand, to be free from the deter-
minism of known patterns. Kuhn (1973) makes the point that; 
"In the absence of a paradigm... all of the facts that could 
possibly pertain to the development of a given science are 
likiy to seem equally relevant. As a result, early fact-
gathering is a far more nearly random activity than the one 
that subsequent scientific development makes familiar." 
Poole, R. (1972) Towards Deep Subjectivity. 
	
P.48 
Goffman, E. (1966) Stigma. 
Kuhn, T.S. (1973) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Vol 11, No 2, P.15. 
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The researcher into creativity has a yet deeper problem, for he may 
not wish to be concerned with facts, and still less with known facts. 
Definitions and methodologies are closely inter-related. 
In his criticism of what might be termed 'over-empiricism', 
Poole (ibid) makes the point that objectivity: 
"... selects what it intends to consider very carefully. It 
selects those parts of a problem which are either quantifiable 
or empirically governable or both." 
It is a pity that defence of one level of analysis often leads to 
rejection of another. Whilst reductionism is not to be encouraged, 
each level of analysis can be seen to serve very different intentions. 
There is a place for focus on 'objectivity' in interpretation of 
reality as there is a place for more phenomenologically based meaning. 
Whatever their position on this continuum, all researchers are limited 
by their initial conceptions and could be re-powered by a 'crisis of 
conceptuality'. Poole himself, who proposes a method of 'subjective 
reflection' in an attempt to come to terms with the complexities of 
reality, is subject to this same limitation. 
A 'crisis of conceptuality' could have subsequent implications 
for actual research methodology. Hudson (1966) believes that some 
innovation is needed here: 
"After an initial period of innovation and experiment, 
progress slackened. 	 Instead of developing more subtle 
tests, psychologists concentrated on the analysis of 
results culled from tests they already possessed." 
Poole, R. (1972) Ibid. 
Hudson, L. (1966) Contrary Imaginations. 
 P 
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Unless definitions and methodologies continue to interact, there will 
be the problem of forcing new conceptions into old methodological 
wine—skins. 	 Such new conceptions could weaken 'methodological 
set'. 
As already suggested, re—constructions of reality — or crises of 
conceptuality — cannot be ordered to time. 	 It is likely, therefore, 
that much research into creativity will proceed step—by—step, with 
gradually increased understanding leading to different constructions 
of the problem in hand. As explained, re—apprehension can come about 
at any stage in the process of potentially creative behaviour, and 
research might well be seen as such a process. 
Mary Hesse (1972) proposes a model of research which regards 
the process in terms of feedback. 	 Citing Habermas, and arguing 
that the model can be equally well applied to 'human sciences', she 
says: 
"Habermas makes frequent use of the concepts of success— 
ful prediction, feedback and self—correction. 	 In effect 
this is to appeal to a model of natural science as a 
learning machine. 	 It is not difficult to incorporate 
most of the features of natural science as at present 
understood into such a model. The presence of feedback 
loops in a learning machine allows for the circular self—
correction of theory by experience and experience by theory 
that is demanded by interpretation of science as theory 
laden." 
Hesse, M. (1972) "In defence of objectivity", read 4 Oct. Proceedings  
of the Brit. Acad. (1973). 
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Research, like the creative process, is about construction and 
re—construction of reality. It can probe these constructions from 
different angles and at different levels of analysis. Man is an 
everyday researcher, and research might best be explained as the 
development of knowledge. The notion of development should be 
stressed, for as the knowledge of the individual can be charac—
terised by a series of hierarchical stages, so too the knowledge of 
the researcher moves from pre—operational intuitions to more 
operationally governed activities and reflections. 
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX I 
Further details on the pre-pilot work 
for Part 1. 
489. 
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Pre-Pilot Tasks for Part 1 of Research  
12 subjects - 6 boys and 6 girls, representing the age groups, were 
finally studied. 
Cards employed (adapted from Hermina Sinclair, 1973) 
a) Discontinuous units of equal length (matchsticks). 
/vv 
 
  
1. 
 
2. 
3. 	 4. 
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5. 
6. 7. 
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b) 	 Discontinuous units of unequal length. 
8. 
awnIndn 	 ndb 
9. 
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The following is a transcript of part of a session with an eight 
year old subject (girl), using the cards just illustrated: 
Card 1 
(1. Are these two lines the same? 
"No, because that one's straight and that not." 
"The straight one's longer than the other. You can see the difference." 
Q. Can you show me the difference? 
"Well, if you had another there, then they would be the same length." 
Card 2 
Q. Not the same. 
"The straight one again is longer, and there is a different shape." 
Q. And the straight one is the longer one? 
"Yes." 
Q. Which one goes the further? 
"The straight one." 
Q. Which would be the quicker road to walk along? 
"I would say the longest one, because you don't have to keep turning 
too much." 
(Experimenting with matches prior to Card 3) 
(Builds roads with matches, same length, but different shapes) 
"Not the same length." 
Q. Have they both got the same number of matches in? 
"Yes." 
Q. If you flattened that road out, would it be the same length(as the 
other road)? 
"Yes." 
Q. If we changed the shape of this straight road, would it be the same length' 
"No, it would be shorter (Uncertain)" 
Q. If we had the same number of matches, would the roads be the same length? 
"Yes, the problem is they don't come to the same length." 
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Card 3  
(Indicates number 1 as longest road) 
"Because it's straight." 
Q. Which has got the most road in it? 
(Indicates the zig-zag (No.4) as having "more road in it", but insists 
it is shorter than No.1.) 
(Is asked to build these roads.) 
"Straight one is longer." 
"Bottom one has more road in it (sees it has more matches)," 
Card 4 (Builds two roads in the two squares.) 
Q. Are these two roads the same length? 
"Nopbottom one is the longest, because it's got more pines of road." 
Card 5  
"The straight road is the longest road, because it just goes further along.' 
Q. Which road has got the most road in? (seems to be aware of number of 
(units but insists that length 
"The bottom one, it's got six." 
OJI related to straightness and 
Q. Which is the quickest road? 
"going further", etc. 
"The straight one, because you don't have to turn too much." 
Q. If you flattened these roads out, which would be the longer road? 
"The bottom one (quite sure of this)". 
Card 6  
Q. What's the same about these two lines, Angela? 
"It's got the same amount. (counts them, sees her error) No, it's 
just that they start at the same time and end at the same time." 
Q. Has one got more road in than the other? 
"Yes, this (zig-zag) has more road." 
Q. Are they both the same length? 
"Yes... because they start at the same time and end at the same time." 
Q. Has this got less road in it than this one (straight v. zig-zag)? 
"(Answers correctly) Yes, because it's only got four pieces" 
Q. If you flattened them out, which would be the longer road? 
"The one with fivn In." 
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Card 1, 
Q. What's the same about these two lines? 
"They're both the same shape but they're not both the same amount." 
(Counts, realises her error) "They're both the same amount, but they 
start together at the top, but they don't end together." 
Q. Are they both the same length? 
"no, because that's shorter than the other one." 
Q. Have they both got the same amount of road in? 
"Yes (quite sure of this)." 
Q. If you stretched them both out would they both be the same length? 
"Yes (quite certain)" 
Q. What do you mean when you say something is the same length, Angela? 
"They start together and they end together." 
Card 8 
"The green straw is longer." 
Q. Have they both got the same number of pieces in? 
"Yes..." 
Q. Why is the blue one shorter even though they've both got three? 
"You've cut the blue one a bit shorter." 
(Asked to make two roads of same length, with blue and green sticks.) 
Counts five sticks in green. Knows she will need more blue sticks • 
"because if I only; use five blue ones it won't be as long." 
Card 9  
Q. Are these two lines the same? 
"Yes, because you put more in than you did that one." 
Q. Why are they the same length...? 
"Liecause you started them at the same time and you ended them at the 
same way .w 
495. 
c) 	 Discontinuous units (string) 
1. 	 2. 
3. 4. 
The above cards (6u x 6") were used in the same way - i.e. to 
examine concepts of length, conservation of length, and grasp 
of 'changes in appearance. 
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The following questions were put to subjects in this pre—pilot work  
— in conjunction with the cards just described: 
Continuous units (string) 
Card 1 
Whichis the longer line here? Why? 
Which has more string in it? 
If this line were stretched out which would be the longer? How do you know? 
(Give child experience with string as needed) 
Card 2 
Which is the longer road here? 
Which has got the most road in it? 
If they were both stretched out which would be the longer? 
Which is the quickest road to the house? 
Which road goes further? 
Card 
Which is the longer road on this card? Why? 
Which is the quicker road? 
Which road has more road in it? 
If the curved road were stretched out, which would be the longer? 
Which road goes the furthest? 
Card 4  
Which is the longer road here? 
Which is the quicker road? Why? 
Which road has more road in it? 
If the road were stretched out, which would be the longer? Why? 
Which road goes the furthest? 
APPENDIX II 
Further details on pre-pilot work 
for Part 2. 
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Pre-Pilot Work for Part 2 of the Research  
6 subjects in all - 3 in 7-8 years range, 3 in the 9-•10 years range. 
An Individual Training Session on a Re-construction Task: 
Subject: Boy aged 7:6 (illustration over page) 
The child was presented with the card showing the block of flats - 5 floors, 
4 windows on each, the ground floor having round windows. 
He was asked: How could you make this look different? You are not 
allowed to add things and you must use everything shown here. 
S. "Can you just change these round and put them in a different place?" 
E. Yes. 
S. "Oh, then it's easy, you just do this." 
He then counted the number of squares, drew the outline of the flat, filled 
in the circles then the remaining squares. 
He was then asked: Could you make this building (see card) into two 
buildings, each building being different from the other? 
S. "You could just cut it in half down the middle like this?" 
E. Yes, and how would you make them look different? 
S. "You could put the windows in different places like this." 
He simply placed the round windows on a different floor in each building, 
using two round ones for each. 
Next he was asked: This time I would like you to make the building into 
two buildings again, but this time I would like you to have a different 
number of windows in each one. (continued on Page 500) 
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First correct attempt to make the building look different. Filled 
in the 4 circles and a few squares then pointed out that all the rest 
would just be square windows. 
First correct attempt to make two buildings out of one. The subject 
asked if it were necessary to separate the two buildings. He pointed 
out the different positions of the round windows in each block and 
said all the rest would be square windows and that there was no need 
to fill them in. 
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S. "I don't know what you mean." 
E. Well, supposing you made this building into two, and you used six 
of the blocks for one of the buildings, how many blocks would you have 
to use for the second building? 
The subject was clearly confused, yet he subtracted well. It was felt 
that the problem was being put in a manner which hindered his perception 
of it. A main difficulty was that he had not as yet realised that the 
building could be perceived as 'units' - blocks. He still adhered to the 
rectangular outline. He had divided the building in Task 1 to a way which 
avoided a fundamental grasp of its structure. 
The following method was then employed: 
Now, here you have 9 blocks with the 
windows in. Build a building with 
them and cross them off as you use 
them. (An uneven number was chosen 
deliberately.) 
S. "Oh, this is good because you don't 
get caught out if you have one left over 
at the end. 
(A reference to the problem of adhering to a rectangular outline as he 
had done previously.) 
Once he realised that this approach was possible, he was well able to con-
struct buildings of different shapes so long as he defined the shape as 
he went along, i.e. not in advance. Initially, he had not perceived the 
building as individual units. 
The early problem was put again: 
First it was put as 9 blocks — and he 
was asked to make 2 buildings with a 
different number in each. 
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Next he was asked to make two buildings from the card. This time he 
could do it. 
Comments: 
With this particular child, an introduction to another way of defining 
the building was important. It increased the possibilities of re—construct—
ing the block of flats and the ways of doing so. From his comments it was 
clear that he understood some of the advantages of the approach. Some 
training can contribute to some advances therefore. However, whilst he 
was ahead of his age group in his ability to see some of the possibilities 
of perceiving the building as a number of separate units, he exhibited 
certain limitations in his use of them. He was unable to anticipate the 
final shape and his thapes lacked organisation or formation and were 
generally units put together with the gaps occurring as they occurred and 
not through planning. In other words, whilst the presentation of a new 
way of perceiving the problem was important to him and to further re—
constructions, further step by step training would be needed in an attempt 
to present him with further organisational possibilities. Further, it 
would seem that the training would have to be suited to his own particular 
case, his own advances and interpretations, and could not therefore be a 
scheme for a group of subjects. 
APPENDIX III 
Detailed Subject Profiles 
(Part 1 of Research) 
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13 
7 
3 
2 
3 
9 
7 
* scores for 6 year olds not included. too difficult. 
Re-Construction 
(2) 	 7/ / organised response. 
.1,'; partly organised. 
NKr I 
vt ia c ui\ disorcanised. 
1,i'' correct figural 
definition. 
ilta.7 2. 
1 of stimulus. 
constructive use 
0 0 0 0 1 4 5 
0 2 6 7 9 7 6 
12 10 6 5 2 1 1 
0 2 4 6 8 10 11 
0 1 2' 3 5 6 
6 
6 
0 
11 
. Subject Profile. 	 Age. 6 years. 
er passed on that item. let. 6 Ss..= Girls. 
No. Age. 	 Elab. .Free 	 Ident. 
Prob. Recog. 
Ident. 	 Wh.Wd. 
Reconstraappen? 
(1) 
Re-Class. 	 Ident. 
Re-Conat. 
(2) 
1.  6.8. 
2.  6.7 
3.  6.7. 
•• 4.  6.5. 
5.  6.9 
6.  6.2 
7.  6.8 
8.  6.7 
9.  6.8 
10.  6.10 
11.  6.4 
12.  6.5. 
0 0 1 
ISO 
Age 7 years. 
13.  7.7. , 
14.  7.6. 
15.  7.6 
16.  7.5 
17.  7.6. 
18 7.4 
19.  7.6. 
20.  7.8. 
21.  7.9. 
22.  7.7. 
23.  7.8. 
24.  7.4. 
0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 1 
No. Age. Blabs Free 
Prob. 
Ident. 
Recog. 
Ident. 
Recon. (1) 
Wh.Wd. 
Happen? 
Re-Claes. Ident. 
(2) 
25 8.5 
26 8.7 
27 8.2 
28 8.11 
29 8.1 
30 8.8 
31 8.6 
32 8.8 
33 8.10 
34 8.8 
35 8.10 
36 8.5. 
1 0 3 2 2 1 2 
9 _years. 
37. 9.10 + + + + 
38 9.11 
39 9.8 
40 9.5 + + + + 
41 9.2 
42 9.3 + 
43 9.8 + + + 
44 9.1 
45 9.2 + 
46 9.3 
47 9.6 + + 	 , + + + + + 
48 9.4 + 
1 	 3. 
10 Bare. 
No. Age. nab. Free 
Prob. 
Ident. 
Recog. 
Ident. 
Recon. 
(1) 
Wh.Wd. 
Happen? 
Re-Claee. Ident. 
Re-Con. 
(2) 
49 10.6 
50 10.6 
51 10.8' 
52 10.7 
53 10.7 
54 10.4 
55 10.9 + + + 
56 10.5 + + 
57 10.6 + + + 
58 10.8 + + 
59 10.2 + 
60 10.4 + 
4 4 6 3 6 2 5 
11 yeare. 
61 11.0 + + + + + + 
62 11.2 + + + + + 
63 11.3 + 
64 11.8 
65 11.4 
66 11.8 + 
67 11.7 + + + 
68 11.6 + + 
69 11.0 + + 
70 11.6 + + + 
71 11.5 + + + 
72 11.6 + + 
6 
No. Age. nab. Tree 
Prob. 
Ident. 
Recog. 
Ident. 
Recon. 
(1) 
Wh.Wd. 
Happen? 
Re-Claee. Ident. 
Recon. 
(2) 
73  
74 
75 
76 
12.6 
12.4 
12.8 . 
12.10 
+ 
4. 
+ 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
77 12.8 + + + + + 
78 12.2 
79 12.4 + 
80 12.10 + + + + 
81 12.2 + + +• + + + 
82 12.8 + 
83 12.6 + + 
84 12.5 + + + + 
6 8 8 5 10 6 5 
13 years. 
85 13.2 + + + + + + + 
86 13.10 + + + + + 
87 13.6 + + + 4. 
88 13.8 4. 4, 
89 13.4 + + + 
90. 13.6 + + + + + 
91 13.11 + • + 
92 13.5 + 
93 13.2 + + + + 
94 13.8 + 
95 13.6 + + + 
96 130 4. + + + + 
6 	 9 	 8 	 6 	 9 	 7 
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